The developmental origins of social hierarchy: how infants and young children mentally represent and respond to power and status

Reading minds or reading scripts? De-intellectualising theory of mind

Understanding the origins of human social cognition is a central challenge in contemporary science. In recent decades, the idea of a 'Theory of Mind' (ToM) has emerged as the most popular way of explaining unique features of human social cognition. This default view has been progressively undermined by research on 'implicit' ToM, which suggests that relevant precursor abilities may already be present in preverbal human infants and great apes. However, this area of research suffers from conceptual difficulties and empirical limitations, including explanatory circularity, over-intellectualisation, and inconsistent empirical replication. Our article breaks new ground by adapting 'script theory' for application to both linguistic and non-linguistic agents. It thereby provides a new theoretical framework able to resolve the aforementioned issues, generate novel predictions, and provide a plausible account of how individuals make sense of the behaviour of others. Script theory is based on the premise that pre-verbal infants and great apes are capable of basic forms of agency-detection and non-mentalistic goal understanding, allowing individuals to form event-schemata that are then used to make sense of the behaviour of others. We show how script theory circumvents fundamental problems created by ToM-based frameworks, explains patterns of inconsistent replication, and offers important novel predictions regarding how humans and other animals understand and predict the behaviour of others.

Neural tracking of social hierarchies in adolescents' real-world social networks

In the current study, we combined sociometric nominations and neuroimaging techniques to examine adolescents' neural tracking of peers from their real-world social network that varied in social preferences and popularity. Adolescent participants from an entire school district (N = 873) completed peer sociometric nominations of their grade at school, and a subset of participants (N = 117, Mage = 13.59 years) completed a neuroimaging task in which they viewed peer faces from their social networks. We revealed two neural processes by which adolescents track social preference: (1) the fusiform face area, an important region for early visual perception and social categorization, simultaneously represented both peers high in social preference and low in social preference; (2) the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which was differentially engaged in tracking peers high and low in social preference. No regions specifically tracked peers high in popularity and only the inferior parietal lobe, temporoparietal junction, midcingulate cortex and insula were involved in tracking unpopular peers. This is the first study to examine the neural circuits that support adolescents' perception of peer-based social networks. These findings identify the neural processes that allow youths to spontaneously keep track of peers' social value within their social network.

Improving the acceptability of social robots: Make them look different from humans

The social robots market will grow considerably in the coming years. What the arrival of these new kind of social agents means for society, however, is largely unknown. Existing cases of robot abuse point to risks of introducing such artificial social agents (ASAs) without considerations about consequences (risks for the robots and the human witnesses to the abuse). We believe that humans react aggressively towards ASAs when they are enticed into establishing dominance hierarchies. This happens when there is a basis for skill comparison. We therefore presented pairs of robots on which we varied similarity and the degree of stimulatability of their mechanisms/functions with the human body (walking, jumping = simulatable; rolling, floating = non-simulatable). We asked which robot (i) resembled more a human, (ii) possessed more "essentialized human qualities" (e.g. creativity). To estimate social acceptability, participants had also (iii) to predict the outcome of a situation where a robot approached a group of humans. For robots with simulatable functions, rating of essentialized human qualities decreased as human resemblance decreased (jumper < walker). For robots with non-simulable functions, the reversed relation was seen: robots that least resembled humans (floater) scored highest in qualities. Critically, robot's acceptability followed ratings of essentialized human qualities. Humans respond socially to certain morphological (physical aspects) and behavioral cues. Therefore, unless ASAs perfectly mimic humans, it is safer to provide them with mechanisms/functions that cannot be simulated with the human body.

Asymmetric Effects of Holding Power Versus Status: Implications for Motivation and Group Dynamics

Although extant research suggests that power without status, but not status without power, induces interpersonal conflict, we are yet to fully understand the asymmetric effects of holding power or status on psychological processes and group functioning. The present research attempts to fill this gap by arguing that holding power would heighten the motivation for status, whereas holding status may not necessarily have an equivalent effect on the motivation for power. We further proposed that power-status misalignment within a group would lead powerholders to be competitive toward statusholders due to heightened status motive and (upon failure to attain status) invest less in their group due to greater emotional distress. Across four (and one Supplemental) studies, we found support for our hypotheses. Our findings not only shed further light on the interactive effects of power and status, but also help better explain why power without status is particularly related to negative outcomes.

Teams moving more synchronously are perceived as socially dominant

Characteristics indicative of individual and group power can be used to judge social dominance. The present study investigated whether observers use movement synchrony to judge the dominance of teams during a social conflict. How synchronously individuals move together has been found to influence judgments of team effectiveness and the formidability of groups. Across four experiments, the present study examined whether movement synchrony is also used as a cue of team dominance. Experiment 1 provided evidence that teams of animated characters with higher movement synchrony were judged as more likely to win a competition and were rated as more dominant. A similar effect of synchrony on teams winning a competition was observed in Experiment 2 with different types of movement. Experiment 3 replicated the effects of the prior experiments: teams that moved more synchronously were judged as more likely to win a competition and rated as more socially dominant. These effects were extended in Experiment 4 with a new set of stimuli, human-like avatars performing complex dance actions, replicating synchrony-effects with different types of characters. This research indicates that human observers use movement synchrony to judge the social dominance of teams. This expands the types of behavioral cues that are used to predict the power of teams when social conflicts occur.

Infants' representation of asymmetric social influence

In social groups, some individuals have more influence than others, for example, because they are learned from or because they coordinate collective actions. Identifying these influential individuals is crucial to learn about one's social environment. Here, we tested whether infants represent asymmetric social influence among individuals from observing the imitation of movements in the absence of any observable coercion or order. We defined social influence in terms of Granger causality; that is, if A influences B, then past behaviors of A contain information that predicts the behaviors and mental states of B above and beyond the information contained in the past behaviors and mental states of B alone. Infants (12-, 15-, and 18-month-olds) were familiarized with agents (imitators) influenced by the actions of another one (target). During the test, the infants observed either an imitator who was no longer influenced by the target (incongruent test) or the target who was not influenced by an imitator (neutral test). The participants looked significantly longer at the incongruent test than at the neutral test. This result shows that infants represent and generalize individuals' potential to influence others' actions and that they are sensitive to the asymmetric nature of social influence; upon learning that A influences B, they expect that the influence of A over B will remain stronger than the influence of B over A in a novel context. Because of the pervasiveness of social influence in many social interactions and relationships, its representation during infancy is fundamental to understand and predict others' behaviors.

Vasopressin mediates nonapeptide and glucocorticoid signaling and social dynamics in juvenile dominance hierarchies of a highly social cichlid fish

Early-life social experience can strongly affect adult behavior, yet the behavioral mechanisms underlying developmental trajectories are poorly understood. Here, we use the highly social cichlid, Burton's Mouthbrooder (Astatotilapia burtoni) to investigate juvenile social status and behavior, as well as the underlying neuroendocrine mechanisms. We placed juveniles in pairs or triads and found that they readily establish social status hierarchies, with some group structural variation depending on group size, as well as the relative body size of the group members. Next, we used intracerebroventricular injections to test the hypothesis that arginine vasopressin (AVP) regulates juvenile social behavior and status, similar to adult A. burtoni. While we found no direct behavioral effects of experimentally increasing (via vasotocin) or decreasing (via antagonist Manning Compound) AVP signaling, social interactions directed at the treated individual were significantly altered. This group-level effect of central AVP manipulation was also reflected in a significant shift in whole brain expression of genes involved in nonapeptide signaling (AVP, oxytocin, and oxytocin receptor) and the neuroendocrine stress axis (corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF), glucocorticoid receptors (GR) 1a and 1b). Further, social status was associated with the expression of genes involved in glucocorticoid signaling (GR1a, GR1b, GR2, mineralocorticoid receptor), social interactions with the dominant fish, and nonapeptide signaling activity (AVP, AVP receptor V1aR2, OTR). Together, our results considerably expand our understanding of the context-specific emergence of social dominance hierarchies in juveniles and demonstrate a role for nonapeptide and stress axis signaling in the regulation of social status and social group dynamics.

How do we know who may replace each other in triadic conflict roles?

Group representations need not reduce to triadic conflict roles, although we infer group membership from them. A conceptual primitive of <group> as one solidary, bounded unity or clique may motivate and facilitate reasoning about cooperative group interactions in context with and without intergroup conflict and may also be necessary for representing which agents would replace one another in a triadic conflict.

Children's thinking about group-based social hierarchies

Wealth, power, and status are distributed unevenly across social groups. A surge of recent research reveals that people being recognizing, representing, and reasoning about group-based patterns of inequity during the first years of life. We first synthesize recent research on what children learn about group-based social hierarchies as well as how this learning occurs. We then discuss how children not only learn about societal structures but become active participants in them. Studying the origins and development of children's thoughts and behavior regarding group-based social hierarchies provides valuable insight into how systems of inequity are perpetuated across generations and how intergroup biases related to wealth, power, and status may be mitigated and reshaped early in development.

Dominance in humans

Dominance captures behavioural patterns found in social hierarchies that arise from agonistic interactions in which some individuals coercively exploit their control over costs and benefits to extract deference from others, often through aggression, threats and/or intimidation. Accumulating evidence points to its importance in humans and its separation from prestige-an alternate avenue to high status in which status arises from information (e.g. knowledge, skill, etc.) or other non-rival goods. In this review, we provide an overview of the theoretical underpinnings of dominance as a concept within evolutionary biology, discuss the challenges of applying it to humans and consider alternative theoretical accounts which assert that dominance is relevant to understanding status in humans. We then review empirical evidence for its continued importance in human groups, including the effects of dominance-independently of prestige-on measurable outcomes such as social influence and reproductive fitness, evidence for specialized dominance psychology, and evidence for gender-specific effects. Finally, because human-specific factors such as norms and coalitions may place bounds on purely coercive status-attainment strategies, we end by considering key situations and contexts that increase the likelihood for dominance status to coexist alongside prestige status within the same individual, including how: (i) institutional power and authority tend to elicit dominance; (ii) dominance-enhancing traits can at times generate benefits for others (prestige); and (iii) certain dominance cues and ethology may lead to mis-attributions of prestige. This article is part of the theme issue 'The centennial of the pecking order: current state and future prospects for the study of dominance hierarchies'.

The boss is not always right: Norwegian preschoolers do not selectively endorse the testimony of a novel dominant agent

Theories of cultural evolution posit that cues of competence-based prestige, rather than formidability-based dominance, should guide culturally transmitted learning, but recent work suggested that French and Kaqchikel Guatamalan preschoolers place their epistemic trust in dominant others. In contrast, this study shows that 249 three- to six-year-olds (116 girls, tested between 2016 and 2018 across metropolitan locations with varying ethnic composition and socioeconomic status) randomly endorsed the word-labels of dominant and subordinate agents in the egalitarian culture of Norway, using stimuli which solicit dominance inferences among infants and manipulating anonymity across studies to control for egalitarian desirability bias. A meta-analysis estimated that 48% endorsed the dominant's testimony. This demonstrates that the tendency to endorse the epistemic claims of dominant individuals does not emerge reliably in early childhood.

Verbally Highlighting Extrinsic Causes of Novel Social Disparities Helps Children View Low-Status Groups as Structurally Disadvantaged Rather Than Personally Inferior

As part of their “essentialist” intuitions, young children tend to form personal attributions for observed intergroup differences – attributing them to groups’ intrinsic natures or inborn characteristics. Much research has linked this essentialist view of social groups with prejudiced attitudes. However, less research has explored children’s capacity to form structural attributions for observed intergroup differences – attributing them to groups’ extrinsic circumstances or access to opportunities – or how structural attributions relate to social attitudes. Structural attributions could enable children to view low-status groups as extrinsically disadvantaged rather than intrinsically inferior. We were interested in whether verbally highlighting the extrinsic causes of novel social status disparities could support young children in forming structural attributions for them, thereby mitigating the formation of prejudice toward novel low-status groups. To investigate, we introduced participants (n=106 5- and 6-year olds) to novel social status disparities that could be attributed to either intrinsic or extrinsic causes, and we framed the disparities in either intrinsic, neutral, or extrinsic terms. We then assessed children’s attributions for the disparities (through two measures: explanations and interventions) and their social attitudes toward the groups (through two measures: friendship preferences and prize allocations). Results indicated that participants tended to provide mostly personal attributions overall but that extrinsic framing led them to provide significantly more structural attributions. Extrinsic framing did not significantly impact social attitudes overall, but exploratory analyses revealed that it impacted participants’ friendship preferences in particular. Together, results suggest that verbally highlighting extrinsic causes can disrupt children’s intuitive tendency toward personal attributions, with promising implications for their views of low-status groups.

Small groups lead, big groups control: Perceptions of numerical group size, power, and status across development

Participants (N = 384 three- to ten-year-olds; 51% girls, 49% boys; 73% White, 18% multiracial/other, 5% Asian, and 3% Black; N = 610 adults) saw depictions of 20 individuals split into two social groups (1:19; 2:18; 5:15; or 8:12 per group) and selected which group was "in charge" (Experiment 1), "the leader" (Experiment 2), or likely to "get the stuff" (resources) in a conflict (Experiment 3). Whereas participants across ages predicted the larger group would "get the stuff," a tendency to view smaller groups as "in charge" and "the leader" strengthened with age and when the smaller group was rarer. These findings suggest the perceived relation between numerical group size and hierarchy is flexible and inform theory regarding the developmental trajectories of reasoning about power and status.

Searching for people: Non-facing distractor pairs hinder the visual search of social scenes more than facing distractor pairs

There is growing interest in the visual and attentional processes recruited when human observers view social scenes containing multiple people. Findings from visual search paradigms have helped shape this emerging literature. Previous research has established that, when hidden amongst pairs of individuals facing in the same direction (leftwards or rightwards), pairs of individuals arranged front-to-front are found faster than pairs of individuals arranged back-to-back. Here, we describe a second, closely-related effect with important theoretical implications. When searching for a pair of individuals facing in the same direction (leftwards or rightwards), target dyads are found faster when hidden amongst distractor pairs arranged front-to-front, than when hidden amongst distractor pairs arranged back-to-back. This distractor arrangement effect was also obtained with target and distractor pairs constructed from arrows and types of common objects that cue visuospatial attention. These findings argue against the view that pairs of people arranged front-to-front capture exogenous attention due to a domain-specific orienting mechanism. Rather, it appears that salient direction cues (e.g., gaze direction, body orientation, arrows) hamper systematic search and impede efficient interpretation, when distractor pairs are arranged back-to-back.

Perceived Social Status and Suicidal Ideation in Maltreated Children and Adolescents

Recent decades have seen an alarming increase in rates of suicide among young people, including children and adolescents (“youth”). Although child maltreatment constitutes a well-established risk factor for suicidal ideation in youth, few efforts have focused on identifying factors associated with maltreated youths’ increased risk for suicidal ideation, especially across development. The present study examined the relations between maltreated youths' (N = 279, M = 12.06 years, 52% female, 53% Latinx) perceptions of their social status and suicidal ideation and compared those relations between pre-adolescents and adolescents. Findings revealed unique developmental patterns: Perceived social status was associated with suicidal ideation, but only in adolescents, who showed greater risk for suicidal ideation if they viewed themselves as lower ranked in society and lower risk for suicidal ideation if they viewed themselves as higher ranked in society. Findings have implications for scientific and practical efforts aimed at better understanding and preventing suicide in a high-risk developmental population.

Preverbal infants expect agents exhibiting counterintuitive capacities to gain access to contested resources

Claims to supernatural power have been used as a basis for authority in a wide range of societies, but little is known about developmental origins of the link between supernatural power and worldly authority. Here, we show that 12- to 16-month-old infants expect agents exhibiting counterintuitive capacities to win out in a two-way standoff over a contested resource. Infants watched two agents gain a reward using either physically intuitive or physically counterintuitive methods, the latter involving simple forms of levitation or teleportation. Infants looked longer, indicating surprise, when the physically intuitive agent subsequently outcompeted a physically counterintuitive agent in securing a reward. Control experiments indicated that infants’ expectations were not simply motived by the efficiency of agents in pursuing their goals, but specifically the deployment of counterintuitive capacities. This suggests that the link between supernatural power and worldly authority has early origins in development.

[The gender of power in children's representations]

Gender studies have largely described social practices that lead to an imbalance of power between girls and boys during childhood. However, little is known about how children represent asymmetries in mixed-gender relationships. Do they expect that males are more likely to exert power on females than vice versa? And if so, does this awareness change depending on children's age, gender, or the country in which they grow up? We present herein an empirical study, recently published in Sex Roles, that addresses these issues. This study included 3- to 6-year-old children, and showed that children from different countries (Norway, Lebanon, France) associate power and masculinity, although it also indicates that girls are less inclined than boys to make this association. We then discuss the worries that children's beliefs of a gendered power may elicit.

Motivated moral judgments about freedom of speech are constrained by a need to maintain consistency

Speech is a critical means of negotiating political, adaptive interests in human society. Prior research on motivated political cognition has found that support for freedom of speech depends on whether one agrees with its ideological content. However, it remains unclear if people (A) openly hold that some speech should be more free than other speech; or (B) want to feel as if speech content does not affect their judgments. Here, we find support for (B) over (A), using social dominance orientation and political alignment to predict support for speech. Study 1 demonstrates that if people have previously judged restrictions of speech which they oppose, they are less harsh in condemning restrictions of speech which they support, and vice versa. Studies 2 and 3 find that when participants judge two versions of the same scenario, with only the ideological direction of speech being reversed, their answers are strongly affected by the ordering of conditions: While the first judgment is made in accordance with one's political attitudes, the second opposing judgment is made so as to remain consistent with the first. Studies 4 and 5 find that people broadly support the principle of giving both sides of contested issues equal speech rights, also when this is stated abstractly, detached from any specific scenario. In Study 6 we explore the boundaries of our findings, and find that the need to be consistent weakens substantially for speech that is widely seen as too extreme. Together, these results suggest that although people can selectively endorse moral principles depending on their political agenda, many seek to conceal this bias from others, and perhaps also themselves.