A rational reinterpretation of dual-process theories

Pupil dilation reflects effortful action invigoration in overcoming aversive Pavlovian biases

"Pavlovian" or "motivational" biases describe the phenomenon that the valence of prospective outcomes modulates action invigoration: Reward prospect invigorates action, whereas punishment prospect suppresses it. The adaptive role of these biases in decision-making is still unclear. One idea is that they constitute a fast-and-frugal decision strategy in situations characterized by high arousal, e.g., in presence of a predator, which demand a quick response. In this pre-registered study (N = 35), we tested whether such a situation-induced via subliminally presented angry versus neutral faces-leads to increased reliance on Pavlovian biases. We measured trial-by-trial arousal by tracking pupil diameter while participants performed an orthogonalized Motivational Go/NoGo Task. Pavlovian biases were present in responses, reaction times, and even gaze, with lower gaze dispersion under aversive cues reflecting "freezing of gaze." The subliminally presented faces did not affect responses, reaction times, or pupil diameter, suggesting that the arousal manipulation was ineffective. However, pupil dilations reflected facets of bias suppression, specifically the physical (but not cognitive) effort needed to overcome aversive inhibition: Particularly strong and sustained dilations occurred when participants managed to perform Go responses to aversive cues. Conversely, no such dilations occurred when they managed to inhibit responses to Win cues. These results suggest that pupil diameter does not reflect response conflict per se nor the inhibition of prepotent responses, but specifically effortful action invigoration as needed to overcome aversive inhibition. We discuss our results in the context of the "value of work" theory of striatal dopamine.

Older adults select different but not simpler strategies than younger adults in risky choice

Younger and older adults often differ in their risky choices. Theoretical frameworks on human aging point to various cognitive and motivational factors that might underlie these differences. Using a novel computational model based on the framework of resource rationality, we find that the two age groups rely on different strategies. Importantly, older adults did not use simpler strategies than younger adults, they did not select among fewer strategies, they did not make more errors, and they did not put more weight on cognitive costs. Instead, older adults selected strategies that had different risk propensities than those selected by younger adults. Our modeling approach suggests that age differences in risky choice are not necessarily a consequence of cognitive decline; instead, they may reflect motivational differences between age groups.

The Willpower Paradox: Possible and Impossible Conceptions of Self-Control

Self-control denotes the ability to override current desires to render behavior consistent with long-term goals. A key assumption is that self-control is required when short-term desires are transiently stronger (more preferred) than long-term goals and people would yield to temptation without exerting self-control. We argue that this widely shared conception of self-control raises a fundamental yet rarely discussed conceptual paradox: How is it possible that a person most strongly desires to perform a behavior (e.g., eat chocolate) and at the same time desires to recruit self-control to prevent themselves from doing it? A detailed analysis reveals that three common assumptions about self-control cannot be true simultaneously. To avoid the paradox, any coherent theory of self-control must abandon either the assumption (a) that recruitment of self-control is an intentional process, or (b) that humans are unitary agents, or (c) that self-control consists in overriding the currently strongest desire. We propose a taxonomy of different kinds of self-control processes that helps organize current theories according to which of these assumptions they abandon. We conclude by outlining unresolved questions and future research perspectives raised by different conceptions of self-control and discuss implications for the question of whether self-control can be considered rational.

Differential associations between scale-free neural dynamics and different levels of cognitive ability

As indicators of cognitive function, scale-free neural dynamics are gaining increasing attention in cognitive neuroscience. Although the functional relevance of scale-free dynamics has been extensively reported, one fundamental question about its association with cognitive ability remains unanswered: is the association universal across a wide spectrum of cognitive abilities or confined to specific domains? Based on dual-process theory, we designed two categories of tasks to analyze two types of cognitive processes-automatic and controlled-and examined their associations with scale-free neural dynamics characterized from resting-state electroencephalography (EEG) recordings obtained from a large sample of human adults (N = 102). Our results showed that resting-state scale-free neural dynamics did not predict individuals' behavioral performance in tasks that primarily engaged the automatic process but did so in tasks that primarily engaged the controlled process. In addition, by fitting the scale-free parameters separately in different frequency bands, we found that the cognitive association of scale-free dynamics was more strongly manifested in higher-band EEG spectrum. Our findings indicate that resting-state scale-free dynamics are not universal neural indicators for all cognitive abilities but are mainly associated with high-level cognition that entails controlled processes. This finding is compatible with the widely claimed role of scale-free dynamics in reflecting properties of complex dynamic systems.

Interaction between habits as action sequences and goal-directed behavior under time pressure

Human behavior consists in large parts of action sequences that are often repeated in mostly the same way. Through extensive repetition, sequential responses become automatic or habitual, but our environment often confronts us with events to which we have to react flexibly and in a goal-directed manner. To assess how implicitly learned action sequences interfere with goal-directed control, we developed a novel behavioral paradigm in which we combined action sequence learning through repetition with a goal-directed task component. So-called dual-target trials require the goal-directed selection of the response with the highest reward probability in a fast succession of trials with short response deadlines. Importantly, the response primed by the learned action sequence is sometimes different from that required by the goal-directed task. As expected, we found that participants learned the action sequence through repetition, as evidenced by reduced reaction times (RT) and error rates (ER), while still acting in a goal-directed manner in dual-target trials. Specifically, we found that the learned action sequence biased choices in the goal-directed task toward the sequential response, and this effect was more pronounced the better individuals had learned the sequence. Our novel task may help shed light on the acquisition of automatic behavioral patterns and habits through extensive repetition, allows to assess positive features of habitual behavior (e.g., increased response speed and reduced error rates), and importantly also the interaction of habitual and goal-directed behaviors under time pressure.