Intentional action and limitation of personal autonomy. Do restrictions of action selection decrease the sense of agency?

Choice effects on temporal binding of action and outcomes: Examining the role of outcome focus and measures of time interval estimation

The ability to make one's own choices is vital to the experience of intentional behavior. Such agency experiences are reflected in the perceptual compression of time between actions and resulting outcomes. Whereas some studies show that choice limitations weaken temporal binding, other studies do not find such an effect. Reviewing the literature, we noted two potential factors that may moderate choice limitation effects on temporal binding: (a) the extent to which individuals represent their actions in terms of the consequences they produce; and (b) the response mode of the time interval estimation measurement where participants report numbers or use a slider to indicate time intervals. Testing these conceptual and methodological factors in two separate experiments yielded clear effects of choice limitation on temporal binding but no clear moderator role of the two factors. Interestingly, overall analyses showed that the choice limitation effect gradually vanishes over time.

Obedience induces agentic shifts by increasing the perceived time between own action and results

The concept of 'agentic shift,' introduced by Stanley Milgram, suggests that obedience reduces the sense of agency. In a recent study simulating the seminal work of Milgram, Caspar et al., 2016 examined this idea in a financial harm context. They demonstrated that, compared to situations of voluntary decision-making, coercion increases the perceived time between action and outcomes-suggested as a marker of diminished agency. Importantly, in this study, participants were agent and victim (relying on a reciprocal relationship) and first experienced free choices, followed by forced choices. This diverts from Milgram's original study, where participants were no victims but only agents who were forced to harm. The current study replicates and extends findings from the 2016 study by Caspar et al. in an online meeting setting, where participants served only as agents-similar to the original Milgram studies-while controlling the order of free and forced choice blocks. Substantiating earlier findings, forced choices reduced temporal binding (increased time interval estimations) compared to free choices independent of the order. We briefly discuss the importance of replications of coercion effects on the sense of agency, particularly in online decision-making settings.

Temporal binding and sense of agency in major depression

Background

Alterations in the experience of controlling oneself and one's environment are of high relevance to understanding the psychopathology of depression. This study investigated the relationship between Temporal Binding for action-event sequences, sense of agency, self-efficacy and symptom severity in Major Depressive Disorder.

Method

We employed the Sense of Agency Scale (SoAS) and the General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSE) to assess explicit Sense of Agency and self-efficacy in a group of 42 persons diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) [20 identifying as female, 19 as male; mean age 37.8 years (± 13.3)] and 40 control persons without a psychiatric diagnosis (CG) [22 identifying as female, 20 as male; mean age 38.0 years ( ± 13.3)]. Depressive symptom severity was measured using the BDI-II. We additionally performed a temporal binding paradigm as a potential correlate to Sense of Agency. Participants partook in a time estimation task judging three intervals (250ms, 450ms, 650ms) while either observing or causing stimulus presentations. The underestimation of intervals following intentional actions causing stimulus presentations (compared to merely observing the stimulus presentation) is interpreted as temporal binding.

Results

SoAS scores demonstrated an inverse correlation with depressive symptoms (CG: p=.032, R2=.113; MDD: p<.001, R2=.260) and a positive correlation with GSE scores (CG: p<.001, R2=.379; MDD: p<.001, R2=.254). We found distinct differences in temporal binding between healthy participants and the Major Depressive Disorder group without significant correlation between temporal binding and the SoAS or GSE scores. The data suggest group differences in time estimation particular pertaining to time intervals involving intentional action and increasingly complex multisensory stimuli.

Discussion

We investigated parameters of subjective control, namely Sense of Agency and Self Efficacy. Here, we were able to reveal their inverse relationship with depressive symptoms in patients with major depressive disorder, highlighting a profound experience of loss of control with increasing symptom load. Deficits in experiencing control, particularly involving intentional motor actions (and more complex multisensory stimuli), appear to be more pronounced in Major Depressive Disorder, involving not only negative self-efficacy expectations but also an altered Sense of Agency and temporal binding. Temporal binding and SoAS scores did not correlate, adding to the growing evidence that the two measures may not be directly related. We propose that future research be directed at this contiguous relationship between Sense of Agency and Self Efficacy in Major Depressive Disorder.

Eye did this! Sense of agency in eye movements

This study investigates the sense of agency (SoA) for saccades with implicit and explicit agency measures. In two eye tracking experiments, participants moved their eyes towards on-screen stimuli that subsequently changed color. Participants then either reproduced the temporal interval between saccade and color-change (Experiment 1) or reported the time points of these events with an auditory Libet clock (Experiment 2) to measure temporal binding effects as implicit indices of SoA. Participants were either made to believe to exert control over the color change or not (agency manipulation). Explicit ratings indicated that the manipulation of causal beliefs and hence agency was successful. However, temporal binding was only evident for caused effects, and only when a sufficiently sensitive procedure was used (auditory Libet clock). This suggests a feebler connection between temporal binding and SoA than previously proposed. The results also provide evidence for a relatively fast acquisition of sense of agency for previously never experienced types of action-effect associations. This indicates that the underlying processes of action control may be rooted in more intricate and adaptable cognitive models than previously thought. Oculomotor SoA as addressed in the present study presumably represents an important cognitive foundation of gaze-based social interaction (social sense of agency) or gaze-based human-machine interaction scenarios. PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: In this study, sense of agency for eye movements in the non-social domain is investigated in detail, using both explicit and implicit measures. Therefore, it offers novel and specific insights into comprehending sense of agency concerning effects induced by eye movements, as well as broader insights into agency pertaining to entirely newly acquired types of action-effect associations. Oculomotor sense of agency presumably represents an important cognitive foundation of gaze-based social interaction (social agency) or gaze-based human-machine interaction scenarios. Due to peculiarities of the oculomotor domain such as the varying degree of volitional control, eye movements could provide new information regarding more general theories of sense of agency in future research.

A spatial-attentional mechanism underlies action-related distortions of time judgment

Temporal binding has been understood as an illusion in timing judgment. When an action triggers an outcome (e.g. a sound) after a brief delay, the action is reported to occur later than if the outcome does not occur, and the outcome is reported to occur earlier than a similar outcome not caused by an action. We show here that an attention mechanism underlies the seeming illusion of timing judgment. In one method, participants watch a rotating clock hand and report event times by noting the clock hand position when the event occurs. We find that visual spatial attention is critically involved in shaping event time reports made in this way. This occurs because action and outcome events result in shifts of attention around the clock rim, thereby biasing the perceived location of the clock hand. Using a probe detection task to measure attention, we show a difference in the distribution of visual spatial attention between a single-event condition (sound only or action only) and a two-event agency condition (action plus sound). Participants accordingly report the timing of the same event (the sound or the action) differently in the two conditions: spatial attentional shifts masquerading as temporal binding. Furthermore, computational modeling based on the attention measure can reproduce the temporal binding effect. Studies that use time judgment as an implicit marker of voluntary agency should first discount the artefactual changes in event timing reports that actually reflect differences in spatial attention. The study also has important implications for related results in mental chronometry obtained with the clock-like method since Wundt, as attention may well be a critical confounding factor in the interpretation of these studies.

Feelings of responsibility and temporal binding: A comparison of two measures of the sense of agency

Temporal binding refers to a subjective shortening of the interval between an action and its perceptual consequences. Temporal binding has often been used by researchers to indirectly measure participants' sense of agency (SoA), or the subjective sense of causing something to happen. Other studies have proposed links between temporal binding and feelings of moral responsibility. The present study compared subjective interval estimates to feelings of responsibility in a between-subjects design (Exp 1) and a within-subjects design (Exp 2). Participants either estimated the interval between two events (two tones in the passive condition, or a keypress followed by a tone in active conditions) or rated their feeling of responsibility for the tone(s). Manipulations of participant involvement and choice impacted feelings of responsibility more than temporal estimates. Overall, the two dependent variables followed different patterns, suggesting subjective interval estimates may not be a reliable proxy for feelings of responsibility.

Attention and expectation likely underlie temporal binding measured using the Libet Clock

An interesting finding that has emerged in studies of the sense of agency is that of a perceived compression of the temporal interval between actions and the outcomes they produce. This is generally referred to as temporal binding. Although temporal binding has been studied using various paradigms, possibly the most popular of these is the Libet Clock task. The Libet task is also interesting because it suggests that temporal binding can be decomposed into two components, one purportedly relating to actions and the other relating to outcomes. These are termed action binding and outcome binding, respectively. In this article, I focus specifically on temporal binding revealed using the Libet Clock task and propose the idea that attention underpins the action binding effect, while outcome binding, on the other hand, is driven by the effects of expectation.

The pursuit of the end: The effects of action-goal choices on temporal binding

The effect of action choice (whether one can choose their actions freely) on temporal binding (TB), the temporal contraction between a voluntary action and its effect, is controversial. The present study tried to distinguish action-goal choice (whether one could pursue the action-effect freely) from action choice. Experiments 1 and 2 focused on the effect of action-goal choice on TB while the congruency between actions and outcomes was manipulated (i.e., 50% in Experiment 1 and 80% in Experiment 2). Experiment 3 investigated the effect of action choice on TB when the outcome congruency was 80%. Results showed that free and instructed action-goals led to comparable magnitudes of TB while free actions led to a larger TB than instructed actions. Furthermore, the effect of outcome congruency on TB varied by action-goal choices (Experiment 2) but not action choices (Experiment 3). These results demonstrate the potential differences between action choice and action-goal choice.

Distracted to a fault: Attention, actions, and time perception

In the last years, it has become general consensus that actions change our time perception. Performing an action to elicit a specific event seems to lead to a systematic underestimation of the interval between action and effect, a phenomenon termed temporal (or previously intentional) binding. Temporal binding has been closely associated with sense of agency, our perceived control over our actions and our environment, and because of its robust behavioral effects has indeed been widely utilized as an implicit correlate of sense of agency. The most robust and clear temporal binding effects are typically found via Libet clock paradigms. In the present study, we investigate a crucial methodological confound in these paradigms that provides an alternative explanation for temporal binding effects: a redirection of attentional resources in two-event sequences (as in classical operant conditions) versus singular events (as in classical baseline conditions). Our results indicate that binding effects in Libet clock paradigms may be based to a large degree on such attentional processes, irrespective of intention or action-effect sequences. Thus, these findings challenge many of the previously drawn conclusions and interpretations with regard to actions and time perception.

Environmental control of social goals: using Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer to test cue-based pro-self and pro-social outcome responses

A large amount of literature demonstrates that social behaviour can be triggered by environmental cues. A long-standing debate involves the question of whether such stimuli trigger behaviour directly (i.e. habits) or whether these effects mediate goals. As studies on automatic goal pursuit typically use real-world cues that are already associated with the behaviour and potentially the goal, it is impossible to make strong claims about the nature of the effects. In the present paper, we use a paradigm inspired by the Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) literature to examine how the environment can trigger goal-directed behaviour. Building on the essence of pro-self and pro-social motives in humans, two experiments explored the PIT effect when the outcomes were framed in terms of self- versus other-interest. Participants performed actions to earn money for themselves or a charity. Each outcome was linked to a different cue. The results showed that a cue predictive of self-interest outcomes facilitated responses instrumental in gaining the outcome, while such specific PIT effect for other-interest outcomes only emerged when participants were free to donate the money. We briefly discuss these findings reflecting on whether the PIT effect in our paradigm is indeed sensitive to the value of social goals.

Non-motor cues do not generate the perception of self-agency: A critique of cue-integration

How does one know that (s)he is the causal agent of their motor actions? Earlier theories of sense of agency have attributed the capacity for perception of self-agency to the comparator process of the motor-control/action system. However, with the advent of the findings implying a role of non-motor cues (like affective states, beliefs, primed concepts, and social instructions or previews of actions) in the sense of agency literature, the perception of self-agency is hypothesized to be generated even by non-motor cues (based on their relative reliability or weighting estimate); and, this theory is come to be known as the cue-integration of sense of agency. However, the cue-integration theory motivates skepticism about whether it is falsifiable and whether it is plausible that non-motor cues that are sensorily unrelated to typical sensory processes of self-agency have the capacity to produce a perception of self-agency. To substantiate this skepticism, I critically analyze the experimental operationalizations of cue-integration-with the (classic) vicarious agency experiment as a case study-to show that (1) the participants in these experiments are ambiguous about their causal agency over motor actions, (2) thus, these participants resort to reports of self-agency as heuristic judgments (under ambiguity) rather than due to cue-integration per se, and (3) there might not have occurred cue-integration based self-agency reports if these experimental operationalizations had eliminated ambiguity about the causal agency. Thus, I conclude that the reports of self-agency (observed in typical non-motor cues based cue-integration experiments) are not instances of perceptual effect-that are hypothesized to be produced by non-motor cues-but are of heuristic judgment effect.

Exploring the relationship between perceived Action-Outcome distance and Agency: Evidence from temporal binding

Intentional actions are usually accompanied by a sense of agency (SoA), along with a perceived shortening of action-outcome intervals known as the intentional binding (IB) effect. This is at least partly associated with the perceived strength of action-outcome relationships, which have been described in terms of distance (e.g., a 'distancing effect'). Given that actions in the modern world are increasingly distant from their outcomes, the current study aimed to explore the effect of perceived spatial distance on the strength of IB. Participants voluntarily triggered, or passively observed, a circle on a background that was either flat or appeared three-dimensional, and estimated action-outcome delays. Depth cues modified the circle's perceived distance while the circle itself did not change. When viewed on a forced-perspective background, interval estimates increased with apparent distance, but only when outcomes were caused by intentional actions. This suggests that agency is reduced for outcomes that appear further away.

Studying the sense of agency in the absence of motor movement: an investigation into temporal binding of tactile sensations and auditory effects

People form coherent representations of goal-directed actions. Such agency experiences of intentional action are reflected by a shift in temporal perception: self-generated motor movements and subsequent sensory effects are perceived to occur closer together in time—a phenomenon termed intentional binding. Building on recent research suggesting that temporal binding occurs without intentionally performing actions, we further examined whether such perceptual compression occurs when motor action is fully absent. In three experiments, we used a novel sensory-based adaptation of the Libet clock paradigm to assess how a brief tactile sensation on the index finger and a resulting auditory stimulus perceptually bind together in time. Findings revealed robust temporal repulsion (instead of binding) between tactile sensation and auditory effect. Temporal repulsion was attenuated when participants could anticipate the identity and temporal onset (two crucial components of intentional action) of the tactile sensation. These findings are briefly discussed in the context of differences between intentional movement and anticipated bodily sensations in shaping action coherence and agentic experiences.