Is my body the sum of online and offline body-representations?

Maladaptive reorganization following SCI: The role of body representation and multisensory integration

In this review we focus on maladaptive brain reorganization after spinal cord injury (SCI), including the development of neuropathic pain, and its relationship with impairments in body representation and multisensory integration. We will discuss the implications of altered sensorimotor interactions after SCI with and without neuropathic pain and possible deficits in multisensory integration and body representation. Within this framework we will examine published research findings focused on the use of bodily illusions to manipulate multisensory body representation to induce analgesic effects in heterogeneous chronic pain populations and in SCI-related neuropathic pain. We propose that the development and intensification of neuropathic pain after SCI is partly dependent on brain reorganization associated with dysfunctional multisensory integration processes and distorted body representation. We conclude this review by suggesting future research avenues that may lead to a better understanding of the complex mechanisms underlying the sense of the body after SCI, with a focus on cortical changes.

Brain Abnormalities in Individuals with a Desire for a Healthy Limb Amputation: Somatosensory, Motoric or Both? A Task-Based fMRI Verdict

Body integrity dysphoria (BID), a long-lasting desire for the amputation of physically healthy limbs, is associated with reduced fMRI resting-state functional connectivity of somatosensory cortices. Here, we used fMRI to evaluate whether these findings could be replicated and expanded using a task-based paradigm. We measured brain activations during somatosensory stimulation and motor tasks for each of the four limbs in ten individuals with a life-long desire for the amputation of the left leg and fourteen controls. For the left leg, BID individuals had reduced brain activation in the right superior parietal lobule for somatosensory stimulation and in the right paracentral lobule for the motor task, areas where we previously found reduced resting-state functional connectivity. In addition, for somatosensory stimulation only, we found a robust reduction in activation of somatosensory areas SII bilaterally, mostly regardless of the stimulated body part. Areas SII were regions of convergent activations for signals from all four limbs in controls to a significantly greater extent than in subjects with BID. We conclude that BID is associated with altered integration of somatosensory and, to a lesser extent, motor signals, involving limb-specific cortical maps and brain regions where the first integration of body-related signals is achieved through convergence.

Use of a real-life practical context changes the relationship between implicit body representations and real body measurements

A mismatch exists between people's mental representations of their own body and their real body measurements, which may impact general well-being and health. We investigated whether this mismatch is reduced when contextualizing body size estimation in a real-life scenario. Using a reverse correlation paradigm, we constructed unbiased, data-driven visual depictions of participants' implicit body representations. Across three conditions-own abstract, ideal, and own concrete body-participants selected the body that looked most like their own, like the body they would like to have, or like the body they would use for online shopping. In the own concrete condition only, we found a significant correlation between perceived and real hip width, suggesting that the perceived/real body match only exists when body size estimation takes place in a practical context, although the negative correlation indicated inaccurate estimation. Further, participants who underestimated their body size or who had more negative attitudes towards their body weight showed a positive correlation between perceived and real body size in the own abstract condition. Finally, our results indicated that different body areas were implicated in the different conditions. These findings suggest that implicit body representations depend on situational and individual differences, which has clinical and practical implications.

Differential effects of minified and magnified mirror visual feedback on the underlying misperception of hand size

Perception of the size of body parts, for instance the hand, has been shown to be distorted in healthy participants, with over- and underestimations of width and length, respectively. Illusory manipulations of body shape and size have highlighted the flexibility of the body representation and have also been found to update immediate perceptions of body size and surrounding objects. Here, we examined whether underlying misperceptions of hand width and length can be modified through exposure to illusory changes in hand size using a mirror visual feedback (MVF) paradigm. While questionnaire responses indicated subjective susceptibility to both magnified and minified manipulations, objective hand size estimates only showed significant differences following exposure to minifying mirrors. These variations might reflect differences in the way that stored representations are accessed or updated in response to size manipulations. Secondly, the findings further reinforce differences between subjective and objective outcomes of illusions on subsequent body perception.

Explicit and Implicit Own's Body and Space Perception in Painful Musculoskeletal Disorders and Rheumatic Diseases: A Systematic Scoping Review

Background: Pain and body perception are essentially two subjective mutually influencing experiences. However, in the field of musculoskeletal disorders and rheumatic diseases we lack of a comprehensive knowledge about the relationship between body perception dysfunctions and pain or disability. We systematically mapped the literature published about the topics of: (a) somatoperception; (b) body ownership; and (c) perception of space, analysing the relationship with pain and disability. The results were organized around the two main topics of the assessment and treatment of perceptual dysfunctions.

Methods: This scoping review followed the six-stage methodology suggested by Arksey and O'Malley. Ten electronic databases and grey literature were systematically searched. The PRISMA Extension for Scoping Reviews was used for reporting results. Two reviewers with different background, independently performed study screening and selection, and one author performed data extraction, that was checked by a second reviewer.

Results: Thirty-seven studies fulfilled the eligibility criteria. The majority of studies (68%) concerned the assessment methodology, and the remaining 32% investigated the effects of therapeutic interventions. Research designs, methodologies adopted, and settings varied considerably across studies. Evidence of distorted body experience were found mainly for explicit somatoperception, especially in studies adopting self-administered questionnaire and subjective measures, highlighting in some cases the presence of sub-groups with different perceptual features. Almost half of the intervention studies (42%) provided therapeutic approaches combining more than one perceptual task, or sensory-motor tasks together with perceptual strategies, thus it was difficult to estimate the relative effectiveness of each single therapeutic component.

Conclusions: To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to systematically map and summarize this research area in the field of musculoskeletal disorders and rheumatic diseases. Although methodological limitations limit the validity of the evidence obtained, some strategies of assessment tested and therapeutic strategies proposed represent useful starting points for future research. This review highlights preliminary evidence, strengths, and limitations of the literature published about the research questions, identifying key points that remain opened to be addressed, and make suggestions for future research studies. Body representation, as well as pain perception and treatment, can be better understood if an enlarged perspective including body and space perception is considered.

Explicit and implicit experience of own's body in painful musculoskeletal disorders and rheumatic diseases: A scoping review protocol of available quantitative and qualitative evidence

Introduction

Our body experience is organized at twofold levels: perceptual and cognitive-emotional. These higher-order processes are clearly different from the primary sensory processing of somatic stimuli (somatosensation). However, most of the available studies have mainly investigated the mechanisms of somatosensation. Moreover, disturbances of our body experience have been documented in some pathological conditions of interest for rehabilitative interventions, but their clinical role and relevance is yet to be clarified. Because in this field we have limited knowledge on perceptual and cognitive body experience, there emerges a need to better clarify this matter. The aim of the present scoping review is to systematically map this topic and to examine the magnitude and the nature of the available evidences.

Materials and Methods

The scoping review will be performed following the six-stage methodology suggested by Arksey and O'Malley. Ten electronic databases will be investigated since their inception. The search strategy will be peer reviewed by PRESS 2015 Evidence-Based Checklist as a quality assurance step. All records retrieved will be screened by two independent reviewers. The Population, Concept, and Context method will be adopted for eligibility criteria and Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses will be used for results reporting. Two reviewers with different background will perform the search process independently. One author will extract data, checked by a second reviewer checking the matching with the research questions and goals. Any disagreements will be solved by a third reviewer.

Ethics and Dissemination

Ethical approval is not required for scoping reviews. Dissemination will include submission to peer-reviewed journal and presentations in conferences in the area of rehabilitation.

Embodied pain in fibromyalgia: Disturbed somatorepresentations and increased plasticity of the body schema

Fibromyalgia syndrome (FMS) is a highly prevalent, chronic musculoskeletal condition characterized by widespread pain and evoked pain at tender points. This study evaluated various aspects of body awareness in a sample of 14 women with FMS and 13 healthy controls, such as plasticity of the body schema, body esteem, and interoceptive awareness. To this end, the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), the Body Esteem Scale (BES), and the Body Perception Questionnaire (BPQ) were used, respectively. Consistent with increased plasticity of the body schema, FMS patients scored higher, with large or very large effect sizes, across all three domains evaluated in the RHI paradigm, namely proprioceptive drift and perceived ownership and motor control over the rubber hand. Scores on all items addressed by the BES were consistently lower among FMS subjects (2.52, SEM .19 vs 3.89, SEM .16, respectively, p < .01, Cohen’s d = .38-.66). In the FMS sample, BES scores assigned to most painful regions also were lower than those assigned to the remaining body sites (1.58, SEM .19 vs 2.87, SEM .18, respectively, p < .01). Significantly higher scores (p < .01, Cohen’s d = .51-.87) were found in the FMS sample across awareness (3.57 SEM .15 vs 1.87 SEM .11), stress response (3.76 SEM .11 vs 1.78 SEM .11), autonomic nervous system reactivity (2.59 SEM .17 vs 1.35 SEM .07), and stress style 2 (2.73 SEM .27 vs 1.13 SEM .04) subscales of the BPQ. Intensity of ongoing clinical pain was found to be strongly correlated with interoceptive awareness (r = .75, p = .002). The results suggest a disturbed embodiment in FMS, characterized by instability of the body schema, negatively biased cognitions regarding one’s own body, and increased vigilance to internal bodily cues. These manifestations may be interpreted as related with the inability of incoming sensory inputs to adequately update negatively biased off-line somatorepresentations stored as long-term memory.

Action-based touch observation in adults with high functioning autism: Can compromised self-other distinction abilities link social and sensory everyday problems?

Next to social problems, individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) often report severe sensory difficulties. Altered processing of touch is however a stronger mediator of social symptoms' severity than altered processing of for instance vision or audition. Why is this the case? We reasoned that sensory difficulties may be linked to social problems in ASD through insufficient self-other distinction centred on touch. We investigated by means of EEG whether the brain of adults with ASD adequately signals when a tactile consequence of an observed action does not match own touch, as compared to the brain of matched controls. We employed the action-based somatosensory congruency paradigm. Participants observed a human or wooden hand touching a surface, combined with a tap-like tactile sensation that either matched or mismatched the tactile consequence of the observed movement. The ASD group showed a diminished congruency effect for human hands only in the P3-complex, suggesting difficulties with signalling observed action-based touch of others that does not match own touch experiences. Crucially, this effect reliably correlated with self-reported social and sensory everyday difficulties in ASD. The findings might denote a novel theoretical link between sensory and social impairments in the autism spectrum.

Handles lost in non-reachable space

Recent evidence indicates that we experience manipulable objects as graspable, provided that they fall within our reaching space. Nevertheless, such evidence comes from studies using virtual objects that have poor ecological validity. Here, we used a spatial alignment effect paradigm and systematically examined this effect when a real handled object was presented at four different distances, namely near-reaching space, actual-reaching space, perceived-reaching space, and non-reaching space. Participants responded with either the right or the left hand as soon as the real object, a mug with the handle oriented toward the left or right, was presented. We found spatial compatibility effect only when the object was presented in the near-reaching and actual-reaching spaces. Results suggest that the activation of the potential actions to perform with objects is modulated by object accessibility. They also suggest that accessibility is exclusively linked to the actual rather than the estimated reaching ability of the perceiver. Results are discussed within the theoretical framework of embodied cognition.

Time to get rid of the 'Modular' in neuropsychology: a unified theory of anosognosia as aberrant predictive coding

Cognitive neuroscience, being more inclusive and ambitious in scope than cognitive neuropsychology, seems to have taken the place of the latter within the modern neurosciences. Nevertheless, recent advances in the neurosciences afford neuropsychology with epistemic possibilities that simply did not exist even 15 years ago. Human lesion studies still have an important role to play in shaping such possibilities, particularly when combined with other methods of enquiry. I first outline theoretical and methodological advances within the neurosciences that can inform and shape the rebirth of a dynamic, non-modular neuropsychology. I then use an influential computational theory of brain function, the free energy principle, to suggest an unified account of anosognosia for hemiplegia as a research example of the potential for transition from a modular, cognitive neuropsychology to a dynamic, computational and even restorative neuropsychology. These and many other adjectives that can flexibly, take the place of 'cognitive' next to 'neuropsychology' will hopefully designate the much needed rebirth and demarcation of a field, neuropsychology itself, that has somehow lost its place within the modern neurosciences and yet seems to have a unique and important role to play in the future understanding of the brain.

Seeing the Forest From Left to Right

Everyday actions such as writing have been proven to produce consistent mental schemata, which are used to represent social interactions. The preference for depicting the agent of an action to the left of the recipient is known as the spatial agency bias (SAB) and has been related to writing direction. The question which we addressed through two studies is whether the mental construal level (CL) affects this embodied bias. We hypothesized that high-CL (vs. low-CL) priming increases the SAB, as it promotes the use of an abstract mental schema to represent the situation. We found that, when asked to depict two interacting targets, participants in a high-CL condition were more likely to adopt a left-to-right representation (Studies 1 and 2). In contrast, under low-CL, participants were more likely to follow the trajectory suggested by contextual details (Study 2). These findings shed light on boundary conditions for the SAB.

Multisensory stimulation can induce an illusion of larger belly size in immersive virtual reality

Background

Body change illusions have been of great interest in recent years for the understanding of how the brain represents the body. Appropriate multisensory stimulation can induce an illusion of ownership over a rubber or virtual arm, simple types of out-of-the-body experiences, and even ownership with respect to an alternate whole body. Here we use immersive virtual reality to investigate whether the illusion of a dramatic increase in belly size can be induced in males through (a) first person perspective position (b) synchronous visual-motor correlation between real and virtual arm movements, and (c) self-induced synchronous visual-tactile stimulation in the stomach area.

Methodology

Twenty two participants entered into a virtual reality (VR) delivered through a stereo head-tracked wide field-of-view head-mounted display. They saw from a first person perspective a virtual body substituting their own that had an inflated belly. For four minutes they repeatedly prodded their real belly with a rod that had a virtual counterpart that they saw in the VR. There was a synchronous condition where their prodding movements were synchronous with what they felt and saw and an asynchronous condition where this was not the case. The experiment was repeated twice for each participant in counter-balanced order. Responses were measured by questionnaire, and also a comparison of before and after self-estimates of belly size produced by direct visual manipulation of the virtual body seen from the first person perspective.

Conclusions

The results show that first person perspective of a virtual body that substitutes for the own body in virtual reality, together with synchronous multisensory stimulation can temporarily produce changes in body representation towards the larger belly size. This was demonstrated by (a) questionnaire results, (b) the difference between the self-estimated belly size, judged from a first person perspective, after and before the experimental manipulation, and (c) significant positive correlations between these two measures. We discuss this result in the general context of body ownership illusions, and suggest applications including treatment for body size distortion illnesses.

First person experience of body transfer in virtual reality

BACKGROUND

Altering the normal association between touch and its visual correlate can result in the illusory perception of a fake limb as part of our own body. Thus, when touch is seen to be applied to a rubber hand while felt synchronously on the corresponding hidden real hand, an illusion of ownership of the rubber hand usually occurs. The illusion has also been demonstrated using visuomotor correlation between the movements of the hidden real hand and the seen fake hand. This type of paradigm has been used with respect to the whole body generating out-of-the-body and body substitution illusions. However, such studies have only ever manipulated a single factor and although they used a form of virtual reality have not exploited the power of immersive virtual reality (IVR) to produce radical transformations in body ownership.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Here we show that a first person perspective of a life-sized virtual human female body that appears to substitute the male subjects' own bodies was sufficient to generate a body transfer illusion. This was demonstrated subjectively by questionnaire and physiologically through heart-rate deceleration in response to a threat to the virtual body. This finding is in contrast to earlier experimental studies that assume visuotactile synchrony to be the critical contributory factor in ownership illusions. Our finding was possible because IVR allowed us to use a novel experimental design for this type of problem with three independent binary factors: (i) perspective position (first or third), (ii) synchronous or asynchronous mirror reflections and (iii) synchrony or asynchrony between felt and seen touch.

CONCLUSIONS

The results support the notion that bottom-up perceptual mechanisms can temporarily override top down knowledge resulting in a radical illusion of transfer of body ownership. The research also illustrates immersive virtual reality as a powerful tool in the study of body representation and experience, since it supports experimental manipulations that would otherwise be infeasible, with the technology being mature enough to represent human bodies and their motion.

The functional architecture of the human body: assessing body representation by sorting body parts and activities

We investigated mental representations of body parts and body-related activities in two subjects with congenitally absent limbs (one with, the other without phantom sensations), a wheelchair sports group of paraplegic participants, and two groups of participants with intact limbs. To analyse mental representation structures, we applied Structure Dimensional Analysis. Verbal labels indicating body parts and related activities were presented in randomized lists that had to be sorted according to a hierarchical splitting paradigm. Participants were required to group the items according to whether or not they were considered related, based on their own body perception. Results of the groups of physically intact and paraplegic participants revealed separate clusters for the lower body, upper body, fingers and head. The participant with congenital phantom limbs also showed a clear separation between upper and lower body (but not between fingers and hands). In the participant without phantom sensations of the absent arms, no such modularity emerged, but the specific practice of his right foot in communication and daily routines was reflected. Sorting verbal labels of body parts and activities appears a useful method to assess body representation in individuals with special body anatomy or function and leads to conclusions largely compatible with other assessment procedures.

The body in the brain revisited

Corporeal awareness is a difficult concept which refers to perception, knowledge and evaluation of one's own body as well as of other bodies. We discuss here some controversies regarding the significance of the concepts of body schema and body image, as variously entertained by different authors, for the understanding of corporeal awareness, and consider some newly proposed alternatives. We describe some recent discoveries of cortical areas specialized for the processing of bodily forms and bodily actions, as revealed by neuroimaging, neurophysiological, and lesion studies. We further describe new empirical and theoretical evidence for the importance of interoception, in addition to exteroception and proprioception, for corporeal awareness, and discuss how itch, a typical interoceptive input, has been wrongly excluded from the classic concept of the proprioceptive-tactile body schema. Finally, we consider the role of the insular cortex as the terminal cortical station of interoception and other bodily signals, along with Craig's proposal that the human insular cortex sets our species apart from other species by supporting consciousness of the body and the self. We conclude that corporeal awareness depends on the spatiotemporally distributed activity of many bodies in the brain, none of which is isomorphic with the actual body.