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Johnson-Laird PN, Ragni M. Reasoning about possibilities: Modal logics, possible worlds, and mental models. Psychon Bull Rev 2024:10.3758/s13423-024-02518-z. [PMID: 39012580 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-024-02518-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/19/2024] [Indexed: 07/17/2024]
Abstract
Everyone reasons about possibilities. This article explains how they could do so using mental models. The theory makes four major claims: 1. Correct inferences are necessary, referring only to facts or possibilities to which the premises refer and not ruling any of them out, for example: She left or hid; Therefore, it's possible that she left and possible that she hid. 2. A possibility such as that she hid, which is represented in an intuitive model, presupposes the possibility that it did not occur, she did not hide, which, if reasoners deliberate, is represented in the resulting model. 3. Reasoners condense consistent possibilities, such as the earlier pair, into one possibility: it is possible that she left and she hid. 4. Inconsistencies, such as she left or hid, and she neither left nor hid, refer to no possibilities whatsoever - they have an empty model - and so their only effects are local. Hence, any inference can be withdrawn with impunity if there is knowledge to the contrary. Experiments have corroborated each of these principles. They are incompatible with four essentials of standard modal logics, which concern deductions based on "possible" or "necessary". Their formal deductions correspond to valid inferences, which have no counterexamples in which the premises are true but the conclusion is false. And so the article examines the differences between the two approaches, and explores the adaptation of a modal logic to account for correct human reasoning. Its feasibility is an open question.
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Affiliation(s)
- P N Johnson-Laird
- Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 08540, USA
- Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place, New York, NY, 10003, USA
| | - Marco Ragni
- Technische Universität Chemnitz, Thüringer Weg 11, 09126, Chemnitz, Germany.
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Jabłońska MZ, Falkowski A, Mackiewicz R. Similarity judgements: the comparison of normative predictions and subjective evaluations - A study of the ratio model of similarity in social context. Front Psychol 2024; 15:1335707. [PMID: 38817837 PMCID: PMC11139025 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1335707] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/10/2023] [Accepted: 03/28/2024] [Indexed: 06/01/2024] Open
Abstract
Introduction This study examines the consistency between subjective similarity evaluations and the theoretical predictions derived from Tversky's ratio model of similarity, alongside the impact of additional positive and negative features on perceived similarity to ideal and bad politicians. Methods Using a sample of 120 participants, we assessed the similarity of eight candidate profiles to an ideal and bad politician, varying in positive and negative features. Participants' subjective evaluations were compared with theoretical predictions derived from Tversky's ratio model. The analysis focused on how candidate and referent valence influenced observed versus theoretical similarity. Results Subjective similarity judgments deviated systematically from theoretical predictions, especially for positively featured candidates, indicating a negativity effect. Additional positive features decreased the perceived similarity of favorable candidates to an ideal politician, while additional negative features did not significantly affect similarity judgments of unfavorable candidates. Discussion Our findings underscore a significant disparity between subjective and objective similarity judgments, notably for favorable candidates. While the ratio model performs well for unfavorable candidates, its applicability diminishes for favorable ones, emphasizing the role of feature valence in decision-making. Further research on feature valence is crucial for a comprehensive understanding across contexts.
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Doan T, Denison S, Friedman O. Close counterfactuals and almost doing the impossible. Psychon Bull Rev 2024; 31:187-195. [PMID: 37488463 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-023-02335-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 07/07/2023] [Indexed: 07/26/2023]
Abstract
Can we feel that an unrealized outcome nearly happened if it was never possible in the first place? People often consider counterfactual events that did not happen, and some counterfactuals seem so close to reality that people say they "almost" or "easily could have" happened. Across four preregistered experiments (total N = 1,228), we investigated how judgments of counterfactual closeness depend on possibility, and whether this varies across two kinds of close counterfactuals. In judging whether outcomes almost happened, participants were more strongly impacted by possibility than by incremental manipulations of probability. In contrast, when judging whether outcomes easily could have happened, participants treated the distinction between impossible and possible like any other variation in probability. Both kinds of judgments were also impacted by propensity, though these effects were comparatively small. Together, these findings reveal novel differences between the two kinds of close counterfactuals and suggest that while possibility is privileged when judging what almost happened, probability is the focus when judging what easily could have happened.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tiffany Doan
- Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue W, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1, Canada.
| | - Stephanie Denison
- Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue W, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1, Canada
| | - Ori Friedman
- Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue W, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1, Canada
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Miceli K, Morales-Torres R, Khoudary A, Faul L, Parikh N, De Brigard F. Perceived plausibility modulates hippocampal activity in episodic counterfactual thinking. Hippocampus 2024; 34:2-6. [PMID: 37904663 DOI: 10.1002/hipo.23583] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/28/2023] [Revised: 09/25/2023] [Accepted: 10/07/2023] [Indexed: 11/01/2023]
Abstract
Episodic counterfactual thinking (ECT) consists of imagining alternative outcomes to past personal events. Previous research has shown that ECT shares common neural substrates with episodic future thinking (EFT): our ability to imagine possible future events. Both ECT and EFT have been shown to critically depend on the hippocampus, and past research has explored hippocampal engagement as a function of the perceived plausibility of an imagined future event. However, the extent to which the hippocampus is modulated by perceived plausibility during ECT is unknown. In this study, we combine two functional magnetic resonance imaging datasets to investigate whether perceived plausibility modulates hippocampal activity during ECT. Our results indicate that plausibility parametrically modulates hippocampal activity during ECT, and that such modulation is confined to the left anterior portion of the hippocampus. Moreover, our results indicate that this modulation is positive, such that increased activity in the left anterior hippocampus is associated with higher ratings of ECT plausibility. We suggest that neither effort nor difficulty alone can account for these results, and instead suggest possible alternatives to explain the role of the hippocampus during the construction of plausible and implausible ECT.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kaylee Miceli
- Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Levine Science Research Center, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
| | - Ricardo Morales-Torres
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Levine Science Research Center, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
| | - Ari Khoudary
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, California, USA
| | - Leonard Faul
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Levine Science Research Center, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
| | - Natasha Parikh
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA
| | - Felipe De Brigard
- Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Levine Science Research Center, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
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Ren Y, Cui G, Christie S. Facts in counterfactuals-cognitive representations of Chinese counterfactuals. Sci Rep 2023; 13:23064. [PMID: 38155159 PMCID: PMC10754909 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-49775-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/28/2023] [Accepted: 12/12/2023] [Indexed: 12/30/2023] Open
Abstract
How do people represent counterfactuals? As languages differ in expressibility of counterfactuals-some languages employ explicit grammatical marking for counterfactuals while others do not-are some speakers' representations of counterfactuals less explicit? Prior studies examining this question with Chinese speakers-a language devoid of explicit counterfactual markings-found mixed results. Here we re-examined the issue by using a more sensitive test: people's sensitivity to detect anomalies in sentences. We asked Chinese speakers to rate the acceptability of sentences employing "ruguo (if)…jiu (then)" configuration-the typical but non-unique, non-explicit marking of counterfactuals. Critically, we varied the semantic adherence to real-world facts [factuality], with some sentences containing made-up conditions [-fact as in "If fish had legs, then…"] versus real facts [+ fact: "If dogs had legs, then…"]. If speakers represent counterfactuals clearly, they should give higher acceptability ratings to [- facts] than to [+ facts] sentences, because the ostensible point of counterfactuals is to express non-factual situations. That is, expressing a true fact under a syntactic counterfactual construction makes the sentence anomalous. Instead, we found that Chinese speakers gave the opposite ratings: factual "if…then" sentences were rated as more acceptable than non-factual ones. This suggests that Chinese speakers find the processing of counterfactuals to be more challenging than processing facts, and that their representation of counterfactuals may be less explicit. Overall, this research contributes to our understanding of the link between linguistic markings and cognitive representations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yufei Ren
- Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
- Tsinghua Laboratory of Brain and Intelligence, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
| | - Gang Cui
- Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
| | - Stella Christie
- Department of Psychology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China.
- Tsinghua Laboratory of Brain and Intelligence, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China.
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Bertolotti M, Catellani P. Counterfactual thinking as a prebunking strategy to contrast misinformation on COVID-19. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2023. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2022.104404] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
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Smallman R, Summerville A, Lowe JC. The Spontaneous Counterfactual Inference Task: Misremembering What Might Have Been. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2022:1461672221142181. [PMID: 36575966 DOI: 10.1177/01461672221142181] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/29/2022]
Abstract
Counterfactuals, thoughts about "what might have been," play an important role in causal judgment, emotion, and motivation, and spontaneously arise during daily life. However, current methods to measure spontaneous counterfactual thinking are cumbersome and subjective. The current research adapts a paradigm from the Spontaneous Trait Inference literature to develop the Spontaneous Counterfactual Inference measure (SCFI), which uses false recognition of counterfactual statements as a measure of spontaneous counterfactual thought. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that the SCFI is sensitive to precursors of counterfactual thinking: norm violation and counterfactual closeness. Study 2 demonstrates that the SCFI converges with the generation of counterfactual statements in an open-ended writing task. The SCFI also predicts two important consequences of counterfactual thought, blame (Study 3), and intention endorsement (Study 4). The SCFI thus offers a new tool for researchers interested in counterfactual thinking.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Amy Summerville
- Kairos Research, Dayton, OH, USA
- Miami University, Oxford, OH, USA
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Khoudary A, O'Neill K, Faul L, Murray S, Smallman R, De Brigard F. Neural differences between internal and external episodic counterfactual thoughts. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2022; 377:20210337. [PMID: 36314151 PMCID: PMC9620758 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2021.0337] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/10/2022] [Accepted: 05/16/2022] [Indexed: 07/26/2023] Open
Abstract
Episodic counterfactual thoughts (eCFT) consist of imagining alternative outcomes to past experiences. A common sub-class of eCFT-upward eCFT-involves imagining how past negative experiences could have been better, either because one could have done something differently (internal) or because something about the circumstances could have been different (external). Although previous neuroimaging research has shown that the brain's default mode network (DMN) supports upward eCFT, it is unclear how it is differentially recruited during internal versus external upward eCFT. We collected functional magnetic resonance imaging data while participants remembered negative autobiographical memories, generated either internal or external upward eCFT for the memory, and then rated the plausibility, perceived control and difficulty of eCFT generation. Both internal and external eCFT engaged midline regions of cingulate cortex, a central node of the DMN. Most activity differentiating eCFT, however, occurred outside the DMN. External eCFT engaged cuneus, angular gyrus and precuneus, whereas internal eCFT engaged posterior cingulate and precentral gyrus. Angular gyrus and precuneus were additionally sensitive to perceived plausibility of external eCFT, while postcentral gyrus and insula activity scaled with perceived plausibility of internal eCFT. These results highlight the key brain regions that might be involved in cases of maladaptive mental simulations. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ari Khoudary
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Levine Science Research Center, 308 Research Drive, C03E, Durham, NC 27708, USA
- Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
| | - Kevin O'Neill
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Levine Science Research Center, 308 Research Drive, C03E, Durham, NC 27708, USA
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
| | - Leonard Faul
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Levine Science Research Center, 308 Research Drive, C03E, Durham, NC 27708, USA
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
| | - Samuel Murray
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Levine Science Research Center, 308 Research Drive, C03E, Durham, NC 27708, USA
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
| | - Rachel Smallman
- Psychological and Brain Sciences, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA
| | - Felipe De Brigard
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Levine Science Research Center, 308 Research Drive, C03E, Durham, NC 27708, USA
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
- Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
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Andonovski N. Episodic representation: A mental models account. Front Psychol 2022; 13:899371. [PMID: 35936308 PMCID: PMC9355728 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.899371] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/18/2022] [Accepted: 06/30/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
This paper offers a modeling account of episodic representation. I argue that the episodic system constructs mental models: representations that preserve the spatiotemporal structure of represented domains. In prototypical cases, these domains are events: occurrences taken by subjects to have characteristic structures, dynamics and relatively determinate beginnings and ends. Due to their simplicity and manipulability, mental event models can be used in a variety of cognitive contexts: in remembering the personal past, but also in future-oriented and counterfactual imagination. As structural representations, they allow surrogative reasoning, supporting inferences about their constituents which can be used in reasoning about the represented events.
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Ikier S, Duman Ç, Gökel N. Phenomenological Experience of Mental Time Travel With a Counterpart Self. APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1002/acp.3940] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
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