The UK National DNA Database: Implementation of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012

Establishment of a national DNA database in the Republic of Serbia: Legal aspects and implications for the future

Forensic DNA databases have been established in the vast majority of European countries and represent an essential personal identification instrument in the criminal justice system. The implementation of suitable legislation and accompanying legal practice is an imperative to ensure sensible use of the DNA repository, without interfering with the rights, freedoms and privacy of individuals and their families. Thus, the complex matter of DNA databank effectiveness and intrusiveness is a delicate balancing act, which has resulted in diverse database governing regimes among different countries. In 2018, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia passed the first Law on the National DNA Register, which was created by the Ministry of Interior. This short and imprecise regulation was announced without prior consultation with professional stakeholders or the public, resulting in controversy. In this article, we examine essential questions pertinent to launching a forensic DNA database through the lens of the new Law on the National DNA Register in the Republic of Serbia and in comparison to the other European approaches and guidelines to regulating forensic DNA repositories. We further discuss the resulting legal, social and ethical implications and concerns and propose future actions intended to improve the legal framework. We believe that stimulating such discussions throughout the scientific and professional community will result in the advancement of DNA profiling and databasing in a future European Union member state and, more generally, the manner in which biological data are managed in various countries, particularly those that are developing.

The evolution, devolution and distribution of UK Biometric Imaginaries

This article critically examines UK biometric policymaking by charting the bodies identified by the 2018 Home Office Biometric Strategy as playing key roles in the oversight of biometric data used in law enforcement and other related functions. The article argues that oversight actors are embedded in biometric imaginaries promoted by the UK Home Office and the devolved Scottish administration. By mapping oversight of UK biometrics policy together with developments in Scotland, the article challenges sociotechnical imaginaries studies which assume the power of national governments to project dominant, cohesive and instrumental visions. The article peels away that image to reveal UK biometric policy as located within a patchwork in which embedded commissioners, regulators and advisors challenge biometric imaginaries through interpretive flexibility and standpoint. By identifying technical, operational, legislative and ethical issues, these actors challenge the UK government imaginary and act as channels of critique between it and wider stakeholder communities. The article further challenges assumptions concerning the cohesion of national imaginaries by highlighting a diverging approach to biometric governance in Scotland. The article uses these observations to sketch a means to further characterise the notion of the biometric imaginary and to address biometric policymaking more widely.

Towards a reformed policy for immigrant DNA tests, a commentary

DNA can be useful corroborative evidence in establishing familial relationship in immigration cases. Presently, there is no specific law in the UK regulating the use of DNA in this domain. This has led to inconsistencies in policy guidance and the rejection of some immigrant applications solely or partly due to a lack of DNA evidence. This commentary draws on the DNA regulatory regime in law enforcement to make a case for a specific DNA immigration law to protect individual rights, assure fairness and trust in the treatment of applicants. In addition to a specific law, consistency in operations should be ensured by developing a central point of contact for guidance including a central IT system, and a custodian of the DNA application process. Further, a single code of practice and conduct is proposed to ensure that guidance products are in line with the law and practice. An independent multi-stakeholder board is also recommended to ensure that policies are representative of the views of applicants and their relatives; policy officers and operational staff; and policymakers and the public.

Affected for good or for evil: The formation of issue-publics that relate to the UK National DNA Database

The United Kingdom has a long tradition of collecting and storing DNA data for criminal identification purposes. The development of the UK National Criminal Intelligence DNA Database has been accompanied by public controversies. Building on recent developments in Science and Technology Studies on public engagement, we elaborate on the concept of emergent and co-produced issue-publics. We explore which different types of issues affect and mobilize publics along the historical development of the National Criminal Intelligence DNA Database, and how publics take shape alongside the institutionalization of regulatory and governance solutions. We identify three related issue-publics: a 'biological citizen issue-public' concerned with human and civil rights regarding the collection of biological material; a 'watchdog issue-public' that emerges to identify the problems surrounding a lack of civic accountability; and a 'co-decision making issue-public', including the stakeholders who advise on decisions relating to the database.

The Prüm Decisions as an Aspirational regime: Reviewing a Decade of Cross-Border Exchange and Comparison of Forensic DNA Data

The automatic exchange and comparison of DNA data between national databases to combat terrorism and cross-border crime in the EU area has been facilitated by the 2008 Prüm Decisions. While it was anticipated that all EU Member States would have fulfilled the requirements by August 2011, this has not yet occurred. Once each Member State has implemented the Prüm Decisions, which is expected to occur by spring or summer 2019, the EU Commission is planning on submitting a legislative proposal to amend the Prüm Decisions, possibly broadening its scope both in terms of types of data exchanged and the number of countries involved. Therefore, it is a timely place to review the available literature on the existing data on the cross-border exchange and comparison of DNA. However, due to the limited amount of available data regarding the Prüm regime's contribution to combating crime and terrorism, this article reviews national DNA databases' contribution to national criminal justice systems before it turns to the Prüm regime. Outlining how Prüm represents an "aspirational regime" focused on a secure and safe future, we draft recommendations directed towards rendering cross-border exchange of DNA data more transparent and accountable.

The effectiveness of the UK national DNA database

Since the emergence of forensic DNA profiling and the corollary creation of DNA databases, efforts to maximise the efficiency and utility of DNA technology have intensified. Such efforts are expedient given the imperative that expenditure on DNA should be cost-effective and the benefits demonstrable. The practice of retaining DNA profiles in databases, either obtained from individuals involved in criminal investigations, or retrieved from suspected crime scenes, has spread globally. The UK's National DNA Database (NDNAD), created in 1995, is both one of the longest established, and biggest of such forensic DNA databases internationally. As such, it is instructive to look at whether there is evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of this DNA database. This paper thus examines efforts to gauge the effectiveness of forensic DNA databases, concluding that while the UK NDNAD may have led directly to convictions in high profile crimes, its broader impact upon public security goals remains elusive.

Trends in forensic DNA database: transnational exchange of DNA data

The transnational exchange of forensic DNA data has become a modern trend in fighting cross-border crime, terrorism and illegal immigration. Forensic DNA data allow the police to identify, eliminate or link individuals associated with a crime. Additionally, different crime scenes can be linked via the DNA profile to identify serial offenders or determine crime patterns. Approaches to the transnational exchange of DNA data can be categorized into four: (1) creation of an international DNA database, (2) linked or networked national DNA databases, (3) request-based exchange of data, and (4) a combination of these. Most countries operate the combination system of data exchange. This paper briefly introduces the different approaches in the transnational sharing of forensic DNA data, the legislative and operational framework, pattern of data exchange and participating states, and policy challenges associated with data sharing. Generally, most DNA exchange systems are modelled as the European Union Prüm regime. This operates under two stages: hit/no-hit query and further information sharing. The scope of the data exchange is governed by individual national legislation that determines the type of information that can be shared and the national authority responsible for the system. Though DNA data exchange has been instrumental in resolving serious crimes such as gang and serial rape, and armed robbery, adequate information about their overall effectiveness and efficiency is lacking. Further, operational, legal and ethical challenges including issues of privacy and proportionality appear to limit the full potential of the DNA data exchange system.

Forensic DNA retention: Public perspective studies in the United Kingdom and around the world

This review analysed public perspective studies on forensic DNA retention in the United Kingdom and around the world. The studies generally show strong public support for the long-term or indefinite retention of DNA from convicts and suspects. There is considerable support for the retention of DNA from all or some arrestees and potentially the entire population. This was predicated upon the belief that forensic DNA databases have crime-solving abilities, which the public rate highly. In the UK, it was found that the current Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 regime is broadly representative of the recommendations of the surveyed British public. Nevertheless, the studies highlighted a gap in forensic DNA education among the public, suggesting that public views may not be well informed. Overall, there was clear evidence of privacy concerns and the potential misuse of DNA records among the public, with a significant number opposing the retention of DNA from the innocent. It was found that most of the studies were qualitative or non-representative of the relevant population, limiting the generalisation of the results. There was also limited studies among a representative sample of primary stakeholders who are well-informed or directly exposed to the benefits, challenges and risks associated with DNA retention. A research into stakeholders rating of different forensic DNA retention regimes is therefore highly recommended. This is important because the studies suggest divergent views among criminal justice professionals and other members of the public, with the former expressing expansive views and the latter expressing restrictive views. The primary stakeholder's survey will help establish whether the relevant safeguards have been put in place to protect both public security and individual interests.