Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond

Which systems/organisms are conscious? New tests for consciousness ('C-tests') are urgently needed. There is persisting uncertainty about when consciousness arises in human development, when it is lost due to neurological disorders and brain injury, and how it is distributed in nonhuman species. This need is amplified by recent and rapid developments in artificial intelligence (AI), neural organoids, and xenobot technology. Although a number of C-tests have been proposed in recent years, most are of limited use, and currently we have no C-tests for many of the populations for which they are most critical. Here, we identify challenges facing any attempt to develop C-tests, propose a multidimensional classification of such tests, and identify strategies that might be used to validate them.

Effects of External Stimulation on Psychedelic State Neurodynamics

Recent findings have shown that psychedelics reliably enhance brain entropy (understood as neural signal diversity), and this effect has been associated with both acute and long-term psychological outcomes, such as personality changes. These findings are particularly intriguing, given that a decrease of brain entropy is a robust indicator of loss of consciousness (e.g., from wakefulness to sleep). However, little is known about how context impacts the entropy-enhancing effect of psychedelics, which carries important implications for how it can be exploited in, for example, psychedelic psychotherapy. This article investigates how brain entropy is modulated by stimulus manipulation during a psychedelic experience by studying participants under the effects of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) or placebo, either with gross state changes (eyes closed vs open) or different stimuli (no stimulus vs music vs video). Results show that while brain entropy increases with LSD under all of the experimental conditions, it exhibits the largest changes when subjects have their eyes closed. Furthermore, brain entropy changes are consistently associated with subjective ratings of the psychedelic experience, but this relationship is disrupted when participants are viewing a video─potentially due to a "competition" between external stimuli and endogenous LSD-induced imagery. Taken together, our findings provide strong quantitative evidence of the role of context in modulating neural dynamics during a psychedelic experience, underlining the importance of performing psychedelic psychotherapy in a suitable environment.

Light Sensitive Liposomes: A Novel Strategy for Targeted Drug Delivery

Light-sensitive liposomes have emerged as a promising platform for drug delivery, offering the potential for precise control over drug release and targeted therapy. These lipid-based nanoparticles possess photoresponsive properties, allowing them to undergo structural changes or release therapeutic payloads upon exposure to specific wavelengths of light. This review presents an overview of the design principles, fabrication methods, and applications of light-sensitive liposomes in drug delivery. Further, this article also discusses the incorporation of light-sensitive moieties, such as azobenzene, spiropyran, and diarylethene, into liposomal structures, enabling spatiotemporal control over drug release. The utilization of photosensitizers and imaging agents to enhance the functionality and versatility of light-sensitive liposomes is also highlighted. Finally, the recent advances, challenges, and future directions in the field, emphasizing the potential for these innovative nanocarriers to revolutionize targeted therapeutics, are also discussed.

Modelling phenomenological differences in aetiologically distinct visual hallucinations using deep neural networks

Visual hallucinations (VHs) are perceptions of objects or events in the absence of the sensory stimulation that would normally support such perceptions. Although all VHs share this core characteristic, there are substantial phenomenological differences between VHs that have different aetiologies, such as those arising from Neurodegenerative conditions, visual loss, or psychedelic compounds. Here, we examine the potential mechanistic basis of these differences by leveraging recent advances in visualising the learned representations of a coupled classifier and generative deep neural network-an approach we call 'computational (neuro)phenomenology'. Examining three aetiologically distinct populations in which VHs occur-Neurodegenerative conditions (Parkinson's Disease and Lewy Body Dementia), visual loss (Charles Bonnet Syndrome, CBS), and psychedelics-we identified three dimensions relevant to distinguishing these classes of VHs: realism (veridicality), dependence on sensory input (spontaneity), and complexity. By selectively tuning the parameters of the visualisation algorithm to reflect influence along each of these phenomenological dimensions we were able to generate 'synthetic VHs' that were characteristic of the VHs experienced by each aetiology. We verified the validity of this approach experimentally in two studies that examined the phenomenology of VHs in Neurodegenerative and CBS patients, and in people with recent psychedelic experience. These studies confirmed the existence of phenomenological differences across these three dimensions between groups, and crucially, found that the appropriate synthetic VHs were rated as being representative of each group's hallucinatory phenomenology. Together, our findings highlight the phenomenological diversity of VHs associated with distinct causal factors and demonstrate how a neural network model of visual phenomenology can successfully capture the distinctive visual characteristics of hallucinatory experience.

Hybrid predictive coding: Inferring, fast and slow

Predictive coding is an influential model of cortical neural activity. It proposes that perceptual beliefs are furnished by sequentially minimising "prediction errors"-the differences between predicted and observed data. Implicit in this proposal is the idea that successful perception requires multiple cycles of neural activity. This is at odds with evidence that several aspects of visual perception-including complex forms of object recognition-arise from an initial "feedforward sweep" that occurs on fast timescales which preclude substantial recurrent activity. Here, we propose that the feedforward sweep can be understood as performing amortized inference (applying a learned function that maps directly from data to beliefs) and recurrent processing can be understood as performing iterative inference (sequentially updating neural activity in order to improve the accuracy of beliefs). We propose a hybrid predictive coding network that combines both iterative and amortized inference in a principled manner by describing both in terms of a dual optimization of a single objective function. We show that the resulting scheme can be implemented in a biologically plausible neural architecture that approximates Bayesian inference utilising local Hebbian update rules. We demonstrate that our hybrid predictive coding model combines the benefits of both amortized and iterative inference-obtaining rapid and computationally cheap perceptual inference for familiar data while maintaining the context-sensitivity, precision, and sample efficiency of iterative inference schemes. Moreover, we show how our model is inherently sensitive to its uncertainty and adaptively balances iterative and amortized inference to obtain accurate beliefs using minimum computational expense. Hybrid predictive coding offers a new perspective on the functional relevance of the feedforward and recurrent activity observed during visual perception and offers novel insights into distinct aspects of visual phenomenology.

Dynamical independence: Discovering emergent macroscopic processes in complex dynamical systems

We introduce a notion of emergence for macroscopic variables associated with highly multivariate microscopic dynamical processes. Dynamical independence instantiates the intuition of an emergent macroscopic process as one possessing the characteristics of a dynamical system "in its own right," with its own dynamical laws distinct from those of the underlying microscopic dynamics. We quantify (departure from) dynamical independence by a transformation-invariant Shannon information-based measure of dynamical dependence. We emphasize the data-driven discovery of dynamically independent macroscopic variables, and introduce the idea of a multiscale "emergence portrait" for complex systems. We show how dynamical dependence may be computed explicitly for linear systems in both time and frequency domains, facilitating discovery of emergent phenomena across spatiotemporal scales, and outline application of the linear operationalization to inference of emergence portraits for neural systems from neurophysiological time-series data. We discuss dynamical independence for discrete- and continuous-time deterministic dynamics, with potential application to Hamiltonian mechanics and classical complex systems such as flocking and cellular automata.

Seeing Ɔ, remembering C: Illusions in short-term memory

Perception can be shaped by our expectations, which can lead to perceptual illusions. Similarly, long-term memories can be shaped to fit our expectations, which can generate false memories. However, it is generally assumed that short-term memory for percepts formed just 1 or 2 seconds ago accurately represents the percepts as they were at the time of perception. Here 4 experiments consistently show that within this timeframe, participants go from reliably reporting what was there (perceptual inference accurately reflecting the bottom-up input), to erroneously but with high confidence reporting what they expected to be there (memory report strongly influenced by top-down expectations). Together, these experiments show that expectations can reshape perceptual representations over short time scales, leading to what we refer to as short-term memory (STM) illusions. These illusions appeared when participants saw a memory display which contained real and pseudo-letters (i.e. mirrored letters). Within seconds after the memory display disappeared, high confidence memory errors increased substantially. This increase in errors over time indicates that the high confidence errors do not (purely) result from incorrect perceptual encoding of the memory display. Moreover, high confidence errors occurred mainly for pseudo-to-real letter memories, and much less often for real-to-pseudo-letter memories, indicating that visual similarity is not the primary cause of this memory-bias. Instead 'world knowledge' (e.g., which orientation letters usually have) appear to drive these STM illusions. Our findings support a predictive processing view of the formation and maintenance of memory in which all memory stages, including STM, involve integration of bottom-up memory input with top-down predictions, such that prior expectations can shape memory traces.

Using Extended Reality to Study the Experience of Presence

Extended reality (XR), encompassing various forms of virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR), has become a powerful experimental tool in consciousness research due to its capability to create holistic and immersive experiences of oneself and surrounding environments through simulation. One hallmark of a successful XR experience is when it elicits a strong sense of presence, which can be thought of as a subjective sense of reality of the self and the world. Although XR research has shed light on many factors that may influence presence (or its absence) in XR environments, there remains much to be discovered about the detailed and diverse phenomenology of presence, and the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie it. In this chapter, we analyse the concept of presence and relate it to the way in which humans may generate and maintain a stable sense of reality during both natural perception and virtual experiences. We start by reviewing the concept of presence as developed in XR research, covering both factors that may influence presence and potential ways of measuring presence. We then discuss the phenomenological characteristics of presence in human consciousness, drawing on clinical examples where presence is disturbed. Next, we describe two experiments using XR that investigated the effects of sensorimotor contingency and affordances on a specific form of presence related to the sense of objects as really existing in the world, referred to as 'objecthood'. We then go beyond perceptual presence to discuss the concept of 'conviction about reality', which corresponds to people's beliefs about the reality status of their perceptual experiences. We finish by exploring how the novel XR method of 'Substitutional Reality' can allow experimental investigation of these topics, opening new experimental directions for studying presence beyond the 'as-if' experience of fully simulated environments.

Psychedelics and schizophrenia: Distinct alterations to Bayesian inference

Schizophrenia and states induced by certain psychotomimetic drugs may share some physiological and phenomenological properties, but they differ in fundamental ways: one is a crippling chronic mental disease, while the others are temporary, pharmacologically-induced states presently being explored as treatments for mental illnesses. Building towards a deeper understanding of these different alterations of normal consciousness, here we compare the changes in neural dynamics induced by LSD and ketamine (in healthy volunteers) against those associated with schizophrenia, as observed in resting-state M/EEG recordings. While both conditions exhibit increased neural signal diversity, our findings reveal that this is accompanied by an increased transfer entropy from the front to the back of the brain in schizophrenia, versus an overall reduction under the two drugs. Furthermore, we show that these effects can be reproduced via different alterations of standard Bayesian inference applied on a computational model based on the predictive processing framework. In particular, the effects observed under the drugs are modelled as a reduction of the precision of the priors, while the effects of schizophrenia correspond to an increased precision of sensory information. These findings shed new light on the similarities and differences between schizophrenia and two psychotomimetic drug states, and have potential implications for the study of consciousness and future mental health treatments.

An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science

We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.

Greater than the parts: a review of the information decomposition approach to causal emergence

Emergence is a profound subject that straddles many scientific disciplines, including the formation of galaxies and how consciousness arises from the collective activity of neurons. Despite the broad interest that exists on this concept, the study of emergence has suffered from a lack of formalisms that could be used to guide discussions and advance theories. Here, we summarize, elaborate on, and extend a recent formal theory of causal emergence based on information decomposition, which is quantifiable and amenable to empirical testing. This theory relates emergence with information about a system's temporal evolution that cannot be obtained from the parts of the system separately. This article provides an accessible but rigorous introduction to the framework, discussing the merits of the approach in various scenarios of interest. We also discuss several interpretation issues and potential misunderstandings, while highlighting the distinctive benefits of this formalism. This article is part of the theme issue 'Emergent phenomena in complex physical and socio-technical systems: from cells to societies'.

Trial-by-trial predictions of subjective time from human brain activity

Human experience of time exhibits systematic, context-dependent deviations from clock time; for example, time is experienced differently at work than on holiday. Here we test the proposal that differences from clock time in subjective experience of time arise because time estimates are constructed by accumulating the same quantity that guides perception: salient events. Healthy human participants watched naturalistic, silent videos of up to 24 seconds in duration and estimated their duration while fMRI was acquired. We were able to reconstruct trial-by-trial biases in participants’ duration reports, which reflect subjective experience of duration, purely from salient events in their visual cortex BOLD activity. By contrast, salient events in neither of two control regions–auditory and somatosensory cortex–were predictive of duration biases. These results held despite being able to (trivially) predict clock time from all three brain areas. Our results reveal that the information arising during perceptual processing of a dynamic environment provides a sufficient basis for reconstructing human subjective time duration.

Our perception of time isn’t like a clock; it varies depending on other aspects of experience, such as what we see and hear in that moment. Previous studies have shown that differences in simple features, such as an image being larger or smaller, or brighter or dimmer, can change how we perceive time for those experiences. But in everyday life, the properties of these simple features can change frequently, presenting a challenge to understanding real-world time perception based on simple lab experiments. To overcome this problem, we developed a computational model of human time perception based on tracking changes in neural activity across brain regions involved in sensory processing (using non-invasive brain imaging). By measuring changes in brain activity patterns across these regions, our approach accommodates the different and changing feature combinations present in natural scenarios, such as walking on a busy street. Our model reproduces people’s duration reports for natural videos (up to almost half a minute long) and, most importantly, predicts whether a person reports a scene as relatively shorter or longer–the biases in time perception that reflect how natural experience of time deviates from clock time.

A Predictive Processing Model of Episodic Memory and Time Perception

Human perception and experience of time are strongly influenced by ongoing stimulation, memory of past experiences, and required task context. When paying attention to time, time experience seems to expand; when distracted, it seems to contract. When considering time based on memory, the experience may be different than what is in the moment, exemplified by sayings like "time flies when you're having fun." Experience of time also depends on the content of perceptual experience-rapidly changing or complex perceptual scenes seem longer in duration than less dynamic ones. The complexity of interactions among attention, memory, and perceptual stimulation is a likely reason that an overarching theory of time perception has been difficult to achieve. Here, we introduce a model of perceptual processing and episodic memory that makes use of hierarchical predictive coding, short-term plasticity, spatiotemporal attention, and episodic memory formation and recall, and apply this model to the problem of human time perception. In an experiment with approximately 13,000 human participants, we investigated the effects of memory, cognitive load, and stimulus content on duration reports of dynamic natural scenes up to about 1 minute long. Using our model to generate duration estimates, we compared human and model performance. Model-based estimates replicated key qualitative biases, including differences by cognitive load (attention), scene type (stimulation), and whether the judgment was made based on current or remembered experience (memory). Our work provides a comprehensive model of human time perception and a foundation for exploring the computational basis of episodic memory within a hierarchical predictive coding framework.

The strength of weak integrated information theory

The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) is divisive: while some believe it provides an unprecedentedly powerful approach to address the 'hard problem', others dismiss it on grounds that it is untestable. We argue that the appeal and applicability of IIT can be greatly widened if we distinguish two flavours of the theory: strong IIT, which identifies consciousness with specific properties associated with maxima of integrated information; and weak IIT, which tests pragmatic hypotheses relating aspects of consciousness to broader measures of information dynamics. We review challenges for strong IIT, explain how existing empirical findings are well explained by weak IIT without needing to commit to the entirety of strong IIT, and discuss the outlook for both flavours of IIT.

From Generative Models to Generative Passages: A Computational Approach to (Neuro) Phenomenology

This paper presents a version of neurophenomenology based on generative modelling techniques developed in computational neuroscience and biology. Our approach can be described as computational phenomenology because it applies methods originally developed in computational modelling to provide a formal model of the descriptions of lived experience in the phenomenological tradition of philosophy (e.g., the work of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, etc.). The first section presents a brief review of the overall project to naturalize phenomenology. The second section presents and evaluates philosophical objections to that project and situates our version of computational phenomenology with respect to these projects. The third section reviews the generative modelling framework. The final section presents our approach in detail. We conclude by discussing how our approach differs from previous attempts to use generative modelling to help understand consciousness. In summary, we describe a version of computational phenomenology which uses generative modelling to construct a computational model of the inferential or interpretive processes that best explain this or that kind of lived experience.

Sensorimotor predictions shape reported conscious visual experience in a breaking continuous flash suppression task

Accounts of predictive processing propose that conscious experience is influenced not only by passive predictions about the world, but also by predictions encompassing how the world changes in relation to our actions-that is, on predictions about sensorimotor contingencies. We tested whether valid sensorimotor predictions, in particular learned associations between stimuli and actions, shape reports about conscious visual experience. Two experiments used instrumental conditioning to build sensorimotor predictions linking different stimuli with distinct actions. Conditioning was followed by a breaking continuous flash suppression task, measuring the speed of reported breakthrough for different pairings between the stimuli and prepared actions, comparing those congruent and incongruent with the trained sensorimotor predictions. In Experiment 1, counterbalancing of the response actions within the breaking continuous flash suppression task was achieved by repeating the same action within each block but having them differ across the two blocks. Experiment 2 sought to increase the predictive salience of the actions by avoiding the repetition within blocks. In Experiment 1, breakthrough times were numerically shorter for congruent than incongruent pairings, but Bayesian analysis supported the null hypothesis of no influence from the sensorimotor predictions. In Experiment 2, reported conscious perception was significantly faster for congruent than for incongruent pairings. A meta-analytic Bayes factor combining the two experiments confirmed this effect. Altogether, we provide evidence for a key implication of the action-oriented predictive processing approach to conscious perception, namely that sensorimotor predictions shape our conscious experience of the world.

Predictive processing as an empirical theory for consciousness science

The theories of consciousness discussed by Doerig and colleagues tend to monolithically identify consciousness with some other phenomenon, process, or mechanism. But by treating consciousness as singular explanatory target, such theories will struggle to account for the diverse properties that conscious experiences exhibit. We propose that progress in consciousness science will best be achieved by elaborating systematic mappings between physical and biological mechanisms, and the functional and (crucially) phenomenological properties of consciousness. This means we need theories for consciousness science, perhaps more so than theories of consciousness. From this perspective, 'predictive processing' emerges as a highly promising candidate.

Reconciling emergences: An information-theoretic approach to identify causal emergence in multivariate data

The broad concept of emergence is instrumental in various of the most challenging open scientific questions-yet, few quantitative theories of what constitutes emergent phenomena have been proposed. This article introduces a formal theory of causal emergence in multivariate systems, which studies the relationship between the dynamics of parts of a system and macroscopic features of interest. Our theory provides a quantitative definition of downward causation, and introduces a complementary modality of emergent behaviour-which we refer to as causal decoupling. Moreover, the theory allows practical criteria that can be efficiently calculated in large systems, making our framework applicable in a range of scenarios of practical interest. We illustrate our findings in a number of case studies, including Conway's Game of Life, Reynolds' flocking model, and neural activity as measured by electrocorticography.

Trait phenomenological control predicts experience of mirror synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion

In hypnotic responding, expectancies arising from imaginative suggestion drive striking experiential changes (e.g., hallucinations) - which are experienced as involuntary - according to a normally distributed and stable trait ability (hypnotisability). Such experiences can be triggered by implicit suggestion and occur outside the hypnotic context. In large sample studies (of 156, 404 and 353 participants), we report substantial relationships between hypnotisability and experimental measures of experiential change in mirror-sensory synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion comparable to relationships between hypnotisability and individual hypnosis scale items. The control of phenomenology to meet expectancies arising from perceived task requirements can account for experiential change in psychological experiments.

Conscious perception and the modulatory role of dopamine: no effect of the dopamine D2 agonist cabergoline on visual masking, the attentional blink, and probabilistic discrimination

RATIONALE

Conscious perception is thought to depend on global amplification of sensory input. In recent years, striatal dopamine has been proposed to be involved in gating information and conscious access, due to its modulatory influence on thalamocortical connectivity.

OBJECTIVES

Since much of the evidence that implicates striatal dopamine is correlational, we conducted a double-blind crossover pharmacological study in which we administered cabergoline-a dopamine D2 agonist-and placebo to 30 healthy participants. Under both conditions, we subjected participants to several well-established experimental conscious-perception paradigms, such as backward masking and the attentional blink task.

RESULTS

We found no evidence in support of an effect of cabergoline on conscious perception: key behavioral and event-related potential (ERP) findings associated with each of these tasks were unaffected by cabergoline.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results cast doubt on a causal role for dopamine in visual perception. It remains an open possibility that dopamine has causal effects in other tasks, perhaps where perceptual uncertainty is more prominent.

Learning action-oriented models through active inference

Converging theories suggest that organisms learn and exploit probabilistic models of their environment. However, it remains unclear how such models can be learned in practice. The open-ended complexity of natural environments means that it is generally infeasible for organisms to model their environment comprehensively. Alternatively, action-oriented models attempt to encode a parsimonious representation of adaptive agent-environment interactions. One approach to learning action-oriented models is to learn online in the presence of goal-directed behaviours. This constrains an agent to behaviourally relevant trajectories, reducing the diversity of the data a model need account for. Unfortunately, this approach can cause models to prematurely converge to sub-optimal solutions, through a process we refer to as a bad-bootstrap. Here, we exploit the normative framework of active inference to show that efficient action-oriented models can be learned by balancing goal-oriented and epistemic (information-seeking) behaviours in a principled manner. We illustrate our approach using a simple agent-based model of bacterial chemotaxis. We first demonstrate that learning via goal-directed behaviour indeed constrains models to behaviorally relevant aspects of the environment, but that this approach is prone to sub-optimal convergence. We then demonstrate that epistemic behaviours facilitate the construction of accurate and comprehensive models, but that these models are not tailored to any specific behavioural niche and are therefore less efficient in their use of data. Finally, we show that active inference agents learn models that are parsimonious, tailored to action, and which avoid bad bootstraps and sub-optimal convergence. Critically, our results indicate that models learned through active inference can support adaptive behaviour in spite of, and indeed because of, their departure from veridical representations of the environment. Our approach provides a principled method for learning adaptive models from limited interactions with an environment, highlighting a route to sample efficient learning algorithms.

A single system account of enhanced recognition memory in synaesthesia

Researchers often adjudicate between models of memory according to the models' ability to explain impaired patterns of performance (e.g., in amnesia). In contrast, evidence from special groups with enhanced memory is very rarely considered. Here, we explored how people with unusual perceptual experiences (synaesthesia) perform on various measures of memory and test how computational models of memory may account for their enhanced performance. We contrasted direct and indirect measures of memory (i.e., recognition memory, repetition priming, and fluency) in grapheme-colour synaesthetes and controls using a continuous identification with recognition (CID-R) paradigm. Synaesthetes outperformed controls on recognition memory and showed a different reaction-time pattern for identification. The data were most parsimoniously accounted for by a single-system computational model of the relationship between recognition and identification. Overall, the findings speak in favour of enhanced processing as an explanation for the memory advantage in synaesthesia. In general, our results show how synaesthesia can be used as an effective tool to study how individual differences in perception affect cognitive functions.

Neurophenomenology of induced and natural synaesthesia

People with synaesthesia have additional perceptual experiences, which are automatically and consistently triggered by specific inducing stimuli. Synaesthesia therefore offers a unique window into the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying conscious perception. A long-standing question in synaesthesia research is whether it is possible to artificially induce non-synaesthetic individuals to have synaesthesia-like experiences. Although synaesthesia is widely considered a congenital condition, increasing evidence points to the potential of a variety of approaches to induce synaesthesia-like experiences, even in adulthood. Here, we summarize a range of methods for artificially inducing synaesthesia-like experiences, comparing the resulting experiences to the key hallmarks of natural synaesthesia which include consistency, automaticity and a lack of 'perceptual presence'. We conclude that a number of aspects of synaesthesia can be artificially induced in non-synaesthetes. These data suggest the involvement of developmental and/or learning components in the acquisition of synaesthesia, and they extend previous reports of perceptual plasticity leading to dramatic changes in perceptual phenomenology in adults. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Bridging senses: novel insights from synaesthesia'.

Intentional Binding Without Intentional Action

The experience of authorship over one’s actions and their consequences—sense of agency—is a fundamental aspect of conscious experience. In recent years, it has become common to use intentional binding as an implicit measure of the sense of agency. However, it remains contentious whether reported intentional-binding effects indicate the role of intention-related information in perception or merely represent a strong case of multisensory causal binding. Here, we used a novel virtual-reality setup to demonstrate identical magnitude-binding effects in both the presence and complete absence of intentional action, when perceptual stimuli were matched for temporal and spatial information. Our results demonstrate that intentional-binding-like effects are most simply accounted for by multisensory causal binding without necessarily being related to intention or agency. Future studies that relate binding effects to agency must provide evidence for effects beyond that expected for multisensory causal binding by itself.

Neurite orientation and dispersion density imaging (NODDI) detects cortical and corticospinal tract degeneration in ALS

BACKGROUND

Corticospinal tract (CST) degeneration and cortical atrophy are consistent features of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). We hypothesised that neurite orientation dispersion and density imaging (NODDI), a multicompartment model of diffusion MRI, would reveal microstructural changes associated with ALS within the CST and precentral gyrus (PCG) 'in vivo'.

METHODS

23 participants with sporadic ALS and 23 healthy controls underwent diffusion MRI. Neurite density index (NDI), orientation dispersion index (ODI) and free water fraction (isotropic compartment (ISO)) were derived. Whole brain voxel-wise analysis was performed to assess for group differences. Standard diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) parameters were computed for comparison. Subgroup analysis was performed to investigate for NODDI parameter differences relating to bulbar involvement. Correlation of NODDI parameters with clinical variables were also explored. The results were accepted as significant where p<0.05 after family-wise error correction at the cluster level, clusters formed with p<0.001.

RESULTS

In the ALS group NDI was reduced in the extensive regions of the CST, the corpus callosum and the right PCG. ODI was reduced in the right anterior internal capsule and the right PCG. Significant differences in NDI were detected between subgroups stratified according to the presence or absence of bulbar involvement. ODI and ISO correlated with disease duration.

CONCLUSIONS

NODDI demonstrates that axonal loss within the CST is a core feature of degeneration in ALS. This is the main factor contributing to the altered diffusivity profile detected using DTI. NODDI also identified dendritic alterations within the PCG, suggesting microstructural cortical dendritic changes occur together with CST axonal damage.

A Bayesian Account of the Sensory-Motor Interactions Underlying Symptoms of Tourette Syndrome

Tourette syndrome is a hyperkinetic movement disorder. Characteristic features include tics, recurrent movements that are experienced as compulsive and "unwilled"; uncomfortable premonitory sensations that resolve through tic release; and often, the ability to suppress tics temporarily. We demonstrate how these symptoms and features can be understood in terms of aberrant predictive (Bayesian) processing in hierarchical neural systems, explaining specifically: why tics arise, their "unvoluntary" nature, how premonitory sensations emerge, and why tic suppression works-sometimes. In our model, premonitory sensations and tics are generated through over-precise priors for sensation and action within somatomotor regions of the striatum. Abnormally high precision of priors arises through the dysfunctional synaptic integration of cortical inputs. These priors for sensation and action are projected into primary sensory and motor areas, triggering premonitory sensations and tics, which in turn elicit prediction errors for unexpected feelings and movements. We propose experimental paradigms to validate this Bayesian account of tics. Our model integrates behavioural, neuroimaging, and computational approaches to provide mechanistic insight into the pathophysiological basis of Tourette syndrome.

Domain-general enhancements of metacognitive ability through adaptive training

The metacognitive ability to introspect about self-performance varies substantially across individuals. Given that effective monitoring of performance is deemed important for effective behavioral control, intervening to improve metacognition may have widespread benefits, for example in educational and clinical settings. However, it is unknown whether and how metacognition can be systematically improved through training independently of task performance, or whether metacognitive improvements generalize across different task domains. Across 8 sessions, here we provided feedback to two groups of participants in a perceptual discrimination task: an experimental group (n = 29) received feedback on their metacognitive judgments, while an active control group (n = 32) received feedback on their decision performance only. Relative to the control group, adaptive training led to increases in metacognitive calibration (as assessed by Brier scores), which generalized both to untrained stimuli and an untrained task (recognition memory). Leveraging signal detection modeling we found that metacognitive improvements were driven both by changes in metacognitive efficiency (meta-d′/d′) and confidence level, and that later increases in metacognitive efficiency were positively mediated by earlier shifts in confidence. Our results reveal a striking malleability of introspection and indicate the potential for a domain-general enhancement of metacognitive abilities.

Individual differences in change blindness are predicted by the strength and stability of visual representations

The phenomenon of change blindness reveals that people are surprisingly poor at detecting unexpected visual changes; however, research on individual differences in detection ability is scarce. Predictive processing accounts of visual perception suggest that better change detection may be linked to assigning greater weight to prediction error signals, as indexed by an increased alternation rate in perceptual rivalry or greater sensitivity to low-level visual signals. Alternatively, superior detection ability may be associated with robust visual predictions against which sensory changes can be more effectively registered, suggesting an association with high-level mechanisms of visual short-term memory (VSTM) and attention. We administered a battery of 10 measures to explore these predictions and to determine, for the first time, the test–retest reliability of commonly used change detection measures. Change detection performance was stable over time and generalized from displays of static scenes to video clips. An exploratory factor analysis revealed two factors explaining performance across the battery, that we identify as visual stability (loading on change detection, attention measures, VSTM and perceptual rivalry) and visual ability (loading on iconic memory, temporal order judgments and contrast sensitivity). These results highlight the importance of strong, stable representations and the ability to resist distraction, in order to successfully incorporate unexpected changes into the contents of visual awareness.

Activity in perceptual classification networks as a basis for human subjective time perception

Despite being a fundamental dimension of experience, how the human brain generates the perception of time remains unknown. Here, we provide a novel explanation for how human time perception might be accomplished, based on non-temporal perceptual classification processes. To demonstrate this proposal, we build an artificial neural system centred on a feed-forward image classification network, functionally similar to human visual processing. In this system, input videos of natural scenes drive changes in network activation, and accumulation of salient changes in activation are used to estimate duration. Estimates produced by this system match human reports made about the same videos, replicating key qualitative biases, including differentiating between scenes of walking around a busy city or sitting in a cafe or office. Our approach provides a working model of duration perception from stimulus to estimation and presents a new direction for examining the foundations of this central aspect of human experience.

Perceptual Content, Not Physiological Signals, Determines Perceived Duration When Viewing Dynamic, Natural Scenes

The neural basis of time perception remains unknown. A prominent account is the pacemaker-accumulator model, wherein regular ticks of some physiological or neural pacemaker are read out as time. Putative candidates for the pacemaker have been suggested in physiological processes (heartbeat), or dopaminergic mid-brain neurons, whose activity has been associated with spontaneous blinking. However, such proposals have difficulty accounting for observations that time perception varies systematically with perceptual content. We examined physiological influences on human duration estimates for naturalistic videos between 1–64 seconds using cardiac and eye recordings. Duration estimates were biased by the amount of change in scene content. Contrary to previous claims, heart rate, and blinking were not related to duration estimates. Our results support a recent proposal that tracking change in perceptual classification networks provides a basis for human time perception, and suggest that previous assertions of the importance of physiological factors should be tempered.

Measuring Integrated Information: Comparison of Candidate Measures in Theory and Simulation

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a prominent theory of consciousness that has at its centre measures that quantify the extent to which a system generates more information than the sum of its parts. While several candidate measures of integrated information (" Φ ") now exist, little is known about how they compare, especially in terms of their behaviour on non-trivial network models. In this article, we provide clear and intuitive descriptions of six distinct candidate measures. We then explore the properties of each of these measures in simulation on networks consisting of eight interacting nodes, animated with Gaussian linear autoregressive dynamics. We find a striking diversity in the behaviour of these measures-no two measures show consistent agreement across all analyses. A subset of the measures appears to reflect some form of dynamical complexity, in the sense of simultaneous segregation and integration between system components. Our results help guide the operationalisation of IIT and advance the development of measures of integrated information and dynamical complexity that may have more general applicability.

Consciousness: The last 50 years (and the next)

The mind and brain sciences began with consciousness as a central concern. But for much of the 20th century, ideological and methodological concerns relegated its empirical study to the margins. Since the 1990s, studying consciousness has regained a legitimacy and momentum befitting its status as the primary feature of our mental lives. Nowadays, consciousness science encompasses a rich interdisciplinary mixture drawing together philosophical, theoretical, computational, experimental, and clinical perspectives, with neuroscience its central discipline. Researchers have learned a great deal about the neural mechanisms underlying global states of consciousness, distinctions between conscious and unconscious perception, and self-consciousness. Further progress will depend on specifying closer explanatory mappings between (first-person subjective) phenomenological descriptions and (third-person objective) descriptions of (embodied and embedded) neuronal mechanisms. Such progress will help reframe our understanding of our place in nature and accelerate clinical approaches to a wide range of psychiatric and neurological disorders.

Face perception enhances insula and motor network reactivity in Tourette syndrome

Tourette syndrome is a neurodevelopmental disorder, characterized by motor and phonic tics. Tics are typically experienced as avolitional, compulsive, and associated with premonitory urges. They are exacerbated by stress and can be triggered by external stimuli, including social cues like the actions and facial expressions of others. Importantly, emotional social stimuli, with angry facial stimuli potentially the most potent social threat cue, also trigger behavioural reactions in healthy individuals, suggesting that such mechanisms may be particularly sensitive in people with Tourette syndrome. Twenty-one participants with Tourette syndrome and 21 healthy controls underwent functional MRI while viewing faces wearing either neutral or angry expressions to quantify group differences in neural activity associated with processing social information. Simultaneous video recordings of participants during neuroimaging enabled us to model confounding effects of tics on task-related responses to the processing of faces. In both Tourette syndrome and control participants, face stimuli evoked enhanced activation within canonical face perception regions, including the occipital face area and fusiform face area. However, the Tourette syndrome group showed additional responses within the anterior insula to both neutral and angry faces. Functional connectivity during face viewing was then examined in a series of psychophysiological interactions. In participants with Tourette syndrome, the insula showed functional connectivity with a set of cortical regions previously implicated in tic generation: the presupplementary motor area, premotor cortex, primary motor cortex, and the putamen. Furthermore, insula functional connectivity with the globus pallidus and thalamus varied in proportion to tic severity, while supplementary motor area connectivity varied in proportion to premonitory sensations, with insula connectivity to these regions increasing to a greater extent in patients with worse symptom severity. In addition, the occipital face area showed increased functional connectivity in Tourette syndrome participants with posterior cortical regions, including primary somatosensory cortex, and occipital face area connectivity with primary somatosensory and primary motor cortices varied in proportion to tic severity. There were no significant psychophysiological interactions in controls. These findings highlight a potential mechanism in Tourette syndrome through which heightened representation within insular cortex of embodied affective social information may impact the reactivity of subcortical motor pathways, supporting programmed motor actions that are causally implicated in tic generation. Medicinal and psychological therapies that focus on reducing insular hyper-reactivity to social stimuli may have potential benefit for tic reduction in people with Tourette syndrome.

Being a Beast Machine: The Somatic Basis of Selfhood

Modern psychology has long focused on the body as the basis of the self. Recently, predictive processing accounts of interoception (perception of the body 'from within') have become influential in accounting for experiences of body ownership and emotion. Here, we describe embodied selfhood in terms of 'instrumental interoceptive inference' that emphasises allostatic regulation and physiological integrity. We apply this approach to the distinctive phenomenology of embodied selfhood, accounting for its non-object-like character and subjective stability over time. Our perspective has implications for the development of selfhood and illuminates longstanding debates about relations between life and mind, implying, contrary to Descartes, that experiences of embodied selfhood arise because of, and not in spite of, our nature as 'beast machines'.

The Illusion of Uniformity Does Not Depend on the Primary Visual Cortex: Evidence From Sensory Adaptation

Visual experience appears richly detailed despite the poor resolution of the majority of the visual field, thanks to foveal-peripheral integration. The recently described uniformity illusion (UI), wherein peripheral elements of a pattern take on the appearance of foveal elements, may shed light on this integration. We examined the basis of UI by generating adaptation to a pattern of Gabors suitable for producing UI on orientation. After removing the pattern, participants reported the tilt of a single peripheral Gabor. The tilt aftereffect followed the physical adapting orientation rather than the global orientation perceived under UI, even when the illusion had been reported for a long time. Conversely, a control experiment replacing illusory uniformity with a physically uniform Gabor pattern for the same durations did produce an aftereffect to the global orientation. Results indicate that UI is not associated with changes in sensory encoding at V1 but likely depends on higher level processes.

Serial dependence in the perception of visual variance

The recent history of perceptual experience has been shown to influence subsequent perception. Classically, this dependence on perceptual history has been examined in sensory-adaptation paradigms, wherein prolonged exposure to a particular stimulus (e.g., a vertically oriented grating) produces changes in perception of subsequently presented stimuli (e.g., the tilt aftereffect). More recently, several studies have investigated the influence of shorter perceptual exposure with effects, referred to as serial dependence, being described for a variety of low- and high-level perceptual dimensions. In this study, we examined serial dependence in the processing of dispersion statistics, namely variance-a key descriptor of the environment and indicative of the precision and reliability of ensemble representations. We found two opposite serial dependences operating at different timescales, and likely originating at different processing levels: A positive, Bayesian-like bias was driven by the most recent exposures, dependent on feature-specific decision making and appearing only when high confidence was placed in that decision; and a longer lasting negative bias-akin to an adaptation aftereffect-becoming manifest as the positive bias declined. Both effects were independent of spatial presentation location and the similarity of other close traits, such as mean direction of the visual variance stimulus. These findings suggest that visual variance processing occurs in high-level areas but is also subject to a combination of multilevel mechanisms balancing perceptual stability and sensitivity, as with many different perceptual dimensions.

Serial dependence in the perception of visual variance

The recent history of perceptual experience has been shown to influence subsequent perception. Classically, this dependence on perceptual history has been examined in sensory-adaptation paradigms, wherein prolonged exposure to a particular stimulus (e.g., a vertically oriented grating) produces changes in perception of subsequently presented stimuli (e.g., the tilt aftereffect). More recently, several studies have investigated the influence of shorter perceptual exposure with effects, referred to as serial dependence, being described for a variety of low- and high-level perceptual dimensions. In this study, we examined serial dependence in the processing of dispersion statistics, namely variance-a key descriptor of the environment and indicative of the precision and reliability of ensemble representations. We found two opposite serial dependences operating at different timescales, and likely originating at different processing levels: A positive, Bayesian-like bias was driven by the most recent exposures, dependent on feature-specific decision making and appearing only when high confidence was placed in that decision; and a longer lasting negative bias-akin to an adaptation aftereffect-becoming manifest as the positive bias declined. Both effects were independent of spatial presentation location and the similarity of other close traits, such as mean direction of the visual variance stimulus. These findings suggest that visual variance processing occurs in high-level areas but is also subject to a combination of multilevel mechanisms balancing perceptual stability and sensitivity, as with many different perceptual dimensions.

Three-Dimensional Digital Template Atlas of the Macaque Brain

We present a new 3D template atlas of the anatomical subdivisions of the macaque brain, which is based on and aligned to the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data set and histological sections of the Saleem and Logothetis atlas. We describe the creation and validation of the atlas that, when registered with macaque structural or functional MRI scans, provides a straightforward means to estimate the boundaries between architectonic areas, either in a 3D volume with different planes of sections, or on an inflated brain surface (cortical flat map). As such, this new template atlas is intended for use as a reference standard for macaque brain research. Atlases and templates are available as both volumes and surfaces in standard NIFTI and GIFTI formats.

Impairment of perceptual metacognitive accuracy and reduced prefrontal grey matter volume in first-episode psychosis

INTRODUCTION

Metacognition, or "thinking about thinking", is a higher-order thought process that allows for the evaluation of perceptual processes for accuracy. Metacognitive accuracy is associated with the grey matter volume (GMV) in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), an area also impacted in schizophrenia. The present study set out to investigate whether deficits in metacognitive accuracy are present in the early stages of psychosis.

METHODS

Metacognitive accuracy in first-episode psychosis (FEP) was assessed on a perceptual decision-making task and their performance compared to matched healthy control participants (N = 18). A novel signal detection theory approach was used to model metacognitive sensitivity independently from objective perceptual performance. A voxel-based morphometry investigation was also conducted on GMV.

RESULTS

We found that the FEP group demonstrated significantly worse metacognitive accuracy compared to controls (p = .039). Importantly, GMV deficits were also observed in the superior frontal gyrus. The findings suggest a specific deficit in this processing domain to exist at first episode; however, no relationship was found between GMV and metacognitive accuracy.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings support the notion that an inability to accurately scrutinise perception may underpin functional deficits observed in later schizophrenia; however, the exact neural basis of metacognitive deficits in FEP remains elusive.

Loss of consciousness is related to hyper-correlated gamma-band activity in anesthetized macaques and sleeping humans

Loss of consciousness can result from a wide range of causes, including natural sleep and pharmacologically induced anesthesia. Important insights might thus come from identifying neuronal mechanisms of loss and re-emergence of consciousness independent of a specific manipulation. Therefore, to seek neuronal signatures of loss of consciousness common to sleep and anesthesia we analyzed spontaneous electrophysiological activity recorded in two experiments. First, electrocorticography (ECoG) acquired from 4 macaque monkeys anesthetized with different anesthetic agents (ketamine, medetomidine, propofol) and, second, stereo-electroencephalography (sEEG) from 10 epilepsy patients in different wake-sleep stages (wakefulness, NREM, REM). Specifically, we investigated co-activation patterns among brain areas, defined as correlations between local amplitudes of gamma-band activity. We found that resting wakefulness was associated with intermediate levels of gamma-band coupling, indicating neither complete dependence, nor full independence among brain regions. In contrast, loss of consciousness during NREM sleep and propofol anesthesia was associated with excessively correlated brain activity, as indicated by a robust increase of number and strength of positive correlations. However, such excessively correlated brain signals were not observed during REM sleep, and were present only to a limited extent during ketamine anesthesia. This might be related to the fact that, despite suppression of behavioral responsiveness, REM sleep and ketamine anesthesia often involve presence of dream-like conscious experiences. We conclude that hyper-correlated gamma-band activity might be a signature of loss of consciousness common across various manipulations and independent of behavioral responsiveness.