Hypnosis and belief: A review of hypnotic delusions

Brain Functional Correlates of Resting Hypnosis and Hypnotizability: A Review

This comprehensive review delves into the cognitive neuroscience of hypnosis and variations in hypnotizability by examining research employing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron emission tomography (PET), and electroencephalography (EEG) methods. Key focus areas include functional brain imaging correlations in hypnosis, EEG band oscillations as indicators of hypnotic states, alterations in EEG functional connectivity during hypnosis and wakefulness, drawing critical conclusions, and suggesting future research directions. The reviewed functional connectivity findings support the notion that disruptions in the available integration between different components of the executive control network during hypnosis may correspond to altered subjective appraisals of the agency during the hypnotic response, as per dissociated and cold control theories of hypnosis. A promising exploration avenue involves investigating how frontal lobes' neurochemical and aperiodic components of the EEG activity at waking-rest are linked to individual differences in hypnotizability. Future studies investigating the effects of hypnosis on brain function should prioritize examining distinctive activation patterns across various neural networks.

The Role of Phenomenological Control in Experience

To varying degrees, people have the capacity to alter their subjective experience such that it misrepresents reality in ways consistent with their goals and such that the misrepresentation can be sustained over at least minutes despite clear contrary evidence. In other words, people have a capacity for phenomenological control. People can use this capacity to fulfill requirements of social situations or personal needs. One such prominent situation is hypnosis. Another situation that psychologists often place people in is the psychological experiment, in which it is often clear to subjects what experiences are desired. Situations in life may also call for certain experiences, for example, encountering a spiritual world according to one’s religious beliefs. These experiences can be constructed so that they seem to confirm the beliefs of all the people involved.

A Critical Review of Standardized Measures of Hypnotic Suggestibility

The most well-established finding gleaned from decades of experimental hypnosis research is that individuals display marked variability in responsiveness to hypnotic suggestions. Insofar as this variability impacts both treatment outcome in therapeutic applications of hypnosis as well as responsiveness to suggestions in experimental contexts, it is imperative that clinicians and researchers use robust measures of hypnotic suggestibility. The current paper critically evaluates contemporary measures of hypnotic suggestibility. After reviewing the most widely used measures, we identify multiple properties of these instruments that result in the loss of valuable information, including binary scoring and single-trial sampling, and hinder their utility, such as the inclusion of suboptimal suggestion content. The scales are not well-suited for contemporary research questions and have outlived their usefulness. We conclude by outlining ways in which the measurement of hypnotic suggestibility can be advanced.

Dreaming, Mind-Wandering, and Hypnotic Dreams

Hobson's AIM theory offers a general framework for thinking about states of consciousness like wakefulness, REM dreaming and NREM mentations in terms of a state space defined by the dimensions of the level of brain activity, the source of input, and the type of neurochemical modulation. This account inspired theoretical models of other altered states of consciousness—including hypnosis—claiming that studying REM dreaming can advance our understanding of these phenomena as well. However, recent developments showed that hypnosis is not a sleep like stage, and that the REM-centric attitude toward dreaming is mistaken. At the same time, the advancement of the neuro-cognitive theory claiming that dreaming and mind-wandering are on a continuum both underlain by default-mode network activity called many aspects of the AIM theory into question. Our aim in this paper is to show that certain hypnotic states—hypnotic dreams (experiences that subjects have in a hypnotic state as a result of an explicit suggestion to have a dream)—can, nevertheless, be highly relevant for the neuro-cognitive theory, and that their comparison with dreaming and mind-wandering has the potential to advance the field in unexpected ways.

Chasing the Rainbow: The Non-conscious Nature of Being

Despite the compelling subjective experience of executive self-control, we argue that “consciousness” contains no top-down control processes and that “consciousness” involves no executive, causal, or controlling relationship with any of the familiar psychological processes conventionally attributed to it. In our view, psychological processing and psychological products are not under the control of consciousness. In particular, we argue that all “contents of consciousness” are generated by and within non-conscious brain systems in the form of a continuous self-referential personal narrative that is not directed or influenced in any way by the “experience of consciousness.” This continuously updated personal narrative arises from selective “internal broadcasting” of outputs from non-conscious executive systems that have access to all forms of cognitive processing, sensory information, and motor control. The personal narrative provides information for storage in autobiographical memory and is underpinned by constructs of self and agency, also created in non-conscious systems. The experience of consciousness is a passive accompaniment to the non-conscious processes of internal broadcasting and the creation of the personal narrative. In this sense, personal awareness is analogous to the rainbow which accompanies physical processes in the atmosphere but exerts no influence over them. Though it is an end-product created by non-conscious executive systems, the personal narrative serves the powerful evolutionary function of enabling individuals to communicate (externally broadcast) the contents of internal broadcasting. This in turn allows recipients to generate potentially adaptive strategies, such as predicting the behavior of others and underlies the development of social and cultural structures, that promote species survival. Consequently, it is the capacity to communicate to others the contents of the personal narrative that confers an evolutionary advantage—not the experience of consciousness (personal awareness) itself.