Manipulating memory associations changes decision-making preferences in a preconditioning task

Proactive reward in conflict tasks: Does it only enhance general performance or also modulate conflict effects?

In the present study, we investigated the influence of performance-contingent reward prospects on task performance across three visual conflict tasks with manual responses (Experiments 1 & 2: Simon and Stroop tasks; Experiment 3: Simon and Eriksen flanker task) using block-wise (Experiment 1) and trial-wise (Experiments 2 & 3) manipulations to signal the possibility of reward. Across all experiments, task performance (in reaction time and/or error rates) generally improved in reward compared with no-reward conditions in each conflict task. However, there was, if any, little evidence that the reward manipulation modulated the size of the mean conflict effects, and there was also no evidence for conflict-specific effects of reward when controlling for time-varying fluctuations in conflict processing via distributional analyses (delta plots). Thus, the results provide no evidence for conflict-specific accounts and instead favor performance-general accounts, where reward anticipation leads to overall performance improvements without affecting conflict effects. We discuss possible implications for how proactive control might modulate the interplay between target- and distractor-processing in conflict tasks.

How False Memory and True Memory Affect Decision Making in Older Adults: A Dissociative Account

OBJECTIVES

Remembering past rewarding experiences plays a crucial rule in guiding people's decision making in the future. However, as people age, they become less accurate in remembering past events and more susceptible to forming false memories. An important question is how the decline of episodic memory and the increase of false memory may affect older adults' decision-making performance.

METHODS

The current study used a newly developed paradigm in which the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm was combined with a reward learning task to create robust false memories of rewarding experiences. Participants learned that some DRM picture lists brought them a monetary reward and some DRM picture lists did not bring reward. Later, their memories were tested and decision-making preferences were measured.

RESULTS

We found that older and younger adults had almost equivalent false and true memories under the rewarding context, but older adults showed significantly lower decision-making preferences for lure pictures and rewarded pictures than younger adults. Furthermore, true and false memories were a stronger predictor of decision-making preferences for younger than for older adults.

DISCUSSION

These results together suggest an age-related dissociation between memory and decision making that older adults may be less efficient in using their memory to guide decision making than younger adults. Future research may further investigate its underlying mechanisms and develop potential interventions aiming at strengthening the connection between memory and decision making in older adults to help improve their decision-making performance.

Suppressing memory associations impacts decision-making preference: Evidence from the think/no-think paradigm

Recent research has suggested that episodic memory can guide our decision-making. Forgetting is one essential characteristic of memory. If certain memories are suppressed to be forgotten, decisions that rely on such memories should be impacted. So far, little research has examined whether suppression of episodic memory would impact decision-making. In the current pre-registered study, the effect of memory suppression on subsequent reinforcement decision-making was examined by combining the Think/No-think paradigm and a reinforcement decision-making task. We found that suppressing memories of learned associations significantly impaired recollected memories of those associations, and participants' decision bias disappeared after their memory associations were suppressed. Furthermore, the more memory associations participants recalled, the higher decision preferences they exhibited. Our findings provide additional support for the role of episodic memory in reinforcement decision-making, and suggest that suppressing memory associations can lead to behavioral consequences.

Inducing emotionally negative nonbelieved memories using negative pictures

Memories that can be recalled but are no longer believed are termed nonbelieved memories. The current studies examined the creation of emotionally negative nonbelieved memories after viewing negatively valenced pictures. In both experiments, participants took part in two sessions. In Session 1, after being presented with a set of neutral and negative pictures, participants had to rate their emotional state. One week later, in Session 2, participants had to complete a recognition task to identify pictures that had appeared during the previous session. During this task, participants' memories for some pictures were challenged by telling them that their answers were incorrect in order to evoke nonbelieved memories. The experimental procedure was successful in creating nonbelieved memories in the participants. Specifically, in Experiment 1 (N = 35), we induced nonbelieved true memories for both negative and neutral pictures. We found a significant decrease in both belief and recollection after the challenge, with the change in belief being twice as large as the change in recollection. In Experiment 2 (N = 43), we successfully induced both nonbelieved true and false memories for negative pictures. Again, the reduction of belief was significantly greater than that of recollection. In general, participants evinced better memory for negative pictures, but following challenges people were just as likely to accept false social feedback and change their memories regarding other types of pictures. In both experiments, our challenges did not lead to notable changes in emotional state. In general, our findings show that emotionally negative nonbelieved memories can be successfully evoked in an experimental setting.

Challenging memories reduces intrusive memories and the memory amplification effect

This study scrutinizes the influence of attenuating beliefs about the veracity of traumatic experiences on the manifestation of intrusive recollections and the memory amplification effect. Participants were exposed to distress-inducing visual stimuli, subsequently rating their emotional status pre and post exposure. They engaged in a recognition task, identifying scenarios within the stimuli. Participants' recall was contested, casting doubt about the occurrence of certain scenes. Subsequently, they maintained a daily log of intrusive memories over a week. A second session reiterated the same process. This method effectively diminished the certainty in the participants' traumatic memories. Scenes whose occurrence was contested demonstrated a significant decline in both intrusive memories and memory amplification when juxtaposed with uncontested ones. Interestingly, no significant correlation emerged between the diminished belief in traumatic incidents and reductions in intrusive memory or memory amplification. Thus, this study advocates that interrogating the veracity of traumatic recollections can mitigate the prevalence of intrusive memories and the memory amplification effect, suggesting a novel potential therapeutic approach for trauma-related disorders.

Manipulating Memory Associations Minimizes Avoidance Behavior

Memories of the past can guide humans to avoid harm. The logical consequence of this is if memories are changed, avoidance behavior should be affected. More than 80 years of false memory research has shown that people's memory can be re-constructed or distorted by receiving suggestive false feedback. The current study examined whether manipulating people's memories of learned associations would impact fear related behavior. A modified sensory preconditioning paradigm of fear learning was used. Critically, in a memory test after fear learning, participants received verbal false feedback to change their memory associations. After receiving the false feedback, participants' beliefs and memories ratings for learned associations decreased significantly compared to the no feedback condition. Furthermore, in the false feedback condition, participants no longer showed avoidance to fear conditioned stimuli and relevant subjective fear ratings dropped significantly. Our results suggest that manipulating memory associations might minimize avoidance behavior in fear conditioning. These data also highlight the role of memory in higher order conditioning.