Thinking about false belief: It’s not just what children say, but how long it takes them to say it

Balancing accuracy and speed in the development of inhibitory control

Inhibitory control develops rapidly and nonlinearly, making its accurate assessment challenging. This research investigated the developmental dynamics of accuracy and response latency in inhibitory control assessment of 3- to 6-year-old children in a longitudinal study (N = 431; 212 girls; Mage = 4.86 years, SD = 0.99) and a cross-sectional study (N = 135; 71 girls; Mage = 4.24 years, SD = 0.61). We employed a computerized Stroop task to measure inhibitory control, with fluid intelligence serving as a covariate. A growth curve analysis revealed that children who reached an accuracy threshold of 80% earlier demonstrated faster improvements in response latency. Both the cross-sectional and longitudinal findings demonstrated a positive association between response latency in the inhibitory control task and fluid intelligence, but only when participants had achieved and maintained high accuracy. These results suggest that researchers should consider response latency as an indicator of inhibitory control only in children who manage to respond accurately in an inhibitory control task.

Can We Boost Preschoolers' Inhibitory Performance Just by Changing the Way They Respond?

Changing the way children make their response appears to sometimes, but not always, boost their inhibitory control-though interpreting existing findings is hampered by inconsistent methods and results. This study investigated the effects of delaying, and changing, the means of responding. Ninety-six preschoolers (M_age 46 months) completed tasks assessing inhibitory control, counterfactual reasoning, strategic reasoning, and false belief understanding. Children responded either immediately or after a delay, and either by pointing with their finger, or with a hand-held arrow. Delaying boosted performance on all tasks except false belief understanding; arrow-pointing only improved strategic reasoning. It is suggested that delay helps children work out the correct response; it is unlikely to help on tasks where this requirement is absent.

Time-Based Measures of Monitoring in Association With Executive Functions in Kindergarten Children

Abstract. Repeatedly, the notion has been put forward that metacognition (MC) and executive functions (EF) share common grounds, as both describe higher order cognitive processes and involve monitoring. However, only few studies addressed this issue empirically and so far their findings are rather inconsistent. Addressing the question whether measurement differences may in part be responsible for the mixed results, the current study included explicitly reported as well as time-based measures of metacognitive monitoring and related them to EF. A total of 202 children aged 4–6 years were assessed in terms of EF (inhibition, working memory, shifting) and monitoring. While there was no significant link between explicitly reported confidence and EF, latencies of monitoring judgments were significantly related to time- and accuracy-based measures of EF. Our findings support the association between EF and MC and the assumption that better inhibition abilities help children to engage in more thorough monitoring.

Bayesian change-point analysis reveals developmental change in a classic theory of mind task

Although learning and development reflect changes situated in an individual brain, most discussions of behavioral change are based on the evidence of group averages. Our reliance on group-averaged data creates a dilemma. On the one hand, we need to use traditional inferential statistics. On the other hand, group averages are highly ambiguous when we need to understand change in the individual; the average pattern of change may characterize all, some, or none of the individuals in the group. Here we present a new method for statistically characterizing developmental change in each individual child we study. Using false-belief tasks, fifty-two children in two cohorts were repeatedly tested for varying lengths of time between 3 and 5 years of age. Using a novel Bayesian change point analysis, we determined both the presence and-just as importantly-the absence of change in individual longitudinal cumulative records. Whenever the analysis supports a change conclusion, it identifies in that child's record the most likely point at which change occurred. Results show striking variability in patterns of change and stability across individual children. We then group the individuals by their various patterns of change or no change. The resulting patterns provide scarce support for sudden changes in competence and shed new light on the concepts of "passing" and "failing" in developmental studies.

Ways of thinking: from crows to children and back again

This article reviews some of the recent work on the remarkable cognitive capacities of food-caching corvids. The focus will be on their ability to think about other minds and other times, and tool-using tests of physical problem solving. Research on developmental cognition suggests that young children do not pass similar tests until they are at least four years of age in the case of the social cognition experiments, and eight years of age in the case of the tasks that tap into physical cognition. This developmental trajectory seems surprising. Intuitively, one might have thought that the social and planning tasks required more complex forms of cognitive process, namely Mental Time Travel and Theory of Mind. Perhaps the fact that children pass these tasks earlier than the physical problem-solving tasks is a reflection of cultural influences. Future research will hope to identify these cognitive milestones by starting to develop tasks that might go some way towards understanding the mechanisms underlying these abilities in both children and corvids, to explore similarities and differences in their ways of thinking.

From infants' to children's appreciation of belief

Evidence is accumulating that infants are sensitive to people's false beliefs, whereas children pass the standard false belief test at around 4 years of age. Debate currently centres on the nature of early and late understanding. We defend the view that early sensitivity to false beliefs shown in 'online tasks' (where engagement with ongoing events reflects an expectation of what will happen without a judgement that it will happen) reflects implicit/unconscious social knowledge of lawful regularities. The traditional false belief task requires explicit consideration of the agent's subjective perspective on his reasons for action. This requires an intentional switch of perspectives not possible before 4 years of age as evidenced by correlations between the false belief task and many different perspective-taking tasks.

A continuous false belief task reveals egocentric biases in children and adolescents with autism spectrum disorders

This study reports on a new false belief measure in a sample of 124 children and adolescents with or without high functioning autism (HFASD). In the classic paradigm, a participant predicts in which of two discrete locations a deceived protagonist will look for an object. In the current Sandbox task, the object is buried and reburied in a sandbox, thus creating a continuum between locations. Compared to typically developing individuals (n=62), those with HFASD (n=62) showed a larger egocentric bias on the Sandbox task. They failed to take the protagonist's false belief into account, despite their adequate ability to infer advanced mental states. This indicates that sensitive measures can reveal subtle first order Theory of Mind impairments in HFASD individuals.

Hindsight bias from 3 to 95 years of age

Upon learning the outcome to a problem, people tend to believe that they knew it all along (hindsight bias). Here, we report the first study to trace the development of hindsight bias across the life span. One hundred ninety-four participants aged 3 to 95 years completed 3 tasks designed to measure visual and verbal hindsight bias. All age groups demonstrated hindsight bias on all 3 tasks; however, preschoolers and older adults exhibited more bias than older children and younger adults. Multinomial processing tree analyses of these data revealed that preschoolers' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them substituting the correct answer for their original answer in their recall (a qualitative error). Conversely, older adults' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them forgetting their original answer and recalling an answer closer to, but not equal to, the correct answer (a quantitative error). We discuss these findings in relation to mechanisms of memory, perspective taking, theory of mind, and executive function.