Visuospatial perspective taking in a dynamic environment: perceiving moving objects from a first-person-perspective induces a disposition to act

Frontotemporal dementia, music perception and social cognition share neurobiological circuits: A meta-analysis

Frontotemporal dementia (FTD) is a neurodegenerative disease that presents with profound changes in social cognition. Music might be a sensitive probe for social cognition abilities, but underlying neurobiological substrates are unclear. We performed a meta-analysis of voxel-based morphometry studies in FTD patients and functional MRI studies for music perception and social cognition tasks in cognitively normal controls to identify robust patterns of atrophy (FTD) or activation (music perception or social cognition). Conjunction analyses were performed to identify overlapping brain regions. In total 303 articles were included: 53 for FTD (n = 1153 patients, 42.5% female; 1337 controls, 53.8% female), 28 for music perception (n = 540, 51.8% female) and 222 for social cognition in controls (n = 5664, 50.2% female). We observed considerable overlap in atrophy patterns associated with FTD, and functional activation associated with music perception and social cognition, mostly encompassing the ventral language network. We further observed overlap across all three modalities in mesolimbic, basal forebrain and striatal regions. The results of our meta-analysis suggest that music perception and social cognition share neurobiological circuits that are affected in FTD. This supports the idea that music might be a sensitive probe for social cognition abilities with implications for diagnosis and monitoring.

The Impact of a Human Figure in a Scene on Spatial Descriptions in Speech, Gesture, and Gesture Alone

The presence of a human figure in a scene appears to change how people describe it. About 20% of participants take the human figure's viewpoint (Tversky and Hard in Cognition 110:124-129, 2009. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.10.008). Five exploratory studies compare descriptions of a scene with no person to descriptions of a scene with a person. About 20% of participants are predicted to use the person's point of view in the "person" conditions. Study 1 replicates the original pattern. Study 2 shows that the pattern holds when object/scene are changed, and that the figure's gaze towards/away from the object does not change the pattern. Studies 3 and 4 show the pattern holds when the object has different positions and when it is moving. Study 5 shows the pattern holds when the describer is talking to an interlocutor, in both speech and co-speech gesture, and when the person is using gesture alone. The presence of a human figure in a scene appears to be a robust variable in shaping spatial descriptions.

Taking Others' Perspectives Enhances Situation Awareness in the Smart Home Interface

In the smart home environment, all devices are connected to each other and are shared by co-users living together. This may make people's interactions with the devices more complicated, owing not only to the difficulty of meeting each co-user's tastes with respect to how the devices operate, but also to variations in the frequency of device use among family members. If so, it is inevitable that using multiple devices by multiple users can lead to difficulty maintaining situation awareness. Therefore, to relieve such interaction problems caused by the presence of co-users, we examined the effect of spontaneous visuospatial perspective taking on situation awareness with respect to the smart home interface. To this end, we measured whether merely the affordance of other users can elicit spontaneous visuospatial perspective-taking, replicating previous research. We also examined whether the affordances of other users can help enhance situation awareness in the mock-up smart home interface design we created. When participants adopted affordances of other users' perspectives, they could easily perceive the information about the devices. However, when they viewed the devices from other's perspective, their understanding of devices mainly used by the self-remained relatively low. Potential reasons for these findings are discussed along with proposals for future research.

Measuring visual perspective taking in the brain with avatars and arrows: Which question are we asking?

There is an ongoing debate about the involvement of Theory of Mind (ToM) processes in Visual Perspective Taking (VPT). In an fMRI study (Schurz et al., 2015), we borrowed the positive features from a novel VPT task - which is widely used in behavioral research - to study previously overlooked experimental factors in neuroimaging studies. However, as Catmur et al. (2016) rightly argue in a comment on our work, our data do not speak strongly to questions discussed in the original behavioral studies, in particular the issue of implicit mentalizing. We appreciate the clarification of these interpretational limitations of our study, but would like to point out the differences between questions emerging from behavioral and neuroimaging research on VPT. Different from what Catmur et al. (2016) discuss, our study was not intended as a test of implicit mentalizing. In fact, the terms "automatic" and "implicit mentalizing" were never mentioned in our manuscript. Our study addressed a methodological gap between ToM and VPT research, which we identified in two previous meta-analyses on the topics (Schurz et al., 2013, 2014). With this difference in mind we show that the critical points levelled by Catmur et al. (2016) cease to apply.

Functional Role of Internal and External Visual Imagery: Preliminary Evidences from Pilates

The present study investigates whether a functional difference between the visualization of a sequence of movements in the perspective of the first- (internal VMI-I) or third- (external VMI-E) person exists, which might be relevant to promote learning. By using a mental chronometry experimental paradigm, we have compared the time or execution, imagination in the VMI-I perspective, and imagination in the VMI-E perspective of two kinds of Pilates exercises. The analysis was carried out in individuals with different levels of competence (expert, novice, and no-practice individuals). Our results showed that in the Expert group, in the VMI-I perspective, the imagination time was similar to the execution time, while in the VMI-E perspective, the imagination time was significantly lower than the execution time. An opposite pattern was found in the Novice group, in which the time of imagination was similar to that of execution only in the VMI-E perspective, while in the VMI-I perspective, the time of imagination was significantly lower than the time of execution. In the control group, the times of both modalities of imagination were significantly lower than the execution time for each exercise. The present data suggest that, while the VMI-I serves to train an already internalised gesture, the VMI-E perspective could be useful to learn, and then improve, the recently acquired sequence of movements. Moreover, visual imagery is not useful for individuals that lack a specific motor experience. The present data offer new insights in the application of mental training techniques, especially in field of sports. However, further investigations are needed to better understand the functional role of internal and external visual imagery.

Changing perspective: The role of vestibular signals

Social interactions depend on mechanisms such as the ability to take another person's viewpoint, i.e. visuo-spatial perspective taking. However, little is known about the sensorimotor mechanisms underpinning perspective taking. Because vestibular signals play roles in mental rotation and spatial cognition tasks and because damage to the vestibular cortex can disturb egocentric perspective, vestibular signals stand as important candidates for the sensorimotor foundations of perspective taking. Yet, no study merged natural full-body vestibular stimulations and explicit visuo-spatial perspective taking tasks in virtual environments. In Experiment 1, we combined natural vestibular stimulation on a rotatory chair with virtual reality to test how vestibular signals are processed to simulate the viewpoint of a distant avatar. While they were rotated, participants tossed a ball to a virtual character from the viewpoint of a distant avatar. Our results showed that vestibular signals influence perspective taking in a direction-specific way: participants were faster when their physical body rotated in the same direction as the mental rotation needed to take the avatar's viewpoint. In Experiment 2, participants realized 3D object mental rotations, which did not involve perspective taking, during the same whole-body vestibular stimulation. Our results demonstrated that vestibular stimulation did not affect 3D object mental rotations. Altogether, these data indicate that vestibular signals have a direction-specific influence on visuo-spatial perspective taking (self-centered mental imagery), but not a general effect on mental imagery. Findings from this study suggest that vestibular signals contribute to one of the most crucial mechanisms of social cognition: understanding others' actions.

"Making it explicit" makes a difference: evidence for a dissociation of spontaneous and intentional level 1 perspective taking in high-functioning autism

The ability of perspective taking is a fundamental aspect of social cognition. The ability to decide, what another person can or cannot see is referred to as "level 1 perspective taking." This is thought to be a process that we can make use of intentionally, but which also takes place spontaneously. Autism is characterized by impairments of social interaction, which are thought to be related to deficits in implicit rather than explicit perspective taking. In order to assess both levels of processing with regard to perspective taking, we employed an established task in patients and controls. Our results demonstrate that both groups engage in spontaneous level 1 perspective taking. In contrast to controls, however, patients reacted more slowly if they had to verify the other's as compared to their own perspective, which shows that participants with high-functioning autism have selective difficulties in explicit, but not implicit, level 1 perspective taking. These findings demonstrate that while spontaneous level 1 perspective taking appears to be intact in autism, this ability is impaired in patients when used explicitly.

Common brain areas engaged in false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies

We performed a quantitative meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies to identify brain areas which are commonly engaged in social and visuo-spatial perspective taking. Specifically, we compared brain activation for visual-perspective taking to activation for false belief reasoning, which requires awareness of perspective to understand someone's mistaken belief about the world which contrasts with reality. In support of a previous account by Perner and Leekam (2008), our meta-analytic conjunction analysis found common activation for false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking in the left but not the right dorsal temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). This fits with the idea that the left dorsal TPJ is responsible for representing different perspectives in a domain-general fashion. Moreover, our conjunction analysis found activation in the precuneus and the left middle occipital gyrus close to the putative Extrastriate Body Area (EBA). The precuneus is linked to mental-imagery which may aid in the construction of a different perspective. The EBA may be engaged due to imagined body-transformations when another's viewpoint is adopted.

Augmented visual, auditory, haptic, and multimodal feedback in motor learning: a review

It is generally accepted that augmented feedback, provided by a human expert or a technical display, effectively enhances motor learning. However, discussion of the way to most effectively provide augmented feedback has been controversial. Related studies have focused primarily on simple or artificial tasks enhanced by visual feedback. Recently, technical advances have made it possible also to investigate more complex, realistic motor tasks and to implement not only visual, but also auditory, haptic, or multimodal augmented feedback. The aim of this review is to address the potential of augmented unimodal and multimodal feedback in the framework of motor learning theories. The review addresses the reasons for the different impacts of feedback strategies within or between the visual, auditory, and haptic modalities and the challenges that need to be overcome to provide appropriate feedback in these modalities, either in isolation or in combination. Accordingly, the design criteria for successful visual, auditory, haptic, and multimodal feedback are elaborated.

To you I am listening: perceived competence of advisors influences judgment and decision-making via recruitment of the amygdala

Considering advice from others is a pervasive element of human social life. We used the judge-advisor paradigm to investigate the neural correlates of advice evaluation and advice integration by means of functional magnetic resonance imaging. Our results demonstrate that evaluating advice recruits the "mentalizing network," brain regions activated when people think about others' mental states. Important activation differences exist, however, depending upon the perceived competence of the advisor. Consistently, additional analyses demonstrate that integrating others' advice, i.e., how much participants actually adjust their initial estimate, correlates with neural activity in the centromedial amygdala in the case of a competent and with activity in visual cortex in the case of an incompetent advisor. Taken together, our findings, therefore, demonstrate that advice evaluation and integration rely on dissociable neural mechanisms and that significant differences exist depending upon the advisor's reputation, which suggests different modes of processing advice depending upon the perceived competence of the advisor.

Brain systems for visual perspective taking and action perception

Taking another person's viewpoint and making sense of their actions are key processes that guide social behavior. Previous neuroimaging investigations have largely studied these processes separately. The current study used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine how the brain incorporates another person's viewpoint and actions into visual perspective judgments. Participants made a left-right judgment about the location of a target object from their own (egocentric) or an actor's visual perspective (altercentric). Actor location varied around a table and the actor was either reaching or not reaching for the target object. Analyses examined brain regions engaged in the egocentric and altercentric tasks, brain regions where response magnitude tracked the orientation of the actor in the scene and brain regions sensitive to the action performed by the actor. The blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) response in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) was sensitive to actor orientation in the altercentric task, whereas the response in right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) was sensitive to actor orientation in the egocentric task. Thus, dmPFC and right IFG may play distinct but complementary roles in visual perspective taking (VPT). Observation of a reaching actor compared to a non-reaching actor yielded activation in lateral occipitotemporal cortex, regardless of task, showing that these regions are sensitive to body posture independent of social context. By considering how an observed actor's location and action influence the neural bases of visual perspective judgments, the current study supports the view that multiple neurocognitive "routes" operate during VPT.

A virtual environment for egocentric and allocentric mental transformations: a study on a nonclinical population of adults with distinct levels of schizotypy

We benefited from the flexibility provided by virtual reality to enhance a classical paradigm on array and self mental rotations and related questions on a set of items. We used this paradigm to investigate how the Level of Schizotypy in nonclinical subjects might influence their behavior in egocentric and allocentric mental transformations. Three elements of novelty were introduced: (i) we separated the phases of mental transformation (Imagined Rotation Phase) and task performance (Task Phase), (ii) we measured the time required for Imagined Rotation Phase and Task Phase separately, and (iii) we cued self-rotations with a virtual human being (self-avatar) or an inanimate object (self-chair). Twenty-four nonclinical participants were categorized in low- and high-schizotypal subjects (Low-S, High-S). A mixed-design analysis of variance showed that High-S were significantly faster than Low-S during the Imagined Rotation Phase (array and self-chair rotations) and during the Task Phase (self-chair). High-S were also faster in the self-chair than in the self-avatar rotation, supporting the existence of a dissociation between perspective changing and perspective taking in High-S. In line with the literature, we found that participant performances decreased with increasing angular difference between the initial and the imagined perspective.

Bodily self-consciousness, and the primacy of self related signals such as the 1(st) person perspective and self-location

Abstract G&K provide a new and interesting perspective on consciousness, by arguing that consciousness is a product of social perception. Based on the overlap between the neural mechanisms underlying spatial awareness of other people and oneself, out-of-body experiences (OBEs), and social perception the authors argue that consciousness is based on the brain signals that represent other people and their spatial awareness. Although we generally welcome the authors efforts, we (1) would like to emphasize that consciousness has two distinct spatial aspects, namely self-location and first-person perspective, (2) cite evidence about distinct developmental and brain mechanisms concerning first- versus third-person perceptions and cogitations and (3) argue for a primacy of multisensory own body perception over social perception and awareness as a neurobiological foundation of consciousness.