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Chiu G, Gilbert SJ. Influence of the physical effort of reminder-setting on strategic offloading of delayed intentions. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2024; 77:1295-1311. [PMID: 37642279 PMCID: PMC11103908 DOI: 10.1177/17470218231199977] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/28/2023] [Revised: 07/26/2023] [Accepted: 07/29/2023] [Indexed: 08/31/2023]
Abstract
Intention offloading involves using external reminders such as diaries, to-do lists, and digital alerts to help us remember delayed intentions. Recent studies have provided evidence for various cognitive and metacognitive factors that guide intention offloading, but little research has investigated the physical cost of reminder-setting itself. Here, we present two pre-registered experiments investigating how the cost of physical effort associated with reminder-setting influences strategic intention offloading under different levels of memory load. At all memory loads, reminder-setting was reduced when it was more effortful. The ability to set reminders allowed participants to compensate for the influence of memory load on accuracy in the low-effort condition; this effect was attenuated in the high-effort condition. In addition, there was evidence that participants with less confidence in their memory abilities were more likely to set reminders. Contrary to prediction, physical effort had the greatest effect on reminder-setting at intermediate memory loads. We speculate that the physical costs of reminder-setting might have the greatest impact when participants are uncertain about their strategy choice. These results demonstrate the importance of physical effort as one of the factors relevant to cost-benefit decision-making about cognitive offloading strategies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gavin Chiu
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, WC1N 3AZ, UK
| | - Sam J Gilbert
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, WC1N 3AZ, UK
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2
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Iley C, Medimorec S. Children's metacognition and cognitive offloading in an immediate memory task. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 2024:10.1007/s00426-024-01978-1. [PMID: 38806733 DOI: 10.1007/s00426-024-01978-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/18/2024] [Accepted: 05/16/2024] [Indexed: 05/30/2024]
Abstract
Cognitive offloading is used to supplement internal processing demands through external actions such as writing down information. While metacognition plays a critical role in adults' cognitive offloading decisions, less is known about the relation between metacognition and cognitive offloading in children. Here, we introduced an immediate memory task to 11- to 12-year-olds under two conditions: no choice to offload and choice to offload. Participants made metacognitive judgements about their memory capacity, and the task performance components such as accuracy and effort. Our results revealed that recall accuracy of the to-be-remembered items increased in the choice condition. Interestingly, while there was a consensus amongst participants that they chose to offload to maximise accuracy and reduce effort, there was no relation between offloading behaviour and metacognitions about accuracy and effort. On the other hand, metacognition for memory capacity was related to offloading behaviour. We discuss the implications for further understanding of the relation between cognitive offloading and metacognition in children.
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3
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Radnan MJ, Nicholson R, Brookman R, Harris CB. Memory compensation strategies in everyday life: similarities and differences between younger and older adults. Sci Rep 2023; 13:8404. [PMID: 37225766 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-34815-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/21/2023] [Accepted: 05/08/2023] [Indexed: 05/26/2023] Open
Abstract
Memory compensation strategies serve an important role in everyday functioning, especially in the face of cognitive decline. Research on the external memory compensation strategies employed by older adults has focused almost entirely on non-digital tools. Less is known about how memory compensation strategies might have changed due to the rapid and widespread uptake of digital technologies. In the current research, 208 younger adults and 114 older adults freely reported what internal or external memory strategy or tool they would use to accomplish 20 different everyday memory tasks. Participants' responses were coded as involving either internal (e.g. using a mnemonic) or external (e.g. writing a list) strategies, and then underwent further categorisation to classify types of internal and external strategies (e.g. digital or physical tool). Findings indicated that external strategies were much more prevalent than internal strategies for both younger and older adults, and that digital compensation strategies were prevalent for both age groups. There were age differences such that older adults reported more strategies overall, and were less likely to report digital tools, more likely to report physical tools, more likely to report environmental tools, and less likely to report social tools than younger adults. Positive attitudes to technology were associated with digital tool use for older but not younger participants. Findings are discussed in terms of existing theories and approaches to studying memory compensation strategies and cognitive offloading.
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Affiliation(s)
- Madeleine J Radnan
- The MARCS Institute for Brain, Behaviour, and Development, Western Sydney University, Penrith, Australia
| | - Riley Nicholson
- The MARCS Institute for Brain, Behaviour, and Development, Western Sydney University, Penrith, Australia
| | - Ruth Brookman
- The MARCS Institute for Brain, Behaviour, and Development, Western Sydney University, Penrith, Australia
| | - Celia B Harris
- The MARCS Institute for Brain, Behaviour, and Development, Western Sydney University, Penrith, Australia.
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Abstract
How do we remember delayed intentions? Three decades of research into prospective memory have provided insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in this form of memory. However, we depend on more than just our brains to remember intentions. We also use external props and tools such as calendars and diaries, strategically placed objects, and technologies such as smartphone alerts. This is known as 'intention offloading'. Despite the progress in our understanding of brain-based prospective memory, we know much less about the role of intention offloading in individuals' ability to fulfil delayed intentions. Here, we review recent research into intention offloading, with a particular focus on how individuals decide between storing intentions in internal memory versus external reminders. We also review studies investigating how intention offloading changes across the lifespan and how it relates to underlying brain mechanisms. We conclude that intention offloading is highly effective, experimentally tractable, and guided by metacognitive processes. Individuals have systematic biases in their offloading strategies that are stable over time. Evidence also suggests that individual differences and developmental changes in offloading strategies are driven at least in part by metacognitive processes. Therefore, metacognitive interventions could play an important role in promoting individuals' adaptive use of cognitive tools.
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5
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Kelly MO, Risko EF. Study effort and the memory cost of external store availability. Cognition 2022; 228:105228. [PMID: 35905543 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105228] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/26/2021] [Revised: 06/18/2022] [Accepted: 07/16/2022] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
Previous work demonstrates that individuals often recall less information if, at study, there is expectation that an external memory store will be available at test. One explanation for this effect is that when individuals can expect access to an external memory store, they forgo intentional, controlled efforts at encoding. The present work offers a novel test of this account by examining study effort, indexed by study time and self-reported strategy use, as a function of instructed external store availability. In two preregistered experiments, participants studied lists of to-be-remembered items for a free recall test and were either instructed that they could use their study list to support them at test or that they could not. Critically, participants controlled their own study time, and no participant had their study list at test, regardless of instruction. Consistent with the effort at encoding account, external store availability influenced both study time and strategy use, and there was evidence that these effects mediated the influence of external store availability on recall performance. Interestingly, much of the memory cost remained when controlling for study effort, thus, suggesting that the cost is potentially multiply determined.
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Grinschgl S, Neubauer AC. Supporting Cognition With Modern Technology: Distributed Cognition Today and in an AI-Enhanced Future. Front Artif Intell 2022; 5:908261. [PMID: 35910191 PMCID: PMC9329671 DOI: 10.3389/frai.2022.908261] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/30/2022] [Accepted: 06/24/2022] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
In the present article, we explore prospects for using artificial intelligence (AI) to distribute cognition via cognitive offloading (i.e., to delegate thinking tasks to AI-technologies). Modern technologies for cognitive support are rapidly developing and increasingly popular. Today, many individuals heavily rely on their smartphones or other technical gadgets to support their daily life but also their learning and work. For instance, smartphones are used to track and analyze changes in the environment, and to store and continually update relevant information. Thus, individuals can offload (i.e., externalize) information to their smartphones and refresh their knowledge by accessing it. This implies that using modern technologies such as AI empowers users via offloading and enables them to function as always-updated knowledge professionals, so that they can deploy their insights strategically instead of relying on outdated and memorized facts. This AI-supported offloading of cognitive processes also saves individuals' internal cognitive resources by distributing the task demands into their environment. In this article, we provide (1) an overview of empirical findings on cognitive offloading and (2) an outlook on how individuals' offloading behavior might change in an AI-enhanced future. More specifically, we first discuss determinants of offloading such as the design of technical tools and links to metacognition. Furthermore, we discuss benefits and risks of cognitive offloading. While offloading improves immediate task performance, it might also be a threat for users' cognitive abilities. Following this, we provide a perspective on whether individuals will make heavier use of AI-technologies for offloading in the future and how this might affect their cognition. On one hand, individuals might heavily rely on easily accessible AI-technologies which in return might diminish their internal cognition/learning. On the other hand, individuals might aim at enhancing their cognition so that they can keep up with AI-technologies and will not be replaced by them. Finally, we present own data and findings from the literature on the assumption that individuals' personality is a predictor of trust in AI. Trust in modern AI-technologies might be a strong determinant for wider appropriation and dependence on these technologies to distribute cognition and should thus be considered in an AI-enhanced future.
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Armitage KL, Taylor AH, Suddendorf T, Redshaw J. Young children spontaneously devise an optimal external solution to a cognitive problem. Dev Sci 2021; 25:e13204. [PMID: 34846761 DOI: 10.1111/desc.13204] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/04/2021] [Revised: 09/12/2021] [Accepted: 11/16/2021] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
Metacognition plays an essential role in adults' cognitive offloading decisions. Despite possessing basic metacognitive capacities, however, preschool-aged children often fail to offload effectively. Here, we introduced 3- to 5-year-olds to a novel search task in which they were unlikely to perform optimally across trials without setting external reminders about the location of a target. Children watched as an experimenter first hid a target in one of three identical opaque containers. The containers were then shuffled out of view before children had to guess where the target was hidden. In the test phase, children could perform perfectly by simply placing a marker in a transparent jar attached to the target container prior to shuffling, and then later selecting the marked container. Children of all ages used this external strategy above chance levels if they had seen it demonstrated to them, but only the 4- and 5-year-olds independently devised the strategy to improve their future performance. These results suggest that, when necessary for optimal performance, even 4- and 5-year-olds can use metacognitive knowledge about their own future uncertainty to deploy effective external solutions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kristy L Armitage
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
| | - Alex H Taylor
- School of Psychology, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
| | - Thomas Suddendorf
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
| | - Jonathan Redshaw
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
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8
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Liu L, Bulley A, Irish M. Subjective Time in Dementia: A Critical Review. Brain Sci 2021; 11:1502. [PMID: 34827501 PMCID: PMC8616021 DOI: 10.3390/brainsci11111502] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/21/2021] [Revised: 11/04/2021] [Accepted: 11/09/2021] [Indexed: 12/31/2022] Open
Abstract
The capacity for subjective time in humans encompasses the perception of time's unfolding from moment to moment, as well as the ability to traverse larger temporal expanses of past- and future-oriented thought via mental time travel. Disruption in time perception can result in maladaptive outcomes-from the innocuous lapse in timing that leads to a burnt piece of toast, to the grievous miscalculation that produces a traffic accident-while disruption to mental time travel can impact core functions from planning appointments to making long-term decisions. Mounting evidence suggests that disturbances to both time perception and mental time travel are prominent in dementia syndromes. Given that such disruptions can have severe consequences for independent functioning in everyday life, here we aim to provide a comprehensive exposition of subjective timing dysfunction in dementia, with a view to informing the management of such disturbances. We consider the neurocognitive mechanisms underpinning changes to both time perception and mental time travel across different dementia disorders. Moreover, we explicate the functional implications of altered subjective timing by reference to two key and representative adaptive capacities: prospective memory and intertemporal decision-making. Overall, our review sheds light on the transdiagnostic implications of subjective timing disturbances in dementia and highlights the high variability in performance across clinical syndromes and functional domains.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lulu Liu
- School of Psychology, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia; (L.L.); (A.B.)
- Brain and Mind Centre, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2050, Australia
| | - Adam Bulley
- School of Psychology, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia; (L.L.); (A.B.)
- Brain and Mind Centre, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2050, Australia
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Boston, MA 02138, USA
| | - Muireann Irish
- School of Psychology, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia; (L.L.); (A.B.)
- Brain and Mind Centre, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2050, Australia
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Armitage KL, Redshaw J. Children boost their cognitive performance with a novel offloading technique. Child Dev 2021; 93:25-38. [PMID: 34510416 DOI: 10.1111/cdev.13664] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/14/2020] [Revised: 05/26/2021] [Accepted: 07/05/2021] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Ninety-seven children aged 4-11 (49 males, 48 females, mostly White) were given the opportunity to improve their problem-solving performance by devising and implementing a novel cognitive offloading strategy. Across two phases, they searched for hidden rewards using maps that were either aligned or misaligned with the search space. In the second phase, maps were presented on rotatable turntables, thus allowing children to manually align all maps and alleviate mental rotation demand. From age six onwards, children showed strong evidence of both mentally rotating misaligned maps in phase 1 and manually aligning them in phase 2. Older children used this form of cognitive offloading more frequently, which substantially improved performance and eliminated the individual differences observed in phase 1.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kristy L Armitage
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Saint Lucia, Queensland, Australia
| | - Jonathan Redshaw
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Saint Lucia, Queensland, Australia
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10
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Grinschgl S, Papenmeier F, Meyerhoff HS. Consequences of cognitive offloading: Boosting performance but diminishing memory. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2021; 74:1477-1496. [PMID: 33752519 PMCID: PMC8358584 DOI: 10.1177/17470218211008060] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
Modern technical tools such as tablets allow for the temporal externalisation of working memory processes (i.e., cognitive offloading). Although such externalisations support immediate performance on different tasks, little is known about potential long-term consequences of offloading behaviour. In the current set of experiments, we studied the relationship between cognitive offloading and subsequent memory for the offloaded information as well as the interplay of this relationship with the goal to acquire new memory representations. Our participants solved the Pattern Copy Task, in which we manipulated the costs of cognitive offloading and the awareness of a subsequent memory test. In Experiment 1 (N = 172), we showed that increasing the costs for offloading induces reduced offloading behaviour. This reduction in offloading came along with lower immediate task performance but more accurate memory in an unexpected test. In Experiment 2 (N = 172), we confirmed these findings and observed that offloading behaviour remained detrimental for subsequent memory performance when participants were aware of the upcoming memory test. Interestingly, Experiment 3 (N = 172) showed that cognitive offloading is not detrimental for long-term memory formation under all circumstances. Those participants who were forced to offload maximally but were aware of the memory test could almost completely counteract the negative impact of offloading on memory. Our experiments highlight the importance of the explicit goal to acquire new memory representations when relying on technical tools as offloading did have detrimental effects on memory without such a goal.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sandra Grinschgl
- Department of Psychology, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany.,Department of Psychology, University of Graz, Graz, Austria
| | - Frank Papenmeier
- Department of Psychology, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany
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Suddendorf T, Kirkland K, Bulley A, Redshaw J, Langley MC. It's in the bag: mobile containers in human evolution and child development. EVOLUTIONARY HUMAN SCIENCES 2020; 2:e48. [PMID: 37588341 PMCID: PMC10427442 DOI: 10.1017/ehs.2020.47] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022] Open
Abstract
Mobile containers are a keystone human innovation. Ethnographic data indicate that all human groups use containers such as bags, quivers and baskets, ensuring that individuals have important resources at the ready and are prepared for opportunities and threats before they materialize. Although there is speculation surrounding the invention of carrying devices, the current hard archaeological evidence only reaches back some 100,000 years. The dearth of ancient evidence may reflect not only taphonomic processes, but also a lack of attention to these devices. To begin investigating the origins of carrying devices we focus on exploring the basic cognitive processes involved in mobile container use and report an initial study on young children's understanding and deployment of such devices. We gave 3- to 7-year-old children (N = 106) the opportunity to spontaneously identify and use a basket to increase their own carrying capacity and thereby obtain more resources in the future. Performance improved linearly with age, as did the likelihood of recognizing that adults use mobile carrying devices to increase carrying capacity. We argue that the evolutionary and developmental origins of mobile containers reflect foundational cognitive processes that enable humans to think about their own limits and compensate for them.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Suddendorf
- Centre for Psychology and Evolution, School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, St Lucia4072, Australia
| | - Kelly Kirkland
- Centre for Psychology and Evolution, School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, St Lucia4072, Australia
| | - Adam Bulley
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA02138, USA
- The University of Sydney, School of Psychology and Brain and Mind Centre, NSW2050, Australia
| | - Jonathan Redshaw
- Centre for Psychology and Evolution, School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, St Lucia4072, Australia
| | - Michelle C. Langley
- Australian Research Centre for Human Evolution, Environmental Futures Research Institute, Griffith University, Nathan4111, Australia
- Forensics and Archaeology, School of Environment and Science, Griffith University, Nathan4111, Australia
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