Influence of membership in outgroups varying in competence and warmth on observers' Level-2 visual perspective taking

Visual perspective taking (VPT), the ability to adopt another person's viewpoint, entails two distinct processes, Level-1 (L1)-VPT and Level-2 (L2-VPT), referring to the ability to perceive whether and how a target sees an object, respectively. Whereas previous efforts investigated the impact of targets' social characteristics on L1-VPT, the present work is the first to do so regarding L2-VPT. Specifically, we investigate the impact of targets' membership in outgroups varying in perceived competence and warmth, the two fundamental dimensions of social perception. Participants in four experiments engaged in a L2-VPT task. Avatars belonged to a low competence low warmth group (LCLW; e.g. the homeless) or to a high competence low warmth group (HCLW; e.g. bankers) in Experiments 1-3, and to a LCLW or high competence high warmth group (HCHW; e.g. female students) in Experiment 4. Participants answered as quickly as possible whether a cued number matched a number present in a scene from either their own or the avatar's perspective. We consistently found support for the presence of both egocentric and altercentric interference, but this was not modulated by group competence and warmth, suggesting that membership in outgroups varying in competence and warmth does not influence L2-VPT. We discuss the findings' implications in the light of recent views on VPT.

What Can We Learn by Treating Perspective Taking as Problem Solving?

Perspective taking has been studied extensively using a wide variety of experimental tasks. The theoretical constructs that are used to develop these tasks and interpret the results obtained from them, most notably theory of mind (ToM), have conceptual shortcomings from a behavior-analytic perspective. The behavioral approach to conceptualizing and studying this class of behavior is parsimonious and pragmatic, but the body of relevant research is currently small. The prominent relational frame theory (RFT) approach to derived perspective taking asserts that "deictic framing" is a core component of this class of behavior, but this proposal also appears to be conceptually problematic. We suggest that in many cases perspective taking is problem solving; when successful, both classes of behavior involve the emission of context-appropriate precurrent behavior that facilitates the appropriate response (i.e., the "solution"). Conceptualizing perspective taking in this way appears to have many advantages, which we explore herein.

The presence of other-race people disrupts spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking

Visual perspective taking is an essential skill for effective social interaction. Previous studies have tested various perceiver-based factors that affect intentional perspective taking; however, the factors affecting spontaneous perspective taking remain unknown. To fill this gap, the present study used a novel spontaneous visual perspective taking paradigm to explore how an agent's race and emotion affect spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking. In Experiment 1, the participants completed a mental rotation task while a human agent simultaneously gazed at the target with positive, negative, or neutral facial expressions. The agent was African, Caucasian, or Chinese. The results revealed that the other-race agents disrupted the participants' spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking, while emotion weakly affected it. Experiment 2 retested whether emotion could affect spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking while only own-race agents were used. The participants completed the same task as that in Experiment 1. The results revealed that emotions weakly affected spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking. In summary, the present study first examined what target-based factors affect spontaneous level-2 visual perspective taking. The results extend the representation and incorporation of the close others' responses (RICOR) model. Specifically, people routinely construct representations of other people's points of view when they share the same racial group.

Dissociating Profiles of Social Cognitive Disturbances Between Mixed Personality and Anxiety Disorder

BACKGROUND

An emerging body of research has begun to elucidate disturbances to social cognition in specific personality disorders (PDs). No research has been conducted on patients with Mixed Personality Disorder (MPD), however, who meet multiple diagnostic criteria. Further, very few studies have compared social cognition between patients with PD and those presenting with symptomatic diagnoses that co-occur with personality pathologies, such as anxiety disorder (AD). The aim of this study was to provide a detailed characterization of deficits to various aspects of social cognition in MPD and dissociate impairments specific to MPD from those exhibited by patients with AD who differ in the severity of personality pathology.

METHOD

Building on our previous research, we administered a large battery of self-report and performance-based measures of social cognition to age-, sex- and education-matched groups of patients with MPD or AD, and healthy control participants (HCs; n = 29, 23, and 54, respectively). This permitted a detailed profiling of these clinical groups according to impairments in emotion recognition and regulation, imitative control, low-level visual perspective taking, and empathic awareness and expression.

RESULTS

The MPD group demonstrated poorer emotion recognition for negative facial expressions relative to both HCs and AD. Compared with HCs, both clinical groups also performed significantly worse in visual perspective taking and interference resolution, and reported higher personal distress when empathizing and more state-oriented emotion regulation.

CONCLUSION

We interpret our results to reflect dysfunctional cognitive control that is common to patients with both MPD and AD. Given the patterns of affective dispositions that characterize these two diagnostic groups, we suggest that prolonged negative affectivity is associated with inflexible styles of emotion regulation and attribution. This might potentiate the interpersonal dysfunction exhibited in MPD, particularly in negatively valenced and challenging social situations.

Secret of the Masters: Young Chess Players Show Advanced Visual Perspective Taking

Playing chess requires perspective taking in order to consistently infer the opponent's next moves. The present study examined whether long-term chess players are more advanced in visual perspective taking tasks than their counterparts without chess training during laboratory visual perspective taking tasks. Visual perspective taking performance was assessed among 11- to 12-year-old experienced chess players (n = 15) and their counterparts without chess training (n = 15) using a dot perspective task. Participants judged their own and the avatar's visual perspective that were either consistent with each other or not. The results indicated that the chess players out-performed the non-chess players (Experiment 1), yet this advantage disappeared when the task required less executive functioning (Experiment 2). Additionally, unlike the non-chess players whose performance improved in Experiment 2 when the executive function (EF) demand was reduced, the chess players did not show better perspective taking under such condition. These findings suggested that long-term chess experience might be associated with children's more efficient perspective taking of other people's viewpoints without exhausting their cognitive resources.

Impaired Self-Other Distinction and Subcortical Gray-Matter Alterations Characterize Socio-Cognitive Disturbances in Multiple Sclerosis

Introduction: Recent studies of patients with multiple sclerosis (MS) have revealed disturbances in distinct components of social cognition, such as impaired mentalizing and empathy. The present study investigated this socio-cognitive profile in MS patients in more detail, by examining their performance on tasks measuring more fundamental components of social cognition and any associated disruptions to gray-matter volume (GMV). Methods: We compared 43 patients with relapse-remitting MS with 43 age- and sex-matched healthy controls (HCs) on clinical characteristics (depression, fatigue), cognitive processing speed, and three aspects of low-level social cognition; specifically, imitative tendencies, visual perspective taking, and emotion recognition. Using voxel-based morphometry, we then explored relationships between GMV and these clinical and behavioral measures. Results: Patients exhibited significantly slower processing speed, poorer perspective taking, and less imitation compared with HCs. These impairments were related to reduced GMV throughout the putamen, thalami, and anterior insula, predominantly in the left hemisphere. Surprisingly, differences between the groups in emotion recognition were not significant. Conclusion: Less imitation and poorer perspective taking indicate a cognitive self-bias when faced with conflicting self- and other-representations. This suggests that impaired self-other distinction, and an associated subcortical pattern of GM atrophy, might underlie the socio-cognitive disturbances observed in MS.

Spontaneous Vicarious Perception of the Content of Another's Visual Perspective

Visual perspective taking (VPT) is a core process of social cognition, providing humans with insights into what the environment looks like from another's point of view [1-4]. While VPT is often described as a quasi-perceptual phenomenon [5, 6], evidence for this proposal has been lacking. Here, we provide direct evidence that another's perspective can "stand in" for one's own sensory input during perceptual decision making. In a variant of the classic mental rotation task, participants judged whether characters presented in different orientations were canonical or mirror inverted. In the absence of another person, we replicate the well-established positive linear relationship between recognition times and angle of orientation such that recognition becomes slower the more an item has to be mentally rotated into its canonical orientation [7]. Importantly, this relationship was disrupted simply by placing another individual in the scene. Items rotated away from the participant were recognized more rapidly the closer they appeared in their canonical orientation, not only to the participant, but also to this other individual, showing that another's visual perspective drives mental rotation and item recognition in a similar way as one's own visual perspective. The effects were large and replicated in the three independent studies. They were observed even when the other person was completely passive, enhanced when the participant was explicitly instructed to take the other person's perspective, but reduced when the persons in the scenes were replaced with objects. The content of another's perspective is therefore spontaneously derived, takes a quasi-perceptual form, and can stand in for one's own sensory input during perceptual decision making.

An objective neural signature of rapid perspective taking

The frequency-tagging approach has generally been confined to study low-level sensory processes and always found related activation over the occipital region. Here for the first time, we investigated with it, high-level socio-cognitive functions, i.e. the processing of what other people are looking at which is referred to as level 1 visual perspective taking (VPT). Sixteen participants were presented with visual scenes alternating at 2.5 Hz which were depicting a person and an object in a room, while recording electrophysiological brain activity. The person orientation and object position changed at every stimulus but the person in the room always faced the object, except on every fifth stimulus. We found responses in the electroencephalography (EEG) spectrum exactly at the frequency corresponding to the presentation of the scenes where the person could not see the object, i.e. 0.5 Hz. While the 2.5 Hz stimulation rate response focused on typical medial occipital sites, the specific 0.5 Hz response was found mainly over a centro-parietal region. Besides a robust group effect, these responses were significant and quantifiable for most individual participants. Overall, these observations reveal a clear measure of level 1-VPT representation, highlighting the potential of EEG frequency-tagging to capture high-level socio-cognitive functions in the brain.

Visible Social Interactions Do Not Support the Development of False Belief Understanding in the Absence of Linguistic Input: Evidence from Deaf Adult Homesigners

Congenitally deaf individuals exhibit enhanced visuospatial abilities relative to normally hearing individuals. An early example is the increased sensitivity of deaf signers to stimuli in the visual periphery (Neville and Lawson, 1987a). While these enhancements are robust and extend across a number of visual and spatial skills, they seem not to extend to other domains which could potentially build on these enhancements. For example, congenitally deaf children, in the absence of adequate language exposure and acquisition, do not develop typical social cognition skills as measured by traditional Theory of Mind tasks. These delays/deficits occur despite their presumed lifetime use of visuo-perceptual abilities to infer the intentions and behaviors of others (e.g., Pyers and Senghas, 2009; O’Reilly et al., 2014). In a series of studies, we explore the limits on the plasticity of visually based socio-cognitive abilities, from perspective taking to Theory of Mind/False Belief, in rarely studied individuals: deaf adults who have not acquired a conventional language (Homesigners). We compared Homesigners’ performance to that of two other understudied groups in the same culture: Deaf signers of an emerging language (Cohort 1 of Nicaraguan Sign Language), and hearing speakers of Spanish with minimal schooling. We found that homesigners performed equivalently to both comparison groups with respect to several visual socio-cognitive abilities: Perspective Taking (Levels 1 and 2), adapted from Masangkay et al. (1974), and the False Photograph task, adapted from Leslie and Thaiss (1992). However, a lifetime of visuo-perceptual experiences (observing the behavior and interactions of others) did not support success on False Belief tasks, even when linguistic demands were minimized. Participants in the comparison groups outperformed the Homesigners, but did not universally pass the False Belief tasks. Our results suggest that while some of the social development achievements of young typically developing children may be dissociable from their linguistic experiences, language and/or educational experiences clearly scaffolds the transition into False Belief understanding. The lack of experience using a shared language cannot be overcome, even with the benefit of many years of observing others’ behaviors and the potential neural reorganization and visuospatial enhancements resulting from deafness.

Male long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) understand the target of facial threat

The cognitive demands of group living have resulted in the development of social competences in a wide range of animal species. Primates are well aware of the complex social structure within their group and infer information about social status by observing interactions of others. A capacity used to infer this information, Visual Perspective Taking (VPT), is present in apes and in monkeys. However, it is unclear whether monkeys really understand that another individual is looking at a specific target. We investigated whether monkeys understand the target of attention of conspecifics using a new paradigm, based on expectancy violation. Subjects were exposed to pictures of scenes involving group members. These pictures either represented congruent (agonistic signals consistent with the dominance hierarchy) or incongruent (signals contradict the dominance hierarchy) social situations. The only difference between scenes concerned the looking direction, that is, the target of attention, and facial expression of the central monkey in the picture. Female subjects did not differ in their looking times to incongruent and congruent scenes, but results may be confounded by their longer looking times at scenes involving kin than non-kin. Male subjects looked significantly longer at incongruent than congruent scenes, suggesting that they understand the target of attention of other individuals. Alternative explanations involving simpler cognitive capacities were excluded. This implies that monkey species share social cognitive capacities underlying VPT with apes and humans. Am. J. Primatol. 78:720-730, 2016. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Left inferior-parietal lobe activity in perspective tasks: identity statements

We investigate the theory that the left inferior parietal lobe (IPL) is closely associated with tracking potential differences of perspective. Developmental studies find that perspective tasks are mastered at around 4 years of age. Our first study, meta-analyses of brain imaging studies shows that perspective tasks specifically activate a region in the left IPL and precuneus. These tasks include processing of false belief, visual perspective, and episodic memory. We test the location specificity theory in our second study with an unusual and novel kind of perspective task: identity statements. According to Frege's classical logical analysis, identity statements require appreciation of modes of presentation (perspectives). We show that identity statements, e.g., "the tour guide is also the driver" activate the left IPL in contrast to a control statements, "the tour guide has an apprentice." This activation overlaps with the activations found in the meta-analysis. This finding is confirmed in a third study with different types of statements and different comparisons. All studies support the theory that the left IPL has as one of its overarching functions the tracking of perspective differences. We discuss how this function relates to the bottom-up attention function proposed for the bilateral IPL.

Developmental changes in mental rotation ability and visual perspective-taking in children and adults with Williams syndrome

Williams syndrome (WS) is a genetic disorder caused by the partial deletion of chromosome 7. Individuals with WS have atypical cognitive abilities, such as hypersociability and compromised visuospatial cognition, although the mechanisms underlying these deficits, as well as the relationship between them, remain unclear. Here, we assessed performance in mental rotation (MR) and level 2 visual perspective taking (VPT2) tasks in individuals with and without WS. Individuals with WS obtained lower scores in the VPT2 task than in the MR task. These individuals also performed poorly on both the MR and VPT2 tasks compared with members of a control group. For the individuals in the control group, performance scores improved during development for both tasks, while the scores of those in the WS group improved only in the MR task, and not the VPT2 task. Therefore, we conducted a second experiment to explore the specific cognitive challenges faced by people with WS in the VPT2 task. In addition to asking participants to change their physical location (self-motion), we also asked them to adopt a third-person perspective by imagining that they had moved to a specified location (self-motion imagery). This enabled us to assess their ability to simulate the movement of their own bodies. The performance in the control group improved in both the self-motion and self-motion imagery tasks and both performances were correlated with verbal mental age. However, we did not find any developmental changes in performance for either task in the WS group. Performance scores for the self-motion imagery task in the WS group were low, similar to the scores observed for the VPT2 in this population. These results suggest that MR and VPT2 tasks involve different processes, and that these processes develop differently in people with WS. Moreover, difficulty completing VPT2 tasks may be partly because of an inability of people with WS to accurately simulate mental body motion.

Common brain areas engaged in false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies

We performed a quantitative meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies to identify brain areas which are commonly engaged in social and visuo-spatial perspective taking. Specifically, we compared brain activation for visual-perspective taking to activation for false belief reasoning, which requires awareness of perspective to understand someone's mistaken belief about the world which contrasts with reality. In support of a previous account by Perner and Leekam (2008), our meta-analytic conjunction analysis found common activation for false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking in the left but not the right dorsal temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). This fits with the idea that the left dorsal TPJ is responsible for representing different perspectives in a domain-general fashion. Moreover, our conjunction analysis found activation in the precuneus and the left middle occipital gyrus close to the putative Extrastriate Body Area (EBA). The precuneus is linked to mental-imagery which may aid in the construction of a different perspective. The EBA may be engaged due to imagined body-transformations when another's viewpoint is adopted.

A review of visual perspective taking in autism spectrum disorder

Impairments in social cognition are a key symptom of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). People with autism have great difficulty with understanding the beliefs and desires of other people. In recent years literature has begun to examine the link between impairments in social cognition and abilities which demand the use of spatial and social skills, such as visual perspective taking (VPT). Flavell (1977) defined two levels of perspective taking: VPT level 1 is the ability to understand that other people have a different line of sight to ourselves, whereas VPT level 2 is the understanding that two people viewing the same item from different points in space may see different things. So far, literature on whether either level of VPT is impaired or intact in autism is inconsistent. Here we review studies which have examined VPT levels 1 and 2 in people with autism with a focus on their methods. We conclude the review with an evaluation of the findings into VPT in autism and give recommendations for future research which may give a clearer insight into whether perspective taking is truly impaired in autism.

Visual perspective taking and laterality decisions: Problems and possible solutions

Perspective taking plays an important role in different areas of psychological and neuroscientific research. Visual perspective taking is an especially prominent approach generally using one of two experimental tasks: in the own-body-transformation task observers are asked to judge the laterality of a salient feature of a human figure (e.g., is the glove on the left or right hand?) from the figure’s perspective. In the avatar-in-scene task they decide about the laterality of objects in a scene (e.g., is the flower on the left or right?) from the avatar’s point of view. Increases in latencies and/or errors are interpreted as originating from additional cognitive processes predominately described as observer-based perspective transformations. A closer look reveals that such an account is disputable on grounds related to the use of laterality judgments. Other transformation accounts, i.e., object or array transformations, as well as non-transformational accounts, i.e., extra processing due to spatial conflicts, have not been adequately considered, tested, or ruled out by existing research. Our review examines visual perspective tasks in detail, identifies problems and makes recommendations for future research.