Aha! under pressure: The Aha! experience is not constrained by cognitive load

Insight and non-insight problem solving: A heart rate variability study

Occasionally, problems are solved with a sudden Aha! moment (insight), while the mundane approach to solving problems is analytical (non-insight). At first glance, non-insight appears to depend on the availability and taxation of cognitive resources to execute the step-by-step approach, whereas insight does not, or to a lesser extent. However, this remains debated. To investigate the reliance of both solution types on cognitive resources, we assessed the involvement of the prefrontal cortex using vagally mediated heart rate variability (vmHRV) as an index. Participants (N = 68) solved 70 compound remote associates word puzzles solvable with insight and non-insight. Before, during, and after solving the word puzzles, we measured the vmHRV. Our results showed that resting-state vmHRV (trait) showed a negative association with behavioural performance for both solution types. This might reflect inter-individual differences in inhibitory control. As the solution search requires one to think of remote associations, inhibitory control might hamper rather than aid this process. Furthermore, we observed, for both solution types, a vmHRV increase from resting-state to solution search (state), lingering on in the post-task recovery period. This could mark the increase of prefrontal resources to promote an open-minded stance, essential for divergent thinking, which arguably is crucial for this task. Our findings suggest that, at a general level, both solution types share common aspects. However, a closer analysis of early and late solutions and puzzle difficulty suggested that metacognitive differentiation between insight and non-insight improved with higher trait vmHRV, and that a unique association between trait vmHRV and puzzle difficulty was present for each solution type.

Retrieval fluency inflates perceived preparation for difficult problems

When faced with a difficult problem, people often rely on past experiences. While remembering clearly helps us reach solutions, can retrieval also lead to misperceptions of our abilities? In three experiments, participants encountered "worst case scenarios" they likely had never experienced and that would be difficult to navigate without extensive training (e.g., bitten by snake). Learning brief tips improved problem-solving performance later, but retrieval increased feelings of preparation by an even larger margin. This gap occurred regardless of whether people thought that tips came from an expert or another participant in the study, and it did not reflect mere familiarity with the problems themselves. Instead, our results suggest that the ease experienced while remembering, or retrieval fluency, inflated feelings of preparation.

A meta-analytical review of the impact of mindfulness on creativity: Framing current lines of research and defining moderator variables

Findings relating to the impact of mindfulness interventions on creative performance remain inconsistent, perhaps because of discrepancies between study designs, including variability in the length of mindfulness interventions, the absence of control groups or the tendencies to explore creativity as one unitary construct. To derive a clearer understanding of the impact that mindfulness interventions may exert on creative performance, two meta-analytical reviews were conducted, drawing respectively on studies using a control group design (n = 20) and studies using a pretest-posttest design (n = 17). A positive effect was identified between mindfulness and creativity, both for control group designs (d = 0.42, 95% CIs [0.29, 0.54]) and pretest-posttest designs (d = 0.59, 95% CIs [0.38, 0.81]). Subgroup analysis revealed that intervention length, creativity task (i.e., divergent vs. convergent thinking tasks) and control group type, were significant moderators for control group studies, whereas only intervention length was a significant moderator for pretest-posttest studies. Overall, the findings support the use of mindfulness as a tool to enhance creative performance, with more advantageous outcomes for convergent as opposed to divergent thinking tasks. We discuss the implications of study design and intervention length as key factors of relevance to future research aimed at advancing theoretical accounts of the relationship between mindfulness and creativity.

A Theory of Mental Frameworks

Problem-solving skills are highly valued in modern society and are often touted as core elements of school mission statements, desirable traits for job applicants, and as some of the most complex thinking that the brain is capable of executing. While learning to problem-solve is a goal of education, and many strategies, methodologies, and activities exist to help teachers guide the development of these skills, there are few formal curriculum structures or broader frameworks that guide teachers toward the achievement of this educational objective. Problem-solving skills have been called "higher order cognitive functions" in cognitive neuroscience as they involve multiple complex networks in the brain, rely on constant rehearsal, and often take years to form. Children of all ages employ problem solving, from a newborn seeking out food to children learning in school settings, or adults tackling real-world conflicts. These skills are usually considered the end product of a good education when in fact, in order to be developed they comprise an ongoing process of learning. "Ways of thinking" have been studied by philosophers and neuroscientists alike, to pinpoint cognitive preferences for problem solving approaches that develop from exposure to distinct models, derived from and resulting in certain heuristics used by learners. This new theory paper suggests a novel understanding of the brain's approach to problem solving that structures existing problem-solving frameworks into an organized design. The authors surveyed problem-solving frameworks from business administration, design, engineering, philosophy, psychology, education, neuroscience and other learning sciences to assess their differences and similarities. This review lead to an appreciation that different problem-solving frameworks from different fields respond more or less accurately and efficiently depending on the kinds of problems being tackled, leading to our conclusion that a wider range of frameworks may help individuals approach more varied problems across fields, and that such frameworks can be organized in school curriculum. This paper proposes that explicit instruction of "mental frameworks" may help organize and formalize the instruction of thinking skills that underpin problem-solving-and by extension-that the more such models a person learns, the more tools they will have for future complex problem-solving. To begin, this paper explains the theoretical underpinnings of the mental frameworks concept, then explores some existing mental frameworks which are applicable to all age groups and subject areas. The paper concludes with a list of five limitations to this proposal and pairs them with counter-balancing benefits.

Unconscious processing of prototype heuristics in scientific innovation problem-solving

Previously published studies on the effect of how different levels of unconsciousness (UC) and different loads of executive functions (EFs) affect insight problem solving are inconsistent. In a set of three experiments, we used scientific innovation problems (SIP) as insight metrics and distractor tasks to induce UC. Experiment 1 confirmed that, compared with conscious processing, unconscious processing is more conducive to obtaining prototype heuristics for correctly solving scientific innovation problems creatively. Furthermore, Experiment 2 found that different levels of unconscious processing, which were induced by different distractor tasks, made a different impact on high or low difficulty creative problem solving. Experiment 3 indicated that unconscious processing could improve prototype activation and the ability to use key heuristics information in prototype heuristics processing by improving working memory, inhibitory control, and shifting ability of EFs. Overall, the present results provide additional evidence for the role of consciousness levels in insight problem solving.

Students With High Metacognition Are Favourable Towards Individualism When Anxious

Metacognitive ability has been described as an important predictor of several processes involved in learning, including problem-solving. Although this relationship is fairly documented, little is known about the mechanisms that could modulate it. Given its relationship with both constructs, we decided to evaluate the impact of self-knowledge on PS. In addition, we inspected whether emotional (self-reported anxiety) and interpersonal (attitudes towards social interdependence) variables could affect the relationship between metacognition and problem-solving. We tested a sample of 32 undergraduate students and used behavioural tasks and self-report questionnaires. Contrary to the literature, we found no significant relationship between metacognition and problem-solving performance, nor a significant moderating effect when including emotional and interpersonal variables in the model. In contrast, we observed a significant moderating model combining metacognition, self-reported anxiety and attitudes towards social interdependence. It was found that participants with high metacognition reported attitudes unfavourable towards interdependence when they felt high anxiety. These results suggest that already anxious individuals with high metacognition would prefer to work alone rather than with others, as a coping mechanism against further anxiety derived from cooperation. We hypothesise that in anxiogenic contexts, metacognition is used as a tool to compare possible threats with one's own skills and act accordingly, in order to maximise one's own performance. Further studies are needed to understand how metacognition works in contexts adverse to learning.