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St Quinton T, Crescioni AW. Free to be Healthy? Free Will Beliefs are Positively Associated With Health Behavior. Psychol Rep 2024:332941241260264. [PMID: 38850130 DOI: 10.1177/00332941241260264] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/09/2024]
Abstract
Previous research has demonstrated that a stronger belief in free will contributes to a variety of socially desirable behaviors. We assessed the correlation between free will beliefs and health behaviors. Four studies (N = 1172) provide evidence that belief in free will is positively associated with health protective behaviors (e.g., physical activity, fruit and vegetable consumption, low fat diet) and negatively associated with health risk behaviors (e.g., alcohol consumption, smoking, unhealthy snacking). In relation to the respective health protective and health risk behaviors, we found free will beliefs were more strongly correlated with physical activity and alcohol consumption, respectively. We also found free will beliefs were associated with key social cognition determinants (e.g., attitude, subjective norm, perceived behavioral control, and intention). Overall, our results suggest that belief in free will can have important consequences for health behavior. This contributes to current theorizing about the implications of believing in free will.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tom St Quinton
- School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Leeds Beckett University, Leeds, UK
| | - A William Crescioni
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, USA
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2
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Giraud T, Neves Leal M, Cova F. "One more time": time loops as a tool to investigate folk conceptions of moral responsibility and human agency. SYNTHESE 2023; 202:83. [PMID: 37655126 PMCID: PMC10465374 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04245-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/12/2022] [Accepted: 06/24/2023] [Indexed: 09/02/2023]
Abstract
In the past 20 years, experimental philosophers have investigated folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility, and their compatibility with determinism. To determine whether laypeople are "natural compatibilists" or "natural incompatibilists", they have used vignettes describing agents living in deterministic universes. However, later research has suggested that participants' answers to these studies are plagued with comprehension errors: either people fail to really accept that these universes are deterministic, or they confuse determinism with something else. This had led certain experimenters to conclude that maybe folk intuitions about the compatibility of free will with determinism could not be empirically investigated. Here, we propose that we should refrain from embracing this pessimistic conclusion, as scenarios involving time loops might allow experiments to bypass most of these methodological issues. Indeed, scenarios involving time loops belong both to the philosophical literature on free will and to popular culture. As such, they might constitute a bridge between the two worlds. We present the results of five studies using time loops to investigate people's intuitions about determinism, free will and moral responsibility. The results of these studies allow us to reach two conclusions. The first is that, when people are introduced to determinism through time loops, they do seem to understand what determinism entails. The second is that, at least in the context of time loops, people do not seem to consider determinism to be incompatible with free will and moral responsibility. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11229-023-04245-9.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Maicol Neves Leal
- Literature & Philosophy Department, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Florian Cova
- Philosophy Department & Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
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3
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Genschow O, Cracco E, Schneider J, Protzko J, Wisniewski D, Brass M, Schooler JW. Manipulating Belief in Free Will and Its Downstream Consequences: A Meta-Analysis. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 2023; 27:52-82. [PMID: 35676864 DOI: 10.1177/10888683221087527] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/30/2023]
Abstract
Ever since some scientists and popular media put forward the idea that free will is an illusion, the question has risen what would happen if people stopped believing in free will. Psychological research has investigated this question by testing the consequences of experimentally weakening people's free will beliefs. The results of these investigations have been mixed, with successful experiments and unsuccessful replications. This raises two fundamental questions: Can free will beliefs be manipulated, and do such manipulations have downstream consequences? In a meta-analysis including 145 experiments (95 unpublished), we show that exposing individuals to anti-free will manipulations decreases belief in free will and increases belief in determinism. However, we could not find evidence for downstream consequences. Our findings have important theoretical implications for research on free will beliefs and contribute to the discussion of whether reducing people's belief in free will has societal consequences.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | - John Protzko
- Central Connecticut State University, New Britain, USA
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4
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Stinnett AJ, Rodriguez JE, Littlefield AK, Alquist JL. Distinguishing free will from moral responsibility when measuring free will beliefs: The FWS-II. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2139232] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/31/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Alec J. Stinnett
- Department of Psychology, Texas Tech University, 2500 Broadway, Lubbock, TX 79409 USA
| | - Jordan E. Rodriguez
- Department of Psychology, Texas Tech University, 2500 Broadway, Lubbock, TX 79409 USA
| | - Andrew K. Littlefield
- Department of Psychology, Texas Tech University, 2500 Broadway, Lubbock, TX 79409 USA
| | - Jessica L. Alquist
- Department of Psychology, Texas Tech University, 2500 Broadway, Lubbock, TX 79409 USA
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5
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It's not what you did, it's what you could have done. Cognition 2022; 228:105222. [PMID: 35834864 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105222] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/08/2021] [Revised: 06/18/2022] [Accepted: 07/01/2022] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
We are more likely to judge agents as morally culpable after we learn they acted freely rather than under duress or coercion. Interestingly, the reverse is also true: Individuals are more likely to be judged to have acted freely after we learn that they committed a moral violation. Researchers have argued that morality affects judgments of force by making the alternative actions the agent could have done instead appear comparatively normal, which then increases the perceived availability of relevant alternative actions. Across five studies, we test the novel predictions of this account. We find that the degree to which participants view possible alternative actions as normal strongly predicts their perceptions that an agent acted freely. This pattern holds both for perceptions of the prescriptive normality of the alternatives (whether the actions are good) and descriptive normality of the alternatives (whether the actions are unusual). We also find that manipulating the prudential value of alternative actions or the degree to which alternatives adhere to social norms, has a similar effect to manipulating whether the actions or their alternatives violate moral norms. This pattern persists even when what is actually done is held constant, and these effects are explained by changes in the perceived normality of the alternatives. Together, these results suggest that across contexts, participants' force judgments depend not on the morality of the actual action taken, but on the normality of possible alternatives. More broadly, our results build on prior work that suggests a unifying role of normality and counterfactuals across many areas of high-level human cognition.
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Stinnett AJ, Alquist JL. Consider the tumor: Brain tumors decrease punishment via perceptions of free will. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2052830] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Alec J. Stinnett
- Department of Psychology, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, USA
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7
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Exceptionality Effect in Agency Attributions: Exceptional Behaviors are Perceived as Higher Free will than Routine Behaviors. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.5334/irsp.591] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
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8
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Ozkok H, Tatar BH, Ayyıldız TN, Eskin M, Erdem G, Turan B. To Blame or Not to Blame: the Role of Belief in Free Will in Substance Use and Suicide Stigma. Int J Ment Health Addict 2022. [DOI: 10.1007/s11469-022-00755-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022] Open
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9
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Fino E, Iliceto P. Do people have control over the decisions they make? Psychometric properties of the Italian version of the free will and scientific determinism questionnaire (FAD-plus-I). CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1007/s12144-021-02268-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/17/2022]
Abstract
AbstractThe FAD-Plus is a multidimensional measure of lay Beliefs in Free Will, Fatalistic Determinism, Scientific Determinism, and Unpredictability. This study had four aims: First, to test the factor structure of the Italian translation of the FAD-Plus in a sample of adults from the community, using structural equation modeling. Second, to test the reliability of the four scales. Third, to investigate gender invariance in item thresholds and factor loadings. Fourth, to analyze the criterion-related validity of the measure. Participants were 328 adults from the community, specifically 173 females and 155 males aged 18–56 years. Results showed that the proposed bifactor model tested by means of exploratory structural equation modeling fitted the data well (CFI = 1.000, RMSEA = 0.000, SRMR = 0.045), and that all the scales were reliable (Omega = .91–.98). Gender invariance was established, with no significant differences in fit indices between females and males. Beliefs in Free Will correlated positively and lowly to moderately with Aggressiveness (rs = .12), Extraversion (.25), Self- (.40) and Other-Representations of adult attachment (.43). Beliefs in Fatalistic Determinism correlated positively and lowly with Other-Representations (rs = .11), whereas its correlations with Aggressiveness, Extraversion, and Neuroticism were close to zero. In conclusion, these findings provide researchers and practitioners with evidence on a reliable and valid measure of Beliefs in free will and determinism in the Italian context, considered as predictors of individuals’ autonomy, effective coping, and prosocial behavior, of foremost importance for prevention and intervention in the community, particularly in occupational, legal, and clinical settings.
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Rakos RF, Switzer K. Culturo-Behavior Science: Now is the Time to Focus on U.S. Immigration Policy. BEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL ISSUES 2021. [DOI: 10.1007/s42822-021-00062-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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11
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Kirfel L, Lagnado D. Causal judgments about atypical actions are influenced by agents' epistemic states. Cognition 2021; 212:104721. [PMID: 33930783 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104721] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/07/2020] [Revised: 04/02/2021] [Accepted: 04/03/2021] [Indexed: 01/22/2023]
Abstract
A prominent finding in causal cognition research is people's tendency to attribute increased causality to atypical actions. If two agents jointly cause an outcome (conjunctive causation), but differ in how frequently they have performed the causal action before, people judge the atypically acting agent to have caused the outcome to a greater extent. In this paper, we argue that it is the epistemic state of an abnormally acting agent, rather than the abnormality of their action, that is driving people's causal judgments. Given the predictability of the normally acting agent's behaviour, the abnormal agent is in a better position to foresee the consequences of their action. We put this hypothesis to test in four experiments. In Experiment 1, we show that people judge the atypical agent as more causal than the normally acting agent, but also judge the atypical agent to have an epistemic advantage. In Experiment 2, we find that people do not judge a causal difference if no epistemic advantage for the abnormal agent arises. In Experiment 3, we replicate these findings in a scenario in which the abnormal agent's epistemic advantage generalises to a novel context. In Experiment 4, we extend these findings to mental states more broadly construed and develop a Bayesian network model that predicts the degree of outcome-oriented mental states based on action normality and epistemic states. We find that people infer mental states like desire and intention to a greater extent from abnormal behaviour when this behaviour is accompanied by an epistemic advantage. We discuss these results in light of current theories and research on people's preference for abnormal causes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lara Kirfel
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, United Kingdom.
| | - David Lagnado
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, United Kingdom
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12
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Free to blame? Belief in free will is related to victim blaming. Conscious Cogn 2021; 88:103074. [PMID: 33445078 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2020.103074] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/14/2020] [Revised: 12/18/2020] [Accepted: 12/22/2020] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
Abstract
The more people believe in free will, the harsher their punishment of criminal offenders. A reason for this finding is that belief in free will leads individuals to perceive others as responsible for their behavior. While research supporting this notion has mainly focused on criminal offenders, the perspective of the victims has been neglected so far. We filled this gap and hypothesized that individuals' belief in free will is positively correlated with victim blaming-the tendency to make victims responsible for their bad luck. In three studies, we found that the more individuals believe in free will, the more they blame victims. Study 3 revealed that belief in free will is correlated with victim blaming even when controlling for just world beliefs, religious worldviews, and political ideology. The results contribute to a more differentiated view of the role of free will beliefs and attributed intentions.
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Strachan JW, Török G. Efficiency is prioritised over fairness when distributing joint actions. Acta Psychol (Amst) 2020; 210:103158. [PMID: 32768609 DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2020.103158] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/29/2020] [Revised: 07/15/2020] [Accepted: 07/24/2020] [Indexed: 10/23/2022] Open
Abstract
Individuals have a drive towards maximising action efficiency, which is reflected in action choices that minimise movement costs to reach a goal. In joint actions, actors prioritise joint efficiency or coefficiency, maximising the utility of the joint action even if this comes at a cost to themselves. However, it remains an open question whether actors are willing to unilaterally sacrifice their partner's individual efficiency for the greater good, when forcing a partner to incur additional costs may be interpreted as unfair. In two experiments we explored how participants would choose to distribute a motor task that required either a fair or an unfair distribution of labour. We found that, both whether there was opportunity for reciprocity (Experiment 1) or not (Experiment 2), participants maximised the coefficiency of their joint actions, regardless of how unfair this distribution of labour proved to be regarding the individual action costs. Taken together, our results suggest participants use a rational decision-making framework that prioritises overall efficiency over both individual efficiency and a consideration of fairness.
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Clark CJ, Winegard BM. Tribalism in War and Peace: The Nature and Evolution of Ideological Epistemology and Its Significance for Modern Social Science. PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY 2020. [DOI: 10.1080/1047840x.2020.1721233] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/07/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Cory J. Clark
- Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, UK
| | - Bo M. Winegard
- Department of Psychology, Marietta College, Marietta, Ohio
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15
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Hannikainen IR, Machery E, Rose D, Stich S, Olivola CY, Sousa P, Cova F, Buchtel EE, Alai M, Angelucci A, Berniûnas R, Chatterjee A, Cheon H, Cho IR, Cohnitz D, Dranseika V, Eraña Lagos Á, Ghadakpour L, Grinberg M, Hashimoto T, Horowitz A, Hristova E, Jraissati Y, Kadreva V, Karasawa K, Kim H, Kim Y, Lee M, Mauro C, Mizumoto M, Moruzzi S, Ornelas J, Osimani B, Romero C, Rosas López A, Sangoi M, Sereni A, Songhorian S, Struchiner N, Tripodi V, Usui N, Vázquez Del Mercado A, Vosgerichian HA, Zhang X, Zhu J. For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures. Front Psychol 2019; 10:2428. [PMID: 31749739 PMCID: PMC6848273 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02428] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/30/2019] [Accepted: 10/14/2019] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ivar R Hannikainen
- Department of Law, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
| | - Edouard Machery
- Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, United States
| | - David Rose
- Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, United States
| | - Stephen Stich
- Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, United States
| | - Christopher Y Olivola
- Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, United States
| | - Paulo Sousa
- Institute of Cognition and Culture, Queen's University, Belfast, United Kingdom
| | - Florian Cova
- Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Emma E Buchtel
- Department of Psychology, The Education University of Hong Kong, Tai Po, Hong Kong
| | - Mario Alai
- Department of Pure and Applied Sciences, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Urbino, Italy
| | - Adriano Angelucci
- Department of Pure and Applied Sciences, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Urbino, Italy
| | | | - Amita Chatterjee
- School of Cognitive Science, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India
| | - Hyundeuk Cheon
- Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea
| | - In-Rae Cho
- Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea
| | - Daniel Cohnitz
- Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands
| | | | | | | | - Maurice Grinberg
- Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
| | | | - Amir Horowitz
- Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic Studies, Open University of Israel, Ra'anana, Israel
| | - Evgeniya Hristova
- Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
| | - Yasmina Jraissati
- Department of Philosophy, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon
| | - Veselina Kadreva
- Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
| | - Kaori Karasawa
- Department of Social Psychology, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
| | - Hackjin Kim
- Department of Psychology, Korea University, Seoul, South Korea
| | - Yeonjeong Kim
- Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, United States
| | - Minwoo Lee
- Department of Psychology, Korea University, Seoul, South Korea
| | | | - Masaharu Mizumoto
- School of Knowledge Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Ishikawa, Japan
| | - Sebastiano Moruzzi
- Department of Philosophy and Communication Studies, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
| | - Jorge Ornelas
- Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, San Luis Potosí, Mexico
| | - Barbara Osimani
- Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, Munich, Germany
| | - Carlos Romero
- Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico
| | | | - Massimo Sangoi
- Department of Pure and Applied Sciences, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Urbino, Italy
| | - Andrea Sereni
- Faculty of Philosophy, Scuola Universitaria Superiore IUSS, Pavia, Italy
| | - Sarah Songhorian
- Faculty of Philosophy, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan, Italy
| | - Noel Struchiner
- Department of Law, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
| | - Vera Tripodi
- Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
| | - Naoki Usui
- Department of Humanities, Mie University, Tsu, Japan
| | | | - Hrag A Vosgerichian
- Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic Studies, Open University of Israel, Ra'anana, Israel
| | - Xueyi Zhang
- School of Humanities, Southeast University, Nanjing, China
| | - Jing Zhu
- School of Information Management, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China
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Clark CJ, Liu BS, Winegard BM, Ditto PH. Tribalism Is Human Nature. CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 2019. [DOI: 10.1177/0963721419862289] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
Humans evolved in the context of intense intergroup competition, and groups comprised of loyal members more often succeeded than groups comprised of nonloyal members. Therefore, selective pressures have sculpted human minds to be tribal, and group loyalty and concomitant cognitive biases likely exist in all groups. Modern politics is one of the most salient forms of modern coalitional conflict and elicits substantial cognitive biases. The common evolutionary history of liberals and conservatives gives little reason to expect protribe biases to be higher on one side of the political spectrum than the other. This evolutionarily plausible null hypothesis has been supported by recent research. In a recent meta-analysis, liberals and conservatives showed similar levels of partisan bias, and several protribe cognitive tendencies often ascribed to conservatives (e.g., intolerance toward dissimilar other people) were found in similar degrees in liberals. We conclude that tribal bias is a natural and nearly ineradicable feature of human cognition and that no group—not even one’s own—is immune.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | - Peter H. Ditto
- Department of Psychological Science, University of California, Irvine
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Clark CJ, Winegard BM, Baumeister RF. Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism. Front Psychol 2019; 10:215. [PMID: 30792683 PMCID: PMC6374326 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00215] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/16/2018] [Accepted: 01/22/2019] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
For years, experimental philosophers have attempted to discern whether laypeople find free will compatible with a scientifically deterministic understanding of the universe, yet no consensus has emerged. The present work provides one potential explanation for these discrepant findings: People are strongly motivated to preserve free will and moral responsibility, and thus do not have stable, logically rigorous notions of free will. Seven studies support this hypothesis by demonstrating that a variety of logically irrelevant (but motivationally relevant) features influence compatibilist judgments. In Study 1, participants who were asked to consider the possibility that our universe is deterministic were more compatibilist than those not asked to consider this possibility, suggesting that determinism poses a threat to moral responsibility, which increases compatibilist responding (thus reducing the threat). In Study 2, participants who considered concrete instances of moral behavior found compatibilist free will more sufficient for moral responsibility than participants who were asked about moral responsibility more generally. In Study 3a, the order in which participants read free will and determinism descriptions influenced their compatibilist judgments-and only when the descriptions had moral significance: Participants were more likely to report that determinism was compatible with free will than that free will was compatible with determinism. In Study 3b, participants who read the free will description first (the more compatibilist group) were particularly likely to confess that their beliefs in free will and moral responsibility and their disbelief in determinism influenced their conclusion. In Study 4, participants reduced their compatibilist beliefs after reading a passage that argued that moral responsibility could be preserved even in the absence of free will. Participants also reported that immaterial souls were compatible with scientific determinism, most strongly among immaterial soul believers (Study 5), and evaluated information about the capacities of primates in a biased manner favoring the existence of human free will (Study 6). These results suggest that people do not have one intuition about whether free will is compatible with determinism. Instead, people report that free will is compatible with determinism when desiring to uphold moral responsibility. Recommendations for future work are discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cory J. Clark
- Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom
| | - Bo M. Winegard
- Department of Psychology, Marietta College, Marietta, OH, United States
| | - Roy F. Baumeister
- Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, United States
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, QLD, Australia
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Goldstein-Greenwood J, Conway P. Fatigue Compatibilism: Lay Perceivers Believe That Fatigue Predicts—But Does Not Excuse—Moral Failings. SOCIAL COGNITION 2019. [DOI: 10.1521/soco.2019.37.1.57] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
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Abstract
AbstractMoral cognition, by its very nature, stems from intuitions about what is good and bad, and these intuitions influence moral assessments outside of conscious awareness. However, because humans evolved a shared set of moral intuitions, and are compelled to justify their moral assessments as good and rational (even erroneously) to others, moral virtue and moral progress are still possible.
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Baumeister RF, Lau S, Maranges HM, Clark CJ. On the Necessity of Consciousness for Sophisticated Human Action. Front Psychol 2018; 9:1925. [PMID: 30349503 PMCID: PMC6186836 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01925] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/22/2018] [Accepted: 09/19/2018] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
In this essay, we aim to counter and qualify the epiphenomenalist challenge proposed in this special issue on the grounds of empirical and theoretical arguments. The current body of scientific knowledge strongly indicates that conscious thought is a necessary condition for many human behaviors, and therefore, consciousness qualifies as a cause of those behaviors. We review illustrative experimental evidence for the causal power of conscious thought while also acknowledging its natural limitations. We argue that it is implausible that the metabolic costs inherent to conscious processes would have evolved in humans without any adaptive benefits. Moreover, we discuss the relevance of conscious thought to the issue of freedom. Many accounts hold conscious thought as necessary and conducive to naturalistic conceptions of personal freedom. Apart from these theories, we show that the conscious perception of freedom and the belief in free will provide sources of interesting findings, beneficial behavioral effects, and new avenues for research. We close by proposing our own challenge via outlining the gaps that have yet to be filled to establish hard evidence of an epiphenomenal model of consciousness. To be sure, we appreciate the epiphenomenalist challenge as it promotes critical thinking and inspires rigorous research. However, we see no merit in downplaying the causal significance of consciousness a priori. Instead, we believe it more worthwhile to focus on the complex interplay between conscious and other causal processes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Roy F. Baumeister
- School of Psychology, Faculty of Health and Behavioural Sciences, University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia
- Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, United States
| | - Stephan Lau
- Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, United States
| | - Heather M. Maranges
- Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, United States
| | - Cory J. Clark
- Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, United States
- Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom
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Feldman G, Chandrashekar SP. Laypersons' Beliefs and Intuitions About Free Will and Determinism: New Insights Linking the Social Psychology and Experimental Philosophy Paradigms. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PERSONALITY SCIENCE 2018; 9:539-549. [PMID: 30220960 PMCID: PMC6113710 DOI: 10.1177/1948550617713254] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
We linked between the social psychology and experimental philosophy paradigms for the study of folk intuitions and beliefs regarding the concept of free will to answer three questions: (1) What intuitions do people have about free will and determinism? (2) Do free will beliefs predict differences in free will and determinism intuitions? and (3) Is there more to free will and determinism than experiencing certainty or uncertainty about the nature of the universe? Overall, laypersons viewed the universe as allowing for human indeterminism, and they did so with certainty. Examining intuitions of prosociality, future orientation, learning, meaningfulness, human uniqueness, and well-being, ratings were highest in the indeterministic universe condition and lowest in the deterministic universe condition, both significantly different from the uncertain universe condition. Participants' free will beliefs had only weak impact on realism, happiness, and learning intuitions but did not reverse the general intuition favoring indeterminism and showed no impact on other intuitions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gilad Feldman
- Department of Work and Social Psychology, Maastricht University, Maastricht, the Netherlands
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Clark CJ, Shniderman A, Luguri JB, Baumeister RF, Ditto PH. Are morally good actions ever free? Conscious Cogn 2018; 63:161-182. [PMID: 29804874 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2018.05.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/18/2017] [Revised: 05/06/2018] [Accepted: 05/15/2018] [Indexed: 12/24/2022]
Abstract
Research has shown that people ascribe more responsibility to morally bad actions than both morally good and neutral ones, suggesting that people do not attribute responsibility to morally good actions. The present work demonstrates that this is not so: People ascribe more free will to morally good than neutral actions (Studies 1a-1b, Mini Meta). Studies 2a-2b distinguished the underlying motives for ascribing freedom to morally good and bad actions. Free will ascriptions for immoral actions were driven predominantly by affective responses (i.e., punitive desires, moral outrage, and perceived severity of the crime). Free will judgments for morally good actions were similarly driven by affective responses (i.e., reward desires, moral uplift, and perceived generosity), but also more pragmatic considerations (perceived utility of reward, counternormativity of the action, and required willpower). Morally good actions may be more carefully considered, leading to generally weaker, but more contextually sensitive free will judgments.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | - Roy F Baumeister
- Florida State University, United States; University of Queensland, Australia
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Feldman G, Farh JL, Wong KFE. Agency Beliefs Over Time and Across Cultures: Free Will Beliefs Predict Higher Job Satisfaction. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2018; 44:304-317. [PMID: 29191084 PMCID: PMC5810915 DOI: 10.1177/0146167217739261] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/05/2017] [Accepted: 10/05/2017] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
In three studies, we examined the relationship between free will beliefs and job satisfaction over time and across cultures. Study 1 examined 252 Taiwanese real-estate agents over a 3-months period. Study 2 examined job satisfaction for 137 American workers on an online labor market over a 6-months period. Study 3 extended to a large sample of 14,062 employees from 16 countries and examined country-level moderators. We found a consistent positive relationship between the belief in free will and job satisfaction. The relationship was above and beyond other agency constructs (Study 2), mediated by perceived autonomy (Studies 2-3), and stronger in countries with a higher national endorsement of the belief in free will (Study 3). We conclude that free-will beliefs predict outcomes over time and across cultures beyond other agency constructs. We call for more cross-cultural and longitudinal studies examining free-will beliefs as predictors of real-life outcomes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gilad Feldman
- University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
- Maastricht University, The Netherlands
| | - Jiing-Lih Farh
- China Europe International Business School, Shanghai, China
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