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Frankfurt O'Brien S, Baptista I, Szeszko PR. Enhancing Conceptual Clarity regarding the Construct of Moral Injury. PSYCHOTHERAPY AND PSYCHOSOMATICS 2024:1-10. [PMID: 39374594 DOI: 10.1159/000540030] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/21/2023] [Accepted: 06/21/2024] [Indexed: 10/09/2024]
Abstract
BACKGROUND The construct of "moral injury" is used widely in the research literature and media to broadly describe the impact of events involving perceived violations of one's sense of right and wrong (herein referred to as "potentially morally injurious events" [PMIEs]). SUMMARY In this theoretical review, we provided a brief overview of the "moral injury" construct and its limitations including the lack of consensus-drawn boundaries and operational definitions to guide hypothesis-driven research. We discussed whether this construct can be reliably distinguished from established psychiatric diagnoses and psychological constructs and the inherent challenges in separating or classifying the impact of high-magnitude stressful life events that likely form the majority of PMIEs. Assessments that purportedly measure "moral injury" are reviewed and limitations are discussed such as shared measurement variance with established psychological instruments. KEY MESSAGES We identified conceptual strategies for investigating behavioral and neurobiological features of PMIEs that could be used to inform the field of traumatic stress. We concluded that the construct of "moral injury" may provide an interpretive framework for positing why someone may be beset by guilt, shame, and/or rage whereas existing psychiatric diagnoses such as post-traumatic stress disorder and depression provide comprehensive descriptions regarding what someone might experience following extremely stressful events. We proposed directions to better clarify the boundaries of "moral injury" versus established psychiatric categories that could be used to enhance the conceptualization and assessment of this construct.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sheila Frankfurt O'Brien
- VISN17 Center of Excellence for Research on Returning War Veterans, Waco, Texas, USA
- Central Texas Veterans Healthcare System, Temple, Texas, USA
| | - Isabelle Baptista
- Mental Illness Research, Education, and Clinical Center (MIRECC), James J. Peters VA Medical Center, Bronx, New York, USA,
- Departments of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, New York, USA,
| | - Philip R Szeszko
- Mental Illness Research, Education, and Clinical Center (MIRECC), James J. Peters VA Medical Center, Bronx, New York, USA
- Departments of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, New York, USA
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Royzman EB, Borislow SH. The puzzle of wrongless injustice: Reflections on Kürthy and Sousa. Cognition 2024; 244:105686. [PMID: 38134629 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105686] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/06/2023] [Revised: 11/19/2023] [Accepted: 12/03/2023] [Indexed: 12/24/2023]
Abstract
The Database of Exemplars (DOE) account of moral cognition emerged in part to explain how wrongless harms could arise (Royzman & Borislow, 2022; henceforth, RB) in spite of being denied by most traditional models (Schein & Gray, 2018; Turiel, 1983; Shweder, 1997; Haidt, 2012). Herein, we defend this account against a set of results that have been claimed to disprove it (Kurthy & Sousa, this issue; henceforth, KS). We argue that DOE is in line with all the findings KS perceive as uniquely supportive of their own account (appraising an act as unjust engenders a judgment of wrong) while RB's findings (Royzman & Borislow, 2022, Studies 2 and 3) do challenge KS under varied conceptions of what it would take for an agent to be or appear unjust in his or her treatment of others, affirming that wrongless injustice is an empirical fact that one must strive to explain and that DOE helps us explain.
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Affiliation(s)
- Edward B Royzman
- Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA; Master of Behavioral and Decision Sciences Program, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA.
| | - Samuel H Borislow
- Marketing Department, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, IL, USA
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Kürthy M, Sousa P. The deflationary model of harm and moral wrongdoing: A rejoinder to Royzman & Borislow. Cognition 2024; 244:105599. [PMID: 38267135 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105599] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/13/2023] [Revised: 08/11/2023] [Accepted: 08/13/2023] [Indexed: 01/26/2024]
Abstract
With a series of studies, Royzman and Borislow (2022) purport to show that extant models about the conditions under which harmful actions are deemed morally wrong do not have explanatory power-for any proposed condition, various harmful actions meet the condition but are not deemed immoral. And they reach the following conclusion: judgments of moral wrongdoing in the context of harmful actions (or judgments of moral wrongdoing more generally) are not reducible to an explanatory template. However, they did not address the main claim of the deflationary model of harm and moral wrongdoing, which is that intuitions of injustice connect harmful actions to judgments of moral wrongdoing (Sousa & Piazza, 2014). Our first study adjusts Royzman and Borislow' design to include a measure of perceived injustice, while our second elaborates their design to manipulate perceived injustice. The results undermine their conclusion and support the deflationary model, which we further refine here in light of the results of Royzman and Borislow's studies and ours.
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Affiliation(s)
- Miklós Kürthy
- Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK.
| | - Paulo Sousa
- Institute of Cognition and Culture, Queen's University Belfast, UK
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Fitouchi L, André JB, Baumard N. The puritanical moral contract: Purity, cooperation, and the architecture of the moral mind. Behav Brain Sci 2023; 46:e322. [PMID: 37789526 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x23001188] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/05/2023]
Abstract
Commentators raise fundamental questions about the notion of purity (sect. R1), the architecture of moral cognition (sect. R2), the functional relationship between morality and cooperation (sect. R3), the role of folk-theories of self-control in moral judgment (sect. R4), and the cultural variation of morality (sect. R5). In our response, we address all these issues by clarifying our theory of puritanism, responding to counter-arguments, and incorporating welcome corrections and extensions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Léo Fitouchi
- Département d'études cognitives, Institut Jean Nicod, École normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, Paris, France ; https://sites.google.com/view/leofitouchi/home ; http://jb.homepage.free.fr/ ; https://nicolasbaumards.org/
| | - Jean-Baptiste André
- Département d'études cognitives, Institut Jean Nicod, École normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, Paris, France ; https://sites.google.com/view/leofitouchi/home ; http://jb.homepage.free.fr/ ; https://nicolasbaumards.org/
| | - Nicolas Baumard
- Département d'études cognitives, Institut Jean Nicod, École normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, Paris, France ; https://sites.google.com/view/leofitouchi/home ; http://jb.homepage.free.fr/ ; https://nicolasbaumards.org/
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Abstract
All psychological research on morality relies on definitions of morality. Yet the various definitions often go unstated. When unstated definitions diverge, theoretical disagreements become intractable, as theories that purport to explain "morality" actually talk about very different things. This article argues for the importance of defining morality and considers four common ways of doing so: The linguistic, the functionalist, the evaluating, and the normative. Each has encountered difficulties. To surmount those difficulties, I propose a technical, psychological, empirical, and distinctive definition of morality: obligatory concerns with others' welfare, rights, fairness, and justice, as well as the reasoning, judgment, emotions, and actions that spring from those concerns. By articulating workable definitions of morality, psychologists can communicate more clearly across paradigms, separate definitional from empirical disagreements, and jointly advance the field of moral psychology.
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Castrellon JJ, Hakimi S, Parelman JM, Yin L, Law JR, Skene JAG, Ball DA, Malekpour A, Beskind DH, Vidmar N, Pearson JM, Skene JHP, Carter RM. Social cognitive processes explain bias in juror decisions. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci 2023; 18:6764664. [PMID: 36264228 PMCID: PMC9949508 DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsac057] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/11/2021] [Revised: 06/28/2022] [Accepted: 10/17/2022] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
Jury decisions are among the most consequential social decisions in which bias plays a notable role. While courts take measures to reduce the influence of non-evidentiary factors, jurors may still incorporate biases into their decisions. One common bias, crime-type bias, is the extent to which the perceived strength of a prosecutor's case depends on the severity of the crime. Moral judgment, affect and social cognition have been proposed as core processes underlying this and other biases. Behavioral evidence alone has been insufficient to distinguish these explanations. To identify the mechanism underlying crime-type bias, we collected functional magnetic resonance imaging patterns of brain activation from mock jurors reading criminal scenarios. Brain patterns from crime-type bias were most similar to those associated with social cognition (mentalizing and racial bias) but not affect or moral judgment. Our results support a central role for social cognition in juror decisions and suggest that crime-type bias and cultural bias may arise from similar mechanisms.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jaime J Castrellon
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708, USA.,Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708, USA
| | - Shabnam Hakimi
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708, USA.,Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0344, USA
| | - Jacob M Parelman
- Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0344, USA.,Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104, USA
| | - Lun Yin
- Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708, USA
| | - Jonathan R Law
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708, USA.,Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708, USA
| | - Jesse A G Skene
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708, USA.,Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708, USA
| | - David A Ball
- Malekpour & Ball Consulting (JuryWatch, Inc.), Durham, North Carolina 27701, USA
| | - Artemis Malekpour
- Malekpour & Ball Consulting (JuryWatch, Inc.), Durham, North Carolina 27701, USA
| | - Donald H Beskind
- School of Law, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708, USA
| | - Neil Vidmar
- School of Law, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708, USA
| | - John M Pearson
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708, USA.,Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708, USA.,Departments of Biostatistics & Bioinformatics, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27710, USA.,Department of Neurobiology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27710, USA
| | - J H Pate Skene
- Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0344, USA.,Department of Neurobiology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27710, USA.,Initiative in Science and Society, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708, USA
| | - R McKell Carter
- Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0344, USA.,Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, Colorado 80302, USA.,Electrical, Computer, and Energy Engineering, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, Colorado 80309, USA
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Just wrong? Or just WEIRD? Investigating the prevalence of moral dumbfounding in non-Western samples. Mem Cognit 2023:10.3758/s13421-022-01386-z. [PMID: 36650349 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-022-01386-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 12/14/2022] [Indexed: 01/18/2023]
Abstract
Moral dumbfounding occurs when people maintain a moral judgment even though they cannot provide a reason for this judgment. Dumbfounded responding may include admitting to not having reasons, or the use of unsupported declarations ("It's just wrong") as justification for a judgment. Published evidence for dumbfounding has drawn exclusively on samples of WEIRD backgrounds (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic), and it remains unclear to what extent the phenomenon is generalizable to other populations. Furthermore, the theoretical implications of moral dumbfounding have been disputed in recent years. In three studies we apply a standardized moral dumbfounding task, and show evidence for moral dumbfounding in a Chinese sample (Study 1, N = 165), an Indian sample (Study 2, N = 181), and a mixed sample primarily (but not exclusively) from North Africa and the Middle East (MENA region, Study 3, N = 264). These findings are consistent with a categorization theories of moral judgment.
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