Mind control? Creating illusory intentions through a phony brain–computer interface

Yes or no? A study of ErrPs in the "guess what I am thinking" paradigm with stimuli of different visual content

Error-related potentials (ErrPs) have attracted attention in part because of their practical potential for building brain-computer interface (BCI) paradigms. BCIs, facilitating direct communication between the brain and machines, hold great promise for brain-AI interaction. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of ErrPs is crucial to ensure reliable BCI outcomes. In this study, we investigated ErrPs in the context of the "guess what I am thinking" paradigm. 23 healthy participants were instructed to imagine an object from a predetermined set, while an algorithm randomly selected another object that was either the same as or different from the imagined object. We recorded and analyzed the participants' EEG activity to capture their mental responses to the algorithm's "predictions". The study identified components distinguishing correct from incorrect responses. It discusses their nature and how they differ from ErrPs extensively studied in other BCI paradigms. We observed pronounced variations in the shape of ErrPs across different stimulus sets, underscoring the significant influence of visual stimulus appearance on ErrP peaks. These findings have implications for designing effective BCI systems, especially considering the less conventional BCI paradigm employed. They emphasize the necessity of accounting for stimulus factors in BCI development.

Synchronous motor imagery and visual feedback of finger movement elicit the moving rubber hand illusion, at least in illusion-susceptible individuals

Recent evidence suggests that imagined auditory and visual sensory stimuli can be integrated with real sensory information from a different sensory modality to change the perception of external events via cross-modal multisensory integration mechanisms. Here, we explored whether imagined voluntary movements can integrate visual and proprioceptive cues to change how we perceive our own limbs in space. Participants viewed a robotic hand wearing a glove repetitively moving its right index finger up and down at a frequency of 1 Hz, while they imagined executing the corresponding movements synchronously or asynchronously (kinesthetic-motor imagery); electromyography (EMG) from the participants' right index flexor muscle confirmed that the participants kept their hand relaxed while imagining the movements. The questionnaire results revealed that the synchronously imagined movements elicited illusory ownership and a sense of agency over the moving robotic hand-the moving rubber hand illusion-compared with asynchronously imagined movements; individuals who affirmed experiencing the illusion with real synchronous movement also did so with synchronous imagined movements. The results from a proprioceptive drift task further demonstrated a shift in the perceived location of the participants' real hand toward the robotic hand in the synchronous versus the asynchronous motor imagery condition. These results suggest that kinesthetic motor imagery can be used to replace veridical congruent somatosensory feedback from a moving finger in the moving rubber hand illusion to trigger illusory body ownership and agency, but only if the temporal congruence rule of the illusion is obeyed. This observation extends previous studies on the integration of mental imagery and sensory perception to the case of multisensory bodily awareness, which has potentially important implications for research into embodiment of brain-computer interface controlled robotic prostheses and computer-generated limbs in virtual reality.

Sense of agency for mental actions: Insights from a belief-based action-effect paradigm

A substantial body of research has converged on the idea that the sense of agency arises from the integration of multiple sources of information. In this study, we investigated whether a measurable sense of agency can be detected for mental actions, without the contribution of motor components. We used a fake action-effect paradigm, where participants were led to think that a motor action or a particular thought could trigger a sound. Results showed that the sense of agency, when measured through explicit reports, was of comparable strength for motor and mental actions. The intentional binding effect, a phenomenon typically associated with the experience of agency, was also observed for both motor and mental actions. Taken together, our results provide novel insights into the specific role of intentional cues in instantiating a sense of agency, even in the absence of motor signals.

The apparent action causation: Using a magician forcing technique to investigate our illusory sense of agency over the outcome of our choices

We often fall victim of an illusory sense of control and agency over our thoughts and actions. Magicians are masters at exploiting these illusions, and forcing techniques provide a powerful way to study apparent action causation-the illusion that our action caused the outcome we get. In this article, we used the Criss-Cross force to study whether people can tell the difference between an action which had an impact on the outcome they get and one which has no impact. In the Criss-Cross force, participants are asked to cut to a card, and while they are genuinely free to cut the cards at any position, the cut does not affect the card they are given (i.e., they always get the top card). We investigate the psychological processes that underpin the success of this force. Experiment 1 (N = 60) showed that participants cannot tell the difference between a forced and a controlled outcome. Experiment 2 (N = 90) showed that contrary to common magicians' knowledge, misdirection does not play a role in the success of the force. Finally, Experiment 3 (N = 60) suggests that rather than misdirection, an attribute substitution error explains why people fail to understand that their action does not have an impact on the outcome they get. Debriefing also shows the importance of participants' expectations in the perception of the trick, as well as the role of prediction of the outcome in participants' sense of agency over the events.

Delusions of control in schizophrenia: Resistant to the mind's best trick?

The existence of a free will is fiercely debated in neuroscience and philosophy. The debate has great impact on society and our self-understanding as human beings. Behavioral and electrophysiological data have challenged the intuitive assumption that human behavior is the result of conscious intentions. This notion has important implications for delusions of control in schizophrenia, where patients experience bodily movements as not being controlled by themselves. Current theories explain control delusions as a deficit to perceive certain aspects of motor control, but many findings are inconsistent with this idea. Here, an alternative view is proposed: Control delusions might be triggered by an even more veridical perception of the temporal order of intentions and actions. This hypothesis is supported by evidence that (a) conscious intentions in healthy subjects are often based on retrospective inferences, (b) temporal recalibrations of conscious percepts occur in healthy subjects and are disturbed in schizophrenia and (c) basic perceptual functions of schizophrenic patients are less influenced by expectations and therefore they can sometimes be closer to physical reality than those of healthy subjects.