Parkinson's disease disrupts the ability to initiate and apply episodic foresight

OBJECTIVE

While Parkinson's disease is associated with impairments in many aspects of prospective cognition, no study to date has tested whether these difficulties extend to problems using episodic foresight to guide future-directed behavior. To provide the first examination of whether people with Parkinson's disease are impaired in their capacity to initiate and apply episodic foresight.

METHOD

People with Parkinson's disease (n = 42), and a demographically matched neurotypical comparison group (n = 42) completed a validated behavioral assessment that met strict criteria for assessing episodic foresight (Virtual Week-Foresight), as well as a broader neurocognitive and clinical test battery.

RESULTS

People with Parkinson's disease were significantly less likely than the comparison group to acquire items that would later allow a problem to be solved and were also less likely to subsequently use these items for problem resolution. These deficits were largely unrelated to performance on other cognitive measures or clinical characteristics of the disorder.

CONCLUSIONS

The ability to engage in episodic foresight in an adaptive way is compromised in Parkinson's disease. This appears to be a stable feature of the disorder, and one that is distinct from other clinical symptoms and neurocognitive deficits. It is now critical to establish exactly why these difficulties exist and how they impact on real-life functional capacity.

Episodic foresight is impaired following acute alcohol intoxication

BACKGROUND

Alcohol intoxication disrupts many aspects of cognition, including the generation of phenomenological characteristics of future events (a component of episodic foresight), and the execution of directed preparatory behaviours (a component of prospective memory). However, no study has tested whether alcohol intoxication is also associated with deficits engaging episodic foresight to guide future-directed behaviour.

AIMS

This study was designed to provide the first test of how alcohol intoxication influences the functional application of episodic foresight. The secondary aim was to establish the degree to which any observed episodic foresight difficulties associated with alcohol use might reflect broader problems in retrospective memory and executive control. Sex differences were also examined.

METHODS

Healthy adult social drinkers randomly received either a moderate dose of 0.6 g/kg alcohol (n = 61) or a matched placebo drink (n = 63) and then completed a validated measure that met strict criteria for assessing the functional application of episodic foresight as well as a broader cognitive test battery.

RESULTS

Relative to the placebo condition, episodic foresight was impaired by acute alcohol consumption, with this impairment related to poorer retrospective memory, but not executive control. The negative effects of alcohol intoxication on episodic foresight did not differ as a function of sex.

CONCLUSIONS

Even a moderate level of intoxication impairs the ability to use episodic foresight in a functionally adaptive way. These findings have implications for understanding many of the maladaptive behaviours that are often associated with acute alcohol use.

The effect of episodic future simulation and motivation on young children's induced-state episodic foresight

Future simulation and motivation are two strategies that might help children improve their induced-state episodic foresight. In Study 1, 3- to 5-year-old children (N = 96) consumed pretzels (to induce thirst) and were asked what they would prefer the next day, pretzels or water. Children were randomly assigned to an experimental condition: (1) a standard thirsty condition, (2) an episodic simulation condition where they imagined being hungry the next day, (3) a motivation condition where children chose between a cupcake and water, or (4) a control condition (thirst was not induced). Future preferences did not differ by age and children were less likely to choose water (vs. a cupcake) in the motivation condition compared to the standard thirsty condition. Study 2 found that 3- to 5-year-old children (N = 22) were also less likely to choose water for right now versus a cupcake when thirst was induced.

"What Should You Bring with You to This Place?": Examining Children's Episodic Foresight Using Open-Ended Questions

Children's episodic foresight, the ability to mentally project oneself into the future to pre-experience an event (e.g., Atance & O'Neill, 2005), begins to emerge early in the preschool years. Results from the Picture-book task (Atance & Meltzoff, 2005) have shown that children are generally capable of selecting an item needed in the future (from provided options), but young preschoolers have difficulty justifying their choice with future-oriented explanations. Because episodic foresight has typically been measured using forced-choice questions (such as the Picture-book task) less is known about children's more naturalistic and "open-ended" future thinking (i.e., more spontaneous forms of episodic foresight). Forty-eight 3-to 5-year-olds completed a new, open-ended version of the Picture-book task. Using a descriptive approach, we found that children were able to generate an appropriate item to bring with them to a future location, and that this ability improved with age. Temporal focus as well as internal (episodic) and external (semantic) details were explored in the context of children's explanations. Children's explanations were mostly present-oriented and included episodic and semantic details equally. Our findings extend our knowledge of children's episodic foresight by highlighting children's ability to solve future-oriented problems in an open-ended manner.

I Can See Clearly Now: Episodic Future Thinking and Imaginability in Perceptions of Climate-Related Risk Events

Climate change is statistical, abstract and difficult to comprehend directly. Imagining a specific, personal episode where you experience consequences of climate change in the future (episodic future thinking) may bring climate change closer, thus increasing the perceived risk of climate-related risk events. We conducted an experiment to test whether episodic future thinking increased the perceived risk of climate-related risk events and climate change in general, as compared to thinking about the future in a general, abstract manner (semantic future thinking). We also tested whether this effect is moderated by how easy it is to imagine the specific climate-related risk event initially. Participants were randomly assigned to an episodic future thinking-condition or a semantic future thinking-condition, and two of the risk events in each condition were related to flooding (difficult to imagine) and two were related to extreme temperature (easy to imagine). The results show no main effect of episodic future thinking on perceived risk, and no interaction effect with imaginability. Contrary to expectations and earlier research, this suggests that episodic future thinking may not influence risk perception.

Manipulating the Valence of Future Thought: The Effect on Affect

Imagining personal future events is associated with well-being, but the nature and direction of this relationship are unclear. This study investigated whether imagining episodic future scenarios, experimentally manipulated for valence, have an immediate impact on affect. University students (N = 197) completed a 2 × 3 between-subject online study in which they imagined four personal events likely to occur in the future. Participants were directed to imagine positive or negative events or were undirected as to valence to additionally assess the valence and effect of self-directed imagined scenarios. Participants in all three conditions reported a change in positive affect immediately after the task, with both positive and nondirected thinking improving positive affect and negative future thoughts reducing it. However, negative affect only shifted in response to negative future thinking but not the other conditions. These findings demonstrate that there is an immediate causal effect of episodic future thinking on affect but only in specific directions and that this differs from the patterns shown in longer term measurements. The findings also suggest when self-directed that imagined future thoughts tend to mirror the valence and causal effect of positively induced thoughts. This study has implications for the ongoing debate around future thinking and well-being.

A Terrible Future: Episodic Future Thinking and the Perceived Risk of Terrorism

Terrorism is a salient risk source in 21st century life and may deter tourists from visiting certain destinations. How people perceive the risk of a future terror attack abroad, and thus their traveling decisions, may be influenced by whether they think about the future in specific and personal terms (episodic future thinking) or in more general, abstract terms (semantic future thinking). In a pre-registered experiment (N = 277) we explored the potential impact of episodic future thinking on the perceived risk of terror attacks abroad. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: (1) An episodic future thinking-condition, where participants were asked to imagine a specific, terror-related personal episode that might occur in the future while traveling abroad; (2) a semantic future thinking-condition, where participants were asked to think more abstractly about terror events that might occur in the future; (3) an episodic counterfactual thinking-condition, where participants were asked to imagine a specific, terror-related personal episode that might have occurred in the past while traveling abroad and (4) a passive control condition. Participants indicated their perceived risk of six different future terror attacks occurring abroad. The manipulation checks suggest that the experimental manipulations functioned as intended. Contrary to the central hypothesis of the study, there were no differences in the perceived risk of terror attacks between the conditions. These results run counter to previous research and do not support the idea that how people think about the future influences their perceived risk of future dramatic events. Potential limitations and implications are discussed.

The Functions of Prospection - Variations in Health and Disease

Much of human life revolves around anticipating and planning for the future. It has become increasingly clear that this capacity for prospective cognition is a core adaptive function of the mind. Here, we review the role of prospection in two key functional domains: goal-directed behavior and flexible decision-making. We then survey and categorize variations in prospection, with a particular focus on functional impact in clinical psychological conditions and neurological disorders. Finally, we suggest avenues for future research into the functions of prospection and the manner in which these functions can shift toward maladaptive outcomes. In doing so, we consider the conceptualization and measurement of prospection, as well as novel approaches to its augmentation in healthy people and managing its alterations in a clinical context.

Preparatory responses to socially determined, mutually exclusive possibilities in chimpanzees and children

The capacity to imagine and prepare for alternative future possibilities is central to human cognition. Recent research suggests that between age 2 and 4 children gradually begin to demonstrate a capacity to prepare for two simple, mutually exclusive alternatives of an immediate future event. When children were given the opportunity to catch a target an experimenter dropped into an inverted Y-shaped tube, 2-year olds-as well as great apes-tended to cover only one of the exits, whereas 4-year-olds spontaneously and consistently prepared for both possible outcomes. Here we gave children, age 2 to 4 years, and chimpanzees a different opportunity to demonstrate potential competence. Given that social behaviour is particularly full of uncertainty, we developed a version of the task where the outcome was still unpredictable yet obviously controlled by an experimenter. Participants could ensure they would catch the target by simply covering two tube exits. While 4-year-olds demonstrated competence, chimpanzees and the younger children instead tended to cover only one exit. These results substantiate the conclusion that the capacity for simultaneous preparation for mutually exclusive event outcomes develops relatively late in children and they are also in line with the possibility that our close animal relatives lack this capacity.

"What" and "where" was when? Memory for the temporal order of episodic events in children

In the past, researchers have shown that the individual components of episodic memory (i.e "what," "where," and "when") may emerge at different points in development. Specifically, while children as young as three can accurately report the "what" and "where" of an event, they struggle to accurately report when the event occurred. One explanation for children's difficulty in reporting when an event took place is a rudimentary understanding, and ability to use, temporal terms. In the current experiment, we employed a physical timeline to aid children's reporting of the order in which a series of episodic events occurred. Overall, while 4-, 5-, and 6-year olds performed above chance, 3-year olds did not. Our findings suggest that 3-year olds' limited ability to produce temporal terms may not be the rate-limiting step preventing them from identifying when events occurred in their recent past.

Episodic foresight beyond the very next event in 3- and 4-year-old children

Testing episodic foresight in children generally involves presenting them with a problem in one location (e.g., Room A) and, after a spending a delay in a different location, telling them they will be returning to Room A. Before they go, children are presented with a number of items, one of which will allow them to solve the problem in Room A. At around 3 to 4 years of age children display episodic foresight, selecting the item that will allow them to solve the problem. To date, however, no study has assessed whether 3- and 4-year-old children can plan beyond the very next event, selecting the correct item when there is a delay before returning to Room A. Here, we show that 3- and 4-year-old children can pass when a delay is imposed but that their performance is significantly worse than when they are planning for an immediate event.

Children's and Apes' Preparatory Responses to Two Mutually Exclusive Possibilities

Animal brains have evolved to predict outcomes of events in the immediate environment [1-5]. Adult humans are particularly adept at dealing with environmental uncertainty, being able to mentally represent multiple, even mutually exclusive versions of the future and prepare accordingly. This capacity is fundamental to many complex future-oriented behaviors [6, 7], yet little is known about when it develops in children [8] and whether it is shared with non-human animals [9]. Here we show that children become able to insightfully prepare for two mutually exclusive versions of an undetermined future event during the middle preschool years, whereas we find no evidence for such a capacity in a sample of chimpanzees and orangutans. We gave 90 preschool children and 8 great apes the opportunity to catch an item dropped into a forked tube with two bottom openings. Children's performance improved linearly across age groups (2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, and 4 years), with none of the youngest group but most of the oldest group spontaneously covering both openings the first time they prepared to catch the item. The apes performed like 2-year-olds on the first trial, with none of them covering both openings. Some apes and 2-year-olds eventually passed the task, but only in a manner consistent with trial-and-error learning. Our results reveal the developmental trajectory of a critical cognitive ability that allows humans to prepare for future uncertainty, and they also raise the possibility that this ability is not shared with other hominids.

Recognition memory and source memory in autism spectrum disorder: A study of the intention superiority and enactment effects

It is well established that neurotypical individuals generally show better memory for actions they have performed than actions they have observed others perform or merely read about, a so-called 'enactment effect'. Strikingly, research has also shown that neurotypical individuals demonstrate superior memory for actions they intend to perform in the future (but have not yet performed), an effect commonly known as the 'intention superiority effect'. Although the enactment effect has been studied among people with autism spectrum disorder, this study is the first to investigate the intention superiority effect in this disorder. This is surprising given the potential importance this issue has for general theory development, as well as for clinical practice. As such, this study aimed to assess the intention superiority and enactment effects in 22 children with autism spectrum disorder, and 20 intelligence quotient/age-matched neurotypical children. The results showed that children with autism spectrum disorder demonstrated not only undiminished enactment effects in recognition and source memory, but also (surprisingly for some theories) typical intention superiority effects. The implications of these results for theory, as well as clinical practice, are discussed.

Deconstructing the nature of episodic foresight deficits associated with chronic opiate use

OBJECTIVES

Episodic foresight refers to the capacity to mentally travel forward in time and has been linked to a wide variety of important functional behaviours. Evidence has recently emerged that chronic opiate use is associated with deficits in this critical capacity and that these difficulties are not simply a secondary consequence of broader cognitive dysfunction. The current study aimed to better understand the circumstances in which chronic opiate users might be expected to have problems with episodic foresight, by addressing whether deficits reflect compromised scene construction, self-projection, or narrative ability.

METHODS

Thirty-five chronic opiate users and 35 demographically matched controls completed an imagination task in which they were instructed to imagine and provide descriptions of an atemporal event, a plausible, self-relevant future event, as well as complete a narrative task. These three imagination conditions systematically varied in their demands on scene construction, self-projection, and narrative ability.

RESULTS

Consistent with prior literature, chronic opiate users exhibited reduced capacity for episodic foresight relative to controls. However, this study was the first to show that these difficulties were independent of capacity for scene construction and narration. Instead, a specific impairment in self-projection into the future appears to contribute to the problems with episodic foresight seen in this clinical group.

CONCLUSIONS

Deficits in self-projection into the future may have important implications in therapeutic environments given that many relapse prevention strategies rely heavily on the ability to project oneself into an unfamiliar future, free of problem substance use.

PRACTITIONER POINTS

A reduced capacity for episodic foresight highlights the importance of refining current relapse prevention protocols that place significant demands for mental time travel into the future. Psychosocial treatments should focus on the attainment of more immediate or short-term goals. It is difficult to delineate the effects of specific substances given long-standing drug use history common to chronic opiate users. Conclusions relating to neurological functioning are speculative given the absence of neuroimaging data.

The future of future-oriented cognition in non-humans: theory and the empirical case of the great apes

One of the most contested areas in the field of animal cognition is non-human future-oriented cognition. We critically examine key underlying assumptions in the debate, which is mainly preoccupied with certain dichotomous positions, the most prevalent being whether or not 'real' future orientation is uniquely human. We argue that future orientation is a theoretical construct threatening to lead research astray. Cognitive operations occur in the present moment and can be influenced only by prior causation and the environment, at the same time that most appear directed towards future outcomes. Regarding the current debate, future orientation becomes a question of where on various continua cognition becomes 'truly' future-oriented. We question both the assumption that episodic cognition is the most important process in future-oriented cognition and the assumption that future-oriented cognition is uniquely human. We review the studies on future-oriented cognition in the great apes to find little doubt that our closest relatives possess such ability. We conclude by urging that future-oriented cognition not be viewed as expression of some select set of skills. Instead, research into future-oriented cognition should be approached more like research into social and physical cognition.

Depression and prospection

OBJECTIVES

Prospection, the mental representation of possible futures, is usually adaptive. When it goes awry, however, it disrupts emotion and motivation. A negative view of the future is typically seen as one symptom of depression, but we suggest that such negative prospection is the core causal element of depression. Here, we describe the empirical evidence supporting this framework, and we explore the implications for clinical interventions.

METHODS

We integrate several literatures: Using the database PsycInfo, we retrieved empirical studies with the keywords prospection, prediction, expectation, pessimism, mental simulation, future-thinking, future-directed thinking, foresight, and/or mental time travel, in conjunction with depression, depressed, or depressive.

RESULTS

Three kinds of faulty prospection, taken together, could drive depression: Poor generation of possible futures, poor evaluation of possible futures, and negative beliefs about the future. Depressed mood and poor functioning, in turn, may maintain faulty prospection and feed a vicious cycle. Future-oriented treatment strategies drawn from cognitive-behavioural therapy help to fix poor prospection, and they deserve to be developed further.

CONCLUSIONS

Prospection-based techniques may lead to transdiagnostic treatment strategies for depression and other disorders.

I want it all and I want it now: Delay of gratification in preschool children

On the delay-of-gratification choice paradigm, 4-year-olds typically choose the larger, delayed reward, exhibiting delay of gratification, whereas 3-year-olds typically choose the small, immediate reward. Despite this highly replicated finding, the cognitive mechanism(s) underlying 3-year-olds' failure on the choice paradigm remain unclear. Recently, several researchers have proposed the involvement of the "hot" affective system and the "cool" cognitive system in pre-schoolers' performance on the choice paradigm. Using this "hot" and "cool" systems framework, we tested 112 3- and 4-year-olds on a modified choice paradigm that was designed to help young children better utilize their "cool" system, allowing them to make more mindful and future-oriented decisions. In the modified paradigm, 3-year-olds made choices consistent with those of 4-year-olds, exhibiting delay of gratification. These findings have important implications for previous theoretical accounts of 3-year-old children's failure to delay gratification. Additionally, they highlight the critical role that the method plays in young children's performance on cognitive paradigms.

A spoon full of studies helps the comparison go down: a comparative analysis of Tulving's spoon test

Mental time travel refers to the ability to cast one’s mind back in time to re-experience a past event and forward in time to pre-experience events that may occur in the future. Tulving (2005), an authority on mental time travel, holds that this ability is unique to humans. Anticipating that comparative psychologists would challenge this claim, Tulving (2005) proposed his spoon test, a test specifically designed to assess whether non-human animals are capable of mental time travel. A number of studies have now employed the spoon test to assess mental time travel in non-human animals. Here, we review the evidence for mental time travel in primates. To provide a benchmark, we also review studies that have employed the spoon test with preschool children. The review demonstrates that if we compare the performance of great apes to that of preschool children, and hold them to the same criteria, the data suggest mental travel is present but not ubiquitous in great apes.

How do episodic and semantic memory contribute to episodic foresight in young children?

Humans are able to transcend the present and mentally travel to another time, place, or perspective. Mentally projecting ourselves backwards (i.e., episodic memory) or forwards (i.e., episodic foresight) in time are crucial characteristics of the human memory system. Indeed, over the past few years, episodic memory has been argued to be involved both in our capacity to retrieve our personal past experiences and in our ability to imagine and foresee future scenarios. However, recent theory and findings suggest that semantic memory also plays a significant role in imagining future scenarios. We draw on Tulving’s definition of episodic and semantic memory to provide a critical analysis of their role in episodic foresight tasks described in the developmental literature. We conclude by suggesting future directions of research that could further our understanding of how both episodic memory and semantic memory are intimately connected to episodic foresight.

Foresight beyond the very next event: four-year-olds can link past and deferred future episodes

Previous experiments have demonstrated that by 4 years of age children can use information from a past episode to solve a problem for the very next future episode. However, it remained unclear whether 4-year-olds can similarly use such information to solve a problem for a more removed future episode that is not of immediate concern. In the current study we introduced 4-year-olds to problems in one room before taking them to another room and distracting them for 15 min. The children were then offered a choice of items to place into a bucket that was to be taken back to the first room when a 5-min sand-timer had completed a cycle. Across two conceptually distinct domains, the children placed the item that could solve the deferred future problem above chance level. This result demonstrates that by 48 months many children can recall a problem from the past and act in the present to solve that problem for a deferred future episode. We discuss implications for theories about the nature of episodic foresight.