Children's developing notions of (im)partiality

Children recognize and reject favoritism in norm enforcement

The impartial enforcement of norms and laws is a hallmark of fair societies, yet partial, unequal norm enforcement is common, for example as a result of corruption. While children condemn norm violations and value impartiality in resource allocation contexts, children's understanding of unequal norm enforcement is currently underexplored. In three vignette studies, we investigated 4- to 8-year-old's (N = 192) developing recognition and condemnation of unequal norm enforcement, which presupposes a sensitivity to impartiality as a meta-norm. Children evaluated the actions of characters who enforced different norms equally or unequally. From age 5, children disapproved of unequal norm enforcement but approved of unequal treatment when justified (Study 1). Children of all ages accepted a lack of punishment when applied equally to all transgressors, suggesting that their negative evaluations of unequal norm enforcement were specifically guided by the element of partiality and not the desire to see transgressors sanctioned (Study 2). Further, children aged 6 years and older were sensitive to the reasons behind unequal punishment, condemning instances of favoritism while accepting selective leniency due to mitigating circumstances (Study 3). The findings show that, from around 5 to 6 years of age, children condemn unequal sanctions for equal transgressions, thereby demonstrating a deep appreciation of impartiality as a foundational principle of fair norm enforcement.

Children use disagreement to infer what happened

In a rapidly changing and diverse world, the ability to reason about conflicting perspectives is critical for effective communication, collaboration, and critical thinking. The current pre-registered experiments with children ages 7 to 11 years investigated the developmental foundations of this ability through a novel social reasoning paradigm and a computational approach. In the inference task, children were asked to figure out what happened based on whether two speakers agreed or disagreed in their interpretation. In the prediction task, children were provided information about what happened and asked to predict whether two speakers will agree or disagree. Together, these experiments assessed children's understanding that disagreement often results from ambiguity about what happened, and that ambiguity about what happened is often predictive of disagreement. Experiment 1 (N = 52) showed that children are more likely to infer that an ambiguous utterance occurred after learning that people disagreed (versus agreed) about what happened and found that these inferences become stronger with age. Experiment 2 (N = 110) similarly found age-related change in children's inferences and also showed that children could reason in the forward direction, predicting that an ambiguous utterance would lead to disagreement. A computational model indicated that although children's ability to predict when disagreements might arise may be critical for making the reverse inferences, it did not fully account for age-related change.

Lying to recommend unqualified friends: Diverging implications for interpersonal and epistemic trust inferences

When people are asked to recommend individuals they care about, they often grapple with conflicts regarding the level of honesty they should maintain when being truthful could potentially hinder those individuals' chances of receiving beneficial opportunities. In the current study, we examined how adolescents evaluate people based on how they respond to such dilemmas, with a focus on how it affects judgments of interpersonal and epistemic trustworthiness. We tested a sample of high school students in the southwestern United States (N = 78; Mage = 16.45 years), who were asked about a moral dilemma in which a story character needed to decide whether to recommend an unqualified friend. We experimentally manipulated whether the friend was very close to the standard (requiring a small exaggeration) or was far from the standard (requiring a large exaggeration) between participants. Across both exaggeration conditions, we observed a dissociation in judgments of epistemic and interpersonal trustworthiness: Lie-tellers were judged to be more interpersonally trustworthy than epistemically trustworthy, whereas truth-tellers were judged to be more epistemically trustworthy than interpersonally trustworthy. These results show that adolescents are capable of using information about an individual's lie-telling versus truth-telling decisions to make highly nuanced social inferences.

Greasing (small) palms: Early rejection of bribery

We tested when U.S. children reject bribery, and whether their rejections vary by public versus private setting. Six- to 10-year-olds (224 children, 118 boys, 106 girls, majority-White) participated across four experiments, in which participants indicated whether a contest judge should accept a contestant's financial gift. Children conveyed their preferences while in public or in private (in the presence or absence of an adult experimenter). Children's rejections of bribes were found to increase with age. Notably, younger children's acceptance rate was higher when the experimenter was present than in their absence; in contrast, older children showed comparable rejection rates across settings. Limitations in children's early reasoning about bribery, including the reputational and moral implications of accepting bribes in public, are discussed.

The potential for effective reasoning guides children's preference for small group discussion over crowdsourcing

Communication between social learners can make a group collectively "wiser" than any individual, but conformist tendencies can also distort collective judgment. We asked whether intuitions about when communication is likely to improve or distort collective judgment could allow social learners to take advantage of the benefits of communication while minimizing the risks. In three experiments (n = 360), 7- to 10-year old children and adults decided whether to refer a question to a small group for discussion or "crowdsource" independent judgments from individual advisors. For problems affording the kind of 'demonstrative' reasoning that allows a group member to reliably correct errors made by even a majority, all ages preferred to consult the discussion group, even compared to a crowd ten times as large-consistent with past research suggesting that discussion groups regularly outperform even their best members for reasoning problems. In contrast, we observed a consistent developmental shift towards crowdsourcing independent judgments when reasoning by itself was insufficient to conclusively answer a question. Results suggest sophisticated intuitions about the nature of social influence and collective intelligence may guide our social learning strategies from early in development.

Procedural (in)justice in children: Children choose procedures that favor their ingroup

Research has shown that both ingroup bias and concern for procedural justice emerge early in development; however, these concerns can conflict. We investigated whether 6- to 8-year-old children are more influenced by procedural justice versus ingroup favoritism in a resource allocation task. In our first study, children played a novel spinner game in which they chose among fair, ingroup favoring, and outgroup favoring procedures to decide whether a resource would go to an unfamiliar ingroup or outgroup recipient. We found that 6- to 8-year-olds overall chose ingroup favoring procedures. However, this tendency decreased with age; whereas younger children were more likely to select procedures that were advantageous to their ingroup, older children (7- and 8-year-olds) mostly chose fair procedures. Our second study investigated the motivations underpinning children's choices by testing whether children's fair procedure choices were in part driven by a desire to appear fair. Here we varied whether children made procedure choices in public, allowing them to manage their reputation, versus in private, where reputational concerns should not guide their choices. We found that from 6 to 8 years of age children chose ingroup favoring procedures and that this tendency was slightly stronger when choosing in private. Taken together, our research suggests that ingroup favoritism often trumps procedural justice in resource allocation tasks, especially for younger children and especially when reputation is not in play.

What we would (but shouldn't) do for those we love: Universalism versus partiality in responding to others' moral transgressions

Recent work indicates that people are more likely to protect a close (vs. distant) other who commits a crime. But do people think it is morally right to treat close others differently? On the one hand, universalist moral principles dictate that people should be treated equally. On the other hand, close relationships are the source of special moral obligations, which may lead people to believe they ought to preferentially protect close others. Here we attempt to adjudicate between these competing considerations by examining what people think they would and should do when a close (vs. distant) other behaves immorally. Across four experiments (N = 2002), we show that people believe they morally should protect close others more than distant others. However, we also document a striking discrepancy: participants reported that they would protect close others far more than they should protect them. These findings demonstrate that people believe close relationships influence what they morally ought to do-but also that moral decisions about close others may be a context in which people are particularly likely to fail to do what they think is morally right.

Even his friend said he's bad: Children think personal alliances bias gossip

Children learn about other people through gossip. Although gossip can be a valuable and efficient way to learn about others, evaluating gossip's credibility requires understanding when people may be biased, and using this information to update the truth-value placed on the gossip. For instance, people may be motivated to improve their and their friends' reputations (or to worsen their enemies' reputations). Therefore, testimony that cuts against these social motivations may be more credible. Here, in four studies with 3- to 13-year-old children (total N = 860), we examined (1) children's expectations about the type of gossip people were likely to spread about friends versus enemies, and (2) children's ability to discount testimony that is in line with a speaker's social biases (e.g., negative testimony about a friend). We found that children expect speakers to say nice things about their friends, and mean things about their enemies. And, children were less likely to endorse potentially biased testimony, though the strength of their ability to avoid endorsing biased testimony varied based on the domain of testimony. Overall, these studies suggest that children expect a speaker's testimony to be systematically biased based on her relationships. Our results underscore the importance of tracking and using relationships when evaluating testimony, because relationships have immense power for helping us effectively make sense of an ambiguous world.

"Favoring my playmate seems fair": Inhibitory control and theory of mind in preschoolers' self-disadvantaging behaviors

The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between preschoolers' cognitive abilities and their fairness-related allocation behaviors in a dilemma of equity-efficiency conflict. In Experiment 1, 4- to 6-year-olds (N = 99) decided how to allocate five reward bells. In the first-party condition, preschoolers were asked to choose among giving more to self (self-advantageous inequity), wasting one bell (equity), or giving more to other (self-disadvantageous inequity); in the third-party condition, they chose either to allocate the extra bell to one of two equally deserving recipients or to waste it. Results showed that, compared with the pattern of decision in the third-party condition, preschoolers in the first-party condition were more likely to give the extra bell to other (self-disadvantaging behaviors) and that age, inhibitory control (IC), and theory of mind were positively correlated with their self-disadvantaging choices, but only IC mediated the relationship between age and self-disadvantaging behaviors. Experiment 2 (N = 41) showed that IC still predicted preschoolers' self-disadvantaging behaviors when they could choose only between equity and disadvantageous inequity. These results suggested that IC played a critical role in the implementation of self-disadvantaging behaviors when this required the control over selfishness and envy.

Parameterizing developmental changes in epistemic trust

Children rely on others for much of what they learn, and therefore must track who to trust for information. Researchers have debated whether to interpret children's behavior as inferences about informants' knowledgeability only or as inferences about both knowledgeability and intent. We introduce a novel framework for integrating results across heterogeneous ages and methods. The framework allows application of a recent computational model to a set of results that span ages 8 months to adulthood and a variety of methods. The results show strong fits to specific findings in the literature trust, and correctly fails to fit one representative result from an adjacent literature. In the aggregate, the results show a clear development in children's reasoning about informants' intent and no appreciable changes in reasoning about informants' knowledgeability, confirming previous results. The results extend previous findings by modeling development over a much wider age range and identifying and explaining differences across methods.

Perspectives on Perspective Taking: How Children Think About the Minds of Others

Perspective taking, or "theory of mind," involves reasoning about the mental states of others (e.g., their intentions, desires, knowledge, beliefs) and is called upon in virtually every aspect of human interaction. Our goals in writing this chapter were to provide an overview of (a) the research questions developmental psychologists ask to shed light on how children think about the inner workings of the mind, and (b) why such research is invaluable in understanding human nature and our ability to interact with, and learn from, one another. We begin with a brief review of early research in this field that culminated in the so-called litmus test for a theory of mind (i.e., false-belief tasks). Next, we describe research with infants and young children that created a puzzle for many researchers, and briefly mention an intriguing approach researchers have used to attempt to "solve" this puzzle. We then turn to research examining children's understanding of a much broader range of mental states (beyond false beliefs). We briefly discuss the value of studying individual differences by highlighting their important implications for social well-being and ways to improve perspective taking. Next, we review work illustrating the value of capitalizing on children's proclivity for selective social learning to reveal their understanding of others' mental states. We close by highlighting one line of research that we believe will be an especially fruitful avenue for future research and serves to emphasize the complex interplay between our perspective-taking abilities and other cognitive processes.

Developing the Bias Blind Spot: Increasing Skepticism towards Others

Two experiments with eighty-eight 7- to 10-year-olds examined the bias blind spot in children. Both younger and older children rated themselves as less likely than a specific other (Experiment 1) or an average child (Experiment 2) to commit various biases. These self-other differences were also more extreme for biased behaviors than for other behaviors. At times, older children demonstrated stronger self-other differences than younger children, which seemed primarily driven by older children’s judgments about bias in others. These findings suggest that, although the bias blind spot exists as soon as children recognize other-committed biases, what changes over development is how skeptical children are towards others.

The better part of not knowing: Virtuous ignorance

Suppose you are presented with 2 informants who have provided answers to the same question. One provides a precise and confident answer, and the other says that they do not know. If you were asked which of these 2 informants was more of an expert, intuitively you would select the informant who provided the certain answer over the ignorant informant. However, for cases in which precise information is practically or actually unknowable (e.g., the number of leaves on all the trees in the world), certainty and confidence indicate a lack of competence, while expressions of ignorance may indicate greater expertise. In 3 experiments, we investigated whether children and adults are able to use this "virtuous ignorance" as a cue to expertise. Experiment 1 found that adults and children older than 9 years selected confident informants for knowable information and ignorant informants for unknowable information. However, 5-6-year-olds overwhelmingly favored the confident informant, even when such certainty was completely implausible. In Experiment 2 we replicated the results of Experiment 1 with a new set of items focused on predictions about the future, rather than numerical information. In Experiment 3, we demonstrated that 5-8-year-olds and adults are both able to distinguish between knowable and unknowable items when asked how difficult the information would be to acquire, but those same children failed to reject the precise and confident informant for unknowable items. We suggest that children have difficulty integrating information about the knowability of particular facts into their evaluations of expertise. (PsycINFO Database Record

Beyond Sally's missing marble: further development in children's understanding of mind and emotion in middle childhood

Research on the development of theory of mind (ToM), the understanding of people in relation to mental states and emotions, has been a vibrant area of cognitive development research. Because the dominant focus has been addressing when children acquire a ToM, researchers have concentrated their efforts on studying the emergence of psychological understanding during infancy and early childhood. Here, the benchmark test has been the false-belief task, the awareness that the mind can misrepresent reality. While understanding false belief is a critical milestone achieved by the age of 4 or 5, children make further advances in their knowledge about mental states and emotions during middle childhood and beyond. Thus, a comprehensive understanding of children's sociocognitive abilities in older age groups is necessary to understand more fully the course of ToM development. The aim of this review is to outline continued development in ToM during middle childhood. In particular, we focus on children's understanding of interpretation-that different minds can construct different interpretations of the same reality. Additionally, we consider children's growing understanding of how mental states (thoughts, emotions, decisions) derive from personal experiences, cohere across time, and interconnect (e.g., thoughts shape emotions). We close with a discussion of the surprising paucity of studies investigating individual differences in ToM beyond age 6. Our hope is that this chapter will invigorate empirical interest in moving the pendulum toward the opposite research direction-toward exploring strengths, limitations, variability, and persistent errors in developing theories of mind across the life span.

The rise of moral cognition

The field of moral cognition has grown rapidly in recent years thanks in no small part to Cognition. Consistent with its interdisciplinary tradition, Cognition encouraged the growth of this field by supporting empirical research conducted by philosophers as well as research native to neighboring fields such as social psychology, evolutionary game theory, and behavioral economics. This research has been exceptionally diverse both in its content and methodology. I argue that this is because morality is unified at the functional level, but not at the cognitive level, much as vehicles are unified by shared function rather than shared mechanics. Research in moral cognition, then, has progressed by explaining the phenomena that we identify as "moral" (for high-level functional reasons) in terms of diverse cognitive components that are not specific to morality. In light of this, research on moral cognition may continue to flourish, not as the identification and characterization of distinctive moral processes, but as a testing ground for theories of high-level, integrative cognitive function.

Do children trust based on group membership or prior accuracy? The role of novel group membership in children's trust decisions

Two experiments examined how an informant's group membership can influence children's trust decisions. Participants (3- to 7-year-olds, N=162) were assigned to either the red or blue group based on their selection of a red or blue apron and watched an in-group and out-group informant provide conflicting names for a set of novel objects. When asked which informant they would prefer to rely on for new information, nearly all age groups trusted the in-group informant. Children then watched as each informant varied in accuracy by labeling either all or none of four familiar items accurately and were then asked which informant's labels they preferred for learning new information. When the in-group informant had previously demonstrated accuracy, children continued to trust the in-group informant for new information. In contrast, when the in-group informant had previously demonstrated inaccuracy, children were unsure who to trust, with only 6- and 7-year-olds showing a decrease in their trust for the inaccurate in-group informant. These findings demonstrate that group membership can skew how children encode new information and can make children uncertain about whom to trust for information.

Knowing when to doubt: developing a critical stance when learning from others

Children may be biased toward accepting information as true, but the fact remains that children are exposed to misinformation from many sources, and mastering the intricacies of doubt is necessary. The current article examines this issue, focusing on understanding developmental changes and consistencies in children's ability to take a critical stance toward information. Research reviewed includes studies of children's ability to detect ignorance, inaccuracy, incompetence, deception, and distortion. Particular emphasis is placed on what this research indicates about how children are reasoning about when to trust and when to doubt. The remainder of the article proposes a framework to evaluate preexisting research and encourage further research, closing with a discussion of several other overarching questions that should be considered to develop a model to explain developmental, individual, and situational differences in children's ability to evaluate information.

Young children selectively seek help when solving problems

There is strong evidence that children show selectivity in their reliance on others as sources of information, but the findings to date have largely been limited to contexts that involve factual information. The current experiments were designed to determine whether children might also show selectivity in their choice of sources within a problem-solving context. Children in two age groups (20-24 months and 30-36 months, total N=60) were presented with a series of conceptually difficult problem-solving tasks and were given an opportunity to interact with adult experimenters who were depicted as either good helpers or bad helpers. Participants in both age groups preferred to seek help from the good helpers. The findings suggest that even young children evaluate others with reference to their potential to provide help and use this information to guide their behavioral choices.

The role of expectations in children's experience of novel events

The expectations children bring to interactions, as well as the information they receive prior to them, may be important for children's experiences of new adults. In this study, 148 children (8-13 years old) reported on their expectations of adults, received one of three types of information about a new adult (positive, realistic, or control), and then "interacted" with a videotaped "controlling" adult. The effect of information type depended on children's age and prior expectations, with expectancy effects emerging in the context of positive information at the younger end of our age range and in the context of realistic information at the older end of our age range. Furthermore, the more expectations exceeded perceptions (i.e., the more disappointment), the lower children's rapport, affect, and prosocial intentions were and the more internal causal attributions they made. Results are discussed in terms of their theoretical and applied contributions.

The development of distrust

Preschool-age children's reasoning about the reliability of deceptive sources was investigated. Ninety 3- to 5-year-olds watched several trials in which an informant gave advice about the location of a hidden sticker. Informants were either helpers who were happy to give correct advice, or trickers who were happy to give incorrect advice. Three-year-olds tended to accept all advice from both helpers and trickers. Four-year-olds were more skeptical but showed no preference for advice from helpers over trickers, even though they differentiated between helpers and trickers on metacognitive measures. Five-year-olds systematically preferred advice from helpers. Selective trust was associated with children's ability to make mental state inferences.

Judging judges: How do children weigh the importance of capability and objectivity for being a good decision maker?

Two studies examined developmental differences in how children weigh capability and objectivity when evaluating potential judges. In Study 1, 84 6- to 12-year-olds and adults were told stories about pairs of judges that varied in capability (i.e., perceptual capacity) and objectivity (i.e., the relationship to a contestant) and were asked to predict which judge would be more accurate. Participants generally preferred capable over incapable judges. Additionally, 10- and 12-year-olds adjusted their preferences for the most capable judge based on objectivity information. Seventy 6- and 8-year-olds participated in Study 2, which was similar to Study 1 except that the judges could both seem incapable unless children understood how different decisions require different kinds of perceptual capabilities. While 8-year-olds chose judges based on the relevance of the perceptual capability, 6-year-olds struggled, seeming to be distracted by the valence of the judges' relationships to the contestants. Overall, these results support that there are important shifts in how children evaluate decision makers from early to middle childhood.

The Feasibility of Folk Science

If folk science means individuals having well worked out mechanistic theories of the workings of the world, then it is not feasible. Lay people's explanatory understandings are remarkably coarse, full of gaps and often full of inconsistencies. Even worse, most people underestimate their own understandings. Yet, recent views suggest that formal scientists may not be so different. In spite of these limitations, science somehow works and its success offers hope for the feasibility of folk science as well. The success of science arises from the ways in which scientists learn to leverage understandings in other minds and to outsource explanatory work through sophisticated methods of deference and simplification of complex systems. Three studies ask whether analogous processes might be present not only in lay people, but also in young children and thereby form a foundation for supplementing explanatory understandings almost from the start of our first attempts to make sense of the world.