Introspection and schizophrenia: a comparative investigation of anomalous self experiences

Schizophrenia, the very idea: On self-disorder, hyperreflexivity, and the diagnostic concept

The purpose of the present article is to consider schizophrenia-the very idea-from the perspective of phenomenological psychopathology, with special attention to the problematic nature of the diagnostic concept as well as to the prospect and challenges inherent in focusing on subjective experience. First, we address historical and philosophical topics relevant to the legitimacy of diagnostic categorization-in general and regarding "schizophrenia" in particular. William James's pragmatist approach to categorization is discussed. Then we offer a version of the well-known basic-self or ipseity-disturbance model (IDM) of schizophrenia, but in a significantly revised form (IDMrevised). The revised model better acknowledges the diverse and even seemingly contradictory nature of schizophrenic symptoms while, at the same time, interpreting these in a more unitary fashion via the key concept of hyperreflexivity-a form of exaggerated self-awareness that tends to undermine normal world-directedness and the stability of self-experience. Particular attention is paid to forms of exaggerated "self-presence" that are sometimes neglected yet imbue classically schizophrenic experiences involving subjectivism or quasi-solipsism and/or all-inclusive or ontological forms of paranoia. We focus on the distinctively paradoxical nature of schizophrenic symptomatology. In concluding we consider precursors in the work of Klaus Conrad, Kimura Bin and Henri Grivois. Finally we defend the concept of schizophrenia by considering its distinctive way of altering certain core aspects of the human condition itself.

Self-Disorder in Schizophrenia: A Revised View (1. Comprehensive Review-Dualities of Self- and World-Experience)

A growing body of research supports the role of self-disorders as core phenotypic features of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Self-disorders comprise various alterations of conscious experience whose theoretical understanding continues to present a challenge. The following 2 articles aim to provide further clarification of the nature of self-disorders in schizophrenia by offering a comprehensive review (article 1) and theoretical revision (article 2) of the currently most influential model of altered selfhood in schizophrenia: the basic-self-disturbance or ipseity-disorder model (IDM). This article presents a state-of-the-art overview of the current self-disturbance model and critically assesses its descriptive adequacy with respect to the clinical variability and heterogeneity of the alterations in self- and world-awareness characteristic of schizophrenia. Special attention is paid to experiences of exaggerated basic self, increased "grip" or "hold" on the world, and paradoxical combinations. The next article proposes a theoretical revision of the self-disturbance model by considering how hyperreflexivity might form the crucial common thread or generating factor that unifies the phenomenologically heterogeneous, and sometimes even contradictory features of schizophrenic self-disorders. We outline the implications of our revised model for explanatory research, therapeutic practice, and our general understanding of the abnormalities in question.

[Spatiotemporal psychopathology-German version of the Scale for Space and Time Experience in Psychosis (STEP) : A validated measurement instrument for the assessment of spatial and temporal experience in psychotic disorders]

Historical authors (e.g., Ludwig Binswanger and Eugène Minkowski) postulated that the experience of patients with schizophrenia is characterized by time fragmentation. From a clinical perspective, patients with schizophrenia also suffer from difficulties in spatial perception (e.g., abnormalities in the experience of interpersonal distance and spatial orientation). Although these changes can lead to a serious detachment from reality, to considerable suffering of the affected persons and to difficulties in the therapeutic process, the abnormal experience of space and time in psychotic disorders has not yet been sufficiently investigated. One possible reason is the lack of appropriate and standardized instruments that quantify the experience of space and time in patients with psychotic disorders. Based on an innovative concept, the so-called spatiotemporal psychopathology (STPP), a clinical rating scale for the systematic-quantitative assessment of spatial and temporal experience in patients with psychotic disorders was developed. This article presents the German version of the Scale for Space and Time Experience in Psychosis (STEP). The original English version of the STEP measures different spatial (14 phenomena) and temporal (11 phenomena) phenomena in 25 items. The STEP shows both a high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = 0.94) and a significant correlation with the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; p < 0.001). In summary, the German version of the STEP scale presented here represents an important instrument in the German-speaking countries for the assessment of spatial and temporal experience in patients with psychotic disorders.

Anomalous self-experiences and neurocognitive functioning in adolescents at risk for psychosis: Still no significant associations found between these two vulnerability markers

BACKGROUND

Anomalous self-experiences (ASEs) and neurocognitive impairments are considered essential domains of vulnerability for developing psychotic disorders. However, little research exists of possible associations between ASEs and neurocognitive functions in individuals at-risk for psychosis. The interconnections between ASEs and neurocognitive impairments should therefore be clarified as much as possible, especially in young individuals at risk. No previous studies have investigated these two fundamental domains in non-help-seeking adolescents at risk for developing psychosis.

METHODS

This study is based on the Norwegian Mother, Father and Child Cohort Study (MoBa). Adolescents (N = 48, 94% females, mean age = 15.3) were invited to participate after completing a 14-year-old survey distributed by MoBA. At-risk adolescents were selected based on the 0.4% highest scores on 19 items assessing both psychotic-like experiences and ASEs. Five specifically selected and formulated items measuring ASEs were computed to an ASEs total score. Neurocognitive functioning was assessed using the MATRICS Consensus Cognitive Battery.

RESULTS

Regression analyses revealed no significant relationships between ASEs and any neurocognitive domain.

CONCLUSIONS

We did not find any significant associations between ASEs and neurocognitive functions in non-help-seeking adolescents at risk for psychotic disorders, which is in line with reports from other types of cohorts. Thus, ASEs and neurocognitive functions may be understood as two relatively separate domains that co-exist in at-risk states. These results underline the need for a wider scope when making predictions about future trajectories, e.g. the development of psychotic disorders. Including both ASEs and neurocognitive functioning in at-risk populations may increase the specificity of vulnerability criteria in this population and enhance our understanding of early psychosis psychopathology.

Taking subjectivity seriously: towards a unification of phenomenology, psychiatry, and neuroscience

Nearly all psychiatric diseases involve alterations in subjective, lived experience. The scientific study of the biological basis of mental illness has generally focused on objective measures and observable behaviors, limiting the potential for our understanding of brain mechanisms of disease states and possible treatments. However, applying methods designed principally to interpret objective behavioral measures to the measurement and extrapolation of subjective states presents a number of challenges. In order to help bridge this gap, we draw on the tradition of phenomenology, a philosophical movement concerned with elucidating the structure of lived experience, which emerged in the early 20th century and influenced philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and psychiatry. A number of early phenomenologically-oriented psychiatrists made influential contributions to the field, but this approach retreated to the background as psychiatry moved towards more operationalized disease classifications. Recently, clinical-phenomenological research and viewpoints have re-emerged in the field. We argue that the potential for phenomenological research and methods to generate productive hypotheses about the neurobiological basis of psychiatric diseases has thus far been underappreciated. Using specific examples drawing on the subjective experience of mania and psychosis, we demonstrate that phenomenologically-oriented clinical studies can generate novel and fruitful propositions for neuroscientific investigation. Additionally, we outline a proposal for more rigorously integrating phenomenological investigations of subjective experience with the methods of modern neuroscience research, advocating a cross-species approach with a key role for human subjects research. Collaborative interaction between phenomenology, psychiatry, and neuroscience has the potential to move these fields towards a unified understanding of the biological basis of mental illness.

Looking within: Interoceptive sensibility in young adults with psychotic-like experiences

AIM

Interoception is the ability to sense internal bodily changes and research indicates that it may play a role in the development of mental illness. In recent years, preliminary evidence has shown that interoception is impaired in people with psychosis. Interoceptive sensibility, a meta-cognitive aspect of interoception, has never been studied across the psychosis continuum. The present study aimed at assessing interoceptive sensibility in youth with psychotic-like experiences.

METHOD

We invited a sample of young adults (N = 609; age 19-21 years) to complete an online survey that included a measure of interoceptive sensibility (the Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness-2) and the Community Assessment of Psychotic Experiences-Positive Scale -15 (CAPE-P15). Using the recommended cutoff for the CAPE-P15, the overall sample was divided into two groups (high/low risk for psychosis).

RESULTS

Significant group differences were observed in several dimensions of interoceptive sensibility. A logistic regression analysis indicated that scores in the subscales of Not-Distracting, Not-Worrying, Attention-Regulation, Emotional Awareness, Body Listening, and Trusting significantly predicted increased risk for psychosis.

CONCLUSION

Abnormal interoceptive sensibility may be a vulnerability marker for psychosis. These results, however, await further validation from additional comprehensive, longitudinal studies. Enhanced interoceptive sensibility has been reported following contemplative training, thus creating opportunities for future interventions to delay or prevent psychotic illness.

Losing the Self in Near-Death Experiences: The Experience of Ego-Dissolution

Many people who have had a near-death experience (NDE) describe, as part of it, a disturbed sense of having a “distinct self”. However, no empirical studies have been conducted to explore the frequency or intensity of these effects. We surveyed 100 NDE experiencers (Near-Death-Experience Content [NDE-C] scale total score ≥27/80). Eighty participants had their NDEs in life-threatening situations and 20 had theirs not related to life-threatening situations. Participants completed the Ego-Dissolution Inventory (EDI) and the Ego-Inflation Inventory (EII) to assess the experience of ego dissolution and inflation potentially experienced during their NDE, respectively. They also completed the Nature-Relatedness Scale (NR-6) which measures the trait-like construct of one’s self-identification with nature. Based on prior hypotheses, ratings of specific NDE-C items pertaining to out-of-body experiences and a sense of unity were used for correlational analyses. We found higher EDI total scores compared with EII total scores in our sample. Total scores of the NDE-C scale were positively correlated with EDI total scores and, although less strongly, the EII and NR-6 scores. EDI total scores were also positively correlated with the intensity of OBE and a sense of unity. This study suggests that the experience of dissolved ego-boundaries is a common feature of NDEs.

Delusions beyond beliefs: a critical overview of diagnostic, aetiological, and therapeutic schizophrenia research from a clinical-phenomenological perspective

Delusions are commonly conceived as false beliefs that are held with certainty and which cannot be corrected. This conception of delusion has been influential throughout the history of psychiatry and continues to inform how delusions are approached in clinical practice and in contemporary schizophrenia research. It is reflected in the full psychosis continuum model, guides psychological and neurocognitive accounts of the formation and maintenance of delusions, and it substantially determines how delusions are approached in cognitive-behavioural treatment. In this Review, we draw on a clinical-phenomenological framework to offer an alternative account of delusion that incorporates the experiential dimension of delusion, emphasising how specific alterations to self-consciousness and reality experience underlie delusions that are considered characteristic of schizophrenia. Against that backdrop, we critically reconsider the current research areas, highlighting empirical and conceptual issues in contemporary delusion research, which appear to largely derive from an insufficient consideration of the experiential dimension of delusions. Finally, we suggest how the alternative phenomenological approach towards delusion could offer new ways to advance current research and clinical practice.

Current evidence of childhood traumatic experiences in psychosis - focus on gender differences

Childhood abuse is common among people with psychosis and it is associated with poor illness outcomes. Some forms of childhood abuse are more common in women, but the impact of gender and childhood abuse in psychosis has been little investigated and evidence has never been put into a congruent frame. Herein, we conducted a narrative review to assess the impact of gender and childhood abuse in psychosis. Research articles were identified (n = 44) using a comprehensive electronic search of PubMed, Web-of-Science, Scopus and Cochrane databases. Women appeared to be at greater risk of sexual abuse than men. Women with childhood abuse report more positive and mood symptoms, and more suicide attempts compared to men. In addition, women exposed to childhood abuse display an earlier age of onset compared to not exposed, but this association is not present in men. Conversely, men with childhood abuse show more negative symptoms, substance use and a poorer cognitive performance compared to women. It seems therefore confirmed that gender and childhood abuse may impact on the outcome of psychosis, since not all gender differences found in patients who had been abused in their childhood are accounted by the overall differences between men and women with psychosis.

Self-disorders in Early Stages of the Schizophrenia Spectrum

The pathogenic nucleus of schizophrenia has varied according to the different eras and influences of distinguished clinical researchers. Self-disorders have also been recognised to be at the heart of this disorder, although they have seldom been studied due to their subjective nature. Recently, due to the growing interest in the study of the early stages of schizophrenia, the study of self-disorders has been resumed. The self-disorders in schizophrenia model, developed by Sass and Parnas, proposes that in this disorder the person suffers loss of the first-person perspective and experiences hyperreflexibility, diminished self-affection and disturbance of the field of awareness. Therefore, the person experiences feelings of strangeness about him/herself, difficulty in understanding the common sense of things and difficulty interacting with his/her environment. Based on this model, self-disorder evaluation instruments have been developed and empirical studies have been conducted to evaluate people at risk of developing a schizophrenia spectrum disorder. These studies show that self-disorders are found in prepsychotic stages and that their manifestation may predict the transition to schizophrenia spectrum disorders. These results have important clinical implications as they enable people in the early stages of the disorder to be identified and create the opportunity to apply early therapeutic interventions.

Self and world experience in non-affective first episode of psychosis

A disturbance of "minimal self," - of the immediate sense of mine-ness inherent in experience-is hypothesized to be the core disturbance in schizophrenia. Research with the Examination of Anomalous Self Experience (EASE) has demonstrated the selective aggregation of anomalous self-experiences in the schizophrenia spectrum. Conceptual research suggests that anomalous world experiences, including changes in the experience of space, time, and other persons, occur alongside anomalous self-experiences and are an important aspect of subjectivity in schizophrenia. The Examination of Anomalous World Experience (EAWE) is a recently published interview format designed to explore changes in world experience in schizophrenia. In the current study, 24 hospital outpatients with non-affective first-episode psychosis and 24 healthy-control participants were assessed with the EAWE and the EASE. First episode psychosis patients had total EAWE and EASE scores that were both, on average, significantly higher than the healthy-control group. EAWE and EASE scores were highly correlated, even after removing overlapping items. The distribution of EAWE items and subtypes in the first-episode psychosis sample was heterogeneous. We conclude that anomalous world experiences represent a relevant aspect of first-episode psychosis, and that they may be related to the self-disturbances thought to underlie schizophrenia spectrum disorders.

Associations among domains of self-disturbance in schizophrenia

Self-disturbances are increasingly recognized as important, possibly even central, features of schizophrenia. However, little is known about the associations among different manifestations of self-disturbances. The aims of the current study were threefold. We aimed to (1) replicate previous findings of increased self-disturbances in schizophrenia, (2) correlate manifestations of self-disturbances in schizophrenia across three domains, and (3) correlate self-disturbances with five symptoms domains of schizophrenia, including positive, negative, disorganized symptoms, excitement, and emotional distress. We examined three domains of self-experience, including somatosensation, anomalous self-experiences, and self-concept clarity. Participants included 48 individuals with schizophrenia and 36 non-psychiatric controls. The results of this study replicate previous findings of significantly higher levels of self-disturbances in people with schizophrenia. The results also indicate positive correlations between the domains of anomalous self-experiences and self-concept clarity, but not somatosensation, in individuals with schizophrenia. As well, anomalous self-experiences were positively correlated with positive symptoms, disorganized symptoms, and emotional distress and self-concept clarity was negatively correlated with disorganized symptoms and emotional distress.

Varieties of Self Disorder: A Bio-Pheno-Social Model of Schizophrenia

The self-disorder model offers a unifying way of conceptualizing schizophrenia's highly diverse symptoms (positive, negative, disorganized), of capturing their distinctive bizarreness, and of conceiving their longitudinal development. These symptoms are viewed as differing manifestations of an underlying disorder of ipseity or core-self: hyper-reflexivity/diminished-self-presence with accompanying disturbances of "grip" or "hold" on reality. Recent revision to this phenomenological theory, in particular distinguishing primary-vs-secondary factors, offers a bio-pheno-social model that is consistent with recent empirical findings and offers several advantages: (1) It helps account for the temporal variations of the symptoms or syndrome, including longitudinal progression, but also the shorter-term, situationally reactive, and sometimes defensive or quasi-intentional variability of symptom-expression that can occur in schizophrenia (consistent with understanding some aspects of ipseity-disturbance as dynamic and mutable, involving shifting attitudes or experiential orientations). (2) It accommodates the overlapping of some key schizophrenic symptoms with certain nonschizophrenic conditions involving dissociation (depersonalization, derealization), including depersonalization disorder and panic disorder, thereby acknowledging both shared and distinguishing symptoms. (3) It integrates recent neurocognitive and neurobiological as well as psychosocial (eg, influence of trauma and culture) findings into a coherent but multi-factorial neuropsychological account. An adequate model of schizophrenia will postulate shared disturbances of core-self experiences that nevertheless can follow several distinct pathways and occur in various forms. Such a model is preferable to uni-dimensional alternatives-whether of schizophrenia or ipseity-disturbance-given its ability to account for distinctive yet varying experiential and neurocognitive abnormalities found in research on schizophrenia, and to integrate these with recent psychosocial and neurobiological findings.

Towards integrating phenomenology and neurocognition: Possible neurocognitive correlates of basic self-disturbance in schizophrenia

Phenomenological research indicates that disturbance of the basic sense of self may be a core phenotypic marker of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Basic self-disturbance refers to disruption of the sense of ownership of experience and agency of action and is associated with a variety of anomalous subjective experiences. Little is known about the neurocognitive correlates of basic self-disturbance. In this paper, we review recent phenomenological and neurocognitive research and point to a convergence of these approaches around the concept of self-disturbance. Specifically, we propose that subjective anomalies associated with basic self-disturbance may be associated with: 1. source monitoring deficits, which may contribute particularly to disturbances of “ownership” and “mineness” (the phenomenological notion of presence) and 2. aberrant salience, and associated disturbances of memory, prediction, and attention processes, which may contribute to hyper-reflexivity, disturbed “grip” or “hold” on the perceptual and conceptual field, and disturbances of intuitive social understanding (“common sense”). These two streams of research are reviewed in turn before considering ways forward in integrative models, particularly regarding the role of early neurodevelopmental disturbances, primary versus secondary disturbances, and the state versus trait nature of such pathology. Empirical studies are required in a variety of populations in order to test the proposed associations between phenomenological and neurocognitive aspects of self-disturbance in schizophrenia. An integration of findings across the phenomenological and neurocognitive domains would represent a significant advance in the understanding of schizophrenia and possibly enhance early identification and intervention strategies.

Interoception and Positive Symptoms in Schizophrenia

The present study focuses on the multifaceted concept of self-disturbance in schizophrenia, adding knowledge about a not yet investigated aspect, which is the interoceptive accuracy. Starting from the assumption that interoceptive accuracy requires an intact sense of self, which otherwise was proved to be altered in schizophrenia, the aim of the present study was to explore interoceptive accuracy in a group of schizophrenia patients, compared to healthy controls. Furthermore, the possible association between interoceptive accuracy and patients' positive and negative symptomatology was assessed. To pursue these goals, a group of 23 schizophrenia patients and a group of 23 healthy controls performed a heartbeat perception task. Patients' symptomatology was assessed by means of the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS). Results demonstrated significantly lower interoceptive accuracy in schizophrenia patients compared to healthy controls. This difference was not accounted for participants' age, BMI, anxiety levels, and heart rate. Furthermore, patients' illness severity, attention and pharmacological treatment did not influence their interoceptive accuracy levels. Interestingly, a strong positive relation between interoceptive accuracy and positive symptoms severity, especially Grandiosity, was found. The present results demonstrate for the first time that interoceptive accuracy is altered in schizophrenia. Furthermore, they prove a specific association between interoceptive accuracy and positive symptomatology, suggesting that the symptom Grandiosity might be protective against an altered basic sense of self in patients characterized by higher sensibility to their inner bodily sensations.

Phenomenology and neurobiology of self disorder in schizophrenia: Secondary factors

Schizophrenia is a diverse and varying syndrome that defies most attempts at classification and pathogenetic explanation. This is the second of two articles offering a comprehensive model meant to integrate an understanding of schizophrenia-related forms of subjectivity, especially anomalous core-self experience (disturbed ipseity), with neurocognitive and neurodevelopmental findings. Previously we discussed the primary or foundational role of disturbed intermodal perceptional integration ("perceptual dys-integration"). Here we discuss phenomenological alterations that can be considered secondary in a pathogenetic sense--whether as consequential products downstream from a more originary disruption, or as defensive reactions involving quasi-intentional or even volitional compensations to the more primary disruptions. These include secondary forms of: 1, hyperreflexivity, 2, diminished self-presence (self-affection), and 3. disturbed "rip" or "hold" on the cognitive/perceptual field of awareness. We consider complementary relations between these secondary abnormal experiences while also considering their temporal relationships and pathogenetic intertwining with the more primary phenomenological alterations discussed previously, all in relation to the neurodevelopmental model. The secondary phenomena can be understood as highly variable factors involving overall orientations or attitudes toward experience; they have some affinities with experiences of meditation, introspectionism, and depersonalization defense. Also, they seem likely to become more pronounced during adolescence as a result of new cognitive capacities related to development of the prefrontal lobes, especially attention allocation, executive functions, abstraction, and meta-awareness. Heterogeneity in these secondary alterations might help explain much of the clinical diversity in schizophrenia, both between patients and within individual patients over time--without however losing sight of key underlying commonalities.

Self-Disturbance and the Bizarre: On Incomprehensibility in Schizophrenic Delusions

The notion of 'bizarre delusion' has come into question in contemporary anglophone psychopathology. In DSM-5, it no longer serves as a special criterion for diagnosing schizophrenia nor as an exclusion criterion for delusional disorder. Empirical studies influencing this development have, however, been relatively sparse and subject to methodological criticism. Major reviews have concluded that current conceptualizations of bizarre delusions may require rethinking and refinement. Defining bizarreness entails a return to Jaspers, whose influential views on the supposed incomprehensibility of bizarre delusions and schizophrenic experience are more nuanced than is generally recognized. Jaspers insisted we must 'get behind' three 'external characteristics' (extraordinary conviction, imperviousness, impossible content) in order to acknowledge a 'primary experience traceable to the illness' in the 'delusions proper' of schizophrenia. He also denied that one could empathize with or otherwise 'understand' this basis. Here, we focus on three features of bizarre delusions that Jaspers foregrounded as illustrating schizophrenic incomprehensibility: disturbance of the cogito, certitude combined with inconsequentiality, delusional mood. We link these with the contemporary ipseity disturbance model of schizophrenia, arguing that Jaspers' examples of incomprehensibility can be understood as manifestations of the three complementary aspects of ipseity-disturbance: diminished self-presence, hyperreflexivity and disturbed grip/hold. We follow Jaspers' lead in acknowledging a distinctive strangeness that defies ready comprehension, but we challenge the absolutism of Jaspers' skepticism by offering a phenomenological account that comprehends bizarreness in two ways: rendering it psychologically understandable, and fitting the various instances of bizarreness into a comprehensive explanatory framework.

Basic Self-Disturbance in the Schizophrenia Spectrum: Taking Stock and Moving Forward

The concept of basic self-disturbance offers a renewed, phenomenologically oriented framework to approach both the cross-sectional and longitudinal complexity of schizophrenia spectrum psychopathology. According to this approach, schizophrenia is characterized by instability in the most foundational and irreducible dimension of selfhood, i.e., the basic sense of self. Whereas normal basic self-experience is characterized by being a self-present, single, temporally persistent, bodily and demarcated (bounded) subject of experience and action, vulnerability to schizophrenia is marked by several structural shifts in such a basic selfhood (e.g., unstable first-person perspective, diminished sense of presence, and loss of vital contact with reality). This provides the ground for the emergence of the varied symptoms of schizophrenia, such as positive, negative and disorganization symptoms. Recent empirical research confirms that basic self-disturbance is specific to the schizophrenia spectrum and might be of value in the prospective identification of prodromal patients. The concept has implications for both aetiopathogenetic research and clinical-psychotherapeutic intervention. Furthermore, it may offer an integrative framework across 'levels' of inquiry in schizophrenia research (i.e. across psychopathological, neurocognitive and neurobiological domains).

What are the neurocognitive correlates of basic self-disturbance in schizophrenia?: Integrating phenomenology and neurocognition. Part 1 (Source monitoring deficits)

Phenomenological research indicates that disturbance of the basic sense of self may be a core phenotypic marker of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Basic self-disturbance refers to disruption of the sense of ownership of experience and agency of action and is associated with a variety of anomalous subjective experiences. Little is known about the neurocognitive underpinnings of basic self-disturbance. In these two theoretical papers (of which this is Part 1), we review some recent phenomenological and neurocognitive research and point to a convergence of these approaches around the concept of self-disturbance. Specifically, we propose that subjective anomalies associated with basic self-disturbance may be associated with: 1. source monitoring deficits, which may contribute particularly to disturbances of "ownership" and "mineness" (the phenomenological notion of presence or self-affection) and 2. aberrant salience, and associated disturbances of memory, prediction and attention processes, which may contribute to hyper-reflexivity, disturbed "grip" or "hold" on the perceptual and conceptual field, and disturbances of intuitive social understanding ("common sense"). In this paper (Part 1) we focus on source monitoring deficits. Part 2 (this issue) addresses aberrant salience. Empirical studies are required in a variety of populations in order to test these proposed associations between phenomenological and neurocognitive aspects of self-disturbance in schizophrenia. An integration of findings across the phenomenological and neurocognitive "levels" would represent a significant advance in the understanding of schizophrenia and possibly enhance early identification and intervention strategies.