Subjective inflation: phenomenology's get-rich-quick scheme

A bias in transsaccadic perception of spatial frequency changes

Visual processing differs between the foveal and peripheral visual field. These differences can lead to different appearances of objects in the periphery and the fovea, posing a challenge to perception across saccades. Differences in the appearance of visual features between the peripheral and foveal visual field may bias change discrimination across saccades. Previously it has been reported that spatial frequency (SF) appears higher in the periphery compared to the fovea (Davis et al., 1987). In this study, we investigated the visual appearance of SF before and after a saccade and the discrimination of SF changes during saccades. In addition, we tested the contributions of pre- and postsaccadic information to change discrimination performance. In the first experiment, we found no differences in the appearance of SF before and after a saccade. However, participants showed a clear bias to report SF increases. Interestingly, a 200-ms postsaccadic blank improved the precision of the responses but did not affect the bias. In the second experiment, participants showed lower thresholds for SF increases than for decreases, suggesting that the bias in the first experiment was not just a response bias. Finally, we asked participants to discriminate the SF of stimuli presented before a saccade. Thresholds in the presaccadic discrimination task were lower than in the change discrimination task, suggesting that transsaccadic change discrimination is not merely limited by presaccadic discrimination in the periphery. The change direction bias might stem from more effective masking or overwriting of the presaccadic stimulus by the postsaccadic low SF stimulus.

Familiarity Alters the Bandwidth of Perceptual Awareness

Results from paradigms like change blindness and inattentional blindness indicate that observers are unaware of numerous aspects of the visual world. However, intuition suggests that perceptual experience is richer than these results indicate. Why does it feel like we see so much when the data suggests we see so little? One possibility stems from the fact that experimental studies always present observers with stimuli that they have never seen before. Meanwhile, when forming intuitions about perceptual experience, observers reflect on their experiences with scenes with which they are highly familiar (e.g., their office). Does prior experience with a scene change the bandwidth of perceptual awareness? Here, we asked if observers were better at noticing alterations to the periphery in familiar scenes compared with unfamiliar scenes. We found that observers noticed changes to the periphery more frequently with familiar stimuli. Signal detection theoretic analyses revealed that when observers are unfamiliar with a stimulus, they are less sensitive at noticing (d') and are more conservative in their response criterion (c). Taken together, these results suggest that prior knowledge expands the bandwidth of perceptual awareness. It should be stressed that these results challenge the widely held idea that prior knowledge fills in perception. Overall, these findings highlight how prior knowledge plays an important role in determining the limits of perceptual experience and is an important factor to consider when attempting to reconcile the tension between empirical observation and personal introspection.

Peripheral vision is mainly for looking rather than seeing

Vision includes looking and seeing. Looking, mainly via gaze shifts, selects a fraction of visual input information for passage through the brain's information bottleneck. The selected input is placed within the attentional spotlight, typically in the central visual field. Seeing decodes, i.e., recognizes and discriminates, the selected inputs. Hence, peripheral vision should be mainly devoted to looking, in particular, deciding where to shift the gaze. Looking is often guided exogenously by a saliency map created by the primary visual cortex (V1), and can be effective with no seeing and limited awareness. In seeing, peripheral vision not only suffers from poor spatial resolution, but is also subject to crowding and is more vulnerable to illusions by misleading, ambiguous, and impoverished visual inputs. Central vision, mainly for seeing, enjoys the top-down feedback that aids seeing in light of the bottleneck which is hypothesized to starts from V1 to higher areas. This feedback queries for additional information from lower visual cortical areas such as V1 for ongoing recognition. Peripheral vision is deficient in this feedback according to the Central-peripheral Dichotomy (CPD) theory. The saccades engendered by peripheral vision allows looking to combine with seeing to give human observers the impression of seeing the whole scene clearly despite inattentional blindness.

Quantifying empirical support for theories of consciousness: a tentative methodological framework

Understanding consciousness is central to understanding human nature. We have competing theories of consciousness. In interdisciplinary consciousness studies most believe that consciousness can be naturalized (i.e., consciousness depends in some substantial way on processes in - or states of - the brain). For roughly two decades, proponents of almost every theory have focused on collecting empirical support for their preferred theory, on the tacit assumption that empirical evidence will resolve the debates. Yet, it remains unclear how empirical evidence can do this in practice. Here I address this issue by offering (a sketch of) a methodology to quantify the divergent sets of empirical support proposed in favor of extant theories of consciousness. This in turn forms the foundation for a process of inference to the best explanation inspired by Bayesian confirmation theory. In interdisciplinary consciousness studies we are blessed with an abundance of theories, but we have reached a point where, going forward, it would be beneficial to focus on the most promising ones. Methods for assessment and comparison are necessary to identify which those are. While future refinement is likely, the methodology for assessment and comparison proposed here is a first step toward a novel way of approaching this through a quantification of empirical support for theories of consciousness.

How to get rich from inflation

We seem to have rich experience across our visual field. Yet we are surprisingly poor at tasks involving the periphery and low spatial attention. Recently, Lau and collaborators have argued that a phenomenon known as "subjective inflation" allows us to reconcile these phenomena. I show inflation is consistent with multiple interpretations, with starkly different consequences for richness and for theories of consciousness more broadly. What's more, we have only weak reasons favouring any of these interpretations over the others. I provisionally argue for an interpretation on which subjective experience is genuinely rich, but (in peripheral/unattended areas) unreliable as a guide to the external world. The main challenge for this view is that it appears to imply that experience in the periphery is not just unreliable but unstable. However, I argue that this consequence, while initially appearing unintuitive, is in fact plausible.

Partial blindness: Visual experience is not rich, but not sparse

Is our perceptual experience constrained by an information bottleneck (i.e., the limited capacity for cognitive access), and if so, how? To answer these questions, we investigated observers' perceptual resolution for an individual face when they saw either a single face or multiple faces simultaneously. We characterized perceptual resolution by measuring how accurately observers detected the degradation of a face. In two experiments, we found that the resolution of perception decreased when seeing multiple faces compared to when seeing a single face, which mainly resulted from the neglect of degradation. Importantly, this degradation neglect was based on partial blindness rather than complete blindness to a face, indicating that perceptual experience is limited by an information bottleneck as a form of partial blindness to an individual item. Together, our findings suggest that perceptual experience at a glance might be sparser than retinal resolution or perceptual resolution measured under conditions where the target stimulus is the sole focus of attention; however, it might be richer than a small handful of items.

The moment of awareness influences the content of awareness in orientation repulsion

Through the neurally evolving process of dynamic contextual modulation of perceptual contents, it remains unclear how the content of awareness is determined. Here we quantified the visual illusion of orientation repulsion, wherein the target appears tilted against the surrounding's orientation, and examined whether its extent changed when the target awareness was quickened by a preceding flanker. Independently of spatial cueing, repulsion was reduced when the flanker preceded the target by 100 ms compared with when they appeared simultaneously. We confirmed that the preceding flanker quickened the awareness of a nearby target relative to distant ones by 40 ms. Furthermore, the preceding flanker that was greater than 7 degrees away from the target still evoked such reduction of repulsion. These findings imply that the content of awareness is determined by the temporal interaction of two distinct processes: one controls the moment of awareness, and the other represents the perceptual content.

Confidence in consciousness research

To study (un)conscious perception and test hypotheses about consciousness, researchers need procedures for determining whether subjects consciously perceive stimuli or not. This article is an introduction to a family of procedures called "confidence-based procedures," which consist in interpreting metacognitive indicators as indicators of consciousness. I assess the validity and accuracy of these procedures, and answer a series of common objections to their use in consciousness research. I conclude that confidence-based procedures are valid for assessing consciousness, and, in most cases, accurate enough for our practical and scientific purposes. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Perception and Psychophysics Philosophy > Consciousness.

Underestimation of the number of hidden objects

The perceptual representation of our environment does not only involve what we actually can see, but also inferences about what is hidden from our sight. For example, in amodal completion, simple contours or surfaces are filled-in behind occluding objects allowing for a complete representation. This is important for many everyday tasks, such as visual search, foraging, and object handling. Although there is support for completion of simple patterns from behavioral and neurophysiological studies, it is unclear if these mechanisms extend to complex, irregular patterns. Here, we show that the number of hidden objects on partially occluded surfaces is underestimated. Observers did not consider accurately the number of visible objects and the proportion of occlusion to infer the number of hidden objects, although these quantities were perceived accurately and reliably. However, visible objects were not simply ignored: estimations of hidden objects increased when the visible objects formed a line across the occluder and decreased when the visible objects formed a line outside of the occluder. Confidence ratings for numerosity estimation were similar for fully visible and partially occluded surfaces. These results suggest that perceptual inferences about what is hidden in our environment can be very inaccurate und underestimate the complexity of the environment.

Challenging the fixed-criterion model of perceptual decision-making

Perceptual decision-making is often conceptualized as the process of comparing an internal decision variable to a categorical boundary or criterion. How the mind sets such a criterion has been studied from at least two perspectives. One idea is that the criterion is a fixed quantity. In work on subjective phenomenology, the notion of a fixed criterion has been proposed to explain a phenomenon called "subjective inflation"-a form of metacognitive mismatch in which observers overestimate the quality of their sensory representation in the periphery or at unattended locations. A contrasting view emerging from studies of perceptual decision-making is that the criterion adjusts to the level sensory uncertainty and is thus sensitive to variations in attention. Here, we mathematically demonstrate that previous empirical findings supporting subjective inflation are consistent with either a fixed or a flexible decision criterion. We further lay out specific task properties that are necessary to make inferences about the flexibility of the criterion: (i) a clear mapping from decision variable space to stimulus feature space and (ii) an incentive for observers to adjust their decision criterion as uncertainty changes. Recent work satisfying these requirements has demonstrated that decision criteria flexibly adjust according to uncertainty. We conclude that the fixed-criterion model of subjective inflation is poorly tenable.

Color diversity judgments in peripheral vision: Evidence against "cost-free" representations

Is visual perception "rich" or "sparse?" One finding supporting the "rich" hypothesis shows that a specific visual summary representation, color diversity, is represented "cost-free" outside focally-attended regions in dual-task paradigms [1]. Here, we investigated whether this "cost-free" phenomenon for color diversity perception extends to peripheral vision. After replicating previous findings and verifying that color diversity is represented "cost-free" in central vision, we performed two experiments: in our first experiment, we extended the paradigm to peripheral vision and found that in minimally-attended regions of space, color diversity perception was impaired. In a second and final experiment, we added confidence judgments to our task, and found that participants maintained high levels of metacognitive awareness of impaired performance in minimally-attended visual areas in the periphery. These findings provide evidence that color perception may be partially attention-dependent in peripheral vision, and challenge previous views on both sides of the rich vs. sparse debate.

How much can we differentiate at a brief glance: revealing the truer limit in conscious contents through the massive report paradigm (MRP)

Upon a brief glance, how well can we differentiate what we see from what we do not? Previous studies answered this question as 'poorly'. This is in stark contrast with our everyday experience. Here, we consider the possibility that previous restriction in stimulus variability and response alternatives reduced what participants could express from what they consciously experienced. We introduce a novel massive report paradigm that probes the ability to differentiate what we see from what we do not. In each trial, participants viewed a natural scene image and judged whether a small image patch was a part of the original image. To examine the limit of discriminability, we also included subtler changes in the image as modification of objects. Neither the images nor patches were repeated per participant. Our results showed that participants were highly accurate (accuracy greater than 80%) in differentiating patches from the viewed images from patches that are not present. Additionally, the differentiation between original and modified objects was influenced by object sizes and/or the congruence between objects and the scene gists. Our massive report paradigm opens a door to quantitatively measure the limit of immense informativeness of a moment of consciousness.

Negative affect impedes perceptual filling-in in the uniformity illusion

The notion of cognitive penetrability, i.e., whether perceptual contents can in principle be influenced by non-perceptual factors, has sparked a significant debate over methodological concerns and the correct interpretation of existing findings. In this study, we combined predictive processing models of visual perception and affective states to investigate influences of affective valence on perceptual filling-in in extrafoveal vision. We tested how experimentally induced affect would influence the probability of perceptual filling-in occurring in the uniformity illusion (N = 50). Negative affect led to reduced occurrence rates and increased onset times of visual uniformity. This effect was selectively observed in illusionary trials, requiring perceptual filling-in, and not in control trials, where uniformity was the veridical percept, ruling out biased motor responses or deliberate judgments as confounding variables. This suggests an influential role of affective status on subsequent perceptual processing, specifically on how much weight is ascribed to priors as opposed to sensory evidence.

A review of interactions between peripheral and foveal vision

Visual processing varies dramatically across the visual field. These differences start in the retina and continue all the way to the visual cortex. Despite these differences in processing, the perceptual experience of humans is remarkably stable and continuous across the visual field. Research in the last decade has shown that processing in peripheral and foveal vision is not independent, but is more directly connected than previously thought. We address three core questions on how peripheral and foveal vision interact, and review recent findings on potentially related phenomena that could provide answers to these questions. First, how is the processing of peripheral and foveal signals related during fixation? Peripheral signals seem to be processed in foveal retinotopic areas to facilitate peripheral object recognition, and foveal information seems to be extrapolated toward the periphery to generate a homogeneous representation of the environment. Second, how are peripheral and foveal signals re-calibrated? Transsaccadic changes in object features lead to a reduction in the discrepancy between peripheral and foveal appearance. Third, how is peripheral and foveal information stitched together across saccades? Peripheral and foveal signals are integrated across saccadic eye movements to average percepts and to reduce uncertainty. Together, these findings illustrate that peripheral and foveal processing are closely connected, mastering the compromise between a large peripheral visual field and high resolution at the fovea.

Defending subjective inflation: an inference to the best explanation

In a recent opinion piece, Abid (2019) criticizes the hypothesis that subjective inflation may partly account for apparent phenomenological richness across the visual field and outside the focus of attention. In response, we address three main issues. First, we maintain that inflation should be interpreted as an intraperceptual-and not post-perceptual-phenomenon. Second, we describe how inflation may differ from filling-in. Finally, we contend that, in general, there is sufficient evidence to tip the scales toward intraperceptual interpretations of visibility and confidence judgments.

Deflating inflation: the connection (or lack thereof) between decisional and metacognitive processes and visual phenomenology

Vision presents us with a richly detailed world. Yet, there is a range of limitations in the processing of visual information, such as poor peripheral resolution and failures to notice things we do not attend. This raises a natural question: How do we seem to see so much when there is considerable evidence indicating otherwise? In an elegant series of studies, Lau and colleagues have offered a novel answer to this long-standing question, proposing that our sense of visual richness is an artifact of decisional and metacognitive deficits. I critically evaluate this proposal and conclude that it rests on questionable presuppositions concerning the relationship between decisional and metacognitive processes, on one hand, and visual phenomenology, on the other.