Knowledge applied to new domains: The unconscious succeeds where the conscious fails

Examining interpersonal metacognitive monitoring in artificial grammar learning

This study investigates the observers' ability to monitor the ongoing cognitive processes of a partner who is implicitly learning an artificial grammar. Our hypothesis posits that learners experience metacognitive feelings as they attempt to apply their implicit knowledge, and that observers are capable of detecting and interpreting these feelings as cues of the learner's cognitive state. For instance, learners might encounter affective signals linked to cognitive conflicts and errors at different processing stages, which observers can construe as manifestations of the learner's cognitive dissonance. The research involved 126 participants organized into dyads, with one participant acting as a learner, and the other as an observer. The observer's task was to judge whether the learner agrees with the information presented (consonance judgment) and was limited to reading the learner's nonverbal signals to avoid explicit mindreading. The findings suggest that observers possess mindreading abilities, enabling them to detect both learners' confidence and accuracy in stimuli classification. This extends our understanding of non-verbal mindreading capabilities and indicates that observers can effectively interpret early implicit metacognitive information, even in the absence of explicit self-evaluation from the learners. This research offers significant insights into how individuals interpret others' mental states during implicit learning tasks, particularly in the context of utilizing early affective cues within the Artificial Grammar Learning paradigm.

Implicit and explicit learning of socio-emotional information in a dynamic interaction with a virtual avatar

Implicit learning (IL) deals with the non-conscious acquisition of structural regularities from the environment. IL is often deemed essential for acquiring regularities followed by social stimuli (e.g., other persons' behavior), hence is hypothesized to play a role in typical social functioning. However, our understanding of how this process might operate in social contexts is limited for two main reasons. First, while IL is highly sensitive to the characteristics of the surface stimuli upon which it operates, most IL studies have used surface stimuli with limited social validity (e.g., letters, symbols, etc.). Second, while the social environment is dynamic (i.e., our behaviors and reactions influence those of our social partners and vice-versa), the bulk of IL research employed noninteractive paradigms. Using a novel task, we examine whether IL is involved in the acquisition of regularities from a dynamic interaction with a realistic real-life-like agent. Participants (N = 115) interacted with a cinematic avatar that displayed different facial expressions. Their task was to regulate the avatar's expression to a specified level. Unbeknownst to them, an equation mediated the relationship between their responses and the avatar's expressions. Learning occurred in the task, as participants gradually increased their ability to bring the avatar in the target state. Subjective measures of awareness revealed that participants acquired both implicit and explicit knowledge from the task. This is the first study to show that IL operates in interactive situations upon socially relevant surface stimuli, facilitating future investigations of the role that IL plays in (a)typical social functioning.

Neural dynamics underlying the processing of implicit form-meaning connections: The dissociative roles of theta and alpha oscillations

Implicit learning plays an important role in the language acquisition. In addition to helping people acquire the form-level rules (e.g., the word order regularities), implicit learning can also facilitate the acquisition of word meanings (i.e., the establishment of connections between the word form and its meanings). Although some behavioral studies have explored the processing of implicit form-meaning connections, the neural dynamics underlying this processing remains unclear. Through examining whether participants could implicitly acquire the literal and metaphorical meanings of novel words, and applying the time-frequency analysis on the electroencephalogram (EEG) data collected in the testing phase, the neural oscillations corresponding to the processing of implicit form-literal and form-metaphorical meaning connections were explored. The results showed that participants in the experimental group could implicitly acquire the form-literal and form-metaphorical meaning connections after training, while participants in the control group who were not trained did not have access to such form-meaning connections. Meanwhile, during the processing of form-literal meaning connections, the greater suppression of alpha oscillations was induced by the testing items that follow the same rules as the training items (i.e., the regular testing items) in the experimental group, whereas the stronger enhancement of theta oscillations was elicited by the regular testing items in the experimental group during the processing of form-metaphorical meaning connections. Our study provides insights for understanding the processing of implicit form-literal and form-metaphorical meaning connections and the neural dynamics underlying the processing.

Implicit learning of regularities followed by realistic body movements in virtual reality

The existence of implicit (unconscious) learning has been demonstrated in several laboratory paradigms. Researchers have also suggested that it plays a role in complex real-life human activities. For instance, in social situations, we may follow unconscious behaviour scripts or intuitively anticipate the reaction of familiar persons based on nonconscious cues. Still, it is difficult to make inferences about the involvement of implicit learning in realistic contexts, given that this phenomenon has been demonstrated, almost exclusively, using simple artificial stimuli (e.g., learning structured patterns of letters). In addition, recent analyses show that the amount of unconscious knowledge learned in these tasks has been overestimated by random measurement error. To overcome these limitations, we adapted the artificial grammar learning (AGL) task, and exposed participants (N = 93), in virtual reality, to a realistic agent that executed combinations of boxing punches. Unknown to participants, the combinations were structured by a complex artificial grammar. In a subsequent test phase, participants accurately discriminated novel grammatical from nongrammatical combinations, showing they had acquired the grammar. For measuring awareness, we used trial-by-trial subjective scales, and an analytical method that accounts for the possible overestimation of unconscious knowledge due to regression to the mean. These methods conjointly showed strong evidence for implicit and for explicit learning. The present study is the first to show that humans can implicitly learn, in VR, knowledge regarding realistic body movements, and, further, that implicit knowledge extracted in AGL is robust when accounting for its possible inflation by random measurement error.

Avoiding pitfalls: Bayes factors can be a reliable tool for post hoc data selection in implicit learning

Research on implicit processes has revealed problems with awareness categorizations based on nonsignificant results. Moreover, post hoc categorizations result in regression to the mean (RTM), by which aware participants are wrongly categorized as unaware. Using Bayes factors to obtain sensitive evidence for participants' lack of knowledge may deal with nonsignificance being nonevidential, but also may prevent regression-to-the-mean effects. Here, we examine the reliability of a novel Bayesian awareness categorization procedure. Participants completed a reward learning task followed by a flanker task measuring attention towards conditioned stimuli. They were categorized as B_Aware and B_Unaware of stimulus-outcome contingencies, and those with insensitive Bayes factors were deemed B_Insensitive. We found that performance for B_Unaware participants was below chance level using unbiased tests. This was further confirmed using a resampling procedure with multiple iterations, contrary to the prediction of RTM effects. Conversely, when categorizing participants using t tests, t_Unaware participants showed RTM effects. We also propose a group boundary optimization procedure to determine the threshold at which regression to the mean is observed. Using Bayes factors instead of t tests as a post hoc categorization tool allows evaluating evidence of unawareness, which in turn helps avoid RTM. The reliability of the Bayesian awareness categorization procedure strengthens previous evidence for implicit reward conditioning. The toolbox used for the categorization procedure is detailed and made available. Post hoc group selection can provide evidence for implicit processes; the relevance of RTM needs to be considered for each study and cannot simply be assumed to be a problem.

Dynamic capabilities and the knowledge nexus

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to propose alternative ways to develop and leverage organisational knowledge by considering the nexus of data managed by information and communications technologies and the expertise of human capacity. In doing so this paper challenges current understanding of tacit–explicit knowledge boundaries and presents a third dimension of knowledge which can be developed as a strategic organisational resource.

Design/methodology/approach

This conceptual paper seeks to extend current understanding of knowledge and presents the organisational knowledge nexus as a confluence of information, knowledge resources and human potential. Knowledge management is explored through the theoretical frameworks of the knowledge nexus and a model of triadic knowledge. Their conceptualisation and development are discussed and illustrated.

Findings

This research suggests the potential for organisational knowledge resources to be advanced is greater, if organisations can strategically use the knowledge nexus with a triadic perspective of knowledge. A framework for knowledge development with increasing levels of insight is proposed.

Research limitations/implications

As a novel conceptual work this research has limitations of newness. It presents a challenge to conventional thinking because of the subliminal nature of latent knowledge and the causal ambiguity of its development process in the knowledge nexus. The potential of latent knowledge and its transition process in the organisational knowledge nexus has significant implications for organisational knowledge development.

Originality/value

The concepts of latent knowledge, the knowledge nexus and their potential ability to develop and leverage organisational knowledge resources presents a paradigm shift to currently accepted understanding of knowledge systems and organisational knowledge management. The originality and value of this work comes through its contribution to broadening our understanding of the scope and potential of organisational knowledge resources and their processes of transition and development.

Consciousness and confidence

It is natural to see conscious perceptions as typically bringing with them a degree of confidence about what is perceived. So one might also expect such confidence not to occur if a perception is not conscious. This has resulted in the use of confidence as a test or measure of consciousness, one that may be more reliable and fine-grained than the traditional appeal to subjective report as a test for a perception's being conscious. The following describes theoretical difficulties for the use of confidence as a reliable test for consciousness, which show that confidence is less reliable than subjective report. Difficulties are also presented for the use of confidence ratings in assessing degrees of consciousness, which cast doubt on any advantage confidence might have from being more fine-grained than subjective report. And an explanation is proposed for the wide appeal of using confidence to assess subjective awareness, an explanation that also makes clear why confidence is less reliable than subjective report.

Fluency Expresses Implicit Knowledge of Tonal Symmetry

The purposes of the present study were twofold. First, we sought to establish whether tonal symmetry produces processing fluency. Second, we sought to explore whether symmetry and chunk strength express themselves differently in fluency, as an indication of different mechanisms being involved for sub- and supra-finite state processing. Across two experiments, participants were asked to listen to and memorize artificial poetry showing a mirror symmetry (an inversion, i.e., a type of cross serial dependency); after this training phase, people completed a four-choice RT task in which they were presented with new artificial poetry. Participants were required to identify the stimulus displayed. We found that symmetry sped up responding to the second half of strings, indicating a fluency effect. Furthermore, there was a dissociation between fluency effects arising from symmetry vs. chunk strength, with stronger fluency effects for symmetry rather than chunks in the second half of strings. Taken together, we conjecture a divide between finite state and supra-finite state mechanisms in learning grammatical sequences.

Consciousness: individuated information in action

Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness - the main aim of this article -into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system), and useful in action (pragmatically functional), is a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. A gradational approach, however, despite its explanatory advantages, can lead to some counterintuitive consequences and theoretical problems. In most such conceptions consciousness is extended globally (attached to primitive organisms or artificial systems), but also locally (connected to certain lower-level neuronal and bodily processes). For example, according to information integration theory (as introduced recently by Tononi and Koch, 2014), even such simple artificial systems as photodiodes possess miniscule amounts of consciousness. The major challenge for this article, then, is to establish reasonable, empirically justified constraints on how extended the range of a graded consciousness could be. It is argued that conscious systems are limited globally by the ability to individuate information (where individuated information is understood as evolutionarily embedded, socially altered, and private), whereas local limitations should be determined on the basis of a hypothesis about the action-oriented nature of the processes that select states of consciousness. Using these constraints, an abstract concept of consciousness is arrived at, hopefully contributing to a more unified state of play within consciousness studies itself.

The neural basis of implicit learning of task-irrelevant Chinese tonal sequence

The present study sought to investigate the neural basis of implicit learning of task-irrelevant perceptual sequence. A novel SRT task, the serial syllable identification task (SSI task), was used in which the participants were asked to recognize which one of two Chinese syllables was presented. The tones of the syllables were irrelevant to the task but followed an underlying structured sequence. Participants were scanned while they performed the SSI task. Results showed that, at the behavioral level, faster RTs for the sequential material indicated that task-irrelevant sequence knowledge could be learned. In the subsequent prediction test of knowledge of the tonal cues using subjective measures, we found that the knowledge was obtained unconsciously. At the neural level, the left caudate, bilateral hippocampus and bilateral superior parietal lobule were engaged during the sequence condition relative to the random condition. Further analyses revealed that greater learning-related activation (relative to random) in the right caudate nucleus, bilateral hippocampus and left superior parietal lobule were found during the second half of the training phase compared with the first half. When people reported that they were guessing, the magnitude of the right hippocampus and left superior parietal lobule activations was positively related to the accuracy of prediction test, which was significantly better than chance. Together, the present results indicated that the caudate, hippocampus and superior parietal lobule played critical roles in the implicit perceptual sequence learning even when the perceptual features were task irrelevant.

Implicit learning and reading: insights from typical children and children with developmental dyslexia using the artificial grammar learning (AGL) paradigm

We examined implicit learning in school-aged children with and without developmental dyslexia based on the proposal that implicit learning plays a significant role in mastering fluent reading. We ran two experiments with 16 typically developing children (9 to 11-years-old) and 16 age-matched children with developmental dyslexia using the artificial grammar learning (AGL) paradigm. In Experiment 1 (non-transfer task), children were trained on stimuli that followed patterns (rules) unknown to them. Subsequently, they were asked to decide from a novel set which stimuli follow the same rules (grammaticality judgments). In Experiment 2 (transfer task), training and testing stimuli differed in their superficial characteristics but followed the same rules. Again, children were asked to make grammaticality judgments. Our findings expand upon previous research by showing that children with developmental dyslexia show difficulties in implicit learning that are most likely specific to higher-order rule-like learning. These findings are discussed in relation to current theories of developmental dyslexia and of implicit learning.

Bidirectional transfer between metaphorical related domains in implicit learning of form-meaning connections

People can implicitly learn a connection between linguistic forms and meanings, for example between specific determiners (e.g. this, that…) and the type of nouns to which they apply. Li et al (2013) recently found that transfer of form-meaning connections from a concrete domain (height) to an abstract domain (power) was achieved in a metaphor-consistent way without awareness, showing that unconscious knowledge can be abstract and flexibly deployed. The current study aims to determine whether people transfer knowledge of form-meaning connections not only from a concrete domain to an abstract one, but also vice versa, consistent with metaphor representation being bi-directional. With a similar paradigm as used by Li et al, participants learnt form- meaning connections of different domains (concrete vs. abstract) and then were tested on two kinds of generalizations (same and different domain generalization). As predicted, transfer of form-meaning connections occurred bidirectionally when structural knowledge was unconscious. Moreover, the present study also revealed that more transfer occurred between metaphorically related domains when judgment knowledge was conscious (intuition) rather than unconscious (guess). Conscious and unconscious judgment knowledge may have different functional properties.

Explicit feedback maintains implicit knowledge

The role of feedback was investigated with respect to conscious and unconscious knowledge acquired during artificial grammar learning (AGL). After incidental learning of training sequences, participants classified further sequences in terms of grammaticality and reported their decision strategy with or without explicit veridical feedback. Sequences that disobeyed the learning structure conformed to an alternative structure. Feedback led to an increase in the amount of reported conscious knowledge of structure (derived rules and recollections) but did not increase its accuracy. Conversely, feedback maintained the accuracy of unconscious knowledge of structure (intuition or familiarity-based responses) which otherwise degraded. Results support a dual-process account of AGL. They suggest that implicit learning of the to-be-rejected structure at test contaminates familiarity-based classifications whereas feedback allows competing familiarity signals to be contextualised, which is incompatible with theories that consider familiarity context-insensitive.

Unconscious learning processes: mental integration of verbal and pictorial instructional materials

This review aims to provide an insight into human learning processes by examining the role of cognitive and emotional unconscious processing in mentally integrating visual and verbal instructional materials. Reviewed literature shows that conscious mental integration does not happen all the time, nor does it necessarily result in optimal learning. Students of all ages and levels of experience cannot always have conscious awareness, control, and the intention to learn or promptly and continually organize perceptual, cognitive, and emotional processes of learning. This review suggests considering the role of unconscious learning processes to enhance the understanding of how students form or activate mental associations between verbal and pictorial information. The understanding would assist in presenting students with spatially-integrated verbal and pictorial instructional materials as a way of facilitating mental integration and improving teaching and learning performance.

Unconscious learning processes: mental integration of verbal and pictorial instructional materials

This review aims to provide an insight into human learning processes by examining the role of cognitive and emotional unconscious processing in mentally integrating visual and verbal instructional materials. Reviewed literature shows that conscious mental integration does not happen all the time, nor does it necessarily result in optimal learning. Students of all ages and levels of experience cannot always have conscious awareness, control, and the intention to learn or promptly and continually organize perceptual, cognitive, and emotional processes of learning. This review suggests considering the role of unconscious learning processes to enhance the understanding of how students form or activate mental associations between verbal and pictorial information. The understanding would assist in presenting students with spatially-integrated verbal and pictorial instructional materials as a way of facilitating mental integration and improving teaching and learning performance.

The speed of metacognition: taking time to get to know one's structural knowledge

The time course of different metacognitive experiences of knowledge was investigated using artificial grammar learning. Experiment 1 revealed that when participants are aware of the basis of their judgments (conscious structural knowledge) decisions are made most rapidly, followed by decisions made with conscious judgment but without conscious knowledge of underlying structure (unconscious structural knowledge), and guess responses (unconscious judgment knowledge) were made most slowly, even when controlling for differences in confidence and accuracy. In experiment 2, short response deadlines decreased the accuracy of unconscious but not conscious structural knowledge. Conversely, the deadline decreased the proportion of conscious structural knowledge in favour of guessing. Unconscious structural knowledge can be applied rapidly but becomes more reliable with additional metacognitive processing time whereas conscious structural knowledge is an all-or-nothing response that cannot always be applied rapidly. These dissociations corroborate quite separate theories of recognition (dual-process) and metacognition (higher order thought and cross-order integration).

From infants' to children's appreciation of belief

Evidence is accumulating that infants are sensitive to people's false beliefs, whereas children pass the standard false belief test at around 4 years of age. Debate currently centres on the nature of early and late understanding. We defend the view that early sensitivity to false beliefs shown in 'online tasks' (where engagement with ongoing events reflects an expectation of what will happen without a judgement that it will happen) reflects implicit/unconscious social knowledge of lawful regularities. The traditional false belief task requires explicit consideration of the agent's subjective perspective on his reasons for action. This requires an intentional switch of perspectives not possible before 4 years of age as evidenced by correlations between the false belief task and many different perspective-taking tasks.

Implicit learning of conjunctive rule sets: an alternative to artificial grammars

A single experiment is reported that investigated implicit learning using a conjunctive rule set applied to natural words. Participants memorized a training list consisting of words that were either rare-concrete and common-abstract or common-concrete and rare-abstract. At test, they were told of the rule set, but not told what it was. Instead, they were shown all four word types and asked to classify words as rule-consistent words or not. Participants classified the items above chance, but were unable to verbalize the rules, even when shown a list that included the categories that made up the conjunctive rule and asked to select them. Most participants identified familiarity as the reason for classifying the items as they did. An analysis of the materials demonstrated that conscious micro-rules (i.e., chunk knowledge) could not have driven performance. We propose that such materials offer an alternative to artificial grammar for studies of implicit learning.

Cross cultural differences in unconscious knowledge

Previous studies have indicated cross cultural differences in conscious processes, such that Asians have a global preference and Westerners a more analytical one. We investigated whether these biases also apply to unconscious knowledge. In Experiment 1, Japanese and UK participants memorized strings of large (global) letters made out of small (local) letters. The strings constituted one sequence of letters at a global level and a different sequence at a local level. Implicit learning occurred at the global and not the local level for the Japanese but equally at both levels for the English. In Experiment 2, the Japanese preference for global over local processing persisted even when structure existed only at the local but not global level. In Experiment 3, Japanese and UK participants were asked to attend to just one of the levels, global or local. Now the cultural groups performed similarly, indicating that the bias largely reflects preference rather than ability (although the data left room for residual ability differences). In Experiment 4, the greater global advantage of Japanese rather English was confirmed for strings made of Japanese kana rather than Roman letters. That is, the cultural difference is not due to familiarity of the sequence elements. In sum, we show for the first time that cultural biases strongly affect the type of unconscious knowledge people acquire.

Conscious and unconscious thought in artificial grammar learning

Unconscious Thought Theory posits that a period of distraction after information acquisition leads to unconscious processing which enhances decision making relative to conscious deliberation or immediate choice (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Support thus far has been mixed. In the present study, artificial grammar learning was used in order to produce measurable amounts of conscious and unconscious knowledge. Intermediate phases were introduced between training and testing. Participants engaged in conscious deliberation of grammar rules, were distracted for the same period of time, or progressed immediately from training to testing. No differences in accuracy were found between intermediate phase groups acting on decisions made with meta-cognitive awareness (either feeling-based intuitive responding or conscious rule- or recollection-based responding). However, the accuracy of guess responses was significantly higher after distraction relative to immediate progression or conscious deliberation. The results suggest any beneficial effects of 'unconscious thought' may not always transfer to conscious awareness.

No-loss gambling shows the speed of the unconscious

This paper investigates the time it takes unconscious vs. conscious knowledge to form by using an improved "no-loss gambling" method to measure awareness of knowing. Subjects could either bet on a transparently random process or on their grammaticality judgment in an artificial grammar learning task. A conflict in the literature is resolved concerning whether unconscious rather than conscious knowledge is especially fast or slow to form. When guessing (betting on a random process), accuracy was above chance and RTs were longer than when feeling confident (betting on the grammaticality decision). In a second experiment, short response deadlines only interfered with the quality of confident decisions (betting on grammaticality). When people are unaware of their knowledge, externally enforced decisions can be made rapidly with little decline in quality; but if given ample time, they await a metacognitive process to complete. The dissociation validates no-loss gambling as a measure of conscious awareness.

Detecting conscious awareness from involuntary autonomic responses

Can conscious awareness be ascertained from physiological responses alone? We evaluate a novel learning-based procedure permitting detection of conscious awareness without reliance on language comprehension or behavioural responses. The method exploits a situation whereby only consciously detected violations of an expectation alter skin conductance responses (SCRs). Thirty participants listened to sequences of piano notes that, without their being told, predicted a pleasant fanfare or an aversive noise according to an abstract rule. Stimuli were presented without distraction (attended), or while distracted by a visual task to remove awareness of the rule (unattended). A test phase included occasional violations of the rule. Only participants attending the sounds reported awareness of violations and only they showed significantly greater SCR for noise occurring in violation, vs. accordance, with the rule. Our results establish theoretically significant dissociations between conscious and unconscious processing and furnish new opportunities for clinical assessment of residual consciousness in patient populations.

Acquisition of conscious and unconscious knowledge of semantic prosody

An experiment explored the acquisition of conscious and unconscious knowledge of semantic prosody in a second language under incidental and intentional learning conditions. Semantic prosody is the conotational coloring of the semantics of a word, largely uncaptured by dictionary definitions. Contrary to some claims in the literature, we revealed that both conscious and unconscious knowledge were involved in the acquisition of semantic prosody. Intentional learning resulted in similar unconscious but more conscious knowledge than incidental learning. The results are discussed in terms of second language learning and the nature of unconscious knowledge.