Level of agency in sub-clinical checking

Obsessive-compulsive symptoms and dissociative experiences: Suggested underlying mechanisms and implications for science and practice

A strong and specific link between obsessive-compulsive disorder or symptoms (OCD/S) and a tendency for dissociative experiences (e.g., depersonalization-derealization, absorption and imaginative involvement) cannot be explained by trauma and is poorly understood. The present theoretical formulation proposes five different models conceptualizing the relationship. According to Model 1, dissociative experiences result from OCD/S through inward-focused attention and repetition. According to Model 2, dissociative absorption causally brings about both OCD/S and associated cognitive risk factors, such as thought-action fusion, partly through impoverished sense of agency. The remaining models highlight common underlying causal mechanisms: temporo-parietal abnormalities impairing embodiment and sensory integration (Model 3); sleep alterations causing sleepiness and dreamlike thought or mixed sleep-wake states (Model 4); and a hyperactive, intrusive imagery system with a tendency for pictorial thinking (Model 5). The latter model relates to Maladaptive Daydreaming, a suggested dissociative syndrome with strong ties to the obsessive-compulsive spectrum. These five models point to potential directions for future research, as these theoretical accounts may aid the two fields in interacting with each other, to the benefit of both. Finally, several dissociation-informed paths for further developing clinical intervention in OCD are identified.

Did i do that? Cognitive flexibility and self-agency in patients with obsessivecompulsive disorder

Self-agency can be understood as the ability to infer causal relationships between actions and sensory events. Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) patients with checking compulsions often report lack of "action-completion" sensations, possibly due to an altered sense of agency in these patients. The present study aimed to investigate whether self-agency was related to cognitive flexibility in OCD checkers. In 18 adult OCD checkers and 18 age- and gender-matched healthy controls, cognitive flexibility was assessed with the Intra-Extra Dimensional Set Shift Task (IED). Self-agency attribution was evaluated in two tasks that targeted the novel construct of "gaze-agency", the capability of an observer to identify his or her own eye movements as the cause of a concurrent event (here, an auditory beep). This technique allows sensitive measurement of agency under subtly varying investigator-controlled conditions. OCD checkers manifested significantly inferior performance correctly ascribing the beeps to their own ocular saccades than controls, even when after a hint was provided. Although cognitive inflexibility (errors on the IED) did not differ significantly between the two groups, within the OCD sample there were positive correlations between errors in self-agency attribution and total and extra-dimensional shift errors. These findings show that cognitive inflexibility is related to self-agency in OCD.

What am I doing? It depends: agency and action identification

Actions can be identified at a range of levels, from higher level, outcome-related descriptions to lower level, movement-related descriptions. But how do these levels of identification influence the experience of control (agency) over a task? We addressed the relation between the level of action identification and agency using a hierarchical task modeled from typing. Participants memorized letter sequences and reported them by moving a cursor to targets that contained letters. To manipulate lower level (aiming) difficulty, the targets were either large or small. To manipulate higher level (memory) difficulty, the letter sequences were either constant or random within a block. We found effects of higher and lower level difficulty on agency and action identification. Moreover, we found interactive effects of higher and lower level difficulty on performance. We discuss these findings in terms of contributions to the study of agency, and some differences from the results of previous studies of action identification.

A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion

In this perspective, we follow the idea that an integration of cognitive models with sensorimotor theories of compulsion is required to understand the subjective experience of compulsive action. We argue that cognitive biases in obsessive-compulsive disorder may obscure an altered momentary, pre-reflective experience of sensorimotor control, whose detection thus requires an implicit experimental operationalization. We propose that a classic psychophysical test exists that provides this implicit operationalization, i.e., the intentional binding paradigm. We show how intentional binding can pit two ideas against each other that are fundamental to current sensorimotor theories of compulsion, i.e., the idea of excessive conscious monitoring of action, and the idea that patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder compensate for diminished conscious access to "internal states", including states of the body, by relying on more readily observable proxies. Following these ideas, we develop concrete, testable hypotheses on how intentional binding changes under the assumption of different sensorimotor theories of compulsion. Furthermore, we demonstrate how intentional binding provides a touchstone for predictive coding accounts of obsessive-compulsive disorder. A thorough empirical test of the hypotheses developed in this perspective could help explain the puzzling, disabling phenomenon of compulsion, with implications for the normal subjective experience of human action.

Sense of Personal Control Intensifies Moral Judgments of Others' Actions

Recent research in moral psychology has highlighted how the current internal states of observers can influence their moral judgments of others' actions. In this article, we argue that an important internal state that serves such a function is the sense of control one has over one's own actions. Across four studies, we show that an individual's own current sense of control is positively associated with the intensity of moral judgments of the actions of others. We also show that this effect extends not only to judgments of rightness and wrongness (Study 1), but also to assignments of reward and punishment (Study 2). Finally, we demonstrate that this effect is based on the current experience of control by showing a moderation of the effect via motivational states (promotion; prevention) that either lead one to incorporate or disregard internal states when making judgments (Study 3) and by subtly manipulating participants' sense of control (Study 4).

Who Has Done It? Exploring Gaze Agency in Obsessive-Compulsive Checkers

The sense of agency (SoA) is a multifaceted construct, which can be defined as the ability to understand the causal relationships between our actions and sensory events. Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) patients with checking compulsions often report a "lack of action completion" sensations, which has been conceptualized in the so-called "Not Just Right Experiences" construct. An intriguing explanation of this phenomenon comes from Belayachi and Van der Linden (2009, 2010), who suggest that OCD-checking patients are more prone to specify their action in a relatively molecular and inflexible way. Currently, there are no studies in literature which address this issue in OCD patients, except for the one of Gentsch et al. (2012), who suggested an altered SoA in these patients. Here we exploited a novel construct, gaze agency, to evaluate causal attribution capabilities in a group of 21 OCD patients (checkers) and matched healthy controls (HCs). Basically, two tasks targeted observers' capability to identify their own eye movements as the cause of concurrently presented beeps, which allowed us to measure agency sensitivity as well as subtle agency alterations in an ecological setting. We found a poorer performance in OCD patients as compared to HCs in many parameters of our tasks, suggesting a difficulty with causal attribution possibly due to both a reduced cognitive flexibility and a less functional gaze agency in OCD patients.

The Cognitive Heterogeneity of Obsessive-Compulsive Checking

The present article reviews the phenomenology of obsessive-compulsive checking, examining how action processing can be differentially affected across distinct checking subtypes. Checking is a normal phenomenon which ensures that an intended goal has been actually completed. Checking symptoms have consistently been connected to impairments in processing information related to self-performances. Theoretical and empirical work has explained compulsive checking as a result of various cognitive deficits related to action processing (e.g., low confidence in cognitive abilities, impaired memory for actions, abnormal reality monitoring, overactive action monitoring, defective goal processing). Such apparent inconsistencies are, however, in agreement with clinical and empirical observations highlighting substantial variability in the subjective experience preceding/accompanying checking. Many factors can in fact prevent the cognitive system from determining whether or not an intended goal has actually been achieved. We argue that several action processing mechanisms are likely affected in checking; the related subjective experience may vary accordingly.

Exploring the Parsing of Dynamic Action in Checking Proneness

Impaired action processing may be a key feature of the obsessive-compulsive checking phenomenon, although the mechanism underlying the impairment remains to be explored. We examined the ability to parse a continuous flow of movements and perceptual changes into meaningful segments of action — a key component of action processing — in checking proneness. Participants (N= 65) completed a measure of obsessive-compulsive symptoms and, while viewing four videotaped movies, were requested to detect the transitions between significant action steps. The main result indicated that Checking — but not the other obsessive-compulsive dimensions — was negatively related, with the size of meaningful units identified. These findings suggest that checking proneness may be specifically connected with difficulties in processing actions on the basis of abstract features such as goal-related information. This could explain why people with checking symptoms find it more difficult to determine whether an intended goal has actually been achieved.

Individual differences in cognitive representations of action influence the activation of goal concepts

Goal representations play a key role in various psychological processes, including behavioral regulation, self-perception and social understanding. Research on cognitive representations of action has identified individual differences in the general tendency to construe actions in terms of their goal (vs. movement parameters), which can be reliably assessed with the Behavior Identification Form (BIF). The aim of the present study was to examine how individual differences in action identification, as measured by the BIF, affect online processing of action in a laboratory study. The main results showed that the level of action identification predicted participants' performance in a task designed to implicitly assess people's automatic processing of action regarding goal features. We discussed the possible role of impaired goal processing in psychological dysfunctions.