Unconscious priming dissociates 'free choice' from 'spontaneous urge' responses

Heartfelt choices: The influence of cardiac phase on free-choice actions

The influence of cardiac phases on cognitive and sensorimotor functions is noteworthy. Specifically, during systole, as opposed to diastole, there is an observed enhancement in tasks demanding the suppression of instructed responses. This suggests that systole contributes to inhibitory control in motor functions. However, the extent to which systolic inhibition is significant in volitional free-choice actions, such as choosing to execute or refrain from a cue-initiated response, remains to be clarified. To fill this gap in the current literature, the purpose of this study was to test whether during the systole phase, compared with the diastole phase, the tendency to enact volitional actions decreased due to the systolic inhibitory effect. We used a modified version of the Go/No-Go task with an added condition for volitional free-choice actions, where participants could decide whether to respond or not, to test whether systolic inhibition could affect the volitional decision to act. The results showed that participants' responses were less frequent in systole than in diastole in the volitional action condition. Then, to test the robustness of the cardiac effect on volitional actions, we used two established manipulations: the Straw Breathing Manipulation and the Cold Pressor Test, which were able to induce anxiety and increase the heart rate, respectively. Results showed that the systole/diastole difference in the number of volitional action trials in which participants decided to respond tended to remain the same despite all manipulations. Overall, our results provide convergent evidence for the effect of the heart on the decision to act, an effect that appears independent of manipulations of both the physiological and psychological state of the individual.

Multiple sources of unconscious-information processing affect a single response: independent unconscious priming effects

At present there is little knowledge on whether and how multiple pieces of unconscious information can simultaneously affect a single conscious response. In the present study, we manipulated the congruency relation between a masked prime arrow and the target arrow, as well as that between masked flankers and the target arrow. The results demonstrated that the masked prime and flankers produced independent unconscious priming effects on the response to the target. In the process of studying the above phenomenon, two secondary findings were made. First, although the prime congruency effect was obtained, the flanker congruency effect was smaller when the flankers were displayed simultaneously with the target than when they were displayed sequentially before the target. This suggested that priming stimulation required enough time to be processed to a sufficient extent to produce an unconscious priming effect. Second, when the prime stimulus was removed, leaving only the flankers, the flanker priming effect increased, suggesting that the attention attracted to the prime and its conscious mask could also reduce the flanker congruency effect. These results observed across several experiments were replicated in one within-subjects experiment. We proposed an "independent unconscious influence hypothesis" for the phenomenon. This hypothesis was further integrated into a more comprehensive unconscious information processing model. The possible causes of the observed phenomena were discussed.

Mistaking opposition for autonomy: psychophysical studies on detecting choice bias

Do people know when they act freely and autonomously versus when their actions are influenced? While the human aspiration to freedom is widespread, little research has investigated how people perceive whether their choices are biased. Here, we explored how actions congruent or incongruent with suggestions are perceived as influenced or free. Across three experiments, participants saw directional stimuli cueing left or right manual responses. They were instructed to follow the cue's suggestion, oppose it or ignore it entirely to make a 'free' choice. We found that we could bias participants' 'free responses' towards adherence or opposition, by making one instruction more frequent than the other. Strikingly, participants consistently reported feeling less influenced by cues to which they responded incongruently, even when response habits effectively biased them towards such opposition behaviour. This effect was so compelling that cues that were frequently presented with the Oppose instruction became systematically judged as having less influence on behaviour, artificially increasing the sense of freedom of choice. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that acting contrarian distorts the perception of autonomy. Crucially, we demonstrate the existence of a novel illusion of freedom evoked by trained opposition. Our results have important implications for understanding mechanisms of persuasion.

Why Cognitive Sciences Do Not Prove That Free Will Is an Epiphenomenon

Is epiphenomenalism virtually entailed by the current empirical knowledge about how the mind/brain causes human behavior? I'll address this question by highlighting that recent discoveries in empirical psychology and neuroscience actually do not strike the final blow to the notions of free will and intentional agency. Indeed, most of the experiments that purport to show that our behavior is unconscious and automatic do not prove that it is indeed the case and that therefore we do not have free will. There are many reasons for this, including the fact that those experiments focus on a specific range of our behavior, one that manifests a significant correlation between unconscious priming and decisions or reactions. However, this doesn't mean that the entire range of our relevant behavior works the same way. It can be argued that there are situations of higher relevance in which we are fully conscious of our decisions or, at least, there are decisions such that psychological experiments cannot prove them to always be unconscious and automatic. However, the epiphenomenalist challenge may suggest that we should abandon some of the suppositions implied by a traditional idea of free will.