Minds in motion in memory: Enhanced spatial memory driven by the perceived animacy of simple shapes

An exploration of the influence of animal and object categories on recall of item location following an incidental learning task

The current study explores the role of attention in location memory for animals and objects. Participants completed an incidental learning task where they rated animals and objects with regard to either their ease of collection to win a scavenger hunt (Experiments 1a and b) or their distance from the centre of the computer screen (Experiment 2). The images of animals and objects were pseudo-randomly positioned on the screen in both experiments. After completing the incidental learning task (and a reverse counting distractor task), participants were then given a surprise location memory recall task. In the location memory recall task, items were shown in the centre of the screen and participants used the mouse to indicate the position the item had been shown during the incidental encoding task. The results of both experiments show that location memory for objects was more accurate than for animals. While we cannot definitively identify the mechanism responsible for the difference in the location memory of objects and animals, we propose that differences in the influence of object-based attention at encoding affect location memory when tested at recall.

Representational Dissimilarity of Faces and Places during a Working Memory Task is Associated with Subsequent Recognition Memory during Development

Nearly 50 years of research has focused on faces as a special visual category, especially during development. Yet it remains unclear how spatial patterns of neural similarity of faces and places relate to how information processing supports subsequent recognition of items from these categories. The current study uses representational similarity analysis and functional imaging data from 9- and 10-year-old youth during an emotional n-back task from the Adolescent Brain and Cognitive Development Study 3.0 data release to relate spatial patterns of neural similarity during working memory to subsequent out-of-scanner performance on a recognition memory task. Specifically, we examine how similarities in representations within face categories (neutral, happy, and fearful faces) and representations between visual categories (faces and places) relate to subsequent recognition memory of these visual categories. Although working memory performance was higher for faces than places, subsequent recognition memory was greater for places than faces. Representational similarity analysis revealed category-specific patterns in face-and place-sensitive brain regions (fusiform gyrus, parahippocampal gyrus) compared with a nonsensitive visual region (pericalcarine cortex). Similarity within face categories and dissimilarity between face and place categories in the parahippocampus was related to better recognition of places from the n-back task. Conversely, in the fusiform, similarity within face categories and their relative dissimilarity from places was associated with better recognition of new faces, but not old faces. These findings highlight how the representational distinctiveness of visual categories influence what information is subsequently prioritized in recognition memory during development.

The psychophysics of bouncing: Perceptual constraints, physical constraints, animacy, and phenomenal causality

In the present study we broadly explored the perception of physical and animated motion in bouncing-like scenarios through four experiments. In the first experiment, participants were asked to categorize bouncing-like displays as physical bounce, animated motion, or other. Several parameters of the animations were manipulated, that is, the simulated coefficient of restitution, the value of simulated gravitational acceleration, the motion pattern (uniform acceleration/deceleration or constant speed) and the number of bouncing cycles. In the second experiment, a variable delay at the moment of the collision between the bouncing object and the bouncing surface was introduced. Main results show that, although observers appear to have realistic representations of physical constraints like energy conservation and gravitational acceleration/deceleration, the amount of visual information available in the scene has a strong modulation effect on the extent to which they rely on these representations. A coefficient of restitution >1 was a crucial cue to animacy in displays showing three bouncing cycles, but not in displays showing one bouncing cycle. Additionally, bouncing impressions appear to be driven by perceptual constraints that are unrelated to the physical realism of the scene, like preference for simulated gravitational attraction smaller than g and perceived temporal contiguity between the different phases of bouncing. In the third experiment, the visible opaque bouncing surface was removed from the scene, and the results showed that this did not have any substantial effect on the resulting impressions of physical bounce or animated motion, suggesting that the visual system can fill-in the scene with the missing element. The fourth experiment explored visual impressions of causality in bouncing scenarios. At odds with claims of current causal perception theories, results indicate that a passive object can be perceived as the direct cause of the motion behavior of an active object.

Perceiving animacy from kinematics: visual specification of life-likeness in simple geometric patterns

Since the seminal work of Heider and Simmel, and Michotte's research, many studies have shown that, under appropriate conditions, displays of simple geometric shapes elicit rich and vivid impressions of animacy and intentionality. The main purpose of this review is to emphasize the close relationship between kinematics and perceived animacy by showing which specific motion cues and spatiotemporal patterns automatically trigger visual perceptions of animacy and intentionality. The animacy phenomenon has been demonstrated to be rather fast, automatic, irresistible, and highly stimulus-driven. Moreover, there is growing evidence that animacy attributions, although usually associated with higher-level cognition and long-term memory, may reflect highly specialized visual processes that have evolved to support adaptive behaviors critical for survival. The hypothesis of a life-detector hardwired in the perceptual system is also supported by recent studies in early development and animal cognition, as well as by the issue of the "irresistibility" criterion, i.e., the persistence of animacy perception in adulthood even in the face of conflicting background knowledge. Finally, further support for the hypothesis that animacy is processed in the earliest stages of vision comes from recent experimental evidence on the interaction of animacy with other visual processes, such as visuomotor performance, visual memory, and speed estimation. Summarizing, the ability to detect animacy in all its nuances may be related to the visual system's sensitivity to those changes in kinematics - considered as a multifactorial relational system - that are associated with the presence of living beings, as opposed to the natural, inert behavior of physically constrained, form-invariant objects, or even mutually independent moving agents. This broad predisposition would allow the observer not only to identify the presence of animates and to distinguish them from inanimate, but also to quickly grasp their psychological, emotional, and social characteristics.

Animate monitoring is not uniform: implications for the animate monitoring hypothesis

The animate monitoring hypothesis (AMH) purports that humans evolved specialized mechanisms that prioritize attention to animates over inanimates. Importantly, the hypothesis emphasizes that any animate-an entity that can move on its own-should take priority in attention. While many experiments have found general support for this hypothesis, there have yet been no systematic investigations into whether the type of animate matters for animate monitoring. In the present research we addressed this issue across three experiments. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 53) searched for an animate or inanimate entity in a search task, and the animate was either a mammal or a non-mammal (e.g., bird, reptile, insect). Mammals were found significantly faster than inanimates, replicating the basic AMH finding. However, they were also found significantly faster than non-mammals, who were not found faster than inanimates. Two additional experiments were conducted to probe for differences among types of non-mammals using an inattentional blindness task. Experiment 2 (N = 171) compared detection of mammals, insects, and inanimates, and Experiment 3 (N = 174) compared birds and herpetofauna (reptiles and amphibians). In Experiment 2, mammals were spontaneously detected at significantly higher rates than insects, who were detected at only slightly higher rates than the inanimates. Furthermore, when participants did not consciously identify the target, they nonetheless could correctly guess the higher level category of the target (living vs. nonliving thing) for the mammals and the inanimates, but could not do so for the insects. We also found in Experiment 3 that reptiles and birds were spontaneously detected at rates similar to the mammals, but like insects they were not identified as living things at rates greater than chance when they were not consciously detected. These results do not support a strong claim that all animates are prioritized in attention, but they do call for a more nuanced view. As such, they open a new window into the nature of animate monitoring, which have implications for theories of its origin.

Animates engender robust memory representations in adults and young children

The animate monitoring hypothesis proposes that humans are predisposed to attend preferentially to animate entities in the environment (New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007). However, there have to date been no developmental investigations of animate monitoring in younger populations, despite the relevance of such evidence to this hypothesis. Here we demonstrate that adults and preschoolers recall a novel sequence of action with greater fidelity if it involves an animate over an inanimate. Experiments 1 (adults) and 2 (preschoolers) provide initial support for this phenomena, when a familiar animate (a dog) is used in the sequence instead of a block. Experiment 2 also revealed that a beetle is not clearly superior to a block, hinting at a possible hierarchy of animacy. Experiment 3 provided the clearest evidence for this memory advantage in preschoolers, when a novel animate that was perceptually identical to two other inanimate controls enhanced memory for the sequence. These results indicate that animate monitoring does not require extensive experience to develop, and could possibly be the result of innate dispositions.

Intentionally distracting: Working memory is disrupted by the perception of other agents attending to you - even without eye-gaze cues

Of all the visual stimuli you can perceive, perhaps the most important are other people's eyes. And this is especially true when those eyes are looking at you: direct gaze has profound influences, even at the level of basic cognitive processes such as working memory. For example, memory for the properties of simple geometric shapes is disrupted by the presence of other eyes gazing at you. But are such effects really specific to direct gaze per se? Seeing eyes is undoubtedly important, but presumably only because of what it tells us about the "mind behind the eyes" - i.e., about others' attention and intentions. This suggests that the same effects might arise even without eyes, as long as an agent's directed attention is conveyed by other means. Here we tested the impact on working memory of simple "mouth" shapes - which in no way resemble eyes, yet can still be readily seen as intentionally facing you (or not). Just as with gaze cues, the ability to detect changes in geometric shapes was impaired by direct (compared to averted) mouths - but not in very similar control stimuli that were not perceived as intentional. We conclude that this disruption of working memory reflects a general phenomenon of "mind contact," rather than a specific effect of eye contact.

Thematic role information is maintained in the visual object-tracking system

Thematic roles characterise the functions of participants in events, but there is no agreement on how these roles are identified in the real world. In three experiments, we examined how role identification in push events is supported by the visual object-tracking system. Participants saw one to three push events in visual scenes with nine identical randomly moving circles. After a period of random movement, two circles from one of the push events and a foil object were given different colours and the participants had to identify their roles in the push with an active sentence, such as red pushed blue. It was found that the participants could track the agent and patient targets and generate descriptions that identified their roles at above chance levels, even under difficult conditions, such as when tracking multiple push events (Experiments 1-3), fixating their gaze (Experiment 1), performing a concurrent speeded-response task (Experiment 2), and when tracking objects that were temporarily invisible (Experiment 3). The results were consistent with previous findings of an average tracking capacity limit of four objects, individual differences in this capacity, and the use of attentional strategies. The studies demonstrated that thematic role information can be maintained when tracking the identity of visually identical objects, then used to map role fillers (e.g., the agent of a push event) into their appropriate sentence positions. This suggests that thematic role features are stored temporarily in the visual object-tracking system.

Fleeing or not: Responsivity of a chased target influences the cognitive representation of the chasing action

The chasing action, in which an actor chases a target, is a fundamental activity for the evolutionary shaping of social abilities. Where previous research has emphasized the chaser's role, the current study explored whether the fleeing responsivity of a chased target influences the cognitive representation of the chasing action. We investigated this with a change-detection task, in which a set of chasing actions, either exhibiting or not exhibiting fleeing behavior, were memorized in sequence, and it was tested whether a memorized action reappeared after altering an object's appearance. The results suggest that the target's fleeing responsivity influenced the detection of representation-related changes in the appearance of the involved agents, especially when the appearance of one target was replaced with another (i.e., a new pair, but with the same functional role), showing impaired sensitivity to change for the chasing action (Experiment 1). This effect disappeared, however, when the perceived chasing from presented movements was impaired, while displaying largely the same low-level differences as those present in earlier trials through the use of mirrored chasing (Experiment 2) and setting the faced direction opposite of the moving direction (Experiment 3). These findings suggest that the fleeing responsivity of the chased target can influence the stored representation of the action. This differentiation may be attributed to the stronger construction of social interaction structure for chasing action with fleeing than without, since the fleeing behavior can be deemed a contingency cue for social interaction interpretation.