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Beerendonk L, Mejías JF, Nuiten SA, de Gee JW, Fahrenfort JJ, van Gaal S. A disinhibitory circuit mechanism explains a general principle of peak performance during mid-level arousal. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2024; 121:e2312898121. [PMID: 38277436 PMCID: PMC10835062 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2312898121] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/30/2023] [Accepted: 12/04/2023] [Indexed: 01/28/2024] Open
Abstract
Perceptual decision-making is highly dependent on the momentary arousal state of the brain, which fluctuates over time on a scale of hours, minutes, and even seconds. The textbook relationship between momentary arousal and task performance is captured by an inverted U-shape, as put forward in the Yerkes-Dodson law. This law suggests optimal performance at moderate levels of arousal and impaired performance at low or high arousal levels. However, despite its popularity, the evidence for this relationship in humans is mixed at best. Here, we use pupil-indexed arousal and performance data from various perceptual decision-making tasks to provide converging evidence for the inverted U-shaped relationship between spontaneous arousal fluctuations and performance across different decision types (discrimination, detection) and sensory modalities (visual, auditory). To further understand this relationship, we built a neurobiologically plausible mechanistic model and show that it is possible to reproduce our findings by incorporating two types of interneurons that are both modulated by an arousal signal. The model architecture produces two dynamical regimes under the influence of arousal: one regime in which performance increases with arousal and another regime in which performance decreases with arousal, together forming an inverted U-shaped arousal-performance relationship. We conclude that the inverted U-shaped arousal-performance relationship is a general and robust property of sensory processing. It might be brought about by the influence of arousal on two types of interneurons that together act as a disinhibitory pathway for the neural populations that encode the available sensory evidence used for the decision.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lola Beerendonk
- Research Priority Area Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1001NK, The Netherlands
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1001NK, The Netherlands
| | - Jorge F. Mejías
- Research Priority Area Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1001NK, The Netherlands
- Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience, Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1098XH, The Netherlands
| | - Stijn A. Nuiten
- Research Priority Area Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1001NK, The Netherlands
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1001NK, The Netherlands
- Universitäre Psychiatrische Kliniken Basel, Wilhelm Klein-Strasse 27, Basel4002, Switzerland
| | - Jan Willem de Gee
- Research Priority Area Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1001NK, The Netherlands
- Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience, Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1098XH, The Netherlands
| | - Johannes J. Fahrenfort
- Institute for Brain and Behavior Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam1081HV, The Netherlands
- Department of Applied and Experimental Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam1081HV, The Netherlands
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Research Priority Area Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1001NK, The Netherlands
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1001NK, The Netherlands
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Canales-Johnson A, Beerendonk L, Chennu S, Davidson MJ, Ince RAA, van Gaal S. Feedback information sharing in the human brain reflects bistable perception in the absence of report. PLoS Biol 2023; 21:e3002120. [PMID: 37155704 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.3002120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/25/2022] [Revised: 05/18/2023] [Accepted: 04/13/2023] [Indexed: 05/10/2023] Open
Abstract
In the search for the neural basis of conscious experience, perception and the cognitive processes associated with reporting perception are typically confounded as neural activity is recorded while participants explicitly report what they experience. Here, we present a novel way to disentangle perception from report using eye movement analysis techniques based on convolutional neural networks and neurodynamical analyses based on information theory. We use a bistable visual stimulus that instantiates two well-known properties of conscious perception: integration and differentiation. At any given moment, observers either perceive the stimulus as one integrated unitary object or as two differentiated objects that are clearly distinct from each other. Using electroencephalography, we show that measures of integration and differentiation based on information theory closely follow participants' perceptual experience of those contents when switches were reported. We observed increased information integration between anterior to posterior electrodes (front to back) prior to a switch to the integrated percept, and higher information differentiation of anterior signals leading up to reporting the differentiated percept. Crucially, information integration was closely linked to perception and even observed in a no-report condition when perceptual transitions were inferred from eye movements alone. In contrast, the link between neural differentiation and perception was observed solely in the active report condition. Our results, therefore, suggest that perception and the processes associated with report require distinct amounts of anterior-posterior network communication and anterior information differentiation. While front-to-back directed information is associated with changes in the content of perception when viewing bistable visual stimuli, regardless of report, frontal information differentiation was absent in the no-report condition and therefore is not directly linked to perception per se.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andres Canales-Johnson
- Conscious Brain Lab, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Cambridge Consciousness and Cognition Lab, Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
- Neuropsychology and Cognitive Neurosciences Research Center, Faculty of Health Sciences, Universidad Católica del Maule, Talca, Chile
| | - Lola Beerendonk
- Conscious Brain Lab, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Srivas Chennu
- School of Computing, University of Kent, Canterbury, United Kingdom
| | | | - Robin A A Ince
- Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, United Kingdom
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Conscious Brain Lab, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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Francken JC, Beerendonk L, Molenaar D, Fahrenfort JJ, Kiverstein JD, Seth AK, van Gaal S. An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science. Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niac011. [PMID: 35975240 PMCID: PMC9374479 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/17/2021] [Revised: 05/13/2022] [Accepted: 07/27/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jolien C Francken
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Sciences, Radboud University, Erasmusplein 1, 6525 HT, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
| | - Lola Beerendonk
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Dylan Molenaar
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Johannes J Fahrenfort
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit, Van der Boechorststraat 7, 1081 BT, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Julian D Kiverstein
- Academic Medical Centre, University of Amsterdam, Meibergdreef 9, 1105 AZ, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Anil K Seth
- Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Sussex House, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Sussex House, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) Program on Brain, Mind, and Consciousness, MaRS Centre, West Tower, 661 University Avenue, Toronto, ON M5G 1M1, Canada
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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Nuiten SA, Canales-Johnson A, Beerendonk L, Nanuashvili N, Fahrenfort JJ, Bekinschtein T, van Gaal S. Preserved sensory processing but hampered conflict detection when stimulus input is task-irrelevant. eLife 2021; 10:64431. [PMID: 34121657 PMCID: PMC8294845 DOI: 10.7554/elife.64431] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/28/2020] [Accepted: 06/02/2021] [Indexed: 12/23/2022] Open
Abstract
Conflict detection in sensory input is central to adaptive human behavior. Perhaps unsurprisingly, past research has shown that conflict may even be detected in the absence of conflict awareness, suggesting that conflict detection is an automatic process that does not require attention. To test the possibility of conflict processing in the absence of attention, we manipulated task relevance and response overlap of potentially conflicting stimulus features across six behavioral tasks. Multivariate analyses on human electroencephalographic data revealed neural signatures of conflict only when at least one feature of a conflicting stimulus was attended, regardless of whether that feature was part of the conflict, or overlaps with the response. In contrast, neural signatures of basic sensory processes were present even when a stimulus was completely unattended. These data reveal an attentional bottleneck at the level of objects, suggesting that object-based attention is a prerequisite for cognitive control operations involved in conflict detection. Focusing your attention on one thing can leave you surprisingly unaware of what goes on around you. A classic experiment known as ‘the invisible gorilla’ highlights this phenomenon. Volunteers were asked to watch a clip featuring basketball players, and count how often those wearing white shirts passed the ball: around half of participants failed to spot that someone wearing a gorilla costume wandered into the game and spent nine seconds on screen. Yet, things that you are not focusing on can sometimes grab your attention anyway. Take for example, the ‘cocktail party effect’, the ability to hear your name among the murmur of a crowded room. So why can we react to our own names, but fail to spot the gorilla? To help answer this question, Nuiten et al. examined how paying attention affects the way the brain processes input. Healthy volunteers were asked to perform various tasks while the words ‘left’ or ‘right’ played through speakers. The content of the word was sometimes consistent with its location (‘left’ being played on the left speaker), and sometimes opposite (‘left’ being played on the right speaker). Processing either the content or the location of the word is relatively simple for the brain; however detecting a discrepancy between these two properties is challenging, requiring the information to be processed in a brain region that monitors conflict in sensory input. To manipulate whether the volunteers needed to pay attention to the words, Nuiten et al. made their content or location either relevant or irrelevant for a task. By analyzing brain activity and task performance, they were able to study the effects of attention on how the word properties were processed. The results showed that the volunteers’ brains were capable of dealing with basic information, such as location or content, even when their attention was directed elsewhere. But discrepancies between content and location could only be detected when the volunteers were focusing on the words, or when their content or location was directly relevant to the task. The findings by Nuiten et al. suggest that while performing a difficult task, our brains continue to react to basic input but often fail to process more complex information. This, in turn, has implications for a range of human activities such as driving. New technology could potentially help to counteract this phenomenon, aiming to direct attention towards complex information that might otherwise be missed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stijn Adriaan Nuiten
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.,Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Andrés Canales-Johnson
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.,Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.,Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom.,Vicerrectoría de Investigación y Posgrado, Universidad Católica del Maule, Talca, Chile
| | - Lola Beerendonk
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.,Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.,Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
| | - Nutsa Nanuashvili
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.,Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Johannes Jacobus Fahrenfort
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.,Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Tristan Bekinschtein
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom.,Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute, Cambridge, United Kingdom
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.,Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
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Canales-Johnson A, Beerendonk L, Blain S, Kitaoka S, Ezquerro-Nassar A, Nuiten S, Fahrenfort J, van Gaal S, Bekinschtein TA. Decreased Alertness Reconfigures Cognitive Control Networks. J Neurosci 2020; 40:7142-7154. [PMID: 32801150 PMCID: PMC7480250 DOI: 10.1523/jneurosci.0343-20.2020] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/12/2020] [Revised: 07/02/2020] [Accepted: 07/10/2020] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans' remarkable capacity to flexibly adapt their behavior based on rapid situational changes is termed cognitive control. Intuitively, cognitive control is thought to be affected by the state of alertness; for example, when drowsy, we feel less capable of adequately implementing effortful cognitive tasks. Although scientific investigations have focused on the effects of sleep deprivation and circadian time, little is known about how natural daily fluctuations in alertness in the regular awake state affect cognitive control. Here we combined a conflict task in the auditory domain with EEG neurodynamics to test how neural and behavioral markers of conflict processing are affected by fluctuations in alertness. Using a novel computational method, we segregated alert and drowsy trials from two testing sessions and observed that, although participants (both sexes) were generally sluggish, the typical conflict effect reflected in slower responses to conflicting information compared with nonconflicting information, as well as the moderating effect of previous conflict (conflict adaptation), were still intact. However, the typical neural markers of cognitive control-local midfrontal theta-band power changes-that participants show during full alertness were no longer noticeable when alertness decreased. Instead, when drowsy, we found an increase in long-range information sharing (connectivity) between brain regions in the same frequency band. These results show the resilience of the human cognitive control system when affected by internal fluctuations of alertness and suggest that there are neural compensatory mechanisms at play in response to physiological pressure during diminished alertness.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The normal variability in alertness we experience in daily tasks is rarely taken into account in cognitive neuroscience. Here we studied neurobehavioral dynamics of cognitive control with decreasing alertness. We used the classic Simon task where participants hear the word "left" or "right" in the right or left ear, eliciting slower responses when the word and the side are incongruent-the conflict effect. Participants performed the task both while fully awake and while getting drowsy, allowing for the characterization of alertness modulating cognitive control. The changes in the neural signatures of conflict from local theta oscillations to a long-distance distributed theta network suggest a reconfiguration of the underlying neural processes subserving cognitive control when affected by alertness fluctuations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Andrés Canales-Johnson
- Cambridge Consciousness and Cognition Laboratory, Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, United Kingdom
- Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, United Kingdom
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Vicerrectoría de Investigación y Posgrado, Universidad Católica del Maule, Talca 3480112, Chile
| | - Lola Beerendonk
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Salome Blain
- Cambridge Consciousness and Cognition Laboratory, Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, United Kingdom
| | - Shin Kitaoka
- Cambridge Consciousness and Cognition Laboratory, Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, United Kingdom
| | - Alejandro Ezquerro-Nassar
- Cambridge Consciousness and Cognition Laboratory, Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, United Kingdom
- Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, United Kingdom
| | - Stijn Nuiten
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Johannes Fahrenfort
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Tristan A Bekinschtein
- Cambridge Consciousness and Cognition Laboratory, Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, United Kingdom
- Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, United Kingdom
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