Great Apes Make Anticipatory Looks Based on Long-Term Memory of Single Events

Mixed Selectivity Coding of Content-Temporal Detail by Dorsomedial Posterior Parietal Neurons

The dorsomedial posterior parietal cortex (dmPPC) is part of a higher-cognition network implicated in elaborate processes underpinning memory formation, recollection, episode reconstruction, and temporal information processing. Neural coding for complex episodic processing is however under-documented. Here, we recorded extracellular neural activities from three male rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) and revealed a set of neural codes of "neuroethogram" in the primate parietal cortex. Analyzing neural responses in macaque dmPPC to naturalistic videos, we discovered several groups of neurons that are sensitive to different categories of ethogram items, low-level sensory features, and saccadic eye movement. We also discovered that the processing of category and feature information by these neurons is sustained by the accumulation of temporal information over a long timescale of up to 30 s, corroborating its reported long temporal receptive windows. We performed an additional behavioral experiment with additional two male rhesus macaques and found that saccade-related activities could not account for the mixed neuronal responses elicited by the video stimuli. We further observed monkeys' scan paths and gaze consistency are modulated by video content. Taken altogether, these neural findings explain how dmPPC weaves fabrics of ongoing experiences together in real time. The high dimensionality of neural representations should motivate us to shift the focus of attention from pure selectivity neurons to mixed selectivity neurons, especially in increasingly complex naturalistic task designs.

Bonobos and chimpanzees remember familiar conspecifics for decades

Recognition and memory of familiar conspecifics provides the foundation for complex sociality and is vital to navigating an unpredictable social world [Tibbetts and Dale, Trends Ecol. Evol. 22, 529-537 (2007)]. Human social memory incorporates content about interactions and relationships and can last for decades [Sherry and Schacter, Psychol. Rev. 94, 439-454 (1987)]. Long-term social memory likely played a key role throughout human evolution, as our ancestors increasingly built relationships that operated across distant space and time [Malone et al., Int. J. Primatol. 33, 1251-1277 (2012)]. Although individual recognition is widespread among animals and sometimes lasts for years, little is known about social memory in nonhuman apes and the shared evolutionary foundations of human social memory. In a preferential-looking eye-tracking task, we presented chimpanzees and bonobos (N = 26) with side-by-side images of a previous groupmate and a conspecific stranger of the same sex. Apes' attention was biased toward former groupmates, indicating long-term memory for past social partners. The strength of biases toward former groupmates was not impacted by the duration apart, and our results suggest that recognition may persist for at least 26 y beyond separation. We also found significant but weak evidence that, like humans, apes may remember the quality or content of these past relationships: apes' looking biases were stronger for individuals with whom they had more positive histories of social interaction. Long-lasting social memory likely provided key foundations for the evolution of human culture and sociality as they extended across time, space, and group boundaries.

Reading minds or reading scripts? De-intellectualising theory of mind

Understanding the origins of human social cognition is a central challenge in contemporary science. In recent decades, the idea of a 'Theory of Mind' (ToM) has emerged as the most popular way of explaining unique features of human social cognition. This default view has been progressively undermined by research on 'implicit' ToM, which suggests that relevant precursor abilities may already be present in preverbal human infants and great apes. However, this area of research suffers from conceptual difficulties and empirical limitations, including explanatory circularity, over-intellectualisation, and inconsistent empirical replication. Our article breaks new ground by adapting 'script theory' for application to both linguistic and non-linguistic agents. It thereby provides a new theoretical framework able to resolve the aforementioned issues, generate novel predictions, and provide a plausible account of how individuals make sense of the behaviour of others. Script theory is based on the premise that pre-verbal infants and great apes are capable of basic forms of agency-detection and non-mentalistic goal understanding, allowing individuals to form event-schemata that are then used to make sense of the behaviour of others. We show how script theory circumvents fundamental problems created by ToM-based frameworks, explains patterns of inconsistent replication, and offers important novel predictions regarding how humans and other animals understand and predict the behaviour of others.

The use of gaze to study cognition: limitations, solutions, and applications to animal welfare

The study of gaze responses, typically using looking time paradigms, has become a popular approach to improving our understanding of cognitive processes in non-verbal individuals. Our interpretation of data derived from these paradigms, however, is constrained by how we conceptually and methodologically approach these problems. In this perspective paper, we outline the application of gaze studies in comparative cognitive and behavioral research and highlight current limitations in the interpretation of commonly used paradigms. Further, we propose potential solutions, including improvements to current experimental approaches, as well as broad-scale benefits of technology and collaboration. Finally, we outline the potential benefits of studying gaze responses from an animal welfare perspective. We advocate the implementation of these proposals across the field of animal behavior and cognition to aid experimental validity, and further advance our knowledge on a variety of cognitive processes and welfare outcomes.

The Benefits and Challenges of Conducting Primate Research in Different Settings

Internationally, primate research takes place in laboratories, zoos, sanctuaries, and the wild. All of these settings present unique advantages and challenges in terms of methodology, translatability, animal welfare, and ethics. In this novel commentary, we explore the scientific and ethical benefits and drawbacks of conducting non-invasive psychological research with primates in each setting. We also suggest ways to overcome some of the barriers. We argue that while there may be greater experimental control in laboratory-based research, settings that more closely mirror primates' natural habitats are generally better suited to meet their specialized needs. More naturalistic research settings, including field studies, may also circumvent some ethical concerns associated with research in captivity, and yield more ecologically valid data.

The evolutionary origins of syntax: Event cognition in nonhuman primates

Languages tend to encode events from the perspective of agents, placing them first and in simpler forms than patients. This agent bias is mirrored by cognition: Agents are more quickly recognized than patients and generally attract more attention. This leads to the hypothesis that key aspects of language structure are fundamentally rooted in a cognition that decomposes events into agents, actions, and patients, privileging agents. Although this type of event representation is almost certainly universal across languages, it remains unclear whether the underlying cognition is uniquely human or more widespread in animals. Here, we review a range of evidence from primates and other animals, which suggests that agent-based event decomposition is phylogenetically older than humans. We propose a research program to test this hypothesis in great apes and human infants, with the goal to resolve one of the major questions in the evolution of language, the origins of syntax.

Eye-tracking as a window into primate social cognition

Over the past decade, noninvasive, restraint-free eye-tracking research with primates has transformed our understanding of primate social cognition. The use of this technology with many primate species allows for the exploration and comparison of how these species attend to and understand social agents and interactions. The ability to compare and contrast the cognitive capacities of various primate species, including humans, provides insight into the evolutionary mechanisms and selective pressures that have likely shaped social cognition in similar and divergent ways across the primate order. In this review, we begin by discussing noninvasive behavioral methods used to measure primate gaze and attention before the introduction of noninvasive, restraint-free eye-tracking methodologies. Next, we focus on findings from recent eye-tracking research on primate social cognition, beginning with simple visual and search mechanisms. We then discuss the results that have built on this basic understanding of how primates view images and videos, exploring discrimination and knowledge of social agents, following social cues, tracking perspectives and predicting behavior, and the combination of eye-tracking and other behavioral and physiological methods. Finally, we discuss some future directions of noninvasive eye-tracking research on primate social cognition and current eye-tracking work-in-progress that builds on these previous studies, investigating underexplored socio-cognitive capacities and utilizing new methodologies.

Do chimpanzees enjoy a virtual forest? A pilot investigation of the use of interactive art as a form of environmental enrichment for zoo-housed chimpanzees

Environmental enrichment is essential for the well-being of zoo animals. Recent advances in sensor and video technologies may contribute to improvements in enrichment in terms of their flexibilities and time constraints. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether interactive movie art can be used as a form of environmental enrichment. We implemented interactive movies designed by a professional artist, a visual art aiming to reflect naturalistic forest habitat, in an indoor chimpanzee enclosure at Kyoto City Zoo in Japan. Motion-tracking sensors embedded in buoys were installed at several locations around the indoor enclosure; the chimpanzees could change the movie contents by physically interacting with these objects. We recorded behaviors by observing entire troop of chimpanzees (six) between March 16 and 20, 2020 (control condition), then recorded behaviors when the interactive movie was presented (experimental condition) between March 21 and 29, 2020. Behaviors were recorded via direct observations and video recordings to examine any changes after the installation of interactive art. The chimpanzees spent more time in the indoor enclosures during the experimental condition than during the control condition. Activity budgets did not change substantially during the study period. There was no evidence of habituation to the movie during the study period. Three chimpanzees, including two young chimpanzees, interacted with the movie more frequently than the others; these young chimpanzees occasionally showed playful expressions when interacting with the movie and exhibited different reactivities to the movie scenes. These results demonstrate, first, that the interactive art did not negatively affect chimpanzee behavior, and second, that some of the chimpanzees indeed showed positive responses to the art. This study, therefore, introduces a novel possibility for environmental enrichment in zoos, involving a collaboration between science and art.

The Eyes Are More Eloquent Than Words: Anticipatory Looking as an Index of Event Memory in Alzheimer's Disease

Alzheimer's disease (AD) is a disorder in which individuals experience a difficulty in maintaining event memory for when, where, who, and what. However, verbal deficiency, one of the other symptoms of AD, may prevent a precise diagnosis of event memory because existing tests are based on verbal instructions by the tester and verbal response from patient. Therefore, non-verbal methods are essential to evaluate event memory in AD. The present study, using eye tracking, investigated whether AD patients deployed anticipatory looking to target acts related to future events based on previous experience when an identical video was presented to them twice. The results revealed the presence of anticipatory looking, although AD patients were unable to verbally report the content of the video. Our results illustrate that AD patients have a one-time event memory better than previously thought.

The application of noninvasive, restraint-free eye-tracking methods for use with nonhuman primates

Over the past 50 years there has been a strong interest in applying eye-tracking techniques to study a myriad of questions related to human and nonhuman primate psychological processes. Eye movements and fixations can provide qualitative and quantitative insights into cognitive processes of nonverbal populations such as nonhuman primates, clarifying the evolutionary, physiological, and representational underpinnings of human cognition. While early attempts at nonhuman primate eye tracking were relatively crude, later, more sophisticated and sensitive techniques required invasive protocols and the use of restraint. In the past decade, technology has advanced to a point where noninvasive eye-tracking techniques, developed for use with human participants, can be applied for use with nonhuman primates in a restraint-free manner. Here we review the corpus of recent studies (N=32) that take such an approach. Despite the growing interest in eye-tracking research, there is still little consensus on "best practices," both in terms of deploying test protocols or reporting methods and results. Therefore, we look to advances made in the field of developmental psychology, as well as our own collective experiences using eye trackers with nonhuman primates, to highlight key elements that researchers should consider when designing noninvasive restraint-free eye-tracking research protocols for use with nonhuman primates. Beyond promoting best practices for research protocols, we also outline an ideal approach for reporting such research and highlight future directions for the field.

Human Self-Domestication and the Evolution of Pragmatics

As proposed for the emergence of modern languages, we argue that modern uses of languages (pragmatics) also evolved gradually in our species under the effects of human self-domestication, with three key aspects involved in a complex feedback loop: (a) a reduction in reactive aggression, (b) the sophistication of language structure (with emerging grammars initially facilitating the transition from physical aggression to verbal aggression); and (c) the potentiation of pragmatic principles governing conversation, including, but not limited to, turn-taking and inferential abilities. Our core hypothesis is that the reduction in reactive aggression, one of the key factors in self-domestication processes, enabled us to fully exploit our cognitive and interactional potential as applied to linguistic exchanges, and ultimately to evolve a specific form of communication governed by persuasive reciprocity-a trait of human conversation characterized by both competition and cooperation. In turn, both early crude forms of language, well suited for verbal aggression/insult, and later more sophisticated forms of language, well suited for persuasive reciprocity, significantly contributed to the resolution and reduction of (physical) aggression, thus having a return effect on the self-domestication processes. Supporting evidence for our proposal, as well as grounds for further testing, comes mainly from the consideration of cognitive disorders, which typically simultaneously present abnormal features of self-domestication (including aggressive behavior) and problems with pragmatics and social functioning. While various approaches to language evolution typically reduce it to a single factor, our approach considers language evolution as a multifactorial process, with each player acting upon the other, engaging in an intense mutually reinforcing feedback loop. Moreover, we see language evolution as a gradual process, continuous with the pre-linguistic cognitive abilities, which were engaged in a positive feedback loop with linguistic innovations, and where gene-culture co-evolution and cultural niche construction were the main driving forces.

The contingency symmetry bias (affirming the consequent fallacy) as a prerequisite for word learning: A comparative study of pre-linguistic human infants and chimpanzees

Humans are known to possess an "affirming the consequent fallacy," which assumes that a learned contingency holds true even when the order is reversed. In contrast, non-human animals do not fall for this fallacy, as they do not have the contingency symmetry bias. Importantly, language is founded on the symmetrical relationship between symbols and referents, and the contingency symmetry bias plays a key role in word learning. A critical problem for the ontogenesis of language is whether the contingency symmetry bias has been acquired through the experience of word learning or if it is present before infants begin word learning. Using a habituation switch paradigm, 8-month-old human infants and adult chimpanzees were familiarized with two object-then-movement sequences, whereby Object A (or B) was always paired with Movement A (or B). At test, the order of the contingency was reversed. The infants showed surprise when observing the violation of the object-movement pairings in the reversed sequence (Experiment 1). In contrast, despite the chimpanzees being able to detect the violation of the pairings in the original direction (Experiment 2a), they did not discriminate the learned and novel pairings when the order of the contingency was reversed (Experiment 2b). The results suggest that the contingency symmetry bias is a uniquely human cognitive bias, one which plays a critical role for language acquisition ontogenetically. This contingency symmetry bias likely gives humans a great advantage, by enabling them to rapidly expand their knowledge without direct training and making them strikingly different from other animal species. (250 words).

Dogs accurately track a moving object on a screen and anticipate its destination

The prediction of upcoming events is of importance not only to humans and non-human primates but also to other animals that live in complex environments with lurking threats or moving prey. In this study, we examined motion tracking and anticipatory looking in dogs in two eye-tracking experiments. In Experiment 1, we presented pet dogs (N = 14) with a video depicting how two players threw a Frisbee back and forth multiple times. The horizontal movement of the Frisbee explained a substantial amount of variance of the dogs' horizontal eye movements. With increasing duration of the video, the dogs looked at the catcher before the Frisbee arrived. In Experiment 2, we showed the dogs (N = 12) the same video recording. This time, however, we froze and rewound parts of the video to examine how the dogs would react to surprising events (i.e., the Frisbee hovering in midair and reversing its direction). The Frisbee again captured the dogs' attention, particularly when the video was frozen and rewound for the first time. Additionally, the dogs looked faster at the catcher when the video moved forward compared to when it was rewound. We conclude that motion tracking and anticipatory looking paradigms provide promising tools for future cognitive research with canids.

Phylogeny and ontogeny of mental time

Humans have mental time in our mind, apart from physical time that is a part of system that governs the physical world, and memory is our key cognitive ability for recognizing the passage of time. Recent studies have suggested that the memory system of several nonhuman animals may have an incidental nature, which is also a feature of episodic memory. In addition, apes, which are phylogenetically close to humans, have an ability to remember a single past event. In the case of humans, preverbal infants under the age of two are able to retain long-term memory of a single event and apply it to predict a future event. Thus, nonhuman animals and preverbal human infants both have their own specific mental time travel abilities, and there is a phylogenetic and ontogenic basis of full-fledged mental time travel that can be found in human adults.

A review of research in primate sanctuaries

While non-human primate studies have long been conducted in laboratories, and more recently at zoological parks, sanctuaries are increasingly considered a viable setting for research. Accredited sanctuaries in non-range countries house thousands of primates formerly used as subjects of medical research, trained performers or personal pets. In range countries, however, sanctuaries typically house orphaned primates confiscated from illegal poaching and the bushmeat and pet trafficking trades. Although the primary mission of these sanctuaries is to rescue and rehabilitate residents, many of these organizations are increasingly willing to participate in non-invasive research. Notably, from a scientific standpoint, most sanctuaries provide potential advantages over traditional settings, such as large, naturalistic physical and social environments which may result in more relevant models of primates' free-ranging wild counterparts than other captive settings. As a result, an impressive scope of research in the fields of primate behaviour, cognition, veterinary science, genetics and physiology have been studied in sanctuaries. In this review, we examine the range and form of research that has been conducted at accredited sanctuaries around the world. We also describe the potential challenges of sanctuary-based work and the considerations that external researchers may face when deciding to collaborate with primate sanctuaries on their research projects.

Are the roots of human economic systems shared with non-human primates?

We review and analyze evidence for an evolutionary rooting of human economic behaviors and organization in non-human primates. Rather than focusing on the direct application of economic models that a priori account for animal decision behavior, we adopt an inductive definition of economic behavior in terms of the contribution of individual cognitive capacities to the provision of resources within an exchange structure. We spell out to what extent non-human primates' individual and strategic decision behaviors are shared with humans. We focus on the ability to trade, through barter or token-mediated exchanges, as a landmark of an economic system among members of the same species. It is an open question why only humans have reached a high level of economic sophistication. While primates have many of the necessary cognitive abilities (symbolic and computational) in isolation, one plausible issue we identify is the limits in exerting cognitive control to combine several sources of information. The difference between human and non-human primates' economies might well then be in degree rather than kind.

Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent's action in a false-belief test

Human social life depends on theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others. A signature of theory of mind, false belief understanding, requires representing others' views of the world, even when they conflict with one's own. After decades of research, it remains controversial whether any nonhuman species possess a theory of mind. One challenge to positive evidence of animal theory of mind, the behavior-rule account, holds that animals solve such tasks by responding to others' behavioral cues rather than their mental states. We distinguish these hypotheses by implementing a version of the "goggles" test, which asks whether, in the absence of any additional behavioral cues, animals can use their own self-experience of a novel barrier being translucent or opaque to determine whether another agent can see through the same barrier. We incorporated this paradigm into an established anticipatory-looking false-belief test for great apes. In a between-subjects design, apes experienced a novel barrier as either translucent or opaque, although both looked identical from afar. While being eye tracked, all apes then watched a video in which an actor saw an object hidden under 1 of 2 identical boxes. The actor then scuttled behind the novel barrier, at which point the object was relocated and then removed. Only apes who experienced the barrier as opaque visually anticipated that the actor would mistakenly search for the object in its previous location. Great apes, therefore, appeared to attribute differential visual access based specifically on their own past perceptual experience to anticipate an agent's actions in a false-belief test.

Innovative problem solving in great apes: the role of visual feedback in the floating peanut task

Nonhuman great apes show remarkable behavioural flexibility. Some individuals are even able to use water as a tool: They spit water into a vertical tube to make a peanut float upwards until it comes into reach (floating peanut task; FPT). In the current study, we used the FPT to investigate how visual feedback, an end-state demonstration and a social demonstration affect task performance in nonhuman great apes in three experiments. Our results indicate that apes who had acquired the solution with a clear tube maintained it with an opaque one. However, apes starting with an opaque tube failed to solve the task. Additionally, facing the peanut floating on a water-filled tube (i.e., an end-state demonstration) promoted success independent on the availability of visual feedback. Moreover, experiencing how water was poured into the tube either by a human demonstrator or by a water tap that had been opened either by the ape or a human did not seem to be of further assistance. First, this study suggests that great apes require visual feedback for solving the FPT, which is no longer required after the initial acquisition. Second, some subjects benefit from encountering the end-state, a finding corroborating previous studies.

Long-Term Memory of Past Events in Great Apes

It has been claimed that the ability to recall personal past events is uniquely human. We review recent evidence that great apes can remember specific events for long periods of time, spanning months and even years, and that such memories can be enhanced by distinctiveness (irrespective of reinforcement) and follow a forgetting curve similar to that in humans. Moreover, recall is enhanced when apes are presented with features that are diagnostic of the event, consistent with notions of encoding specificity and cue overload in human memory. These findings are also consistent with the involuntary retrieval of past events in humans, a mode of remembering that is thought to be less cognitively demanding than voluntary retrieval. Taken together, these findings reveal further similarities between the way humans and animals remember past events and open new avenues of research on long-term memory in nonhuman animals.

Time-space-displaced responses in the orangutan vocal system

One of the defining features of language is displaced reference-the capacity to transmit information about something that is not present or about a past or future event. It is very rare in nature and has not been shown in any nonhuman primate, confounding, as such, any understanding of its precursors and evolution in the human lineage. Here, we describe a vocal phenomenon in a wild great ape with unparalleled affinities with displaced reference. When exposed to predator models, Sumatran orangutan mothers temporarily suppressed alarm calls up to 20 min until the model was out of sight. Subjects delayed their vocal responses in function of perceived danger for themselves, but four major predictions for stress-based mechanisms were not met. Conversely, vocal delay was also a function of perceived danger for another-an infant-suggesting high-order cognition. Our findings suggest that displaced reference in language is likely to have originally piggybacked on akin behaviors in an ancestral hominid.

Comparing chimpanzees' preparatory responses to known and unknown future outcomes

When humans plan for the future, we recognize not only that one particular event may occur, but that the future can have different, mutually exclusive possible outcomes. A recent study by Suddendorf et al (Suddendorf 2017 Biol. Lett. 13, 20170170 (doi:10.1098/rsbl.2017.0170)) suggests that young children (less than 3 years) and apes lack this capacity, as demonstrated by their failure to cover each of two tube openings to ensure catching an object that would drop randomly from one of the tubes. Before drawing conclusions based on these negative results, however, it is important to assess subjects' failures and test the reliability of the task itself. To explore whether the apes' performance resulted from an inability to represent mutually exclusive futures or from extraneous factors related to the task, we replicated the methods of Suddendorf et al (Suddendorf 2017 Biol. Lett. 13, 20170170 (doi:10.1098/rsbl.2017.0170)) with a group of six chimpanzees but included a key control condition in which subjects were expected to cover both tubes on every trial (i.e. the rewards would consistently emerge from both tubes). We show that even in this straightforward condition in which the outcome of the trial was known, only four of the six subjects ever covered both tubes, typically doing so after a minimum of 17 trials, and often reverting back to covering one tube on later trials. We conclude that this task is not valid for testing the ability to represent mutually exclusive futures. We discuss what potential factors may explain the results and outline a new suggested method to continue testing for this capacity in the future.

Primate social attention: Species differences and effects of individual experience in humans, great apes, and macaques

When viewing social scenes, humans and nonhuman primates focus on particular features, such as the models' eyes, mouth, and action targets. Previous studies reported that such viewing patterns vary significantly across individuals in humans, and also across closely-related primate species. However, the nature of these individual and species differences remains unclear, particularly among nonhuman primates. In large samples of human and nonhuman primates, we examined species differences and the effects of experience on patterns of gaze toward social movies. Experiment 1 examined the species differences across rhesus macaques, nonhuman apes (bonobos, chimpanzees, and orangutans), and humans while they viewed movies of various animals' species-typical behaviors. We found that each species had distinct viewing patterns of the models' faces, eyes, mouths, and action targets. Experiment 2 tested the effect of individuals' experience on chimpanzee and human viewing patterns. We presented movies depicting natural behaviors of chimpanzees to three groups of chimpanzees (individuals from a zoo, a sanctuary, and a research institute) differing in their early social and physical experiences. We also presented the same movies to human adults and children differing in their expertise with chimpanzees (experts vs. novices) or movie-viewing generally (adults vs. preschoolers). Individuals varied within each species in their patterns of gaze toward models' faces, eyes, mouths, and action targets depending on their unique individual experiences. We thus found that the viewing patterns for social stimuli are both individual- and species-specific in these closely-related primates. Such individual/species-specificities are likely related to both individual experience and species-typical temperament, suggesting that primate individuals acquire their unique attentional biases through both ontogeny and evolution. Such unique attentional biases may help them learn efficiently about their particular social environments.

Non-goal-directed recall of specific events in apes after long delays

We examined if apes spontaneously remember one-time, distinctive events across long delays when probed by discriminant cues. Apes witnessed an experimenter hide a cache of food, which they could then retrieve. They retrieved one of two food types; one more distinctive than the other. Two, 10 or 50 weeks later, the apes returned to the same enclosure and found a piece of the previously hidden food on the ground. An experimenter who had not hidden the food was also present. Apes immediately searched the location where the food was previously hidden (no food was here), showing recall of the event. One week later, apes returned to the same enclosure, with the same food on the ground, but now the experimenter that had hidden the food was present. Again, apes immediately searched the hiding location. Apes that had not witnessed the hiding event did not search. There was no significant effect of food type, and retention declined from exposure to the two-week delay, then levelled, consistent with the forgetting curve in humans (Ebbinghaus, H. 1964 Memory: a contribution to experimental psychology (transl. H.A. Ruger & C.E. Bussenvis). New York, NY: Dover. (Original work published 1885.)). This is the first study to show apes can recall a one-time, non-goal-directed event longer than two weeks ago and that apes' recall declines in accordance with a standard retention function.

Great apes anticipate that other individuals will act according to false beliefs

Humans operate with a "theory of mind" with which they are able to understand that others' actions are driven not by reality but by beliefs about reality, even when those beliefs are false. Although great apes share with humans many social-cognitive skills, they have repeatedly failed experimental tests of such false-belief understanding. We use an anticipatory looking test (originally developed for human infants) to show that three species of great apes reliably look in anticipation of an agent acting on a location where he falsely believes an object to be, even though the apes themselves know that the object is no longer there. Our results suggest that great apes also operate, at least on an implicit level, with an understanding of false beliefs.

Development of long-term event memory in preverbal infants: an eye-tracking study

The development of long-term event memory in preverbal infants remains elusive. To address this issue, we applied an eye-tracking method that successfully revealed in great apes that they have long-term memory of single events. Six-, 12-, 18- and 24-month-old infants watched a video story in which an aggressive ape-looking character came out from one of two identical doors. While viewing the same video again 24 hours later, 18- and 24-month-old infants anticipatorily looked at the door where the character would show up before it actually came out, but 6- and 12-month-old infants did not. Next, 12-, 18- and 24-month-old infants watched a different video story, in which a human grabbed one of two objects to hit back at the character. In their second viewing after a 24-hour delay, 18- and 24-month-old infants increased viewing time on the objects before the character grabbed one. In this viewing, 24-month-old infants preferentially looked at the object that the human had used, but 18-month-old infants did not show such preference. Our results show that infants at 18 months of age have developed long-term event memory, an ability to encode and retrieve a one-time event and this ability is elaborated thereafter.

Eye tracking uncovered great apes' ability to anticipate that other individuals will act according to false beliefs

Using a novel eye-tracking test, we recently showed that great apes anticipate that other individuals will act according to false beliefs. This finding suggests that, like humans, great apes understand others' false beliefs, at least in an implicit way. One key question raised by our study is why apes have passed our tests but not previous ones. In this article, we consider this question by detailing the development of our task. We considered 3 major differences in our task compared with the previous ones. First, we monitored apes' eye movements, and specifically their anticipatory looks, to measure their predictions about how agents will behave. Second, we adapted our design from an anticipatory-looking false belief test originally developed for human infants. Third, we developed novel test scenarios that were specifically designed to capture the attention of our ape participants. We then discuss how each difference may help explain differences in performance on our task and previous ones, and finally propose some directions for future studies.

Social Models Enhance Apes' Memory for Novel Events

Nonhuman primates are more likely to learn from the actions of a social model than a non-social "ghost display", however the mechanism underlying this effect is still unknown. One possibility is that live models are more engaging, drawing increased attention to social stimuli. However, recent research with humans has suggested that live models fundamentally alter memory, not low-level attention. In the current study, we developed a novel eye-tracking paradigm to disentangle the influence of social context on attention and memory in apes. Tested in two conditions, zoo-housed apes (2 gorillas, 5 chimpanzees) were familiarized to videos of a human hand (social condition) and mechanical claw (non-social condition) constructing a three-block tower. During the memory test, subjects viewed side-by-side pictures of the previously-constructed block tower and a novel block tower. In accordance with looking-time paradigms, increased looking time to the novel block tower was used to measure event memory. Apes evidenced memory for the event featuring a social model, though not for the non-social condition. This effect was not dependent on attention differences to the videos. These findings provide the first evidence that, like humans, social stimuli increase nonhuman primates' event memory, which may aid in information transmission via social learning.

What Cognitive Representations Support Primate Theory of Mind?

Much recent work has examined the evolutionary origins of human mental state representations. This work has yielded strikingly consistent results: primates show a sophisticated ability to track the current and past perceptions of others, but they fail to represent the beliefs of others. We offer a new account of the nuanced performance of primates in theory of mind (ToM) tasks. We argue that primates form awareness relations tracking the aspects of reality that other agents are aware of. We contend that these awareness relations allow primates to make accurate predictions in social situations, but that this capacity falls short of our human-like representational ToM. We end by explaining how this new account makes important new empirical predictions about primate ToM.

Animal Memory: Chimpanzees Anticipate What Comes Next in Short Movies

A recent study shows that chimpanzees remember a movie they viewed one day earlier, and their eye movements show that they anticipate certain actions in that movie before those actions occur by looking to parts of the scene that are about to become relevant to the storyline.