How to Become a Memory: The Individual and Collective Aspects of Mnemicity

Human adults distinguish their mental event simulations along various dimensions-most prominently according to their "mnemicity": we track whether these simulations are outcomes of past personal experiences or not (i.e., whether we are "remembering" or "imagining"). This distinction between memory and imagination is commonly thought to reflect a deep architectural distinction in the mind. Against this idea, I argue that mnemicity is not based on a fundamentalstructural difference between memories and imaginations but is instead the result of metacognitive attribution and social construction. On this attributional view, mnemicity is likely a uniquely human capacity that both serves collective functions and has been shaped by collective norms. First, on the individual level, mnemicity attribution is an outcome of metacognitive learning: it relies on acquired interpretations of the phenomenal features of mental event simulations. Such interpretations are in part acquired through interactive reminiscing with other community members. Further, how the distinction between memory and imagination is drawn is likely sensitive to cultural norms about what remembering is, when it is appropriate to claim to remember, what can be remembered, and what remembering entails. As a result, how individuals determine whether they remember or imagine is bound to be deeply enculturated. Second, mnemicity attribution solves an important collective challenge: who to grant epistemic authority about the past. Solving this challenge is important because-for humans-the past represents not just an opportunity to learn about the future but to coordinate present social realities. How a community determines such social realities both draws on individuals' remembering and in turn shapes when, what, and how individuals remember.

Unraveling the brain mechanisms of source monitoring with non-invasive brain stimulation: A systematic review

Background/Objective

Source monitoring refers to the ability to determine the source of memories and encompasses three subprocesses: internal source monitoring, reality monitoring, and external source monitoring. Neuroimaging studies provide valuable insights about neural correlates of source monitoring, but the causal relationship between brain and behavior is lacking. This study aimed to identify brain circuits involved in source monitoring by synthesizing the effects of brain stimulation on source monitoring as a function of the targeted brain regions or circuits.

Method

We conducted a systematic review of interventional studies that have examined the effects of brain stimulation on source monitoring across six databases. The principal outcome was the difference of source monitoring performance between active and control stimulation conditions.

Results

23 studies (920 healthy participants and 54 patients with schizophrenia) were included. Our findings revealed the involvement of i) the lateral prefrontal and temporoparietal cortices in internal source monitoring, ii) the medial prefrontal and temporoparietal cortices in reality monitoring, and iii) the precuneus and the left angular gyrus in external source monitoring.

Conclusions

These findings deepen our understanding of the brain mechanisms of source monitoring and highlight specific stimulation targets to alleviate source monitoring deficits.

Reality monitoring and metacognitive judgments in a false-memory paradigm

How well do we distinguish between different memory sources when the information from imagination and perception is similar? And how do metacognitive (confidence) judgments differ across different sources of experiences? To study these questions, we developed a reality monitoring task using semantically related words from the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm of false memories. In an orientation phase, participants either perceived word pairs or had to voluntarily imagine the second word of a word pair. In a test phase, participants viewed words and had to judge whether the paired word was previously perceived, imagined, or new. Results revealed an interaction between memory source and judgment type on both response rates and confidence judgments: reality monitoring was better for new and perceived (compared to imagined) sources, and participants often incorrectly reported imagined experiences to be perceived. Individuals exhibited similar confidence between correct imagined source judgments and incorrect imagined sources reported to be perceived. Modeling results indicated that the observed judgments were likely due to an externalizing bias (i.e., a bias to judge the memory source as perceived). Additionally, we found that overall metacognitive ability was best in the perceived source. Together, these results reveal a source-dependent effect on response rates and confidence ratings, and provide evidence that observers are surprisingly prone to externalizing biases when monitoring their own memories.

A randomised controlled trial investigating the causal role of the medial prefrontal cortex in mediating self-agency during speech monitoring and reality monitoring

Self-agency is the awareness of being the agent of one's own thoughts and actions. Self-agency is essential for interacting with the outside world (reality-monitoring). The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is thought to be one neural correlate of self-agency. We investigated whether mPFC activity can causally modulate self-agency on two different tasks of speech-monitoring and reality-monitoring. The experience of self-agency is thought to result from making reliable predictions about the expected outcomes of one's own actions. This self-prediction ability is necessary for the encoding and memory retrieval of one's own thoughts during reality-monitoring to enable accurate judgments of self-agency. This self-prediction ability is also necessary for speech-monitoring where speakers consistently compare auditory feedback (what we hear ourselves say) with what we expect to hear while speaking. In this study, 30 healthy participants are assigned to either 10 Hz repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to enhance mPFC excitability (N = 15) or 10 Hz rTMS targeting a distal temporoparietal site (N = 15). High-frequency rTMS to mPFC enhanced self-predictions during speech-monitoring that predicted improved self-agency judgments during reality-monitoring. This is the first study to provide robust evidence for mPFC underlying a causal role in self-agency, that results from the fundamental ability of improving self-predictions across two different tasks.

Explanatory power by vagueness. Challenges to the strong prior hypothesis on hallucinations exemplified by the Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome

Predictive processing models are often ascribed a certain generality in conceptually unifying the relationships between perception, action, and cognition or the potential to posit a 'grand unified theory' of the mind. The limitations of this unification can be seen when these models are applied to specific cognitive phenomena or phenomenal consciousness. Our article discusses these shortcomings for predictive processing models of hallucinations by the example of the Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. This case study shows that the current predictive processing account omits essential characteristics of stimulus-independent perception in general, which has critical phenomenological implications. We argue that the most popular predictive processing model of hallucinatory conditions - the strong prior hypothesis - fails to fully account for the characteristics of nonveridical perceptual experiences associated with Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. To fill this explanatory gap, we propose that the strong prior hypothesis needs to include reality monitoring to apply to more than just veridical percepts.

Using Extended Reality to Study the Experience of Presence

Extended reality (XR), encompassing various forms of virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR), has become a powerful experimental tool in consciousness research due to its capability to create holistic and immersive experiences of oneself and surrounding environments through simulation. One hallmark of a successful XR experience is when it elicits a strong sense of presence, which can be thought of as a subjective sense of reality of the self and the world. Although XR research has shed light on many factors that may influence presence (or its absence) in XR environments, there remains much to be discovered about the detailed and diverse phenomenology of presence, and the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie it. In this chapter, we analyse the concept of presence and relate it to the way in which humans may generate and maintain a stable sense of reality during both natural perception and virtual experiences. We start by reviewing the concept of presence as developed in XR research, covering both factors that may influence presence and potential ways of measuring presence. We then discuss the phenomenological characteristics of presence in human consciousness, drawing on clinical examples where presence is disturbed. Next, we describe two experiments using XR that investigated the effects of sensorimotor contingency and affordances on a specific form of presence related to the sense of objects as really existing in the world, referred to as 'objecthood'. We then go beyond perceptual presence to discuss the concept of 'conviction about reality', which corresponds to people's beliefs about the reality status of their perceptual experiences. We finish by exploring how the novel XR method of 'Substitutional Reality' can allow experimental investigation of these topics, opening new experimental directions for studying presence beyond the 'as-if' experience of fully simulated environments.

Dream lucidity positively correlates with reality monitoring

Dream lucidity, the awareness of consciousness in dreams, is linked to functions that support reality monitoring in differentiating between internally and externally generated memories. However, lucid dreams have been argued to result from thin reality-fantasy boundaries that lead to reality monitoring errors. To examine the relationship between dream lucidity and reality monitoring, we recruited 31 college students to rate their dream lucidity for 7 days and then complete a reality monitoring test in Experiment 1, observing a positive correlation between dream lucidity and reality monitoring. In Experiment 2, 109 participants rated dream lucidity and the memory characteristics of perceived and imagined events. Dream lucidity was negatively correlated with differences in sensory details between the memories of perceived and imagined events. The findings indicate that individuals with high dream lucidity have a superior ability to discriminate between externally and internally generated events that are susceptible to reality monitoring errors.

Mistaking imagination for reality: Congruent mental imagery leads to more liberal perceptual detection

Visual experiences can be triggered externally, by signals coming from the outside world during perception; or internally, by signals from memory during mental imagery. Imagery and perception activate similar neural codes in sensory areas, suggesting that they might sometimes be confused. In the current study, we investigated whether imagery influences perception by instructing participants to imagine gratings while externally detecting these same gratings at threshold. In a series of three experiments, we showed that imagery led to a more liberal criterion for reporting stimulus presence, and that this effect was both independent of expectation and stimulus-specific. Furthermore, participants with more vivid imagery were generally more likely to report the presence of external stimuli, independent of condition. The results can be explained as either a low-level sensory or a high-level decision-making effect. We discuss that the most likely explanation is that during imagery, internally generated sensory signals are sometimes confused for perception and suggest how the underlying mechanisms can be further characterized in future research. Our findings show that imagery and perception interact and emphasize that internally and externally generated signals are combined in complex ways to determine conscious perception.

Investigating the roles of medial prefrontal and superior temporal cortex in source monitoring

Source monitoring, or the ability to recall the origin of information, is a crucial aspect of remembering past experience. One facet of this, reality monitoring, refers to the ability to distinguish between internally generated and externally generated information, biases in which have previously been associated with auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia. Neuroimaging evidence suggests that medial prefrontal and superior temporal (STG) regions may play a role in reality monitoring for auditory verbal information, with evidence from a previous neurostimulation experiment also suggesting that modulation of excitability in STG may affect reality monitoring task performance. Here, two experiments are reported that used transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to modulate excitability in medial prefrontal and superior temporal cortex, to further investigate the role of these brain regions in reality monitoring. In the first experiment (N = 36), tDCS was applied during the encoding stage of the task, while in the second experiment, in a separate sample (N = 36), it was applied during the test stage. There was no effect of tDCS compared to a sham condition in either experiment, with Bayesian analysis providing evidence for the null hypothesis in both cases. This suggests that tDCS applied to superior temporal or medial prefrontal regions may not affect reality monitoring performance, and has implications for theoretical models that link reality monitoring to the therapeutic effect of tDCS on auditory verbal hallucinations.

I remember emotional content better, but I'm struggling to remember who said it!

The joint impact of emotion and production on conversational memory was examined in two experiments where pairs of participants took turns producing verbal information. They were instructed to produce out loud sentences based on either neutral or emotional (Experiment 1: negative; Experiment 2: positive) words. Each participant was then asked to recall as many words as possible (content memory) and to indicate who had produced each word (reality monitoring). The analyses showed that both self-production and emotion boost content memory, although emotion also impairs reality monitoring. This study sheds light on how both factors (emotion and production) may constrain language interaction memory through information saliency.

Reality monitoring performance and the role of visual imagery in visual hallucinations

BACKGROUND

Auditory Hallucinations may arise from people confusing their own inner speech with external spoken speech. People with visual hallucinations (VH) may similarly confuse vivid mental imagery with external events. This paper reports two experiments exploring confusion between internal and external visual material.

METHOD

Experiment 1 examined reality monitoring in people with psychosis; those with visual hallucinations (n = 16) and those without (n = 15). Experiment 2 used two non-clinical groups of people with high or low predisposition to VH (HVH, n = 26, LVH, n = 21). All participants completed the same reality monitoring task. Participants in Experiment 2 also completed measures of imagery.

RESULTS

Psychosis patients with VH demonstrated biased reality monitoring, where they misremembered items that had been presented as words as having been presented as pictures. Patients without VH did not show this bias. In Experiment 2, the HVH group demonstrated the same bias in reality monitoring that psychosis patients with VH had shown. The LVH group did not show this bias. In addition, the HVH group reported more vivid imagery and particularly more negative imagery.

CONCLUSIONS

Both studies found that people with visual hallucinations or prone-ness to such experiences confused their inner visual experiences with external images. Vivid imagery was also related to proneness to VH. Hence, vivid imagery and reality monitoring confusion could be contributory factors to understanding VH.

Deficits in reality and internal source monitoring of actions are associated with the positive dimension of schizotypy

People with schizophrenia have deficits in retrieving the source of memory information. Research has focused on two types of judgements: reality monitoring (discriminating internally-generated stimuli from external information) and internal source monitoring (distinguishing two different internal sources). The aim of the current study was to assess the relation between schizotypy and both types of source memory in healthy volunteers. One hundred and two participants completed two source memory tasks: one involved the completion of well-known word pairs (e.g. Fish and? ) and the other was an action based task (e.g. nod your head). At test participants needed to indicate whether the act had been performed or imagined by themselves, performed by the experimenter, or was new. The positive dimension of schizotypy was positively correlated with errors in internal source monitoring i.e. confusing participant performed and imagined acts. Furthermore, the same dimension of schizotypy was also positively associated with reality monitoring errors i.e. confusing participant performed/imagined with experimenter performed items. However, these relationships were not found in the word pair task. Our findings suggest that there might be overlap in the processes required to retrieve source information from memory, particularly for actions, and the occurrence of unusual experiences in healthy volunteers.

Reality Monitoring and Metamemory in Adults with Autism Spectrum Conditions

Studies of reality monitoring (RM) often implicate medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in distinguishing internal and external information, a region linked to autism-related deficits in social and self-referential information processing, executive function, and memory. This study used two RM conditions (self-other; perceived-imagined) to investigate RM and metamemory in adults with autism. The autism group showed a deficit in RM, which did not differ across source conditions, and both groups exhibited a self-encoding benefit on recognition and source memory. Metamemory for perceived-imagined information, but not for self-other information, was significantly lower in the autism group. Therefore, reality monitoring and metamemory, sensitive to mPFC function, appear impaired in autism, highlighting a difficulty in remembering and monitoring internal and external details of past events.

Reality monitoring impairment in schizophrenia reflects specific prefrontal cortex dysfunction

Reality monitoring impairment is often reported in schizophrenia but the neural basis of this deficit is poorly understood. Difficulties with reality monitoring could be attributable to the same pattern of neural dysfunction as other cognitive deficits that characterize schizophrenia, or might instead represent a separable and dissociable impairment. This question was addressed through direct comparison of behavioral performance and neural activity associated with reality monitoring and working memory in patients with schizophrenia and matched healthy controls. Participants performed a word-pair reality monitoring task and a Sternberg working memory task while undergoing fMRI scanning. Distinct behavioral deficits were observed in the patients during performance of each task, which were associated with separable task- and region-specific dysfunction in the medial anterior prefrontal cortex for reality monitoring and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex for working memory. The results suggest that reality monitoring impairment is a distinct neurocognitive deficit in schizophrenia. The findings are consistent with the presence of a range of dissociable cognitive deficits in schizophrenia which may be associated with variable functional and structural dysconnectivity in underlying processing networks.

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We examined reality monitoring and working memory in patients with schizophrenia.

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Distinct behavioral deficits observed during performance of each task

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Separable task- and region-specific dysfunction in distinct prefrontal cortex regions

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Reality monitoring appears to be a distinct neurocognitive deficit in schizophrenia.

Neural mechanisms of mood-induced modulation of reality monitoring in schizophrenia

Reality monitoring is the ability to accurately distinguish the source of self-generated information from externally-presented information. Although people with schizophrenia (SZ) show impaired reality monitoring, nothing is known about how mood state influences this higher-order cognitive process. Accordingly, we induced positive, neutral and negative mood states to test how different mood states modulate subsequent reality monitoring performance. Our findings indicate that mood affected reality monitoring performance in HC and SZ participants in both similar and dissociable ways. Only a positive mood facilitated task performance in Healthy Control (HC) subjects, whereas a negative mood facilitated task performance in SZ subjects. Yet, when both HC and SZ participants were in a positive mood, they recruited medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) to bias better subsequent self-generated item identification, despite the fact that mPFC signal was reduced in SZ participants. Additionally, in SZ subjects, negative mood states also modulated left and right dorsal mPFC signal to bias better externally-presented item identification. Together our findings reveal that although the mPFC is hypoactive in SZ participants, mPFC signal plays a functional role in mood-cognition interactions during both positive and negative mood states to facilitate subsequent reality monitoring decision-making.

Testing continuum models of psychosis: No reduction in source monitoring ability in healthy individuals prone to auditory hallucinations

People with schizophrenia who hallucinate show impairments in reality monitoring (the ability to distinguish internally generated information from information obtained from external sources) compared to non-hallucinating patients and healthy individuals. While this may be explained at least in part by an increased externalizing bias, it remains unclear whether this impairment is specific to reality monitoring, or whether it also reflects a general deficit in the monitoring of self-generated information (internal source monitoring). Much interest has focused recently on continuum models of psychosis which argue that hallucination-proneness is distributed in clinical and non-clinical groups, but few studies have directly investigated reality monitoring and internal source monitoring abilities in healthy individuals with a proneness to hallucinations. Two experiments are presented here: the first (N = 47, with participants selected for hallucination-proneness from a larger sample of 677 adults) found no evidence of an impairment or externalizing bias on a reality monitoring task in hallucination-prone individuals; the second (N = 124) found no evidence of atypical performance on an internal source monitoring task in hallucination-prone individuals. The significance of these findings is reviewed in light of the clinical evidence and the implications for models of hallucination generation discussed.

Self-generation and positivity effects following transcranial random noise stimulation in medial prefrontal cortex: A reality monitoring task in older adults

Activation of medial Prefrontal Cortex (mPFC) has been typically found during reality monitoring tasks (i.e., distinguishing between internal self-generated vs external information). No study, however, has yet investigated whether transcranial Random Noise Stimulation (tRNS) over the mPFC leads to a reduction in reality-monitoring misattributions in aging. In particular, stimulating mPFC should increase the number of cognitive operations engaged while encoding and this distinctive information may help older adults to discriminate between internal and external sources better. In addition, given that older adults are more sensitive to positively-charged information compared to younger adults and that mPFC is typically recruited during encoding of positive stimuli with reference to themselves, activation of mPFC should further sustain source retrieval in older adults. In this double-blind, sham-controlled study, we examined whether tRNS over the mPFC of healthy younger and older adults during encoding enhances subsequent reality monitoring for seen versus imagined emotionally-charged words. Our findings show that tRNS enhances reality monitoring for positively-charged imagined words in the older adult group alone, highlighting the role that mPFC plays in their memory for positive information. In line with the control-based account of positivity effects, our results add evidence about the neurocognitive processes involved in reality monitoring when older adults face emotionally-charged events.

Confabulation in children with autism

Some children with high-functioning autistic spectrum conditions (ASC) have been noted clinically to produce accounts and responses akin to confabulations in neurological patients. Neurological confabulation is typically associated with abnormalities of the frontal lobes and related structures, and some forms have been linked to poor performance on source monitoring and executive function tasks. ASC has also been linked to atypical development of the frontal lobes, and impaired performance on source monitoring and executive tasks. But confabulation in autism has not to our knowledge previously been examined experimentally. So we investigated whether patterns of confabulation in autism might share similarities with neurologically-based confabulation. Tests of confabulation elicitation, source monitoring (reality monitoring, plus temporal and task context memory) and executive function were administered to four adolescents with ASC who had previously been noted to confabulate spontaneously in everyday life. Scores were compared to a typically developing (TD) and an ASC control group. One confabulating participant was significantly impaired at reality monitoring, and one was significantly worse at a task context test, relative to both the ASC and TD controls. Three of the confabulators showed impairment on measures of executive function (Brixton test; Cognitive Estimates test; Hayling Test B errors) relative to both control groups. Three were significantly poorer than the TD controls on two others (Hayling A and B times), but the ASC control group was also significantly slower at this test than the TD controls. Compared to TD controls, two of the four confabulating participants produced an abnormal number of confabulations during a confabulation elicitation questionnaire, where the ASC controls and TD controls did not differ from each other. These results raise the possibility that in at least some cases, confabulation in autism may be less related to social factors than it is to impaired source memory or poor executive function.

The neural mechanisms of hallucinations: A quantitative meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies

Activation likelihood estimation meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging data was used to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying auditory-verbal and visual hallucinations (AVHs and VHs). Consistent activation across studies during AVHs, but not VHs, in Wernicke's and Broca's areas is consistent with involvement of speech and language processes in the experience of hearing voices when none are present. Similarly, greater activity in auditory cortex during AVHs and in visual cortex during VHs supports models proposing over-stimulation of sensory cortices in the generation of these perceptual anomalies. Activation across studies in the medial temporal lobe highlights a role for memory intrusions in the provision of content for AVHs, whereas insula activation may relate to the involvement of awareness and self-representation. Finally, activation in the paracingulate region of medial prefrontal cortex during AVHs is consistent with models implicating reality monitoring impairment in the misattribution of self-generated information as externally perceived. In the light of the results, the need for unified theoretical frameworks that account for the full range of hallucinatory experiences is discussed.

Monitoring what is real: The effects of modality and action on accuracy and type of reality monitoring error

Reality monitoring refers to processes involved in distinguishing internally generated information from information presented in the external world, an activity thought to be based, in part, on assessment of activated features such as the amount and type of cognitive operations and perceptual content. Impairment in reality monitoring has been implicated in symptoms of mental illness and associated more widely with the occurrence of anomalous perceptions as well as false memories and beliefs. In the present experiment, the cognitive mechanisms of reality monitoring were probed in healthy individuals using a task that investigated the effects of stimulus modality (auditory vs visual) and the type of action undertaken during encoding (thought vs speech) on subsequent source memory. There was reduced source accuracy for auditory stimuli compared with visual, and when encoding was accompanied by thought as opposed to speech, and a greater rate of externalization than internalization errors that was stable across factors. Interpreted within the source monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), the results are consistent with the greater prevalence of clinically observed auditory than visual reality discrimination failures. The significance of these findings is discussed in light of theories of hallucinations, delusions and confabulation.

Functional brain networks involved in reality monitoring

Source monitoring refers to the recollection of variables that specify the context and conditions in which a memory episode was encoded. This process involves using the qualitative and quantitative features of a memory trace to distinguish its source. One specific class of source monitoring is reality monitoring, which involves distinguishing internally generated from externally generated information, that is, memories of imagined events from real events. The purpose of the present study was to identify functional brain networks that underlie reality monitoring, using an alternative type of source monitoring as a control condition. On the basis of previous studies on self-referential thinking, it was expected that a medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) based network would be more active during reality monitoring than the control condition, due to the requirement to focus on a comparison of internal (self) and external (other) source information. Two functional brain networks emerged from this analysis, one reflecting increasing task-related activity, and one reflecting decreasing task-related activity. The second network was mPFC based, and was characterized by task-related deactivations in areas resembling the default-mode network; namely, the mPFC, middle temporal gyri, lateral parietal regions, and the precuneus, and these deactivations were diminished during reality monitoring relative to source monitoring, resulting in higher activity during reality monitoring. This result supports previous research suggesting that self-referential thinking involves the mPFC, but extends this to a network-level interpretation of reality monitoring.

False action memories in older adults: relationship with executive functions?

Merely observing another person performing an action can make young people later misremember having performed this action themselves (the observation-inflation effect). We examined this type of memory error in healthy older adults. Overall, both young and older adult groups showed robust observation inflation. Although the number of people committing observation-inflation errors did not differ between age groups, those older adults who were prone to this illusion showed a greater observation-inflation effect compared to the corresponding young. At the same time, observation also had beneficial effects on subsequent action memory, especially in older adults. Surprisingly, executive functioning was not correlated with the degree to which older adults made observation-inflation errors, but it was related to the degree to which older adults benefited from observation. We consider accounts of observation inflation based on source monitoring, familiarity misattribution, and motor simulation.

Auditory verbal hallucinations as atypical inner speech monitoring, and the potential of neurostimulation as a treatment option

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We discuss ‘inner speech’ theories of auditory verbal hallucinations.

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Atypical self-monitoring may lead to the experience of inner speech as external.

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We summarize research into the use of neurostimulation to treat hallucinations.

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Effects of neurostimulation may be due to modulation of self-monitoring networks.

Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are the experience of hearing voices in the absence of any speaker, often associated with a schizophrenia diagnosis. Prominent cognitive models of AVHs suggest they may be the result of inner speech being misattributed to an external or non-self source, due to atypical self- or reality monitoring. These arguments are supported by studies showing that people experiencing AVHs often show an externalising bias during monitoring tasks, and neuroimaging evidence which implicates superior temporal brain regions, both during AVHs and during tasks that measure verbal self-monitoring performance. Recently, efficacy of noninvasive neurostimulation techniques as a treatment option for AVHs has been tested. Meta-analyses show a moderate effect size in reduction of AVH frequency, but there has been little attempt to explain the therapeutic effect of neurostimulation in relation to existing cognitive models. This article reviews inner speech models of AVHs, and argues that a possible explanation for reduction in frequency following treatment may be modulation of activity in the brain regions involving the monitoring of inner speech.

Aging, culture, and memory for categorically processed information

OBJECTIVES

Literature on cross-cultural differences in cognition suggests that categorization, as an information processing and organization strategy, was more often used by Westerners than by East Asians, particularly for older adults. This study examines East-West cultural differences in memory for categorically processed items and sources in young and older Canadians and native Chinese with a conceptual source memory task (Experiment 1) and a reality monitoring task (Experiment 2).

METHOD

In Experiment 1, participants encoded photographic faces of their own ethnicity that were artificially categorized into GOOD or EVIL characters and then completed a source memory task in which they identified faces as old-GOOD, old-EVIL, or new. In Experiment 2, participants viewed a series of words, each followed either by a corresponding image (i.e., SEEN) or by a blank square within which they imagined an image for the word (i.e., IMAGINED). At test, they decided whether the test words were old-SEEN, old-IMAGINED, or new.

RESULTS

In general, Canadians outperformed Chinese in memory for categorically processed information, an effect more pronounced for older than for young adults.

DISCUSSION

Extensive exercise of culturally preferred categorization strategy differentially benefits Canadians and reduces their age group differences in memory for categorically processed information.