Old processes, new perspectives: Familiarity is correlated with (not independent of) recollection and is more (not equally) variable for targets than for lures

Recognition memory: The probe, the returned signal, and the decision

In an attempt to better understand recognition memory we look at how three approaches (dual processing, signal detection, and global matching) have addressed the probe, the returned signal and the decision in four recognition paradigms. These are single-item recognition (including the remember/know paradigm), recognition in relational context, associative recognition, and source monitoring. The contrast, with regards to the double-miss rate (the probability of recognizing neither item in intact and rearranged pairs) and the effect of the oldness of the other member of the test pair, between identifying the old words in test pairs (the relational context paradigm) and first identifying the intact test pairs and then identifying the old words (adding associative recognition to the relational context paradigm) suggests that the retrieval of associative information in the relational context paradigm is unintentional, unlike the retrieval of associative information in associative recognition. It also seems possible that the information that is spontaneously retrieved in single-item recognition, possibly including the remember/know paradigm, is also unintentional, unlike the retrieval of information in source monitoring. Probable differences between intentional and unintentional retrieval, together with the pattern of effects with regards to the double-miss rate and the effect of the other member of the test pair, are used to evaluate the three approaches. Our conclusion is that all three approaches have something valid to say about recognition, but none is equally applicable across all four paradigms.

Electrophysiological analysis of signal detection outcomes emphasizes the role of decisional factors in recognition memory

Introduction

Event-related potential (ERP) studies have identified two time windows associated with recognition memory and interpreted them as reflecting two processes: familiarity and recollection. However, using relatively simple stimuli and achieving high recognition rates, most studies focused on hits and correct rejections. This leaves out some information (misses and false alarms) that according to Signal Detection Theory (SDT) is necessary to understand signal processing.

Methods

We used a difficult visual recognition task with colored pictures of different categories to obtain enough of the four possible SDT outcomes and analyzed them with modern ERP methods.

Results

Non-parametric analysis of these outcomes identified a single time window (470 to 670 ms) which reflected activity within fronto-central and posterior-left clusters of electrodes, indicating differential processing. The posterior-left cluster significantly distinguished all STD outcomes. The fronto-central cluster only distinguished ERPs according to the subject's response: yes vs. no. Additionally, only electrophysiological activity within the posterior-left cluster correlated with the discrimination index (d').

Discussion

We show that when all SDT outcomes are examined, ERPs of recognition memory reflect a single-time window that may reveal a bottom-up factor discriminating the history of items (i.e. memory strength), as well as a top-down factor indicating participants' decision.

Dopamine enhances model-free credit assignment through boosting of retrospective model-based inference

Dopamine is implicated in representing model-free (MF) reward prediction errors a as well as influencing model-based (MB) credit assignment and choice. Putative cooperative interactions between MB and MF systems include a guidance of MF credit assignment by MB inference. Here, we used a double-blind, placebo-controlled, within-subjects design to test an hypothesis that enhancing dopamine levels boosts the guidance of MF credit assignment by MB inference. In line with this, we found that levodopa enhanced guidance of MF credit assignment by MB inference, without impacting MF and MB influences directly. This drug effect correlated negatively with a dopamine-dependent change in purely MB credit assignment, possibly reflecting a trade-off between these two MB components of behavioural control. Our findings of a dopamine boost in MB inference guidance of MF learning highlight a novel DA influence on MB-MF cooperative interactions.

Efficiency and prioritization of inference-based credit assignment

Organisms adapt to their environments by learning to approach states that predict rewards and avoid states associated with punishments. Knowledge about the affective value of states often relies on credit assignment (CA), whereby state values are updated on the basis of reward feedback. Remarkably, humans assign credit to states that are not observed but are instead inferred based on a cognitive map that represents structural knowledge of an environment. A pertinent example is authors attempting to infer the identity of anonymous reviewers to assign them credit or blame and, on this basis, inform future referee recommendations. Although inference is cognitively costly, it is unknown how it influences CA or how it is apportioned between hidden and observable states (for example, both anonymous and revealed reviewers). We addressed these questions in a task that provided choices between lotteries where each led to a unique pair of occasionally rewarding outcome states. On some trials, both states were observable (rendering inference nugatory), whereas on others, the identity of one of the states was concealed. Importantly, by exploiting knowledge of choice-state associations, subjects could infer the identity of this hidden state. We show that having to perform inference reduces state-value updates. Strikingly, and in violation of normative theories, this reduction in CA was selective for the observed outcome alone. These findings have implications for the operation of putative cognitive maps.

Critical tests of the continuous dual-process model of recognition

Dual process recognition models assume recognition depends upon context recollection and/or item familiarity. While most assume recollection is more highly valued or weighted than familiarity during judgment, we tested a continuous dual process (CDP) model that instead assumes recollection and familiarity are equally weighted during recognition judgment. Experiments 1a and 1b used a joint rating scale in which each probe was rated for recollection and familiarity strength, which were then used to predict overall recognition confidence. In both, recollection dominated familiarity such that familiarity ratings were only predictive of confidence when recollection ratings were relatively weaker. In contrast, when recollection ratings were stronger, familiarity made no contribution to recognition confidence. Experiment 2 used a different, bifurcated rating scale previously demonstrating that strong ratings of familiarity can lead to better recognition yet worse contextual source memory than weak ratings of recollection. However, the current study failed to find this dissociation, instead demonstrating that weak recollection ratings were as or more accurate than the strongest familiarity ratings in both recognition and source memory. Replacing the CDP model equal weighting decision rule with one incorporating a strong relative preference for recollection over familiarity yielded simulation data more consistent with the empirical data and is more optimal if recollection is in fact more diagnostic of recognition than familiarity. Overall, these findings suggest that observers have a strong preference for relying on recollection over familiarity during recognition, presumably because it better situates the probe within a specific episode.

Human subjects exploit a cognitive map for credit assignment

Credit assignment (CA) to relevant actions poses a challenge because one is often flooded with reward feedback that is not easily causally attributed. We addressed this issue in a reinforcement learning framework wherein choice is mutually controlled by value-caching model-free (MF) and prospective, planning model-based (MB) systems. We find knowledge, stored in a cognitive map, filters exuberant reward feedback to guide CA in both systems but based on different attribute dimensions. In MF, CA is boosted for outcomes that are relevant (causally related) to one’s choice, whereas in MB, CA is enhanced for outcomes that attract greater attention during the deliberation process that preceded a choice. We consider normative and mechanistic accounts, including how these processes are instrumental to adaptation.

An influential reinforcement learning framework proposes that behavior is jointly governed by model-free (MF) and model-based (MB) controllers. The former learns the values of actions directly from past encounters, and the latter exploits a cognitive map of the task to calculate these prospectively. Considerable attention has been paid to how these systems interact during choice, but how and whether knowledge of a cognitive map contributes to the way MF and MB controllers assign credit (i.e., to how they revaluate actions and states following the receipt of an outcome) remains underexplored. Here, we examine such sophisticated credit assignment using a dual-outcome bandit task. We provide evidence that knowledge of a cognitive map influences credit assignment in both MF and MB systems, mediating subtly different aspects of apparent relevance. Specifically, we show MF credit assignment is enhanced for those rewards that are related to a choice, and this contrasted with choice-unrelated rewards that reinforced subsequent choices negatively. This modulation is only possible based on knowledge of task structure. On the other hand, MB credit assignment was boosted for outcomes that impacted on differences in values between offered bandits. We consider mechanistic accounts and the normative status of these findings. We suggest the findings extend the scope and sophistication of cognitive map-based credit assignment during reinforcement learning, with implications for understanding behavioral control.

Model based planners reflect on their model-free propensities

Dual-reinforcement learning theory proposes behaviour is under the tutelage of a retrospective, value-caching, model-free (MF) system and a prospective-planning, model-based (MB), system. This architecture raises a question as to the degree to which, when devising a plan, a MB controller takes account of influences from its MF counterpart. We present evidence that such a sophisticated self-reflective MB planner incorporates an anticipation of the influences its own MF-proclivities exerts on the execution of its planned future actions. Using a novel bandit task, wherein subjects were periodically allowed to design their environment, we show that reward-assignments were constructed in a manner consistent with a MB system taking account of its MF propensities. Thus, in the task participants assigned higher rewards to bandits that were momentarily associated with stronger MF tendencies. Our findings have implications for a range of decision making domains that includes drug abuse, pre-commitment, and the tension between short and long-term decision horizons in economics.

Deficits in recent but not lifetime familiarity in amnestic mild cognitive impairment

People with amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) repeat questions, seemingly without any sense of familiarity (i.e., recognition of prior occurrence without recollection of episodic context). Accumulation of neurofibrillary tau in preclinical Alzheimer's disease begins in perirhinal cortex, a medial temporal lobe region linked to familiarity. Both observations would predict impaired familiarity assessment in aMCI; however, the extant evidence is mixed. To reveal familiarity impairments, it may be necessary to minimize the influence of recollection. In the current study, older adults with aMCI and healthy controls were administered two tasks on which a well-characterized patient (NB) with selective familiarity impairments due to surgical left temporal lobe excision sparing the hippocampus showed abnormal performance: frequency judgments for words exposed to in a recent study phase and judgments of cumulative lifetime familiarity for object concepts denoted by words. We also administered a process dissociation procedure (PDP) task that previously revealed spared familiarity in aMCI. We predicted that familiarity would be spared in aMCI on the PDP task, but impaired when assessed by frequency judgments for recent laboratory exposures and lifetime familiarity judgments. Familiarity was spared on the PDP task, but was impaired when probed with frequency judgments for recently exposed words in aMCI. Lifetime familiarity was also not impaired in aMCI. These results highlight the benefits of studying familiarity under conditions that minimize recollection and the value of frequency judgments in revealing familiarity deficits, and suggest that perirhinal cortex may not be necessary for accessing familiarity accumulated over a lifetime of experience.

Probability of target recollection varies with target-lure relatedness under the dual process signal detection model

The ROC function plots hit and false alarm rates against one another. For item recognition the z-transformed ROC (Z-ROC) function is typically linear with slope less than one. The Dual Process Signal Detection (DPSD) and Unequal Variance Signal Detection (UVSD) models see the slope as reflecting the ratio of the lure and target evidence standard deviations. The DPSD model in addition sees the slope as co-varying with estimates of target recollection probability (R). This follows because the slope decreases with increases in the target evidence standard deviation which in turn increases with increases in the numbers of high evidence recollection items. However our results suggest that the lure evidence standard deviation, and thus the Z-ROC slope, can vary with factors seemingly unrelated to target recollection, posing problems for DPSD estimates of R. In word recognition the standard deviation of lure confidence ratings and the slope of the z-ROC function were larger with semantically related than unrelated lures. When the data for related and unrelated lures were fit separately, the standard two-parameter DPSD model, implausibly, set R lower for related than unrelated lures. The UVSD model, more plausibly, set the lure evidence standard deviation larger for related than unrelated lures.

Retrospective model-based inference guides model-free credit assignment

An extensive reinforcement learning literature shows that organisms assign credit efficiently, even under conditions of state uncertainty. However, little is known about credit-assignment when state uncertainty is subsequently resolved. Here, we address this problem within the framework of an interaction between model-free (MF) and model-based (MB) control systems. We present and support experimentally a theory of MB retrospective-inference. Within this framework, a MB system resolves uncertainty that prevailed when actions were taken thus guiding an MF credit-assignment. Using a task in which there was initial uncertainty about the lotteries that were chosen, we found that when participants' momentary uncertainty about which lottery had generated an outcome was resolved by provision of subsequent information, participants preferentially assigned credit within a MF system to the lottery they retrospectively inferred was responsible for this outcome. These findings extend our knowledge about the range of MB functions and the scope of system interactions.

Medial thalamic stroke and its impact on familiarity and recollection

Models of recognition memory have postulated that the mammillo-thalamic tract (MTT)/anterior thalamic nucleus (AN) complex would be critical for recollection while the Mediodorsal nucleus (MD) of the thalamus would support familiarity and indirectly also be involved in recollection (Aggleton et al., 2011). 12 patients with left thalamic stroke underwent a neuropsychological assessment, three verbal recognition memory tasks assessing familiarity and recollection each using different procedures and a high-resolution structural MRI. Patients showed poor recollection on all three tasks. In contrast, familiarity was spared in each task. No patient had significant AN lesions. Critically, a subset of 5 patients had lesions of the MD without lesions of the MTT. They also showed impaired recollection but preserved familiarity. Recollection is therefore impaired following MD damage, but familiarity is not. This suggests that models of familiarity, which assign a critical role to the MD, should be reappraised.

The Electrophysiological Signature of Remember-Know Is Confounded with Memory Strength and Cannot Be Interpreted as Evidence for Dual-process Theory of Recognition

The quantity and nature of the processes underlying recognition memory remains an open question. A majority of behavioral, neuropsychological, and brain studies have suggested that recognition memory is supported by two dissociable processes: recollection and familiarity. It has been conversely argued, however, that recollection and familiarity map onto a single continuum of mnemonic strength and hence that recognition memory is mediated by a single process. Previous electrophysiological studies found marked dissociations between recollection and familiarity, which have been widely held as corroborating the dual-process account. However, it remains unknown whether a strength interpretation can likewise apply for these findings. Here we describe an ERP study, using a modified remember-know (RK) procedure, which allowed us to control for mnemonic strength. We find that ERPs of high and low mnemonic strength mimicked the electrophysiological distinction between R and K responses, in a lateral positive component (LPC), 500-1000 msec poststimulus onset. Critically, when contrasting strength with RK experience, by comparing weak R to strong K responses, the electrophysiological signal mapped onto strength, not onto subjective RK experience. Invoking the LPC as support for dual-process accounts may, therefore, be amiss.

The representational consequences of intentional forgetting: Impairments to both the probability and fidelity of long-term memory

We investigated whether intentional forgetting impacts only the likelihood of later retrieval from long-term memory or whether it also impacts the fidelity of those representations that are successfully retrieved. We accomplished this by combining an item-method directed forgetting task with a testing procedure and modeling approach inspired by the delayed-estimation paradigm used in the study of visual short-term memory (STM). Abstract or concrete colored images were each followed by a remember (R) or forget (F) instruction and sometimes by a visual probe requiring a speeded detection response (E1-E3). Memory was tested using an old-new (E1-E2) or remember-know-no (E3) recognition task followed by a continuous color judgment task (E2-E3); a final experiment included only the color judgment task (E4). Replicating the existing literature, more "old" or "remember" responses were made to R than F items and RTs to postinstruction visual probes were longer following F than R instructions. Color judgments were more accurate for successfully recognized or recollected R than F items (E2-E3); a mixture model confirmed a decrease to both the probability of retrieving the F items as well as the fidelity of the representation of those F items that were retrieved (E4). We conclude that intentional forgetting is an effortful process that not only reduces the likelihood of successfully encoding an item for later retrieval, but also produces an impoverished memory trace even when those items are retrieved; these findings draw a parallel between the control of memory representations within working and long-term memory.

Fuzzy-Trace Theory and Lifespan Cognitive Development

Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) emphasizes the use of core theoretical principles, such as the verbatim-gist distinction, to predict new findings about cognitive development that are counterintuitive from the perspective of other theories or of common-sense. To the extent that such predictions are confirmed, the range of phenomena that are explained expands without increasing the complexity of the theory's assumptions. We examine research on recent examples of such predictions during four epochs of cognitive development: childhood, adolescence, young adulthood, and late adulthood. During the first two, the featured predictions are surprising developmental reversals in false memory (childhood) and in risky decision making (adolescence). During young adulthood, FTT predicts that a retrieval operation that figures centrally in dual-process theories of memory, recollection, is bivariate rather than univariate. During the late adulthood, FTT identifies a retrieval operation, reconstruction, that has been omitted from current theories of normal memory declines in aging and pathological declines in dementia. The theory predicts that reconstruction is a major factor in such declines and that it is able to forecast future dementia.

Recollection-Based Retrieval Is Influenced by Contextual Variation at Encoding but Not at Retrieval

In this article, we investigated the effects of variations at encoding and retrieval on recollection. We argue that recollection is more likely to be affected by the processing that information undergoes at encoding than at retrieval. To date, manipulations shown to affect recollection were typically carried out at encoding. Therefore, an open question is whether these same manipulations would also affect recollection when carried out at retrieval, or whether there is an inherent connection between their effects on recollection and the encoding stage. We therefore manipulated, at either encoding or retrieval, fluency of processing (Experiment 1)-typically found not to affect recollection-and the amount of attentional resources available for processing (Experiments 2 and 3)-typically reported to affect recollection. We found that regardless of the type of manipulation, recollection was affected more by manipulations carried out at encoding and was essentially unaffected when these manipulations were carried out at retrieval. These findings suggest an inherent dependency between recollection-based retrieval and the encoding stage. It seems that because recollection is a contextual-based retrieval process, it is determined by the processing information undergoes at encoding-at the time when context is bound with the items-but not at retrieval-when context is only recovered.