How the environment evokes actions that lead to different goals: the role of object multi-functionality in pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer

Research shows that stimuli in the environment can trigger behavior via the activation of goal representations. This process can be tested in the Pavlovian-to-Instrumental Transfer (PIT) paradigm, where stimuli can only affect behavior through the activation of the representation of its desired outcome (i.e., the PIT effect). Previous research has demonstrated that the PIT effect is stronger when the goal is more desirable. While this research only looked at actions that have single outcomes (e.g., obtaining a snack to satisfy appetite), in the present paper, we reason that actions that are instrumental in obtaining outcomes that are desirable in multiple ways (e.g., obtaining a snack to satisfy one's appetite, giving it to a friend, trading it for money) should produce stronger PIT effects. In two experiments, participants learned to perform left and right key presses to earn a snack, either framed as having a single function or multiple functions. Participants also learned to associate the two differently framed snacks with two cues. In a PIT test, they were required to press the keys as fast as possible upon exposure to the cues (i.e., the PIT effect). We found that cues associated with the multi-functional snack facilitated the actions that earned those snacks before, while cues associated with the single-functional snack did not facilitate such actions. We discuss these findings in the context of research on free choice and personal autonomy and how people appreciate the multi-functional nature of their goal-directed behavior in the environment.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04612-2.

Developing habit-based health behaviour change interventions: twenty-one questions to guide future research

OBJECTIVE

Habitual behaviours are triggered automatically, with little conscious forethought. Theory suggests that making healthy behaviours habitual, and breaking the habits that underpin many ingrained unhealthy behaviours, promotes long-term behaviour change. This has prompted interest in incorporating habit formation and disruption strategies into behaviour change interventions. Yet, notable research gaps limit understanding of how to harness habit to change real-world behaviours.

METHODS

Discussions among health psychology researchers and practitioners, at the 2019 European Health Psychology Society 'Synergy Expert Meeting', generated pertinent questions to guide further research into habit and health behaviour.

RESULTS

In line with the four topics discussed at the meeting, 21 questions were identified, concerning: how habit manifests in health behaviour (3 questions); how to form healthy habits (5 questions); how to break unhealthy habits (4 questions); and how to develop and evaluate habit-based behaviour change interventions (9 questions).

CONCLUSIONS

While our questions transcend research contexts, accumulating knowledge across studies of specific health behaviours, settings, and populations will build a broader understanding of habit change principles and how they may be embedded into interventions. We encourage researchers and practitioners to prioritise these questions, to further theory and evidence around how to create long-lasting health behaviour change.

Environmental control of social goals: using Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer to test cue-based pro-self and pro-social outcome responses

A large amount of literature demonstrates that social behaviour can be triggered by environmental cues. A long-standing debate involves the question of whether such stimuli trigger behaviour directly (i.e. habits) or whether these effects mediate goals. As studies on automatic goal pursuit typically use real-world cues that are already associated with the behaviour and potentially the goal, it is impossible to make strong claims about the nature of the effects. In the present paper, we use a paradigm inspired by the Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) literature to examine how the environment can trigger goal-directed behaviour. Building on the essence of pro-self and pro-social motives in humans, two experiments explored the PIT effect when the outcomes were framed in terms of self- versus other-interest. Participants performed actions to earn money for themselves or a charity. Each outcome was linked to a different cue. The results showed that a cue predictive of self-interest outcomes facilitated responses instrumental in gaining the outcome, while such specific PIT effect for other-interest outcomes only emerged when participants were free to donate the money. We briefly discuss these findings reflecting on whether the PIT effect in our paradigm is indeed sensitive to the value of social goals.

Examining mechanistic explanations for ideomotor effects

Ideomotor (IM) theory provides a popular mechanistic account for understanding how goal-directed action can be learned and instigated. That is, when associations between actions and outcomes have been established in memory, the perception or thought of the outcome could automatically activate the associated action. Whereas a sizable literature provides evidence in line with this account, it does not successfully exclude alternative explanations in terms of propositions based on causal inferences. In the present paper, we present an online IM paradigm, in which learning and testing occurs on the same trials. In line with recent findings, we demonstrate that IM effects can emerge within a couple of trials, but also that people can update learned action-outcome associations immediately when a new mapping of outcomes on actions is introduced, without any switch costs. Together, this suggests that IM effects may be driven by propositions about causal relations, rather than bidirectional associations stored in memory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Studying the sense of agency in the absence of motor movement: an investigation into temporal binding of tactile sensations and auditory effects

People form coherent representations of goal-directed actions. Such agency experiences of intentional action are reflected by a shift in temporal perception: self-generated motor movements and subsequent sensory effects are perceived to occur closer together in time—a phenomenon termed intentional binding. Building on recent research suggesting that temporal binding occurs without intentionally performing actions, we further examined whether such perceptual compression occurs when motor action is fully absent. In three experiments, we used a novel sensory-based adaptation of the Libet clock paradigm to assess how a brief tactile sensation on the index finger and a resulting auditory stimulus perceptually bind together in time. Findings revealed robust temporal repulsion (instead of binding) between tactile sensation and auditory effect. Temporal repulsion was attenuated when participants could anticipate the identity and temporal onset (two crucial components of intentional action) of the tactile sensation. These findings are briefly discussed in the context of differences between intentional movement and anticipated bodily sensations in shaping action coherence and agentic experiences.

Intentional action and limitation of personal autonomy. Do restrictions of action selection decrease the sense of agency?

The experience of being an intentional agent is a key component of personal autonomy. Here, we tested how undermining intentional action affects the sense of agency as indexed by intentional binding. In three experiments using the Libet clock paradigm, participants judged the onset of their action (key presses) and resulting effect (auditory stimuli) under conditions of no, partial, or full autonomy over selecting and timing their actions. In all cases, we observed a moderate to strong intentional binding effect. However, we found no evidence for an influence of personal autonomy on intentional binding. These findings thus suggest that being unable to decide how and when to perform actions does not affect the perceived temporal binding between action and effect, a phenomenon suggested to be associated with the implicit sense of agency. We discuss the implications of our findings in the context of research on personal autonomy and goal-directed behavior.

Biased preferences through exploitation: How initial biases are consolidated in reward-rich environments

In the current article, we test the prediction that an initial bias favoring 1 of 2 equally rewarding options-either based on a genuine contingency or a pseudocontingency in a small sample of initial observations-can survive over an extended period of further sampling from both options, when the reward structure fosters exploitation. Specifically, we argue and demonstrate that in reward-rich environments where two options predominantly-but equally frequently-yield positive outcomes, the initial bias should be upheld because exploitation of the allegedly superior option reinforces the biased preference. In contrast, in reward-impoverished environments, where both options yield predominantly negative outcomes, initial biases can be expected to be eradicated through exploration, which increases the chance of recognizing the equality of the initially nonpreferred option. In 3 experiments, initial evidence in a guided-sampling phase was set up for participants to perceive an actual contingency (Experiment 1) or infer a pseudocontingency (Experiment 2a and b) that made 1 option look more rewarding. In a subsequent free-sampling phase this led to a sustained bias toward this option when the environment contained mostly positive but not when it contained mostly negative outcomes. We argue that biased sampling in reward-rich environments could be responsible for false beliefs about the outcomes of behavioral options, and as such could be relevant to a broad range of topics including social interactions or health contexts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Ideomotor Action: Evidence for Automaticity in Learning, but Not Execution

Human habits are widely assumed to result from stimulus-response (S-R) associations that are formed if one frequently and consistently does the same thing in the same situation. According to Ideomotor Theory, a distinct but similar process could lead to response-outcome (R-O) associations if responses frequently and consistently produce the same outcomes. This process is assumed to occur spontaneously, and because these associations can operate in a bidirectional manner, merely perceiving or thinking of an outcome should automatically activate the associated action. In the current paper we test this automaticity feature of ideomotor learning. In four experiments, participants completed the same learning phase in which they could acquire associations, and were either explicitly informed about the contingency between actions and outcomes, or not. Automatic action selection and initiation were investigated using a free-choice task in Experiment 1 and forced-choice tasks in Experiment 2, 3a, and 3b. An ideomotor effect was only obtained in the free-choice, but not convincingly in the forced-choice tasks. Together, this suggests that action-outcome relations can be learned spontaneously, but that there may be limits to the automaticity of the ideomotor effect.

Studying Human Habits in Societal Context: Examining Support for a Basic Stimulus–Response Mechanism

Human habits are considered to be an important root of societal problems. The significance of habits has been demonstrated for a variety of behaviors in different domains, such as work, transportation, health, and ecology, suggesting that habits have a pervasive impact on human life. Studying and changing habits in societal context requires a broad view of behavior, which poses a challenge for applying basic models to complex human habits. We address the conceptualization and operationalization of habits in the current literature and note that claims about the role of habits in societal context rarely agree with the basic definition of habits as goal-independent behavior. We consider future directions that are important for making progress in the study of habit change in societal context.

Adaptive control of human action: the role of outcome representations and reward signals

The present paper aims to advance the understanding of the control of human behavior by integrating two lines of literature that so far have led separate lives. First, one line of literature is concerned with the ideomotor principle of human behavior, according to which actions are represented in terms of their outcomes. The second line of literature mainly considers the role of reward signals in adaptive control. Here, we offer a combined perspective on how outcome representations and reward signals work together to modulate adaptive control processes. We propose that reward signals signify the value of outcome representations and facilitate the recruitment of control resources in situations where behavior needs to be maintained or adapted to attain the represented outcome. We discuss recent research demonstrating how adaptive control of goal-directed behavior may emerge when outcome representations are co-activated with positive reward signals.

Preparing and motivating behavior outside of awareness

The mere activation of the idea of a behavioral act moves the human body without the person consciously deciding to take action. In an experiment, we showed that people subliminally primed with the concept of exertion were faster to squeeze a hand grip forcefully but expended more effort when the subliminal primes were directly accompanied by consciously visible positive stimuli. These findings demonstrate the human capacity to rely on mental processes in preparing and motivating behavior outside of awareness.