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Abstract
An important question in the study of canine cognition is how dogs understand humans, given that they show impressive abilities for interacting and communicating with us. In this review, we describe and discuss studies that have investigated dogs' perspective-taking abilities. There is solid evidence that dogs are not only sensitive to the gaze of others, but also their attention. We specifically address the question whether dogs have the ability to take the perspective of others and thus come to understand what others can or cannot perceive. From the latter, they may then infer what others know and use this representation to anticipate what others do next. Still, dogs might simply rely on directly observable cues and on what they themselves can perceive when they assess what others can perceive. And instead of making inferences from representations of others' mental states, they may have just learned that certain behaviours of ours lead to certain outcomes. However, recent research seems to challenge this low-level explanation. Dogs have solved several perspective-taking tasks instantly and reliably across a large number of variations, including geometrical gaze-following, stealing in the dark, concealing information from others, and Guesser/Knower differentiation. In the latter studies, dogs' choices between two human informants were strongly influenced by cues related to the humans' visual access to the food, even when the two informants behaved identically. And finally, we review a recent study that found dogs reacting differently to misleading suggestions of human informants that have either a true or false belief about the location of food. We discuss this surprising result in terms of the comprehension of reality-incongruent mental states, which is considered as a hallmark of Theory of Mind acquisition in human development. Especially on the basis of the latter findings, we conclude that pet dogs might be sensitive to what others see, know, intend, and believe. Therefore, this ability seems to have evolved not just in the corvid and primate lineages, but also in dogs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ludwig Huber
- Comparative Cognition, Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, Medical University of Vienna, University of Vienna, Veterinaerplatz 1, 1210, Vienna, Austria.
| | - Lucrezia Lonardo
- Comparative Cognition, Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, Medical University of Vienna, University of Vienna, Veterinaerplatz 1, 1210, Vienna, Austria
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Lurz R, Krachun C, Hopkins WD, Taglialatela J. Evidence of psychological essentialism in a symbol-trained bonobo (Pan paniscus). INT J PRIMATOL 2022. [DOI: 10.1007/s10764-021-00266-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
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Hirel M, Thiriau C, Roho I, Meunier H. Are monkeys able to discriminate appearance from reality? Cognition 2019; 196:104123. [PMID: 31835097 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2019.104123] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/14/2018] [Revised: 10/29/2019] [Accepted: 10/31/2019] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
The understanding that the perceptual appearance of the environment can differ in several ways from the reality underlies the ability to discriminate appearance from reality. Being able to realize when a misperception can lead us to behave in inappropriate ways confers an evolutionary advantage and may be a prerequisite to develop a Theory of Mind. Understanding that our own perception can differ from reality seems indeed necessary to attribute to others perceptions or beliefs different than ours. This appearance-reality discrimination ability has recently been demonstrated in great apes but no information is currently available regarding this ability in other nonhuman species. In a comparative study, we tested Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana), an Old World primate species, and brown capuchins (Sapajus apella), a New World primate species. We provided monkeys with two experiments using visual illusions of size and quantity to test their ability to discriminate appearance from reality, with an experimental setup similar to the one developed by Krachun et al. (2016) on chimpanzees. A large number of brown capuchins, from different ages and both sexes, as well as two Tonkean macaques succeeded in the two experiments. By ruling out all alternative explanations (i.e. visual tracking or associative learning), our study brings the first evidence that some Old World and New World monkeys are able to discriminate appearance from reality. Our results suggest moving the evolutionary apparition of this cognitive ability earlier in time. Finally, it suggests that humans could share more Theory of Mind components with more nonhuman species than we previously thought.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marie Hirel
- Centre de primatologie de l'Université de Strasbourg, Fort Foch, 67207, Niederhausbergen, France; Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Adaptatives, UMR 7364, Université de Strasbourg, France.
| | - Constance Thiriau
- Centre de primatologie de l'Université de Strasbourg, Fort Foch, 67207, Niederhausbergen, France; Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Adaptatives, UMR 7364, Université de Strasbourg, France
| | - Inès Roho
- Centre de primatologie de l'Université de Strasbourg, Fort Foch, 67207, Niederhausbergen, France; Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Adaptatives, UMR 7364, Université de Strasbourg, France
| | - Hélène Meunier
- Centre de primatologie de l'Université de Strasbourg, Fort Foch, 67207, Niederhausbergen, France; Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Adaptatives, UMR 7364, Université de Strasbourg, France
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Hirel M. Le jeu des illusions : discrimination entre apparence et réalité chez les primates. REVUE DE PRIMATOLOGIE 2019. [DOI: 10.4000/primatologie.4056] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
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Morchain P, Lacroix A, Guillot S. Représentation de la magie chez des enfants de 4 à 9 ans. ENFANCE 2019. [DOI: 10.3917/enf2.194.0487] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/14/2022]
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Völter CJ, Call J. Intuitive optics: what great apes infer from mirrors and shadows. Anim Cogn 2018; 21:493-512. [PMID: 29721698 PMCID: PMC6004283 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-018-1184-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/05/2017] [Revised: 04/16/2018] [Accepted: 04/22/2018] [Indexed: 12/01/2022]
Abstract
There is ongoing debate about the extent to which nonhuman animals, like humans, can go beyond first-order perceptual information to abstract structural information from their environment. To provide more empirical evidence regarding this question, we examined what type of information great apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans) gain from optical effects such as shadows and mirror images. In an initial experiment, we investigated whether apes would use mirror images and shadows to locate hidden food. We found that all examined ape species used these cues to find the food. Follow-up experiments showed that apes neither confused these optical effects with the food rewards nor did they merely associate cues with food. First, naïve chimpanzees used the shadow of the hidden food to locate it but they did not learn within the same number of trials to use a perceptually similar rubber patch as indicator of the hidden food reward. Second, apes made use of the mirror images to estimate the distance of the hidden food from their own body. Depending on the distance, apes either pointed into the direction of the food or tried to access the hidden food directly. Third, apes showed some sensitivity to the geometrical relation between mirror orientation and mirrored objects when searching hidden food. Fourth, apes tended to interpret mirror images and pictures of these mirror images differently depending on their prior knowledge. Together, these findings suggest that apes are sensitive to the optical relation between mirror images and shadows and their physical referents.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christoph J Völter
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St Mary's Quad, South Street, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland, KY16 9JP, UK. .,Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, 04103, Leipzig, Germany.
| | - Josep Call
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St Mary's Quad, South Street, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland, KY16 9JP, UK.,Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, 04103, Leipzig, Germany
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Krachun C, Lurz RW. I know you see it wrong! Children use others' false perceptions to predict their behaviors. J Exp Child Psychol 2016; 150:380-395. [PMID: 27451060 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2016.06.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/14/2015] [Revised: 06/15/2016] [Accepted: 06/19/2016] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
Research on children's ability to attribute false mental states to others has focused exclusively on false beliefs. We developed a novel paradigm that focuses instead on another type of false mental state: false perceptions. From approximately 4years of age, children begin to recognize that their perception of an illusory object can be at odds with its true properties. Our question was whether they also recognize that another individual viewing the object will similarly experience a false perception. We tested 33 preschool children with a task in which distorting lenses caused a small object to appear large and a large object to appear small. To succeed, children needed to recognize that a naive agent would falsely perceive the relative size of the objects and to correctly anticipate the agent's actions on that basis. Children performed significantly better than chance in our false perception test, and there was a developmental progression in performance from 4 to 5years of age similar to that seen in standard false belief tests. Our findings demonstrate that preschool children are capable of understanding that other individuals will be perceptually misled by illusory objects and that these false perceptions will influence their actions in predictable ways.
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Affiliation(s)
- Carla Krachun
- University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK S7N 5A5, Canada.
| | - Robert W Lurz
- Brooklyn College, City University of New York (CUNY), Brooklyn, NY 11210, USA
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Are apes essentialists? Scope and limits of psychological essentialism in great apes. Anim Cogn 2016; 19:921-37. [PMID: 27142417 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-016-0991-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2016] [Revised: 04/22/2016] [Accepted: 04/27/2016] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
Abstract
Human reasoning is characterized by psychological essentialism (Gelman in The essential child: origins of essentialism in everyday thought. Oxford University Press, New York, 2003): when reasoning about objects, we distinguish between deep essential properties defining the object's kind and identity, and merely superficial features that can be changed without altering the object's identity. To date, it is unclear whether psychological essentialism is based on the acquisition of linguistic means (such as kind terms) and therefore uniquely human, or whether it is a more fundamental cognitive capacity which might be present also in the absence of language. In the present study, we addressed this question by testing whether, and if so, under which circumstances non-human apes also rely on psychological essentialism to identify objects. For this purpose, we adapted classical verbal transformation scenarios used in research on psychological essentialism (Keil in Concepts, kinds, and cognitive development. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1989) and implemented them in two nonverbal tasks: first, a box task, typically used to test object individuation (Experiment 1), and second, an object choice task, typically used to test object discrimination, object preferences and logical inferences (Experiments 2-4). Taken together, the results of the four experiments suggest that under suitable circumstances (when memory and other task demands are minimized), great apes engage in basic forms of essentialist reasoning. Psychological essentialism is thus possible also in the absence of language.
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Krachun C, Lurz R, Russell JL, Hopkins WD. Smoke and mirrors: Testing the scope of chimpanzees' appearance-reality understanding. Cognition 2016; 150:53-67. [PMID: 26848736 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/05/2014] [Revised: 12/16/2015] [Accepted: 01/17/2016] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
Abstract
The ability to make appearance-reality (AR) discriminations is an important higher-order cognitive adaptation in humans but is still poorly understood in our closest primate relatives. Previous research showed that chimpanzees are capable of AR discrimination when choosing between food items that appear, due to the effects of distorting lenses, to be smaller or larger than they actually are (Krachun, Call, & Tomasello, 2009). In the current study, we investigated the scope and flexibility of chimpanzees' AR discrimination abilities by presenting them with a wider range of illusory stimuli. In addition to using lenses to change the apparent size of food items (Experiment 1), we used a mirror to change the apparent number of items (Experiment 2), and tinted filters to change their apparent color (Experiment 3). In all three experiments, some chimpanzees were able to maximize their food rewards by making a choice based on the real properties of the stimuli in contrast to their manifest apparent properties. These results replicate the earlier findings for size illusions and extend them to additional situations involving illusory number and color. Control tests, together with findings from previous studies, ruled out lower-level explanations for the chimpanzees' performance. The findings thus support the hypothesis that chimpanzees are capable of making AR discriminations with a range of illusory stimuli.
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Affiliation(s)
- Carla Krachun
- Grenfell Campus, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 20 University Drive, Corner Brook, NL A2H 5G4, Canada.
| | - Robert Lurz
- Brooklyn College, CUNY, 2900 Bedford Avenue, Brooklyn, NY 11210, United States.
| | - Jamie L Russell
- Georgia State University, Neuroscience Institute, 100 Piedmont Avenue SE, Atlanta, GA 30303, United States; Yerkes National Primate Research Center, 954 Gatewood Road, Atlanta, GA 30329, United States.
| | - William D Hopkins
- Georgia State University, Neuroscience Institute, 100 Piedmont Avenue SE, Atlanta, GA 30303, United States; Yerkes National Primate Research Center, 954 Gatewood Road, Atlanta, GA 30329, United States.
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Assessment of metacognitive monitoring and control in baboons (Papio papio). Anim Cogn 2015; 18:1347-62. [PMID: 26232908 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-015-0907-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/16/2015] [Revised: 06/02/2015] [Accepted: 07/16/2015] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Metacognition refers to the ability of an organism to evaluate its states of knowledge (metacognitive monitoring) and engage in appropriate information-seeking behaviors when a lack of knowledge is detected (metacognitive control). This study assessed metacognitive monitoring and control in three Guinea baboons (Papio papio). Monkeys were required to report on a touchscreen the location of two target stimuli that had previously appeared briefly on a grid. They could either respond directly or use a "Repeat" key providing an opportunity to repeat the target stimuli. In Experiment 1, the baboons used the Repeat key more frequently in difficult trials and transferred this use of the key to novel conditions. Two baboons showed higher accuracy when they declined using the key compared to Baseline trials in which the key was not available, suggesting accurate metacognitive monitoring judgments. The same two baboons were consistently faster at reporting the targets' locations after a repetition of the stimulus. In Experiment 2, the baboons had to choose between two Repeat keys, one for each target. Two baboons showed a preference for repeating the presentation of the less visible target, suggesting that they identified what information they lack. Overall, results support the hypothesis of metacognitive monitoring in baboons, and also provide limited evidence for metacognitive control. We propose that tests requiring subjects to choose between several metacognitive responses in computerized tasks provide a suitable new approach for studying targeted information-seeking behaviors in animals.
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How Could We Know Whether Nonhuman Primates Understand Others’ Internal Goals and Intentions? Solving Povinelli’s Problem. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2011. [DOI: 10.1007/s13164-011-0068-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
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Lurz RW. Belief Attribution in Animals: On How to Move Forward Conceptually and Empirically. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2010. [DOI: 10.1007/s13164-010-0042-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
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