One Link to Link Them All

A conditioned response to a stimulus can be transferred to an associated stimulus, as seen in sensory preconditioning. In this research paper, we aimed to explore this phenomenon using a stimulus-response contingency learning paradigm using voluntary actions as responses. We conducted two preregistered experiments that explored whether a learned response can be indirectly activated by a stimulus (S1) that was never directly paired with the response itself. Importantly, S1 was previously associated with another stimulus (S2) that was then directly and contingently paired with a response (S2-R contingency). In Experiment 1a, an indirect activation of acquired stimulus-response contingencies was present for audiovisual stimulus pairs wherein the stimulus association resembled a vocabulary learning setup. This result was replicated in Experiment 1b. Additionally, we found that the effect is moderated by having conscious awareness of the S1-S2 association and the S2-R contingency. By demonstrating indirect activation effects for voluntary actions, our findings show that principles of Pavlovian conditioning like sensory preconditioning also apply to contingency learning of stimulus-response relations for operant behavior.

Danger Changes the Way the Brain Consolidates Neutral Information; and Does So by Interacting with Processes Involved in the Encoding of That Information

This study examined the effect of danger on consolidation of neutral information in two regions of the rat (male and female) medial temporal lobe: the perirhinal cortex (PRh) and basolateral amygdala complex (BLA). The neutral information was the association that forms between an auditory stimulus and a visual stimulus (labeled S2 and S1) across their pairings in sensory preconditioning. We show that, when the sensory preconditioning session is followed by a shocked context exposure, the danger shifts consolidation of the S2-S1 association from the PRh to the BLA; and does so by interacting with processes involved in encoding of the S2-S1 pairings. Specifically, we show that the initial S2-S1 pairing in sensory preconditioning is encoded in the BLA and not the PRh; whereas the later S2-S1 pairings are encoded in the PRh and not the BLA. When the sensory preconditioning session is followed by a context alone exposure, the BLA-dependent trace of the early S2-S1 pairings decays and the PRh-dependent trace of the later S2-S1 pairings is consolidated in memory. However, when the sensory preconditioning session is followed by a shocked context exposure, the PRh-dependent trace of the later S2-S1 pairings is suppressed and the BLA-dependent trace of the initial S2-S1 pairing is consolidated in memory. These findings are discussed with respect to mutually inhibitory interactions between the PRh and BLA, and the way that these regions support memory in other protocols, including recognition memory in people.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The perirhinal cortex (PRh) and basolateral amygdala complex (BLA) process the pairings of neutral auditory and visual stimuli in sensory preconditioning. The involvement of each region in this processing is determined by the novelty/familiarity of the stimuli as well as events that occur immediately after the preconditioning session. Novel stimuli are represented in the BLA; however, as these stimuli are repeatedly presented without consequence, they come to be represented in the PRh. Whether the BLA- or PRh-dependent representation is consolidated in memory depends on what happens next. When nothing of significance occurs, the PRh-dependent representation is consolidated and the BLA-dependent representation decays; but when danger is encountered, the PRh-dependent representation is inhibited and the BLA-dependent representation is selected for consolidation.

How common is a common error term? The rules that govern associative learning in sensory preconditioning and second-order conditioning

In standard (first-order) Pavlovian conditioning protocols, pairings of an initially neutral conditioned stimulus (CS) and a biologically significant unconditioned stimulus (US) result in the formation of a CS-US association. The strength of this association is theoretically regulated by prediction error: specifically, the difference between the total level of conditioning supported by the US and the degree to which it is predicted by all stimuli present (i.e., a common error term). In higher-order conditioning protocols (e.g., sensory preconditioning and second-order conditioning), a Pavlovian CS is used to condition responses to other stimuli with which it is paired. At present, it is unknown whether error-correction processes regulate associative learning in higher-order conditioning and, if so, whether these processes are the same as those that regulate formation of a CS-US association in first-order conditioning. Here we review studies that have provided findings relevant to this question: specifically, studies that have examined blocking and/or inhibitory learning in sensory preconditioning and second-order conditioning. These studies show that: (1) animals can form inhibitory associations between relatively neutral sensory stimuli; (2) the learning that occurs in sensory preconditioning and second-order conditioning can be blocked; and, finally, (3) a first-order CS can block conditioning to a second-order CS, and vice versa. The findings are taken to imply that a common error term regulates associative learning in higher-order conditioning, just as it regulates associative learning in first-order conditioning. They are discussed with respect to the nature of the error signal that underlies conditioning and future work that is needed to advance our understanding of the rules that govern different types of learning.

Understanding Associative Learning Through Higher-Order Conditioning

Associative learning is often considered to require the physical presence of stimuli in the environment in order for them to be linked. This, however, is not a necessary condition for learning. Indeed, associative relationships can form between events that are never directly paired. That is, associative learning can occur by integrating information across different phases of training. Higher-order conditioning provides evidence for such learning through two deceptively similar designs – sensory preconditioning and second-order conditioning. In this review, we detail the procedures and factors that influence learning in these designs, describe the associative relationships that can be acquired, and argue for the importance of this knowledge in studying brain function.

Anterior cingulate neurons signal neutral cue pairings during sensory preconditioning

Of all frontocortical subregions, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has perhaps the most overlapping theories of function.1-3 Recording studies in rats, humans, and other primates have reported diverse neural responses that support many theories,4-12 yet nearly all these studies have in common tasks in which one event reliably predicts another. This leaves open the possibility that ACC represents associative pairing of events, independent of their overt biological significance. Sensory preconditioning13 provides an opportunity to test this. In the first phase, preconditioning, value-neutral sensory stimuli are paired (A→B). To test whether this was learned, subjects are given standard conditioning during which one of the previously neutral sensory cues is paired with a biologically meaningful outcome (B→outcome). During the final probe test, the neutral cue which was never paired with a biologically meaningful outcome is presented alone (A→) and will elicit a conditional response, suggesting that subjects had learned the associative structure during preconditioning and use that knowledge to infer presentation of the biologically relevant outcome (A→B→outcome). Inference-based responding demonstrates a fundamental property of model-based reasoning14,15 and requires learning of the associations between neutral stimuli before rewards are introduced.16-19 ACC neurons developed firing patterns that reflected the learning of sensory associations during preconditioning, even though no rewards were present. The strength of these correlates predicted rats' ability to later mobilize and use that associative information during the probe test. These results demonstrate that clear biological significance is not necessary to produce correlates of learning in ACC.

The Opioid Receptor Antagonist Naloxone Enhances First-Order Fear Conditioning, Second-Order Fear Conditioning and Sensory Preconditioning in Rats

The opioid receptor antagonist naloxone enhances Pavlovian fear conditioning when rats are exposed to pairings of an initially neutral stimulus, such as a tone, and a painful foot shock unconditioned stimulus (US; so-called first-order fear conditioning; Pavlov, 1927). The present series of experiments examined whether naloxone has the same effect when conditioning occurs in the absence of US exposure. In Experiments 1a and 1b, rats were exposed to tone-shock pairings in stage 1 (one trial per day for 4 days) and then to pairings of an initially neutral light with the already conditioned tone in stage 2 (one trial per day for 4 days). Experiment 1a confirmed that this training results in second-order fear of the light; and Experiment 1b showed that naloxone enhances this conditioning: rats injected with naloxone in stage 2 froze more than vehicle-injected controls when tested with the light alone (drug-free). In Experiments 2a and 2b, rats were exposed to light-tone pairings in stage 1 (one trial per day for 4 days) and then to tone-shock pairings in stage 2 (one trial per day for 2 days). Experiment 2a confirmed that this training results in sensory preconditioned fear of the light; and Experiment 2b showed that naloxone enhances sensory preconditioning when injected prior to each of the light-tone pairings: rats injected with naloxone in stage 1 froze more than vehicle-injected controls when tested with the light alone (drug-free). These results were taken to mean that naloxone enhances fear conditioning independently of its effect on US processing; and more generally, that opioids regulate the error-correction mechanisms that underlie associative formation.

Manipulating Memory Associations Minimizes Avoidance Behavior

Memories of the past can guide humans to avoid harm. The logical consequence of this is if memories are changed, avoidance behavior should be affected. More than 80 years of false memory research has shown that people's memory can be re-constructed or distorted by receiving suggestive false feedback. The current study examined whether manipulating people's memories of learned associations would impact fear related behavior. A modified sensory preconditioning paradigm of fear learning was used. Critically, in a memory test after fear learning, participants received verbal false feedback to change their memory associations. After receiving the false feedback, participants' beliefs and memories ratings for learned associations decreased significantly compared to the no feedback condition. Furthermore, in the false feedback condition, participants no longer showed avoidance to fear conditioned stimuli and relevant subjective fear ratings dropped significantly. Our results suggest that manipulating memory associations might minimize avoidance behavior in fear conditioning. These data also highlight the role of memory in higher order conditioning.

Higher-Order Conditioning and Dopamine: Charting a Path Forward

Higher-order conditioning involves learning causal links between multiple events, which then allows one to make novel inferences. For example, observing a correlation between two events (e.g., a neighbor wearing a particular sports jersey), later helps one make new predictions based on this knowledge (e.g., the neighbor's wife's favorite sports team). This type of learning is important because it allows one to benefit maximally from previous experiences and perform adaptively in complex environments where many things are ambiguous or uncertain. Two procedures in the lab are often used to probe this kind of learning, second-order conditioning (SOC) and sensory preconditioning (SPC). In second-order conditioning (SOC), we first teach subjects that there is a relationship between a stimulus and an outcome (e.g., a tone that predicts food). Then, an additional stimulus is taught to precede the predictive stimulus (e.g., a light leads to the food-predictive tone). In sensory preconditioning (SPC), this order of training is reversed. Specifically, the two neutral stimuli (i.e., light and tone) are first paired together and then the tone is paired separately with food. Interestingly, in both SPC and SOC, humans, rodents, and even insects, and other invertebrates will later predict that both the light and tone are likely to lead to food, even though they only experienced the tone directly paired with food. While these processes are procedurally similar, a wealth of research suggests they are associatively and neurobiologically distinct. However, midbrain dopamine, a neurotransmitter long thought to facilitate basic Pavlovian conditioning in a relatively simplistic manner, appears critical for both SOC and SPC. These findings suggest dopamine may contribute to learning in ways that transcend differences in associative and neurological structure. We discuss how research demonstrating that dopamine is critical to both SOC and SPC places it at the center of more complex forms of cognition (e.g., spatial navigation and causal reasoning). Further, we suggest that these more sophisticated learning procedures, coupled with recent advances in recording and manipulating dopamine neurons, represent a new path forward in understanding dopamine's contribution to learning and cognition.

Neural circuits for inference-based decision-making

In novel situations, where direct experience is lacking or outdated, humans must rely on mental simulations to predict future outcomes. This review discusses recent work on the neural circuits that support such inference-based behavior. We focus on two specific examples: 1) using knowledge about the associative structure of the world to infer outcomes when direct experience is lacking; 2) inferring the current value of options when the desirability of the associated outcome has changed since the original learning experience. These two examples can be studied in the sensory preconditioning and devaluation tasks, respectively. We review results from studies in animals and humans suggesting that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), together with the hippocampus and amygdala, is necessary for inference in both of these tasks. Together, these findings suggest that the OFC is a critical hub in the brain network that supports inference-based decision-making.

Neural Substrates of Incidental Associations and Mediated Learning: The Role of Cannabinoid Receptors

The ability to form associations between different stimuli in the environment to guide adaptive behavior is a central element of learning processes, from perceptual learning in humans to Pavlovian conditioning in animals. Like so, classical conditioning paradigms that test direct associations between low salience sensory stimuli and high salience motivational reinforcers are extremely informative. However, a large part of everyday learning cannot be solely explained by direct conditioning mechanisms - this includes to a great extent associations between individual sensory stimuli, carrying low or null immediate motivational value. This type of associative learning is often described as incidental learning and can be captured in animal models through sensory preconditioning procedures. Here we summarize the evolution of research on incidental and mediated learning, overview the brain systems involved and describe evidence for the role of cannabinoid receptors in such higher-order learning tasks. This evidence favors a number of contemporary hypotheses concerning the participation of the endocannabinoid system in psychosis and psychotic experiences and provides a conceptual framework for understanding how the use of cannabinoid drugs can lead to altered perceptive states.

Cortical Contributions to Higher-Order Conditioning: A Review of Retrosplenial Cortex Function

In higher-order conditioning paradigms, such as sensory preconditioning or second-order conditioning, discrete (e.g., phasic) or contextual (e.g., static) stimuli can gain the ability to elicit learned responses despite never being directly paired with reinforcement. The purpose of this mini-review is to examine the neuroanatomical basis of high-order conditioning, by selectively reviewing research that has examined the role of the retrosplenial cortex (RSC) in sensory preconditioning and second-order conditioning. For both forms of higher-order conditioning, we first discuss the types of associations that may occur and then review findings from RSC lesion/inactivation experiments. These experiments demonstrate a role for the RSC in sensory preconditioning, suggesting that this cortical region might contribute to higher-order conditioning via the encoding of neutral stimulus-stimulus associations. In addition, we address knowledge gaps, avenues for future research, and consider the contribution of the RSC to higher-order conditioning in relation to related brain structures.

Targeted Stimulation of an Orbitofrontal Network Disrupts Decisions Based on Inferred, Not Experienced Outcomes

When direct experience is unavailable, animals and humans can imagine or infer the future to guide decisions. Behavior based on direct experience versus inference may recruit partially distinct brain circuits. In rodents, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) contains neural signatures of inferred outcomes, and OFC is necessary for behavior that requires inference but not for responding driven by direct experience. In humans, OFC activity is also correlated with inferred outcomes, but it is unclear whether OFC activity is required for inference-based behavior. To test this, we used noninvasive network-based continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) in human subjects (male and female) to target lateral OFC networks in the context of a sensory preconditioning task that was designed to isolate inference-based behavior from responding that can be based on direct experience alone. We show that, relative to sham, cTBS targeting this network impairs reward-related behavior in conditions in which outcome expectations have to be mentally inferred. In contrast, OFC-targeted stimulation does not impair behavior that can be based on previously experienced stimulus–outcome associations. These findings suggest that activity in the targeted OFC network supports decision-making when outcomes have to be mentally simulated, providing converging cross-species evidence for a critical role of OFC in model-based but not model-free control of behavior.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT It is widely accepted that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is important for decision-making. However, it is less clear how exactly this region contributes to behavior. Here we test the hypothesis that the human OFC is only required for decision-making when future outcomes have to be mentally simulated, but not when direct experience with stimulus–outcome associations is available. We show that targeting OFC network activity in humans using network-based continuous theta burst stimulation selectively impairs behavior that requires inference but does not affect responding that can be based solely on direct experience. These results are in line with previous findings in animals and suggest a critical role for human OFC in model-based but not model-free behavior.

Responding to preconditioned cues is devaluation sensitive and requires orbitofrontal cortex during cue-cue learning

The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is necessary for inferring value in tests of model-based reasoning, including in sensory preconditioning. This involvement could be accounted for by representation of value or by representation of broader associative structure. We recently reported neural correlates of such broader associative structure in OFC during the initial phase of sensory preconditioning (Sadacca et al., 2018). Here, we used optogenetic inhibition of OFC to test whether these correlates might be necessary for value inference during later probe testing. We found that inhibition of OFC during cue-cue learning abolished value inference during the probe test, inference subsequently shown in control rats to be sensitive to devaluation of the expected reward. These results demonstrate that OFC must be online during cue-cue learning, consistent with the argument that the correlates previously observed are not simply downstream readouts of sensory processing and instead contribute to building the associative model supporting later behavior.

Retrosplenial cortex damage impairs unimodal sensory preconditioning

The retrosplenial cortex (RSC) is positioned at the interface between cortical sensory regions and the structures that compose the medial temporal lobe memory system. It has recently been suggested that 1 functional role of the RSC involves the formation of associations between cues in the environment (stimulus-stimulus [S-S] learning; Bucci & Robinson, 2014). This suggestion is based, in part, on the finding that lesions or temporary inactivation of the RSC impair sensory preconditioning. However, all prior studies examining the role of the RSC in sensory preconditioning have used cues from multiple modalities (both visual and auditory stimuli). The purpose of the present experiment was to determine whether the RSC contributes to unimodal sensory preconditioning. In the present study we found that both electrolytic and neurotoxic lesions of the RSC impaired sensory preconditioning with auditory cues. Together with previous experiments, these findings indicate that the RSC contributes to both multisensory and unimodal sensory integration, which suggests a general role for the RSC in linking sensory cues in the environment. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

'Online' integration of sensory and fear memories in the rat medial temporal lobe

How does a stimulus never associated with danger become frightening? The present study addressed this question using a sensory preconditioning task with rats. In this task, rats integrate a sound-light memory formed in stage 1 with a light-danger memory formed in stage 2, as they show fear when tested with the sound in stage 3. Here we show that this integration occurs 'online' during stage 2: when activity in the region that consolidated the sound-light memory (perirhinal cortex) was inhibited during formation of the light-danger memory, rats no longer showed fear when tested with the sound but continued to fear the light. Thus, fear that accrues to a stimulus paired with danger simultaneously spreads to its past associates, thereby roping those associates into a fear memory network.

Impaired generalization of reward but not loss in obsessive-compulsive disorder

BACKGROUND

Generalizing from past experiences can be adaptive by allowing those experiences to guide behavior in new situations. Generalizing too much, however, can be maladaptive. For example, individuals with pathological anxiety are believed to overgeneralize emotional responses from past threats, broadening their scope of fears. Whether individuals with pathological anxiety overgeneralize in other situations remains unclear.

METHODS

The present study (N = 57) used a monetary sensory preconditioning paradigm with rewards and losses to address this question in individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and social anxiety disorder (SAD), comparing them to healthy comparison subjects (HC). In all groups, we tested direct learning of associations between cues and reward vs. loss outcomes, as well as generalization of learning to novel choice options.

RESULTS

We found no differences between the three groups in the direct learning of stimuli with their outcomes: all subjects demonstrated intact stimulus-response learning by choosing rewarding options and avoiding negative ones. However, OCD subjects were less likely to generalize from rewards than either the SAD or HC groups, and this impairment was not found for losses. Additionally, greater deficits in reward generalization were correlated with severity of threat estimation, as measured by a subscale of the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire, both within OCD and across all groups.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings suggest that a compromised ability to generalize from rewarding events may impede adaptive behavior in OCD and in those susceptible to high estimation of threat.

Danger Changes the Way the Mammalian Brain Stores Information About Innocuous Events: A Study of Sensory Preconditioning in Rats

The amygdala is a critical substrate for learning about cues that signal danger. Less is known about its role in processing innocuous or background information. The present study addressed this question using a sensory preconditioning protocol in male rats. In each experiment, rats were exposed to pairings of two innocuous stimuli in stage 1, S2 and S1, and then to pairings of S1 and shock in stage 2. As a consequence of this training, control rats displayed defensive reactions (freezing) when tested with both S2 and S1. The freezing to S2 is a product of two associations formed in training: an S2-S1 association in stage 1 and an S1-shock association in stage 2. We examined the roles of two medial temporal lobe (MTL) structures in consolidation of the S2-S1 association: the perirhinal cortex (PRh) and basolateral complex of the amygdala (BLA). When the S2-S1 association formed in a safe context, its consolidation required neuronal activity in the PRh (but not BLA), including activation of AMPA receptors and MAPK signaling. In contrast, when the S2-S1 association formed in a dangerous context, or when the context was rendered dangerous immediately after the association had formed, its consolidation required neuronal activity in the BLA (but not PRh), including activation of AMPA receptors and MAPK signaling. These roles of the PRh and BLA show that danger changes the way the mammalian brain stores information about innocuous events. They are discussed with respect to danger-induced changes in stimulus processing.

Preconditioning of Spatial and Auditory Cues: Roles of the Hippocampus, Frontal Cortex, and Cue-Directed Attention

Loss of function of the hippocampus or frontal cortex is associated with reduced performance on memory tasks, in which subjects are incidentally exposed to cues at specific places in the environment and are subsequently asked to recollect the location at which the cue was experienced. Here, we examined the roles of the rodent hippocampus and frontal cortex in cue-directed attention during encoding of memory for the location of a single incidentally experienced cue. During a spatial sensory preconditioning task, rats explored an elevated platform while an auditory cue was incidentally presented at one corner. The opposite corner acted as an unpaired control location. The rats demonstrated recollection of location by avoiding the paired corner after the auditory cue was in turn paired with shock. Damage to either the dorsal hippocampus or the frontal cortex impaired this memory ability. However, we also found that hippocampal lesions enhanced attention directed towards the cue during the encoding phase, while frontal cortical lesions reduced cue-directed attention. These results suggest that the deficit in spatial sensory preconditioning caused by frontal cortical damage may be mediated by inattention to the location of cues during the latent encoding phase, while deficits following hippocampal damage must be related to other mechanisms such as generation of neural plasticity.

Transitions in the temporal parameters of sensory preconditioning during infancy

Sensory preconditioning (SPC) is a form of latent learning in which preexposure to co-occurring neutral stimuli (S1 -S2 ) permits subsequent learning to be transferred from one stimulus (S1 ) to the other (S2 ). We examined whether human infants exhibit developmental transitions in the temporal parameters of SPC by manipulating the preexposure regimen. Infants received simultaneous or sequential preexposure to puppets S1 and S2 (Days 1-2); saw target actions modeled on S1 (Day 3); and were tested for deferred imitation with S2 (Day 4). Although 6-, 9-, and 12-month-olds associated the puppets, there was a shift in the effective regimen from simultaneous to sequential preexposure-similar to prior findings with rat pups (Experiment 1). Experiment 2 revealed that human infants potentially exhibit another transition in SPC at 15 and 18 months of age. We consider the roles of ontogenetic shifts in infants' ecological niche, selective attention, and unitization in developmental transitions in SPC.

Relational associative learning induces cross-modal plasticity in early visual cortex

Neurobiological theories of memory posit that the neocortex is a storage site of declarative memories, a hallmark of which is the association of two arbitrary neutral stimuli. Early sensory cortices, once assumed uninvolved in memory storage, recently have been implicated in associations between neutral stimuli and reward or punishment. We asked whether links between neutral stimuli also could be formed in early visual or auditory cortices. Rats were presented with a tone paired with a light using a sensory preconditioning paradigm that enabled later evaluation of successful association. Subjects that acquired this association developed enhanced sound evoked potentials in their primary and secondary visual cortices. Laminar recordings localized this potential to cortical Layers 5 and 6. A similar pattern of activation was elicited by microstimulation of primary auditory cortex in the same subjects, consistent with a cortico-cortical substrate of association. Thus, early sensory cortex has the capability to form neutral stimulus associations. This plasticity may constitute a declarative memory trace between sensory cortices.

Nucleus accumbens core neurons encode value-independent associations necessary for sensory preconditioning

Reinforcement-based learning models predict that the strength of association between cues and outcomes is driven by aspects of outcome value. However, animals routinely make associations between contingent stimuli in the world, even if those associations hold no value to the organism. At the neural level, the nucleus accumbens (NAc) is known to encode associative information, but it is not known whether this encoding is specific for value-based information (consistent with reinforcement-based models) or if the NAc additionally plays a more general role in forming predictive associations, independent of outcome value. To test this, we employed a sensory preconditioning (SPC) task where rats initially (Preconditioning) received either contingent pairings of 2 neutral stimuli (e.g., tone [A] and light [X]; "Paired"), or random noncontingent presentations ("Unpaired"). After cue X was subsequently conditioned with food (First-Order Conditioning), the effect of preconditioning was assessed in Phase 3 (Test) by presentations of cue A alone. Electrophysiological recordings from the NAc core showed significant increases in phasic encoding for the stimuli in the Paired (but not Unpaired) condition as well as during test. Further, these effects were only seen in Paired rats that showed successful behavior during test (Good Learners), but not those who did not (Poor Learners) or Unpaired controls. These findings reveal a role for the NAc in the encoding of associative contingencies independent of value, and suggest that this structure also plays a more general role in forming associations necessary for predictive behavior.

Neural correlates of sensory preconditioning: a preliminary fMRI investigation

Sensory preconditioning (SPC; also known as behaviorally silent learning) consists of a combination of two neutral stimuli, none of which elicits an unconditional response. After one of them is later paired with an unconditional stimulus (US), the other neutral stimulus also yields a conditional response although it has never been paired with the US. In this study, an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigm was used to specify brain regions involved in SPC. The results demonstrated that SPC was associated with significant changes in activity of several regions, notably, the left amygdala, the left hippocampus, the bilateral thalamus, the bilateral medial globus pallidus, the bilateral cerebellum, the bilateral premotor cortex, and the bilateral middle frontal gyrus. This is a first effort to use fMRI to examine the effects of SPC on brain activation. Our data suggest that there is a distributed network of structures involved in SPC including both cortical and subcortical regions, therefore add to our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying the ability to associative learning.

Disruption of model-based behavior and learning by cocaine self-administration in rats

RATIONALE

Addiction is characterized by maladaptive decision-making, in which individuals seem unable to use adverse outcomes to modify their behavior. Adverse outcomes are often infrequent, delayed, and even rare events, especially when compared to the reliable rewarding drug-associated outcomes. As a result, recognizing and using information about their occurrence put a premium on the operation of so-called model-based systems of behavioral control, which allow one to mentally simulate outcomes of different courses of action based on knowledge of the underlying associative structure of the environment. This suggests that addiction may reflect, in part, drug-induced dysfunction in these systems. Here, we tested this hypothesis.

OBJECTIVES

This study aimed to test whether cocaine causes deficits in model-based behavior and learning independent of requirements for response inhibition or perception of costs or punishment.

METHODS

We trained rats to self-administer sucrose or cocaine for 2 weeks. Four weeks later, the rats began training on a sensory preconditioning and inferred value blocking task. Like devaluation, normal performance on this task requires representations of the underlying task structure; however, unlike devaluation, it does not require either response inhibition or adapting behavior to reflect aversive outcomes.

RESULTS

Rats trained to self-administer cocaine failed to show conditioned responding or blocking to the preconditioned cue. These deficits were not observed in sucrose-trained rats nor did they reflect any changes in responding to cues paired directly with reward.

CONCLUSIONS

These results imply that cocaine disrupts the operation of neural circuits that mediate model-based behavioral control.

Infant long-term memory for associations formed during mere exposure

We previously found that young infants spontaneously associate stimuli that they merely see together. Using a sensory preconditioning paradigm with 6- and 9-month-olds, we asked how long such associations remain latent before being forgotten and what exposure conditions affect their persistence. Groups were preexposed to two puppets for 1h/day for 2 days, 1h on 1 day, or 1h on 1 day in two sessions; 1-27 days later, target actions were modeled on one puppet, and infants were tested with the other puppet 1 day later. The longest delay after which infants imitated the actions on the other puppet defined how long they remembered the association. The data revealed that the preexposure regimen determined retention. Regardless of exposure time, both ages remembered the association longer after two sessions, and younger infants remembered longer than older infants--for 4 weeks--after two 30-min sessions on 1 day.

Why a neuromaturational model of memory fails: exuberant learning in early infancy

The characteristics of memory in infants and adults seem vastly different. The neuromaturational model attributes these differences to an ontogenetic change in the basic memory process, namely, to the hierarchical maturation of two distinct memory systems. The early-maturing (implicit) system is functional during the first third of infancy and supports the gradual learning of perceptual and motor skills; the late-maturing (explicit) system supports representations of contextually specific events, relationships, and associations. An alternative model holds that the basic memory process does not change, but what infants and adults select to encode for learning does. This ontogenetic change in selective attention has been mistaken for an ontogenetic shift in the basic memory process. Over the last 25 years, evidence from transfer studies with developing rats and human infants has revealed that the first third of infancy is actually a period of exuberant learning that ends, not coincidentally, at the same age that the late-maturing memory system presumably emerges. This article reviews data from recent studies of sensory preconditioning, potentiation, associative chains, and transitive inference with human infants that support this conclusion-data for which the neuromaturational model cannot account. Fast mapping is a general learning mechanism that accounts for this evidence.

Multiple memory systems are unnecessary to account for infant memory development: an ecological model

How the memory of adults evolves from the memory abilities of infants is a central problem in cognitive development. The popular solution holds that the multiple memory systems of adults mature at different rates during infancy. The early-maturing system (implicit or nondeclarative memory) functions automatically from birth, whereas the late-maturing system (explicit or declarative memory) functions intentionally, with awareness, from late in the first year. Data are presented from research on deferred imitation, sensory preconditioning, potentiation, and context for which this solution cannot account and present an alternative model that eschews the need for multiple memory systems. The ecological model of infant memory development (N. E. Spear, 1984) holds that members of all species are perfectly adapted to their niche at each point in ontogeny and exhibit effective, evolutionarily selected solutions to whatever challenges each new niche poses. Because adults and infants occupy different niches, what they perceive, learn, and remember about the same event differs, but their raw capacity to learn and remember does not.

Preserved sensitivity to outcome value after lesions of the basolateral amygdala

Recent work (Blundell et al., 2001; Balleine et al., 2003) has suggested that the basolateral region of the amygdala (BLA) is important in the representation of the sensory and incentive aspects of motivationally significant events. In common with other theories of function of the BLA, this predicts that lesions of the BLA will interfere with reinforcer devaluation after appetitive Pavlovian or instrumental conditioning. However, this hypothesis also predicts that BLA lesions will be without effect on postconditioning changes in reinforcer value if initial learning is only about the sensory aspects of otherwise neutral events. This interpretation is supported by evidence for significant detrimental effects of BLA lesions on reinforcer devaluation in a Pavlovian autoshaping procedure, but no effect of postconditioning devaluation using a sensory preconditioning procedure. These results demonstrate that animals with BLA lesions can remain sensitive to post-training changes in the motivational value of outcomes.