Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness potentials with non-conscious volition

Exploring the Role of Conscious and Unconscious Processes in Hypnosis: A Theoretical Review

This review provided a comprehensive examination of various theories that attempt to explain hypnosis, focusing on the interplay between conscious and unconscious processes. We conducted a thorough analysis of key theories, from historical origins to recent models centered on cognition, social factors, and attributions. A central theme emerged: the critical role of the unconscious as a "gatekeeper" that modulates and guides the hypnotic experience. This notion appears in various forms across many theories, with the unconscious actively shaping and regulating the flow of information between conscious and unconscious realms during hypnosis. Understanding this dynamic interplay is crucial for comprehending the complex nature of hypnosis. The synthesized view of the unconscious as a "gatekeeper" offers a framework for integrating insights from diverse perspectives and highlights the centrality of unconscious processes in shaping hypnotic phenomena. Future research should further investigate the mechanisms of this unconscious "gatekeeper" role and its impact on hypnosis.

Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.

Can neuroscience enlighten the philosophical debate about free will?

Free will has been at the heart of philosophical and scientific discussions for many years. However, recent advances in neuroscience have been perceived as a threat to the commonsense notion of free will as they challenge two core requirements for actions to be free. The first is the notion of determinism and free will, i.e., decisions and actions must not be entirely determined by antecedent causes. The second is the notion of mental causation, i.e., our mental state must have causal effects in the physical world, in other words, actions are caused by conscious intention. We present the classical philosophical positions related to determinism and mental causation, and discuss how neuroscience could shed a new light on the philosophical debate based on recent experimental findings. Overall, we conclude that the current evidence is insufficient to undermine free will.

Hypnosis and Hypnotic ability between old beliefs and new evidences: An epistemological reflection

The history of hypnosis has been marked by its effectiveness paralleled by prejudicial refusal, due to its ostensible incompatibility with the ruling Weltbild (picture of the world). Its interpretation has been mainly based on concepts like suggestibility, dissociation, hallucination, impairment of sense of agency, and free will. Nevertheless, little evidence and agreement has been reached so far on the nature of hypnosis and hypnotic ability, an uncertainty enhanced by the wide range of meanings and ambiguities of the used terms. This article analyzes the main epistemological implications involved in the topic.

Some common fallacies in arguments from M/EEG data

Like all humans, M/EEG researchers commit certain fallacies or mistakes in reasoning. This article surveys seven well-known but still common fallacies, including reverse inference, hasty generalization, hasty exclusion, inferring from group to individual, inferring from correlation to causation, affirming a disjunct, and false dichotomy. These fallacies are illustrated with classic EEG research by Libet and collaborators, but many researchers (not just Libet) continue to commit them in all areas of research (not just M/EEG). This article gives practical suggestions about how to spot and avoid each fallacy.

Conscious intention and human action: Review of the rise and fall of the readiness potential and Libet's clock

Is consciousness-the subjective awareness of the sensations, perceptions, beliefs, desires, and intentions of mental life-a genuine cause of human action or a mere impotent epiphenomenon accompanying the brain's physical activity but utterly incapable of making anything actually happen? This article will review the history and current status of experiments and commentary related to Libet's influential paper (Brain 106:623-664, 1983) whose conclusion "that cerebral initiation even of a spontaneous voluntary act …can and usually does begin unconsciously" has had a huge effect on debate about the efficacy of conscious intentions. Early (up to 2008) and more recent (2008 on) experiments replicating and criticizing Libet's conclusions and especially his methods will be discussed, focusing especially on recent observations that the readiness potential (RP) may only be an "artifact of averaging" and that, when intention is measured using "tone probes," the onset of intention is found much earlier and often before the onset of the RP. Based on these findings, Libet's methodology was flawed and his results are no longer valid reasons for rejecting Fodor's "good old commonsense belief/desire psychology" that "my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching.".

What Is the Readiness Potential?

The readiness potential (RP), a slow buildup of electrical potential recorded at the scalp using electroencephalography, has been associated with neural activity involved in movement preparation. It became famous thanks to Benjamin Libet (Brain 1983;106:623-642), who used the time difference between the RP and self-reported time of conscious intention to move to argue that we lack free will. The RP's informativeness about self-generated action and derivatively about free will has prompted continued research on this neural phenomenon. Here, we argue that recent advances in our understanding of the RP, including computational modeling of the phenomenon, call for a reassessment of its relevance for understanding volition and the philosophical problem of free will.

Preserved critical ability and free will in deep hypnosis during oral surgery

Free will is a complex construct that includes critical reasoning, sense of ownership, and agency. The whole history of hypnosis has been linked to suggestibility. Little agreement has been reached, however, on exactly what we mean by suggestibility, and its role in hypnosis, despite the abundance of studies, hypotheses, and theories published to date. We report on a highly hypnotizable patient with a previous allergy to lidocaine and paradoxical reactions to pharmacological sedation, who underwent oral surgery with mepivacaine for local anesthesia, and hypnosis for sedation. During the procedure, she felt some pain and the hypnotist recommended bupivacaine to ensure lasting anesthesia. While remaining under deep hypnosis, the patient refused to change anesthetic and decided autonomously to continue with mepivacaine (for which she had previously been tested for allergy). Our case clearly shows a preserved, exemplary reasoning and ability to make autonomous decisions diverging from the hypnotist's advice while under deep hypnosis.

Why neuroscience does not disprove free will

While the question whether free will exists or not has concerned philosophers for centuries, empirical research on this question is relatively young. About 35 years ago Benjamin Libet designed an experiment that challenged the common intuition of free will, namely that conscious intentions are causally efficacious. Libet demonstrated that conscious intentions are preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation, suggesting that unconscious processes determine our decisions and we are only retrospectively informed about these decisions. Libet-style experiments have ever since dominated the discourse about the existence of free will and have found their way into the public media. Here we review the most important challenges to the common interpretation of Libet-style tasks and argue that the common interpretation is questionable. Brain activity preceding conscious decisions reflects the decision process rather than its outcome. Furthermore, the decision process is configured by conditional intentions that participants form at the beginning of the experiment. We conclude that Libet-style tasks do not provide a serious challenge to our intuition of free will.

Pathogenesis and pathophysiology of functional (psychogenic) movement disorders

Functional movement disorders (FMDs), known over time as "hysteria", "dissociative", "conversion", "somatoform", "non-organic" and "psychogenic" disorders, are characterized by having a voluntary quality, being modifiable by attention and distraction but perceived by the patient as involuntary. Although a high prevalence of depression and anxiety is observed in these patients, a definitive role of psychiatric disorders in FMDs has not been proven, and many patients do not endorse such manifestations. Stressful events, social influences and minor trauma may precede the onset of FMDs, but their pathogenic mechanisms are unclear. Patients with FMDs have several abnormalities in their neurobiology including strengthened connectivity between the limbic and motor networks. Additionally, there is altered top-down regulation of motor activities and increased activation of areas implicated in self-awareness, self-monitoring, and active motor inhibition such as the cingulate and insular cortex. Decreased activation of the supplementary motor area (SMA) and pre-SMA, implicated in motor control and preparation, is another finding. The sense of agency defined as the feeling of controlling external events through one's own action also seems to be impaired in individuals with FMDs. Correlating with this is a loss of intentional binding, a subjective time compression between intentional action and its sensory consequences. Organic and functional dystonia may be difficult to differentiate since they share diverse neurophysiological features including decreased cortical inhibition, and similar local field potentials in the globus pallidus and thalamus; although increased cortical plasticity is observed only in patients with organic dystonia. Advances in the pathogenesis and pathophysiology of FMDs may be helpful to understand the nature of these disorders and plan further treatment strategies.

Chasing the Rainbow: The Non-conscious Nature of Being

Despite the compelling subjective experience of executive self-control, we argue that “consciousness” contains no top-down control processes and that “consciousness” involves no executive, causal, or controlling relationship with any of the familiar psychological processes conventionally attributed to it. In our view, psychological processing and psychological products are not under the control of consciousness. In particular, we argue that all “contents of consciousness” are generated by and within non-conscious brain systems in the form of a continuous self-referential personal narrative that is not directed or influenced in any way by the “experience of consciousness.” This continuously updated personal narrative arises from selective “internal broadcasting” of outputs from non-conscious executive systems that have access to all forms of cognitive processing, sensory information, and motor control. The personal narrative provides information for storage in autobiographical memory and is underpinned by constructs of self and agency, also created in non-conscious systems. The experience of consciousness is a passive accompaniment to the non-conscious processes of internal broadcasting and the creation of the personal narrative. In this sense, personal awareness is analogous to the rainbow which accompanies physical processes in the atmosphere but exerts no influence over them. Though it is an end-product created by non-conscious executive systems, the personal narrative serves the powerful evolutionary function of enabling individuals to communicate (externally broadcast) the contents of internal broadcasting. This in turn allows recipients to generate potentially adaptive strategies, such as predicting the behavior of others and underlies the development of social and cultural structures, that promote species survival. Consequently, it is the capacity to communicate to others the contents of the personal narrative that confers an evolutionary advantage—not the experience of consciousness (personal awareness) itself.

Metacognition of intentions in mindfulness and hypnosis

In a famous series of experiments, Libet investigated the subjective timing of awareness of an intention to move, a task that can be considered a metacognitive judgement. The ability to strategically produce inaccurate metacognitions about intentions has been postulated to be central to the changes in judgements of agency common to all hypnotic responding. Therefore, differences in hypnotisability may be reflected in Libet’s measure. Specifically, the ability to sustain inaccurate judgements of agency displayed by highly hypnotisable people may result from their having coarser higher order representations of intentions. They, therefore, should report a delayed time of intention relative to less hypnotisable individuals. Conversely, mindfulness practice aims at accurate metacognition, including of intentions, and may lead to the development of finer grained higher order representations of intending. Thus, the long-term practice of mindfulness may produce an earlier judgement of the time of an intention. We tested these groups using Libet’s task, and found that, consistent with predictions, highly hypnotisable people reported a later time of intention than less hypnotisable people and meditators an earlier time than non-meditators. In a further two studies, we replicated the finding that hypnotisable people report later awareness of a motor intention and additionally found a negative relationship between trait mindfulness and this measure. Based on these findings, we argue that hypnotic response and meditation involve opposite processes.