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Espino O, Orenes I, Moreno-Ríos S. Illusory inferences in conditional expressions. Mem Cognit 2024:10.3758/s13421-024-01571-2. [PMID: 38689204 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-024-01571-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/11/2024] [Indexed: 05/02/2024]
Abstract
A robber points a gun at a cashier and says: "Only one of these two options is true: If you conceal the combination to the safe, then I kill you; otherwise, if you don´t conceal the combination to the safe, then I kill you." Hearing this statement, most people conclude that, in either case, "I kill you." This is an illusory response, in fact; the valid conclusion states "I don´t kill you." The research reported here studied the roles that different expressions of conditionals ("if-then," "only if," and "if and only if") play in the illusory response. Three experiments show that participants inferred the conclusion "I kill you" from the conditional "if-then" and "I may or may not kill you" from the conditional "only if," while selecting both options with similar frequency for the biconditional "if and only if." These results shed light on the main theories of deductive reasoning.
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Affiliation(s)
- Orlando Espino
- Department of Cognitive, Social, and Organizational Psychology, University of La Laguna, Tenerife, Spain.
| | - Isabel Orenes
- Department of Basic Psychology, National Distance Education University (UNED), Madrid, Spain
| | - Sergio Moreno-Ríos
- Department of Developmental and Educational Psychology & CIMCYC, University of Granada, Granada, Spain
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Garcia-Marques T, Figueira P, Fernandes A, Martins J. Deontic signs increase control monitoring: evidence from a modified traffic flanker task. Cogn Process 2023; 24:327-338. [PMID: 37115463 PMCID: PMC10359393 DOI: 10.1007/s10339-023-01139-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/03/2021] [Accepted: 04/12/2023] [Indexed: 04/29/2023]
Abstract
Deontic norms are expected to impose individuals' control over their behavior. In this paper, we address such norms presented in traffic signs and test their influence over executive control functions. For Experiment 1, we develop a traffic flanker task in which the typical neutral arrows are replaced with traffic prohibition/obligation signs. Experiment 2 isolated the deontic aspect of the signs using simple arrows on red, blue, and green backgrounds and either primed them to be interpreted as traffic signs or as elements of a gaming console controller. Results in both studies show evidence of controlling context interferences more efficiently when dealing with deontic (traffic) signs than with simple arrows (Experiment 1) or with similar perceptive targets when primed with a deontic context than with a gaming context (Experiment 2). In both studies, obligation/blue signs mitigate flanker effects less than prohibition/red signs. Stimuli color affects the alertness of the cognitive system, with the color red being, by itself, a cue for increased control. Based on temporal analysis, we further discuss these results as evidence of an increase in proactive control that aims to prevent the occurrence of undesirable influence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Teresa Garcia-Marques
- William James Center for Research, ISPA - Instituto Universitário, Rua Jardim do Tabaco, 34, 1149-041, Lisbon, Portugal.
| | - Pedro Figueira
- William James Center for Research, ISPA - Instituto Universitário, Rua Jardim do Tabaco, 34, 1149-041, Lisbon, Portugal
| | - Alexandre Fernandes
- William James Center for Research, ISPA - Instituto Universitário, Rua Jardim do Tabaco, 34, 1149-041, Lisbon, Portugal
| | - João Martins
- William James Center for Research, ISPA - Instituto Universitário, Rua Jardim do Tabaco, 34, 1149-041, Lisbon, Portugal
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3
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Orenes I, Moreno-Ríos S, Espino O. Representing negated statements: when false possibilities also play in the mind. JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2022.2094934] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Isabel Orenes
- Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Madrid, Spain
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Gómez-Sánchez J, Moreno-Ríos S, Frosch C. Alternatives or syntactic negation? Adults’ and children’s preferences for constructing counterfactual possibilities. CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1007/s12144-021-02456-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
AbstractReasoning with counterfactuals such as “if his sister had entered silently, the child would have been awake”, requires considering what is conjectured (“his sister entered silently”) and what is the counterfactual possibility (“his sister did not enter silently”). In two experiments, we test how both adults (Study 1) and children from 8 to 12 years (Study 2) construct counterfactual possibilities about the cause of an effect (“the child was awake because…”). We test specifically whether people construct the counterfactual possibility by recovering alternatives, for example, “the alarm clock sounded” or by using the syntactic negation using propositional symbols (“his sister did not enter silently”). Moreover, as children show difficulty in thinking with abstract contents, we test whether they construct the counterfactual possibility more readily by recovering concrete alternatives (“the alarm clock sounded”) rather than abstract alternatives (“he had trouble sleeping”). Results showed that children, as well as adults, recovered the alternative as the cause of the effect rather than the negation. Moreover, children, unlike adults, created the counterfactual possibility more frequently by recovering concrete situations rather than abstract situations.
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Vargas C, Moreno-Ríos S. Signalling Three-Way Intersections: Is Redundancy Better Than Only Mandatory or Prohibitory Signs? Front Psychol 2021; 12:712102. [PMID: 34764903 PMCID: PMC8575695 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.712102] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/19/2021] [Accepted: 09/23/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
At intersections, drivers need to infer which ways are allowed by interpreting mandatory and/or prohibitory traffic signs. Time and accuracy in this decision-making process are crucial factors to avoid accidents. Previous studies show that integrating information from prohibitory signs is generally more difficult than from mandatory signs. In Study 1, we compare combined redundant signalling conditions to simple sign conditions at three-way intersections. In Study 2, we carried out a survey among professionals responsible for signposting to test whether common practices are consistent with experimental research. In Study 1, an experimental task was applied (n=24), and in Study 2, the survey response rate was 17%. These included the main cities in Spain such as Madrid and Barcelona. Study 1 showed that inferences with mandatory signs are faster than those with prohibitory signs, and redundant information is an improvement only on prohibitory signs. In Study 2, prohibitory signs were those most frequently chosen by professionals responsible for signposting. In conclusion, the most used signs, according to the laboratory study, were not the best ones for signposting because the faster responses were obtained for mandatory signs, and in second place for redundant signs.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Sergio Moreno-Ríos
- The Mind, Brain and Behavior Research Center (CIMCYC-UGR), University of Granada, Granada, Spain
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Johnson-Laird PN, Quelhas AC, Rasga C. The mental model theory of free choice permissions and paradoxical disjunctive inferences. JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2021.1967963] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- P. N. Johnson-Laird
- Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA
| | | | - Célia Rasga
- ISPA-Instituto Universitário, APPsyCI, Lisbon, Portugal
- Instituto Nacional de Saúde Doutor Ricardo Jorge, Lisbon, Portugal
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Gómez-Sánchez J, Ruiz-Ballesteros JA, Moreno-Ríos S. How children and adults keep track of real information when thinking counterfactually. PLoS One 2020; 15:e0242967. [PMID: 33275631 PMCID: PMC7717521 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0242967] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/23/2020] [Accepted: 11/12/2020] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Thinking about counterfactual conditionals such as “if she had not painted the sheet of paper, it would have been blank” requires us to consider what is conjectured (She did not paint and the sheet was blank) and what actually happened (She painted and the sheet was not blank). In two experiments with adults (Study 1) and schoolchildren from 7 to 13 years (Study 2), we tested three potential sources of difficulty with counterfactuals: inferring, distinguishing what is real vs conjectured (epistemic status) and comprehending linguistic conditional expressions (“if” vs “even if”). The results showed that neither adults nor schoolchildren had difficulty in the comprehension of counterfactual expressions such as “even if” with respect to “if then”. The ability to infer with both of these develops during school years, with adults showing great ability. However, the third source factor is critical: we found that the key to young children’s difficulty with counterfactual thinking was their inability to differentiate real and conjectured information, while adults showed little difficulty with this.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jesica Gómez-Sánchez
- Department of Developmental and Educational Psychology, University of Granada, Granada, Spain
- * E-mail:
| | | | - Sergio Moreno-Ríos
- Department of Developmental and Educational Psychology, University of Granada, Granada, Spain
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Ragni M, Johnson-Laird P. Reasoning about epistemic possibilities. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2020; 208:103081. [PMID: 32497740 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2020.103081] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/26/2019] [Revised: 03/09/2020] [Accepted: 04/24/2020] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
Reasoning about epistemic possibilities - those based on knowledge - is fundamental in daily life. It is formalized in modal logics, of which there are infinitely many, based on the semantics of 'possible worlds'. An alternative psychological theory postulates that possibilities (and probabilities) in daily life are based on the human ability to construct mental models of finite alternatives, which can each be realized in an indefinite number of different ways. This account leads to three main predictions that diverge from normal modal logics. First, the assertion of an epistemic possibility, A, presupposes the possibility of not-A, in default of knowledge to the contrary. Second, reasoners condense multiple possibilities into one, contravening modal logics, but reducing the load on working memory, e.g.: When knowledge shows that this condensation would be inconsistent, reasoners resist it. Epistemic possibilities are akin to non-numerical probabilities, forming a scale that runs from impossible to certain. In contrast, epistemic necessities state a necessary condition for some other proposition, e.g.: "It is necessary that it rains tomorrow for the plants to survive." The article reports five experiments corroborating these predictions. Their results challenge current conceptions of human reasoning.
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Johnson-Laird PN, Ragni M. Possibilities as the foundation of reasoning. Cognition 2019; 193:103950. [PMID: 31374514 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2019.04.019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/21/2018] [Revised: 04/03/2019] [Accepted: 04/22/2019] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
Abstract
Reasoning about possibilities is fundamental in daily life. Yet, it has been little studied in psychology. We present a psychological theory in which it is the foundation of human reasoning. The theory explains how possibilities have distinct interpretations (deontic, epistemic, and alethic), how people represent them in models, and how these models yield inferences. Key principles are that the semantics of possibilities are the same finitary alternatives underlying probabilities, that speech acts can create obligations inexpressible as probabilities, that compound assertions - conditionals and disjunctions - refer to conjunctions of possibilities holding in default of knowledge to the contrary, and that mental models condense multiple consistent possibilities into one. The theory is incompatible with all normal modal logics and with probabilistic logic. Yet, experiments have corroborated its predictions. The article discusses its precursors, rivals, and potentials.
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Affiliation(s)
- P N Johnson-Laird
- Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA; Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, USA.
| | - Marco Ragni
- Cognitive Computation Lab, Institut für Informatik, Technische Fakultät, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Georges-Köhler-Allee, Geb. 052, 79110 Freiburg, Germany
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10
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Emotions and beliefs about morality can change one another. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2019; 198:102880. [PMID: 31301575 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2019.102880] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/11/2018] [Revised: 05/04/2019] [Accepted: 06/30/2019] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
A dual-process theory postulates that belief and emotions about moral assertions can affect one another. The present study corroborated this prediction. Experiments 1, 2 and 3 showed that the pleasantness of a moral assertion - from loathing it to loving it - correlated with how strongly individuals believed it, i.e., its subjective probability. But, despite repeated testing, this relation did not occur for factual assertions. To create the correlation, it sufficed to change factual assertions, such as, "Advanced countries are democracies," into moral assertions, "Advanced countries should be democracies". Two further experiments corroborated the two-way causal relations for moral assertions. Experiment 4 showed that recall of pleasant memories about moral assertions increased their believability, and that the recall of unpleasant memories had the opposite effect. Experiment 5 showed that the creation of reasons to believe moral assertions increased the pleasantness of the emotions they evoked, and that the creation of reasons to disbelieve moral assertions had the opposite effect. Hence, emotions can change beliefs about moral assertions; and reasons can change emotions about moral assertions. We discuss the implications of these results for alternative theories of morality.
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Khemlani SS, Byrne RMJ, Johnson-Laird PN. Facts and Possibilities: A Model-Based Theory of Sentential Reasoning. Cogn Sci 2018; 42:1887-1924. [PMID: 29968343 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12634] [Citation(s) in RCA: 41] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/08/2017] [Revised: 04/17/2018] [Accepted: 05/03/2018] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
This article presents a fundamental advance in the theory of mental models as an explanation of reasoning about facts, possibilities, and probabilities. It postulates that the meanings of compound assertions, such as conditionals (if) and disjunctions (or), unlike those in logic, refer to conjunctions of epistemic possibilities that hold in default of information to the contrary. Various factors such as general knowledge can modulate these interpretations. New information can always override sentential inferences; that is, reasoning in daily life is defeasible (or nonmonotonic). The theory is a dual process one: It distinguishes between intuitive inferences (based on system 1) and deliberative inferences (based on system 2). The article describes a computer implementation of the theory, including its two systems of reasoning, and it shows how the program simulates crucial predictions that evidence corroborates. It concludes with a discussion of how the theory contrasts with those based on logic or on probabilities.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sangeet S Khemlani
- Navy Center for Applied Research in Artificial Intelligence, US Naval Research Laboratory
| | - Ruth M J Byrne
- School of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College Dublin, University of Dublin
| | - Philip N Johnson-Laird
- Department of Psychology, Princeton University
- Department of Psychology, New York University
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Timmons S, Byrne RM. Moral fatigue: The effects of cognitive fatigue on moral reasoning. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2018; 72:943-954. [PMID: 29642785 DOI: 10.1177/1747021818772045] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
We report two experiments that show a moral fatigue effect: participants who are fatigued after they have carried out a tiring cognitive task make different moral judgements compared to participants who are not fatigued. Fatigued participants tend to judge that a moral violation is less permissible even though it would have a beneficial effect, such as killing one person to save the lives of five others. The moral fatigue effect occurs when people make a judgement that focuses on the harmful action, killing one person, but not when they make a judgement that focuses on the beneficial outcome, saving the lives of others, as shown in Experiment 1 ( n = 196). It also occurs for judgements about morally good actions, such as jumping onto railway tracks to save a person who has fallen there, as shown in Experiment 2 ( n = 187). The results have implications for alternative explanations of moral reasoning.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shane Timmons
- School of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College Dublin, University of Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
| | - Ruth Mj Byrne
- School of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College Dublin, University of Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
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14
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Hilton DJ, Charalambides L, Hoareau-Blanchet S. Reasoning about rights and duties: mental models, world knowledge and pragmatic interpretation. THINKING & REASONING 2015. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2015.1076520] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
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Gazzo Castañeda LE, Knauff M. When will is not the same as should: The role of modals in reasoning with legal conditionals. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2015; 69:1480-97. [PMID: 26292145 DOI: 10.1080/17470218.2015.1085067] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Naïve reasoners reject logically valid conclusions from conditional rules if they can think of exceptions in which the antecedent is true, but the consequent is not. However, when reasoning with legal conditionals (e.g., "If a person kills another human, then this person should be punished for manslaughter") people hardly consider exceptions but evaluate conclusions depending on their own sense of justice. We show that participants' reluctance to consider exceptions in legal reasoning depends on the modal auxiliary used. In two experiments we phrased legal conditionals either with the modal "should" (i.e., " . . . then this person should be punished"), or with "will" (i.e., " . . . then this person will be punished") and presented them as modus ponens or modus tollens inferences. Participants had to decide whether the offender should or will be punished (modus ponens) or whether the offender indeed committed the offence (modus tollens). For modus ponens inferences phrased with "should" we replicate previous findings showing that participants select conclusions on the basis of their own sense of justice (Experiments 1 and 2). Yet, when the legal conditional is phrased with the modal "will" this effect is attenuated (Experiments 1 and 2), and exceptions are considered (Experiment 1). The modal auxiliary did not affect modus tollens inferences.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Markus Knauff
- a Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Science , Justus Liebig University Giessen , Giessen , Germany
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Corradi-Dell'Acqua C, Turri F, Kaufmann L, Clément F, Schwartz S. How the brain predicts people's behavior in relation to rules and desires. Evidence of a medio-prefrontal dissociation. Cortex 2015; 70:21-34. [PMID: 25820129 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2015.02.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/18/2014] [Revised: 11/28/2014] [Accepted: 02/17/2015] [Indexed: 12/31/2022]
Abstract
Forming and updating impressions about others is critical in everyday life and engages portions of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC), the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and the amygdala. Some of these activations are attributed to "mentalizing" functions necessary to represent people's mental states, such as beliefs or desires. Evolutionary psychology and developmental studies, however, suggest that interpersonal inferences can also be obtained through the aid of deontic heuristics, which dictate what must (or must not) be done in given circumstances. We used fMRI and asked 18 participants to predict whether unknown characters would follow their desires or obey external rules. Participants had no means, at the beginning, to make accurate predictions, but slowly learned (throughout the experiment) each character's behavioral profile. We isolated brain regions whose activity changed during the experiment, as a neural signature of impression updating: whereas dMPFC was progressively more involved in predicting characters' behavior in relation to their desires, the medial orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala were progressively more recruited in predicting rule-based behavior. Our data provide evidence of a neural dissociation between deontic inference and theory-of-mind (ToM), and support a differentiation of orbital and dorsal prefrontal cortex in terms of low- and high-level social cognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Corrado Corradi-Dell'Acqua
- Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland; Department of Fundamental Neurosciences, University Medical Center, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland.
| | - Francesco Turri
- Department of Fundamental Neurosciences, University Medical Center, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland.
| | - Laurence Kaufmann
- Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lausanne, Quartier UNIL-Mouline, Lausanne, Switzerland.
| | - Fabrice Clément
- Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland; Cognitive Science Centre, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland.
| | - Sophie Schwartz
- Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland; Department of Fundamental Neurosciences, University Medical Center, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland; Geneva Neuroscience Center, University of Geneva, Switzerland.
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18
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Gubbins E, Byrne RMJ. Dual processes of emotion and reason in judgments about moral dilemmas. THINKING & REASONING 2014. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2013.877400] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
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Elqayam S, Over DE. New paradigm psychology of reasoning: An introduction to the special issue edited by Elqayam, Bonnefon, and Over. THINKING & REASONING 2013. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2013.841591] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Shira Elqayam
- a School of Applied Social Sciences , De Montfort University , UK
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20
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Elqayam S, Evans JSBT. Rationality in the new paradigm: Strict versus soft Bayesian approaches. THINKING & REASONING 2013. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2013.834268] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Shira Elqayam
- a Division of Psychology, School of Applied Social Sciences , De Montfort University , Leicester , UK
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Sousa P, Piazza J. Harmful transgressions qua moral transgressions: A deflationary view. THINKING & REASONING 2013. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2013.834845] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
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22
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Lee NYL, Johnson-Laird PN. A theory of reverse engineering and its application to Boolean systems. JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2013. [DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2013.782033] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
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23
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Toward a Unified Theory of Reasoning. PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 2013. [DOI: 10.1016/b978-0-12-407187-2.00001-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/03/2023]
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Roca J, Castro C, Bueno M, Moreno-Ríos S. A driving-emulation task to study the integration of goals with obligatory and prohibitory traffic signs. APPLIED ERGONOMICS 2012; 43:81-88. [PMID: 21514565 DOI: 10.1016/j.apergo.2011.03.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/29/2009] [Revised: 11/04/2010] [Accepted: 03/29/2011] [Indexed: 05/30/2023]
Abstract
This research aims to analyse how drivers integrate the information provided by traffic signs with their general goals (i.e. where they want to go). Some previous studies have evaluated the comparative advantages of obligatory and prohibitory traffic signs using a judgement task. In this work, a new experimental task with greater similarity to driving situations is proposed. Participants imagine they are driving a vehicle and must make right or left turn manoeuvres according to a previously indicated objective and the information from obligatory and prohibitory traffic signs. Eighty-two participants took part in two different experiments. According to the results, an obligatory traffic sign is associated with faster and more accurate responses only when the participant's initial objective is allowed. When the initial objective was not allowed, an advantage in accuracy was observed with prohibitory traffic signs and there was no significant difference in reaction time between the two types of sign. These results suggest that having an obligatory traffic sign may facilitate a correct response when the driver's goal is effectively allowed, whereas a prohibitory traffic sign could be more effective in preventing error when the driver has a not-allowed goal in mind. However, processing a prohibitory sign requires an extra inference (i.e. deciding which is the allowed manoeuvre), and thus the potential advantage in reaction time of the prohibitory sign may disappear. A second experiment showed that the results could not be explained by a potential congruency effect between the location (left or right) of the road signs and the position of the key or the hand used to respond (such as the Simon effect or the spatial Stroop effect). Also, an increase in the difficulty of the task (using an incongruent hand to respond) affected performance more strongly in experimental conditions that required making inferences. This made the advantage of the obligatory sign over the prohibitory sign in this condition more noteworthy. The evidence gathered in the current study could be of particular interest in some applied research areas, such as the assessment of road traffic signalling strategies or the ergonomic design of GPS navigation systems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Javier Roca
- Departamento de Psicología Experimental y Fisiología del Comportamiento, Universidad de Granada, Campus Cartuja s/n, 18011 Granada, Spain.
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Vargas C, Moreno-Rios S, Castro C, Underwood G. Encoding time and signs exposure time in the representation of diagrammatic deontic meanings. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2011; 137:106-14. [PMID: 21463852 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2011.03.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2009] [Revised: 03/10/2011] [Accepted: 03/11/2011] [Indexed: 10/18/2022] Open
Abstract
It has been proposed that prohibition and obligation be represented in different ways in reasoning with deontic information (Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 2005). Obligations are salient in permissible situations and prohibitions in impermissible situations. In some specific cases, differential initial representations are also consistently predicted from the comprehension of negations, if prohibition is considered as the negation of an obligation. Three experiments evaluate whether traffic signs of prohibition and obligation speed up the response time to the proposed direction represented and whether this advantage remains when people have more time to think. When making judgements about the manoeuvre performed by a vehicle, participants' response times are consistent with the predicted representation when they have a short time (i.e., 300ms) to understand the premise. In this case they represent what is permissible by obligatory signs and also what is impermissible by prohibitory signs. However, if they have more time (i.e., 1000 ms) to understand the premise, they still represent what is permissible by obligatory signs but they seem to change their initial representations to what is permissible by prohibitory signs.
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Abstract
To be rational is to be able to reason. Thirty years ago psychologists believed that human reasoning depended on formal rules of inference akin to those of a logical calculus. This hypothesis ran into difficulties, which led to an alternative view: reasoning depends on envisaging the possibilities consistent with the starting point--a perception of the world, a set of assertions, a memory, or some mixture of them. We construct mental models of each distinct possibility and derive a conclusion from them. The theory predicts systematic errors in our reasoning, and the evidence corroborates this prediction. Yet, our ability to use counterexamples to refute invalid inferences provides a foundation for rationality. On this account, reasoning is a simulation of the world fleshed out with our knowledge, not a formal rearrangement of the logical skeletons of sentences.
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Quelhas AC, Johnson-Laird PN, Juhos C. The modulation of conditional assertions and its effects on reasoning. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2010; 63:1716-39. [DOI: 10.1080/17470210903536902] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Abstract
The theory of mental models postulates that conditionals of the sort, if A then C, have a “core” meaning referring to three possibilities: A and C, not-A and C, and not-A and not-C. The meaning of a conditional's clauses and general knowledge can modulate this meaning, blocking certain possibilities or adding relations between the clauses. Four experiments investigated such interpretations in factual and deontic domains. In Experiment 1, the participants constructed instances of what was possible and what was impossible according to various conditionals. The results corroborated the general predictions of the model theory and also the occurrence of modulation. The resulting interpretations governed the conclusions that participants accepted in Experiment 2, which also yielded the predicted effects of a time limit on responding. In Experiment 3, the participants drew the predicted conclusions for themselves. In Experiment 4, modulation led to predicted temporal relations between A and C. We relate these results to current theories of conditionals.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Csongor Juhos
- Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada, Lisbon, Portugal
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29
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Abstract
Henrich et al. address how culture leads to cognitive variability and recommend that researchers be critical about the samples they investigate. However, there are other sources of variability, such as individual strategies in reasoning and the content and context on which processes operate. Because strategy and content drive variability, those factors are of primary interest, while culture is merely incidental.
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Beller S. Deontic reasoning reviewed: psychological questions, empirical findings, and current theories. Cogn Process 2009; 11:123-32. [DOI: 10.1007/s10339-009-0265-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/31/2008] [Accepted: 05/27/2009] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
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Castro C, Moreno-Ríos S, Tornay F, Vargas C. Mental representations of obligatory and prohibitory traffic signs. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2008; 129:8-17. [PMID: 18501319 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2008.03.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/21/2005] [Revised: 03/29/2008] [Accepted: 03/31/2008] [Indexed: 10/22/2022] Open
Abstract
Every traffic sign conveys a single proposition about traffic conditions. Drivers must integrate this proposition with their goals and other known facts to decide on an appropriate action in what amounts to a deduction task. For example, imagine that you are driving a car and you want to turn right at an intersection but there is a 'no right turn' sign. You have to assess the options and make a decision (reach a conclusion). Theoretical accounts from research about reasoning can be applied to how we understand traffic signs and make inferences from them. This study includes two experiments that analysed how people decide whether a situation is allowed or not, taking into account the information provided by one sign--obligatory or prohibitory--or two signs--two obligatory or two prohibitory signs. The number of signs, that is, the complexity of the driving scene, was a key factor in this study. The two experiments differ in the presentation format of the two-sign experimental condition. In the first experiment, the signs were presented as two isolated signs. In the second experiment, the two signs were embedded in one. Equivalent results were found whether two isolated signs or two embedded signs were shown. When an obligatory sign was used at the junction, faster responses were obtained for allowed manoeuvres than for those not allowed. When a prohibitory sign was used, the results were the opposite. However, the advantage of prohibitory signs in the not-allowed situation was not replicated when people had to collect information from two prohibitory signs. Results showed that people integrate two obligatory sign messages--informing where one can go--more easily than two prohibitory sign messages--informing where not to go. Therefore, it could be said that each traffic sign elicits an internal mental model elaboration in which forbidden actions are explicitly labelled by means of attached "mental footnotes" indicating the epistemic status of "prohibitory information."
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Précis of The rational imagination: how people create alternatives to reality. Behav Brain Sci 2008; 30:439-53; discussion 453-76. [PMID: 18321404 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x07002579] [Citation(s) in RCA: 80] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
The human imagination remains one of the last uncharted terrains of the mind. People often imagine how events might have turned out "if only" something had been different. The "fault lines" of reality, those aspects more readily changed, indicate that counterfactual thoughts are guided by the same principles as rational thoughts. In the past, rationality and imagination have been viewed as opposites. But research has shown that rational thought is more imaginative than cognitive scientists had supposed. In The Rational Imagination, I argue that imaginative thought is more rational than scientists have imagined. People exhibit remarkable similarities in the sorts of things they change in their mental representation of reality when they imagine how the facts could have turned out differently. For example, they tend to imagine alternatives to actions rather than inactions, events within their control rather than those beyond their control, and socially unacceptable events rather than acceptable ones. Their thoughts about how an event might have turned out differently lead them to judge that a strong causal relation exists between an antecedent event and the outcome, and their thoughts about how an event might have turned out the same lead them to judge that a weaker causal relation exists. In a simple temporal sequence, people tend to imagine alternatives to the most recent event. The central claim in the book is that counterfactual thoughts are organised along the same principles as rational thought. The idea that the counterfactual imagination is rational depends on three steps: (1) humans are capable of rational thought; (2) they make inferences by thinking about possibilities; and (3) their counterfactual thoughts rely on thinking about possibilities, just as rational thoughts do. The sorts of possibilities that people envisage explain the mutability of certain aspects of mental representations and the immutability of other aspects.
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The psychology of moral reasoning. JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 2008. [DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500001479] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/04/2023]
Abstract
AbstractThis article presents a theory of reasoning about moral propositions that is based on four fundamental principles. First, no simple criterion picks out propositions about morality from within the larger set of deontic propositions concerning what is permissible and impermissible in social relations, the law, games, and manners. Second, the mechanisms underlying emotions and deontic evaluations are independent and operate in parallel, and so some scenarios elicit emotions prior to moral evaluations, some elicit moral evaluations prior to emotions, and some elicit them at the same time. Third, deontic evaluations depend on inferences, either unconscious intuitions or conscious reasoning. Fourth, human beliefs about what is, and isn’t, moral are neither complete nor consistent. The article marshals the evidence, which includes new studies, corroborating these principles, and discusses the relations between them and other current theories of moral reasoning.
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