Factors affecting infants' manual search for occluded objects and the genesis of object permanence

The emergence of identity, agency and consciousness from the temporal dynamics of neural elaboration

Identity-differentiating self from external reality-and agency-being the author of one's acts-are generally considered intrinsic properties of awareness and looked at as mental constructs generated by consciousness. Here a different view is proposed. All physiological systems display complex time-dependent regulations to adapt or anticipate external changes. To interact with rapid changes, an animal needs a nervous system capable of modelling and predicting (not simply representing) it. Different algorithms must be employed to predict the momentary location of an object based on sensory information (received with a delay), or to design in advance and direct the trajectory of movement. Thus, the temporal dynamics of external events and action must be handled in differential ways, thereby generating the distinction between self and non-self ("identity") as an intrinsic computational construct in neuronal elaboration. Handling time is not what neurons are designed for. Neuronal circuits are based on parallel processing: each bit of information diverges on many neurons, each of which combines it with many other data. Spike firing reports the likelihood that the specific pattern the neuron is designed to respond to is present in the incoming data. This organization seems designed to process synchronous datasets. However, since neural networks can introduce delays in processing, time sequences can be transformed into simultaneous patterns and analysed as such. This way predictive algorithms can be implemented, and continually improved through neuronal plasticity. To successfully interact with the external reality, the nervous system must model and predict, but also differentially handle perceptual functions or motor activity, by putting in register information that becomes available at different time moments. Also, to learn through positive/negative reinforcement, modelling must establish a causal relation between motor control and its consequences: the contrast between phase lag in perception and phase lead (and control) in motor programming produces the emergence of identity (discerning self from surrounding) and agency (control on actions) as necessary computational constructs to model reality. This does not require any form of awareness. In a brain, capable of producing awareness, these constructs may evolve from mere computational requirements into mental (conscious) constructs.

Object Permanence and the Relationship to Sitting Development in Infants With Motor Delays

PURPOSE

This study examines object permanence development in infants with motor delays (MD) compared with infants with typical development (TD) and in relation to sitting skill.

METHODS

Fifty-six infants with MD (mean age = 10 months) and 36 with TD (mean age = 5.7 months) were assessed at baseline and then at 1.5, 3, and 6 months postbaseline. A scale was developed to measure object permanence (Object Permanence Scale [OPS]), and the Gross Motor Function Measure sitting subsection (GMFM-SS), and the Bayley Scales of Infant and Toddler Development, 3rd Edition (Bayley-III) were administered.

RESULTS

Interrater reliability of the OPS was excellent and correlation between the OPS and Bayley-III cognitive scores was moderately positive. Compared with TD, infants with MD were delayed in development of object permanence but demonstrated increased understanding over time and as sitting skills improved.

CONCLUSION

In children with MD, object permanence, as quantified by the OPS, emerges in conjunction with sitting skill.

Subjectivity as an Emergent Property of Information Processing by Neuronal Networks

Here, we examine subjectivity and consciousness as emergent properties of the computational complexity of information processing by the brain, rather than metaphysical phenomena. While Psychology concentrates on the emergent properties and Neurobiology examines the properties of the biological substrate, Neurophysiology and Cognitive Neuroscience link the two levels by investigating the mechanisms and processes by which the functions of the brain emerge from the anatomical, cellular and network properties of the nervous system. Our purpose here is not to locate the neural structures that sustain subjectivity or other psychic functions; rather, we examine the operating modes of neurons and neural circuits: they reveal an intrinsically relational quality; sensory elaboration itself proves to be relational and self-centred, necessarily associated with the vital, hedonic, emotional relevance of each experience and external cue, and intrinsically oriented to a behavioral interaction with the latter. The hippocampus adds to this self-centred relational perspective the capability of transforming the identification and the spatial location of objects into a contextualized representation of reality. Since the hippocampus is strongly interconnected with the archaic structures that evaluate vital and hedonic relevance and generate emotional responses, the contextualized information, emotionally colored, is transformed into a comprehensive individual experience. This way, a subjective, self-centred, affectively colored perspective arises in animals due to the intrinsic properties of neuronal circuits in the brain. We conclude that neuronal network processing is strongly characterized per se by a relational and self-centred (subjective) and emotionally colored, motivationally oriented (personal) perspective. The properties and features of neural processing discussed here constitute well-established knowledge in the neuroscientific community. Yet, from a layman’s perception, subjectivity still mysteriously arises in our brain due to the action of consciousness, and in epistemological and philosophical debates, the question often arises as to how consciousness may add the subjective and personal perspective to neural elaboration. The answer appears to be simple: it does not; subjectivity is already there, present ab initio in neuronal processing and not added a posteriori by some other “consciousness” function of unclear neural basis.

Gaze Following Is Not Dependent on Ostensive Cues: A Critical Test of Natural Pedagogy

The theory of natural pedagogy stipulates that infants follow gaze because they are sensitive to the communicative intent of others. According to this theory, gaze following should be present if, and only if, accompanied by at least one of a set of specific ostensive cues. The current article demonstrates gaze following in a range of contexts, both with and without expressions of communicative intent in a between-subjects design with a large sample of 6-month-old infants (n = 94). Thus, conceptually replicating prior results from Szufnarowska et al. (2014) and falsifying a central pillar of the natural pedagogy theory. The results suggest that there are opportunities to learn from others' gaze independently of their displayed communicative intent.

Sound effects: Multimodal input helps infants find displaced objects

Before 9 months, infants use sound to retrieve a stationary object hidden by darkness but not one hidden by occlusion, suggesting auditory input is more salient in the absence of visual input. This article addresses how audiovisual input affects 10-month-olds' search for displaced objects. In AB tasks, infants who previously retrieved an object at A subsequently fail to find it after it is displaced to B, especially following a delay between hiding and retrieval. Experiment 1 manipulated auditory input by keeping the hidden object audible versus silent, and visual input by presenting the delay in the light versus dark. Infants succeeded more at B with audible than silent objects and, unexpectedly, more after delays in the light than dark. Experiment 2 presented both the delay and search phases in darkness. The unexpected light-dark difference disappeared. Across experiments, the presence of auditory input helped infants find displaced objects, whereas the absence of visual input did not. Sound might help by strengthening object representation, reducing memory load, or focusing attention. This work provides new evidence on when bimodal input aids object processing, corroborates claims that audiovisual processing improves over the first year of life, and contributes to multisensory approaches to studying cognition. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject Before 9 months, infants use sound to retrieve a stationary object hidden by darkness but not one hidden by occlusion. This suggests they find auditory input more salient in the absence of visual input in simple search tasks. After 9 months, infants' object processing appears more sensitive to multimodal (e.g., audiovisual) input. What does this study add? This study tested how audiovisual input affects 10-month-olds' search for an object displaced in an AB task. Sound helped infants find displaced objects in both the presence and absence of visual input. Object processing becomes more sensitive to bimodal input as multisensory functions develop across the first year.

Understanding the effects of one's actions upon hidden objects and the development of search behaviour in 7-month-old infants

Infants' understanding of how their actions affect the visibility of hidden objects may be a crucial aspect of the development of search behaviour. To investigate this possibility, 7-month-old infants took part in a two-day training study. At the start of the first session, and at the end of the second, all infants performed a search task with a hiding-well. On both days, infants had an additional training experience. The 'Agency group' learnt to spin a turntable to reveal a hidden toy, whilst the 'Means-End' group learnt the same means-end motor action, but the toy was always visible. The Agency group showed greater improvement on the hiding-well search task following their training experience. We suggest that the Agency group's turntable experience was effective because it provided the experience of bringing objects back into visibility by one's actions. Further, the performance of the Agency group demonstrates generalized transfer of learning across situations with both different motor actions and stimuli in infants as young as 7 months.