Safety by design: Biosafety and biosecurity in the age of synthetic genomics

Orthopox viruses: is the threat growing?

BACKGROUND

Smallpox was a major cause of human mortality until its eradication, but the threat of orthopox viruses has not disappeared. Since the eradication of smallpox and the cessation of the related vaccination campaigns, the threat has been growing, as evidenced by the currently ongoing worldwide Mpox outbreak. In addition to threats of an evolving Mpox, we must also be aware of a myriad of other threats that remain. Many countries still lack biosecurity regulations reflecting the recent technological advances, and the threat of bioterrorism remains ever present. Reconstruction of smallpox is a distinct possibility, as are other scenarios whereby other orthopox viruses may be made more fit for transmission in humans.

OBJECTIVES

To outline and discuss potential biosafety and biosecurity threats posed by orthopox viruses.

SOURCES

Published scientific literature, news articles, and international agreements.

CONTENT AND IMPLICATIONS

It would be wise to take steps to mitigate these threats now. Vaccination campaigns should be considered in areas with frequent orthopox outbreaks, and more efforts must be made to put a final end to the Mpox outbreak. In many countries, national biosafety and biosecurity regulations may need to be revised and strengthened to better reflect the threats posed by new technologies, including controls on synthesis of smallpox sequences. Furthermore, more international cooperation and aid is needed. The present global Mpox outbreak could likely have been prevented had areas where Mpox is endemic not been neglected. Future outbreaks could be much worse.

Data hazards in synthetic biology

Data science is playing an increasingly important role in the design and analysis of engineered biology. This has been fueled by the development of high-throughput methods like massively parallel reporter assays, data-rich microscopy techniques, computational protein structure prediction and design, and the development of whole-cell models able to generate huge volumes of data. Although the ability to apply data-centric analyses in these contexts is appealing and increasingly simple to do, it comes with potential risks. For example, how might biases in the underlying data affect the validity of a result and what might the environmental impact of large-scale data analyses be? Here, we present a community-developed framework for assessing data hazards to help address these concerns and demonstrate its application to two synthetic biology case studies. We show the diversity of considerations that arise in common types of bioengineering projects and provide some guidelines and mitigating steps. Understanding potential issues and dangers when working with data and proactively addressing them will be essential for ensuring the appropriate use of emerging data-intensive AI methods and help increase the trustworthiness of their applications in synthetic biology.

Ser/Leu-swapped cell-free translation system constructed with natural/in vitro transcribed-hybrid tRNA set

The Ser/Leu-swapped genetic code can act as a genetic firewall, mitigating biohazard risks arising from horizontal gene transfer in genetically modified organisms. Our prior work demonstrated the orthogonality of this swapped code to the standard genetic code using a cell-free translation system comprised of 21 in vitro transcribed tRNAs. In this study, to advance this system for protein engineering, we introduce a natural/in vitro transcribed-hybrid tRNA set. This set combines natural tRNAs from Escherichia coli (excluding Ser, Leu, and Tyr) and in vitro transcribed tRNAs, encompassing anticodon-swapped tRNASerGAG and tRNALeuGGA. This approach reduces the number of in vitro transcribed tRNAs required from 21 to only 4. In this optimized system, the production of a model protein, superfolder green fluorescent protein, increases to 3.5-fold. With this hybrid tRNA set, the Ser/Leu-swapped cell-free translation system will stand as a potent tool for protein production with reduced biohazard concerns in future biological endeavors.

Artificial intelligence challenges in the face of biological threats: emerging catastrophic risks for public health

The threat landscape of biological hazards with the evolution of AI presents challenges. While AI promises innovative solutions, concerns arise about its misuse in the creation of biological weapons. The convergence of AI and genetic editing raises questions about biosecurity, potentially accelerating the development of dangerous pathogens. The mapping conducted highlights the critical intersection between AI and biological threats, underscoring emerging risks in the criminal manipulation of pathogens. Technological advancement in biology requires preventative and regulatory measures. Expert recommendations emphasize the need for solid regulations and responsibility of creators, demanding a proactive, ethical approach and governance to ensure global safety.

Engineering stringent genetic biocontainment of yeast with a protein stability switch

Synthetic biology holds immense promise to tackle key problems in resource use, environmental remediation, and human health care. However, comprehensive safety measures are lacking to employ engineered microorganisms in open-environment applications. Genetically encoded biocontainment systems may solve this issue. Here, we describe such a system based on conditional stability of essential proteins. We used a destabilizing domain degron stabilized by estradiol addition (ERdd). We ERdd-tagged 775 essential genes and screened for strains with estradiol dependent growth. Three genes, SPC110, DIS3 and RRP46, were found to be particularly suitable targets. Respective strains showed no growth defect in the presence of estradiol and strong growth inhibition in its absence. SPC110-ERdd offered the most stringent containment, with an escape frequency of <5×10-7. Removal of its C-terminal domain decreased the escape frequency further to <10-8. Being based on conditional protein stability, the presented approach is mechanistically orthogonal to previously reported genetic biocontainment systems.

Open-endedness in synthetic biology: A route to continual innovation for biological design

Design in synthetic biology is typically goal oriented, aiming to repurpose or optimize existing biological functions, augmenting biology with new-to-nature capabilities, or creating life-like systems from scratch. While the field has seen many advances, bottlenecks in the complexity of the systems built are emerging and designs that function in the lab often fail when used in real-world contexts. Here, we propose an open-ended approach to biological design, with the novelty of designed biology being at least as important as how well it fulfils its goal. Rather than solely focusing on optimization toward a single best design, designing with novelty in mind may allow us to move beyond the diminishing returns we see in performance for most engineered biology. Research from the artificial life community has demonstrated that embracing novelty can automatically generate innovative and unexpected solutions to challenging problems beyond local optima. Synthetic biology offers the ideal playground to explore more creative approaches to biological design.

Anthrax revisited: how assessing the unpredictable can improve biosecurity

B. anthracis is one of the most often weaponized pathogens. States had it in their bioweapons programs and criminals and terrorists have used or attempted to use it. This study is motivated by the narrative that emerging and developing technologies today contribute to the amplification of danger through greater easiness, accessibility and affordability of steps in the making of an anthrax weapon. As states would have way better preconditions if they would decide for an offensive bioweapons program, we focus on bioterrorism. This paper analyzes and assesses the possible bioterrorism threat arising from advances in synthetic biology, genome editing, information availability, and other emerging, and converging sciences and enabling technologies. Methodologically we apply foresight methods to encourage the analysis of contemporary technological advances. We have developed a conceptual six-step foresight science framework approach. It represents a synthesis of various foresight methodologies including literature review, elements of horizon scanning, trend impact analysis, red team exercise, and free flow open-ended discussions. Our results show a significant shift in the threat landscape. Increasing affordability, widespread distribution, efficiency, as well as ease of use of DNA synthesis, and rapid advances in genome-editing and synthetic genomic technologies lead to an ever-growing number and types of actors who could potentially weaponize B. anthracis. Understanding the current and future capabilities of these technologies and their potential for misuse critically shapes the current and future threat landscape and underlines the necessary adaptation of biosecurity measures in the spheres of multi-level political decision making and in the science community.