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Landy JF, Lemli BA, Shah P, Perry AD, Sager R. Moral preference reversals: Violations of procedure invariance in moral judgments of sacrificial dilemmas. Cognition 2024; 252:105919. [PMID: 39167992 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105919] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/11/2023] [Revised: 08/05/2024] [Accepted: 08/08/2024] [Indexed: 08/23/2024]
Abstract
In this research, we examine whether moral judgments sometimes violate the normative principle of procedure invariance - that is, whether normatively equivalent elicitation tasks can result in different judgment patterns. Specifically, we show that the relative morality of two actions can reverse across evaluation modes and elicitation tasks, mirroring preference reversals in consumer behavior. Across six studies (five preregistered, total N = 719), we provide evidence of three reversals of moral judgments of sacrificial dilemmas. First, directly killing one person to save many others was rated as morally worse than indirectly killing one person via an intervening mechanism in order to save a few others in separate evaluation, but this difference reversed in joint evaluation, in both between-subjects (Studies 1a and 1b) and within-subjects (Study 2) designs. Next, directly killing one person to save many others was judged as morally better than indirectly killing one person to save a few others more often in matching than in choice (Study 3) and rating (Study 4), between-subjects. Lastly, we replicate the results of Studies 3 and 4 within-subjects and show that susceptibility to these moral preference reversals is correlated with Faith in Intuition (Study 5). The present research introduces a new methodological approach to moral psychology, demonstrates that moral judgments can fully reverse across tasks, and supports an emerging view that moral judgments, like consumer preferences, are at least sometimes constructed in the moment, relative to the context and task at hand.
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Affiliation(s)
- Justin F Landy
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Nova Southeastern University, USA.
| | - Benjamin A Lemli
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Nova Southeastern University, USA
| | - Pritika Shah
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Nova Southeastern University, USA
| | - Alexander D Perry
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Nova Southeastern University, USA
| | - Rebekah Sager
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Nova Southeastern University, USA
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2
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Anderson RA, Ruisch BC, Pizarro DA. On the Highway to Hell: Slippery Slope Perceptions in Judgments of Moral Character. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2024; 50:679-693. [PMID: 36602035 DOI: 10.1177/01461672221143022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/06/2023]
Abstract
Across four studies, we test the hypothesis that people exhibit "slippery slope" thinking in their judgments of moral character-that is, do observers judge that a person who behaves immorally will become increasingly immoral over time? In Study 1, we find that a person who commits an immoral act is judged as more likely to behave immorally and as having a worse character in the future than in the past. In Study 2, we find that it is the commission of an immoral act specifically-rather than merely attempting an immoral act-that drives this slippery slope effect. In Study 3, we demonstrate that observers judge the moral agent as more likely to commit acts of greater severity further in time after the initial immoral act. In Study 4, we find that this effect is driven by an anticipated corrupting of moral character, related to perceptions of the agent's guilt.
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Bocian K, Gonidis L, Everett JA. Moral conformity in a digital world: Human and nonhuman agents as a source of social pressure for judgments of moral character. PLoS One 2024; 19:e0298293. [PMID: 38358977 PMCID: PMC10868870 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0298293] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2023] [Accepted: 01/23/2024] [Indexed: 02/17/2024] Open
Abstract
Could judgments about others' moral character be changed under group pressure produced by human and virtual agents? In Study 1 (N = 103), participants first judged targets' moral character privately and two weeks later in the presence of real humans. Analysis of how many times participants changed their private moral judgments under group pressure showed that moral conformity occurred, on average, 43% of the time. In Study 2 (N = 138), we extended this using Virtual Reality, where group pressure was produced either by avatars allegedly controlled by humans or AI. While replicating the effect of moral conformity (at 28% of the time), we find that the moral conformity for the human and AI-controlled avatars did not differ. Our results suggest that human and nonhuman groups shape moral character judgments in both the physical and virtual worlds, shedding new light on the potential social consequences of moral conformity in the modern digital world.
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Affiliation(s)
- Konrad Bocian
- Department of Psychology in Sopot, SWPS University, Warszawa, Poland
| | - Lazaros Gonidis
- School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom
| | - Jim A.C. Everett
- School of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, United Kingdom
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Davis I, Carlson R, Dunham Y, Jara-Ettinger J. Identifying social partners through indirect prosociality: A computational account. Cognition 2023; 240:105580. [PMID: 37572564 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105580] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/10/2023] [Revised: 07/24/2023] [Accepted: 07/25/2023] [Indexed: 08/14/2023]
Abstract
The ability to identify people who are prosocial, supportive, and mindful of others is critical for choosing social partners. While past work has emphasized the information value of direct social interactions (such as watching someone help or hinder others), social tendencies can also be inferred from indirect evidence, such as how an agent considers others when making personal choices. Here we present a computational model of this capacity, grounded in a Bayesian framework for action understanding. Across four experiments we show that this model captures how people infer social preferences based on how agents act when their choices indirectly impact others (Experiments 1a, 1b, & 1c), and how people infer what an agent knows about others from knowledge of that agent's social preferences (Experiment 2). Critically, people's patterns of inferences could not be explained by simpler alternatives. These findings illuminate how people can discern potential social partners from indirect evidence of their prosociality, thus deepening our understanding of partner detection, and social cognition more broadly.
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Affiliation(s)
- Isaac Davis
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, United States of America.
| | - Ryan Carlson
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, United States of America
| | - Yarrow Dunham
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, United States of America; Wu Tsai Institute, Yale University, United States of America
| | - Julian Jara-Ettinger
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, United States of America; Wu Tsai Institute, Yale University, United States of America
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Prinzing MM, Fredrickson BL. No Peace for the Wicked? Immorality Is Thought to Disrupt Intrapersonal Harmony, Impeding Positive Psychological States and Happiness. Cogn Sci 2023; 47:e13371. [PMID: 37961006 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13371] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/31/2023] [Revised: 08/16/2023] [Accepted: 10/16/2023] [Indexed: 11/15/2023]
Abstract
Why do people think that someone living a morally bad life is less happy than someone living a good life? One possibility is that judging whether someone is happy involves not only attributing positive psychological states (i.e., lots of pleasant emotions, few unpleasant emotions, and satisfaction with life) but also forming an evaluative judgment. Another possibility is that moral considerations affect happiness attributions because they tacitly influence attributions of positive psychological states. In two studies, we found strong support for the second hypothesis. Moral considerations only appear to affect happiness attributions when they also affect attributions of positive psychological states. Additionally, both studies supported a hypothesis about why moral judgments have these effects. Specifically, we found that when people judge that someone is living a bad life, they infer that the person is not at peace with themselves. However, when this inference is blocked, moral considerations do not affect attributions of happiness or positive psychological states. In sum, although "happiness" appears to be a purely psychological concept, happiness judgments are sensitive to moral considerations because people often assume that immorality disrupts intrapersonal harmony.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Barbara L Fredrickson
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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Kraft-Todd GT, Kleiman-Weiner M, Young L. Virtue Discounting: Observability Reduces Moral Actors' Perceived Virtue. Open Mind (Camb) 2023; 7:460-482. [PMID: 37637300 PMCID: PMC10449397 DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00085] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/29/2022] [Accepted: 05/16/2023] [Indexed: 08/29/2023] Open
Abstract
Performing prosociality in public presents a paradox: only by doing so can people demonstrate their virtue and also influence others through their example, yet observers may derogate actors' behavior as mere "virtue signaling." Here we investigate the role of observability of actors' behavior as one reason that people engage in such "virtue discounting." Further, we investigate observers' motivational inferences as a mechanism of this effect, using the comparison of generosity and fairness as a case study among virtues. Across 14 studies (7 preregistered, total N = 9,360), we show that public actors are perceived as less virtuous than private actors, and that this effect is stronger for generosity compared to fairness (i.e., differential virtue discounting). Exploratory factor analysis suggests that three types of motives-principled, reputation-signaling, and norm-signaling-affect virtue discounting. Using structural equation modeling, we show that observability's effect on actors' trait virtue ratings is largely explained by inferences that actors have less principled motivations. Further, we leverage experimental evidence to provide stronger causal evidence of these effects. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of our findings, as well as future directions for research on the social perception of virtue.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gordon T. Kraft-Todd
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, 140 Commonwealth Ave, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA
| | - Max Kleiman-Weiner
- School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33 Kirkland St., Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | - Liane Young
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, 140 Commonwealth Ave, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA
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Schwartz SA, Inbar Y. Is it good to feel bad about littering? Conflict between moral beliefs and behaviors for everyday transgressions. Cognition 2023; 236:105437. [PMID: 36989917 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105437] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2022] [Revised: 03/04/2023] [Accepted: 03/06/2023] [Indexed: 03/29/2023]
Abstract
People sometimes do things that they think are morally wrong. We investigate how actors' perceptions of the morality of their own behaviors affects observer evaluations. In Study 1 (n = 302), we presented participants with six different descriptions of actors who routinely engaged in a morally questionable behavior and varied whether the actors thought the behavior was morally wrong. Actors who believed their behavior was wrong were seen as having better moral character, but their behavior was rated as more wrong. In Study 2 (n = 391) we investigated whether perceptions of actor metadesires were responsible for the effects of actor beliefs on character judgments. We used the same stimuli and measures as in Study 1 but added a measure of the actor's perceived desires to engage in the behaviors. As predicted, the effect of actors' moral beliefs on judgments of their moral character was mediated by perceived metadesires. In Study 3 (n = 1092) we replicated these findings in a between-participants design and further found that the effect of actor beliefs on act and character judgments was moderated by participant beliefs about the general acceptability of the behavior.
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Yang C, You X, Xie X, Duan Y, Wang B, Zhou Y, Feng H, Wang W, Fan L, Huang G, Shen X. Development of a Chinese werewolf deception database. Front Psychol 2023; 13:1047427. [PMID: 36698609 PMCID: PMC9869050 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1047427] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/18/2022] [Accepted: 12/15/2022] [Indexed: 01/11/2023] Open
Abstract
Although it is important to accurately detect deception, limited research in this area has been undertaken involving Asian people. We aim to address this gap by undertaking research regarding the identification of deception in Asians in realistic environments. In this study, we develop a Chinese Werewolf Deception Database (C2W2D), which consists of 168 video clips (84 deception videos and 84 honest videos). A total of 1,738,760 frames of facial data are recorded. Fifty-eight healthy undergraduates (24 men and 34 women) and 26 drug addicts (26 men) participated in a werewolf game. The development of C2W2D is accomplished based on a "werewolf" deception game paradigm in which the participants spontaneously tell the truth or a lie. Two synced high-speed cameras are used to capture the game process. To explore the differences between lying and truth-telling in the database, descriptive statistics (e.g., duration and quantity) and hypothesis tests are conducted using action units (AUs) of facial expressions (e.g., t-test). The C2W2D contributes to a relatively sizable number of deceptive and honest samples with high ecological validity. These samples can be used to study the individual differences and the underlying mechanisms of lies and truth-telling between drug addicts and healthy people.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chaocao Yang
- Key Laboratory of Psychology of TCM and Brain Science, Jiangxi Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Jiangxi University of Chinese Medicine, Nanchang, China,School of Psychology, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an, China,Shaanxi Provincial Key Laboratory of Behavior and Cognitive Neuroscience, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an, China
| | - Xuqun You
- School of Psychology, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an, China,Shaanxi Provincial Key Laboratory of Behavior and Cognitive Neuroscience, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an, China
| | - Xudong Xie
- School of Psychology, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an, China,Shaanxi Provincial Key Laboratory of Behavior and Cognitive Neuroscience, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an, China
| | - Yuanyuan Duan
- Key Laboratory of Psychology of TCM and Brain Science, Jiangxi Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Jiangxi University of Chinese Medicine, Nanchang, China
| | - Buxue Wang
- Key Laboratory of Psychology of TCM and Brain Science, Jiangxi Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Jiangxi University of Chinese Medicine, Nanchang, China
| | - Yuxi Zhou
- Key Laboratory of Psychology of TCM and Brain Science, Jiangxi Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Jiangxi University of Chinese Medicine, Nanchang, China
| | - Hong Feng
- Key Laboratory of Psychology of TCM and Brain Science, Jiangxi Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Jiangxi University of Chinese Medicine, Nanchang, China
| | - Wenjing Wang
- Key Laboratory of Psychology of TCM and Brain Science, Jiangxi Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Jiangxi University of Chinese Medicine, Nanchang, China
| | - Ling Fan
- Key Laboratory of Psychology of TCM and Brain Science, Jiangxi Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Jiangxi University of Chinese Medicine, Nanchang, China
| | - Genying Huang
- Key Laboratory of Psychology of TCM and Brain Science, Jiangxi Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Jiangxi University of Chinese Medicine, Nanchang, China
| | - Xunbing Shen
- Key Laboratory of Psychology of TCM and Brain Science, Jiangxi Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Jiangxi University of Chinese Medicine, Nanchang, China,*Correspondence: Xunbing Shen,
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Workman CI, Smith KM, Apicella CL, Chatterjee A. Evidence against the "anomalous-is-bad" stereotype in Hadza hunter gatherers. Sci Rep 2022; 12:8693. [PMID: 35610269 PMCID: PMC9130266 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-12440-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/11/2022] [Accepted: 04/15/2022] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
People have an "anomalous-is-bad" stereotype whereby they make negative inferences about the moral character of people with craniofacial anomalies like scars. This stereotype is hypothesized to be a byproduct of adaptations for avoiding pathogens. However, evidence for the anomalous-is-bad stereotype comes from studies of European and North American populations; the byproduct hypothesis would predict universality of the stereotype. We presented 123 Hadza across ten camps pairs of morphed Hadza faces-each with one face altered to include a scar-and asked who they expected to be more moral and a better forager. Hadza with minimal exposure to other cultures chose at chance for both questions. Hadza with greater exposure to other cultures, however, expected the scarred face to be less moral and a better forager. These results suggest the anomalous-is-bad stereotype may be culturally shared or learned erroneously through associations with population-level differences, providing evidence against a universal pathogen avoidance byproduct hypothesis.
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Affiliation(s)
- Clifford I Workman
- Department of Neurology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA.
- Penn Brain Science Center, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA.
- Penn Center for Neuroaesthetics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA.
| | - Kristopher M Smith
- Department of Anthropology, Washington State University, Pullman, WA, 99163, USA.
| | - Coren L Apicella
- Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA
| | - Anjan Chatterjee
- Department of Neurology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA
- Penn Brain Science Center, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA
- Penn Center for Neuroaesthetics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA
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Arhiri L, Gherman MA, Holman AC. A Person-Centered Approach to Moralization-The Case of Vaping. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND PUBLIC HEALTH 2022; 19:ijerph19095628. [PMID: 35565020 PMCID: PMC9101583 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph19095628] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/06/2022] [Revised: 05/02/2022] [Accepted: 05/04/2022] [Indexed: 02/05/2023]
Abstract
Using e-cigarettes for smoking cessation is a controversial topic among health experts. Evidence suggests that vaping might have been moralized among the general public. Despite the detrimental consequences of moralizing health behaviors on social cohesion and health, some argue for using moralization strategically to prevent and combat vaping. We aim to add to the body of literature showing the dangers of moralization in health by proposing a person-centered approach to the moralization of anti-vaping attitudes. Our cross-sectional survey explores the moralization of anti-vaping attitudes and its predictors on a convenience sample of 348 Romanian never-vapers, before the final vote to severely restrict vaping. By fitting a hierarchical regression model on our data, we found support for a unique contribution of negative prototypes (β = 0.13) and opinions of vapers (β = 0.08) in predicting moralization, with significant contributions of piggybacking on moralized self-control, on moralized attitudes toward smoking and on sanctity/degradation, disgust, anger, harm to children, and gender. Together, these variables explained 56% of the variance of the moralization of anti-vaping attitudes. Our findings add to our knowledge of motivated moralization and advise against using moralization in health, suggesting that people may weaponize it to legitimize group dislike.
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