Early sensitivity to arguments: How preschoolers weight circular arguments

Children consider informants' explanation quality with their social dominance in seeking novel explanations

Identifying high-quality causal explanations is key to scientific understanding. This research (N = 202; 50% girls; M age: 5.82 years; 64% Asian, 33% White, and 3% multiracial; data collected from 2018 to 2024) examined how explanation circularity and informants' social dominance impact children's learning preferences for causal explanations. Raised in a culture valuing circular logic, Chinese children still preferred non-circular explanations and learning from informants providing non-circular explanations (d ≥ 0.50). When informants with non-circular explanations were subordinate to those with circular explanations, Chinese and American children preferred non-circular over circular explanations (d = 1.10), but did not prefer learning new information from either informant. Although children weigh explanation quality over informant dominance when seeking explanations for given questions, they consider both cues when evaluating informants' credibility.

Appealing to consequences, or authority? The influence of explanations on children's moral judgments across two cultures

Recent research shows that children's moral judgments can be influenced by testimony, but it remains unclear whether certain types of testimony are more influential than others. Here we examined two specific types of moral testimony - one that appealed to the authority of the speaker and one that appealed to the consequence of the action - and measured how each type of testimony moved children's judgments about harm. Chinese (N = 181; 45.3 % girls; all ethnically Chinese, middle-class) and U.S children (N = 198; 55.6 % girls; predominantly White, middle-class) were presented with countervailing testimony that justified novel, distress-inducing actions as acceptable, either by appealing to the speaker's authority or by reasoning about the positive consequences of the action. Both types of explanations significantly influenced children's moral judgments, leading children from both cultures to judge harm-related actions as more morally permissible. However, with age, children across both cultures became less receptive towards authority-based explanations. Neither type of explanation affected adults' (N = 180, recruited online from across China and the U.S.) moral judgments. Together, these findings provide developmental evidence on the types of explanations that influence children's moral judgments about actions that cause harm.

Children recognize and reject favoritism in norm enforcement

The impartial enforcement of norms and laws is a hallmark of fair societies, yet partial, unequal norm enforcement is common, for example as a result of corruption. While children condemn norm violations and value impartiality in resource allocation contexts, children's understanding of unequal norm enforcement is currently underexplored. In three vignette studies, we investigated 4- to 8-year-old's (N = 192) developing recognition and condemnation of unequal norm enforcement, which presupposes a sensitivity to impartiality as a meta-norm. Children evaluated the actions of characters who enforced different norms equally or unequally. From age 5, children disapproved of unequal norm enforcement but approved of unequal treatment when justified (Study 1). Children of all ages accepted a lack of punishment when applied equally to all transgressors, suggesting that their negative evaluations of unequal norm enforcement were specifically guided by the element of partiality and not the desire to see transgressors sanctioned (Study 2). Further, children aged 6 years and older were sensitive to the reasons behind unequal punishment, condemning instances of favoritism while accepting selective leniency due to mitigating circumstances (Study 3). The findings show that, from around 5 to 6 years of age, children condemn unequal sanctions for equal transgressions, thereby demonstrating a deep appreciation of impartiality as a foundational principle of fair norm enforcement.

A cross-linguistic approach to children's reasoning: Turkish- and English-speaking children's use of metatalk

When collaboratively solving problems, children discuss information reliability, for example, whether claims are based on direct or indirect observation, termed as "metatalk". Unlike English in which evidential marking is optional, languages with obligatory evidential marking such as Turkish, might provide children some advantages in communicating the reliability of their claims. The current preregistered online study investigated Turkish- and English-speaking 3- and 5-year-old children's (N = 144) use of metatalk. The child and the experimenter (E) were asked to decide in which of the two houses a toy was hiding. One house had the toy's footprints. When E left the Zoom meeting, an informant told the child that the toy was in the other house without the footprints in three within-subjects conditions. In the direct-observation condition, the child witnessed the informant move the toy. In the indirect-witness condition, the informant checked both houses and said that the toy was in the other house. In the indirect-hearsay condition, the informant simply said that the toy was in the other house. When E returned, the child had to convince E about how they knew the toy was in the other house using metatalk (e.g., "I saw it move"). Turkish-speaking children used metatalk more often than did English-speaking children, especially in the direct-observation condition. In the two indirect conditions, both groups of 5-year-olds were similar in their use of metatalk, but Turkish speaking 3-year-olds produced metatalk more often than did English-speaking 3-year-olds. Thus, languages with obligatory evidential marking might facilitate children's collaborative reasoning. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Children as young as 3 years of age can produce metatalk. Turkish-speaking children produce metatalk more often than English-speaking children. The difference between the two linguistic groups is more pronounced at age 3.

Epistemic trust: a comprehensive review of empirical insights and implications for developmental psychopathology

Originally rooted in philosophy and sociology, the concept of epistemic trust has recently transitioned to developmental psychopathology, illuminating social-cognitive processes in psychopathology. This narrative review synthesizes empirical evidence on epistemic trust to inform future research. A literature search highlighted 3 areas: i) the development of selective trust in children; ii) epistemic trust in non-clinical adults; iii) its link to mental health. Young children demonstrate selective learning from reliable sources using epistemic cues. Empirical studies beyond childhood were greatly facilitated in the last 2 years with the introduction of the Epistemic Trust, Mistrust and Credulity Questionnaire, a self-report scale measuring epistemic stance. Cross-sectional studies pinpointed dysfunctional epistemic strategies as factors in mental health vulnerability, and some qualitative work offered initial evidence linking restored epistemic trust to effective psychotherapy. For future research, we propose focusing on 3 primary areas. First, empirical investigations in adolescent samples are needed, as adolescence seems to be a pivotal phase in the development of epistemic trust. Second, more experimental research is required to assess dysfunctional and functional epistemic stances and how they relate to vulnerability to mental health disorders. Finally, intervention studies should explore the dynamics of epistemic stances within and between therapy sessions and their impact on therapeutic outcomes.

Tautological formal explanations: does prior knowledge affect their satisfiability?

It is known that formal explanations with categorical labels are more satisfying than explicit tautologies. However, would they still be more satisfying if they are implicitly tautological themselves? In two experiments, we compared the degree of satisfaction between tautological formal explanations, explicit tautologies, and proper explanations. Additionally, we examined whether participants knew the correct definitions for the labels used in the formal explanations. Finally, we asked whether cultural and linguistic differences can play a role in the treatment of formal explanations with categorical labels. To this end, the first experiment involved Chilean students (N = 50), and the second experiment involved Russian students (N = 51). It was found that formal explanations, despite their intentional tautology, were still rated as more convincing compared to explicit tautologies (but less convincing than proper explanations). Furthermore, this effect did not depend on participants' previous knowledge (the label's definitions) or linguistic and cultural background. Taking all this into account, we consider this effect as a relatively universal psychological phenomenon and relate our findings to existing theories of formal explanations.

Five-year-old children value reasons in apologies for belief-based accidents

Accidents can be intent-based (unintended action-unintended outcome) or belief-based (intended action-unintended outcome). As compared to intent-based accidents, giving reasons is more crucial for belief-based accidents because the transgressor appears to have intentionally transgressed. In Study 1, UK-based preschoolers who were native English speakers (N = 96, 53 girls, collected 2020-2021) witnessed two intent-based or belief-based accidents; one transgressor apologized, the other apologized with a reason. Five-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, favored the reason-giving transgressor following a belief-based accident but not an intent-based accident (where an apology sufficed). In Study 2, 5-year-olds (N = 48, 25 girls, collected 2021) distinguished between "good" and "bad" reasons for the harm caused. Thus, 5-year-old children recognize when reasons should accompany apologies and account for the quality of these reasons.

From outcome to process: A developmental shift in judgments of good reasoning

What does it mean to reason well? One might argue that good reasoning means that the outcome of the reasoning process is correct: reaching the right belief. Alternatively, good reasoning might refer to the reasoning process itself: following the right epistemic procedures. In a preregistered study, we investigated children's (4-9-year-olds) and adults' judgments of reasoning in China and the US (N = 256). Participants of all age groups evaluated the outcome when the process was kept constant - they favored agents who reached correct over incorrect beliefs, and they evaluated the process when the outcome was kept constant - they preferred agents who formed their beliefs using valid over invalid procedures. Developmental changes emerged when we pitted outcome against process: young children weighed outcome more heavily than process; older children and adults showed the reverse preference. This pattern was constant across the two cultural contexts, with the switch from outcome to process happening earlier in development in China. These results suggest that children initially value what someone believes, but, with development, come to increasingly value how beliefs are formed.

How children revise their beliefs in light of reasons

We investigate how the ability to respond appropriately to reasons provided in discourse develops in young children. In Study 1 (N = 58, Germany, 26 girls), 4- and 5-, but not 3-year-old children, differentiated good from bad reasons. In Study 2 (N = 131, Germany, 64 girls), 4- and 5-year-old children considered both the strength of evidence for their initial belief and the quality of socially provided reasons for an alternative view when deciding whether to change their minds. Study 3 (N = 80, the United States, 42 girls, preregistered) shows that 4- and 5-year-old children also consider meta-reasons (reasons about reasons) in their belief revision. These results suggest that by age 4, children possess key critical thinking capacities for participating in public discourse.

The effect of source claims on statement believability and speaker accountability

What is the effect of source claims (such as "I saw it" or "Somebody told me") on the believability of statements, and what mechanisms are responsible for this effect? In this study, we tested the idea that source claims impact statement believability by modulating the extent to which a speaker is perceived to be committed to (and thereby accountable for) the truth of her assertion. Across three experiments, we presented participants with statements associated with different source claims, asked them to judge how much they believed the statements, and how much the speaker was responsible if the statement turned out to be false. We found that (1) statement believability predicted speaker accountability independently of a statement's perceived prior likelihood or associated source claim; (2) being associated with a claim to first-hand ("I saw that . . .") or second-hand ("Somebody told me that . . .") evidence strengthened this association; (3) bare assertions about specific circumstances were commonly interpreted as claims to first-hand evidence; and (4) (everything else being equal) claims to first-hand evidence increased while claims to second-hand evidence decreased both statement believability and speaker accountability. These results support the idea that the believability of a statement is closely related to how committed to its truth the speaker is perceived to be and that source claims modulate the extent of this perceived commitment.

Children selectively endorse speculative conjectures

Young children are epistemically vigilant, attending to the reliability, expertise, and confidence of their informants and the prior probability and verifiability of their claims. But the pre-eminent requirement of any hypothesis is that it provides a potential solution to the question at hand. Given questions with no known answer, the ability to selectively adopt new, unverified, speculative proposals may be critical to learning. This study explores when people might reasonably reject known facts in favor of unverified conjectures. Across four experiments, when conjectures answer questions that available facts do not, both adults (n = 48) and children (4.0-7.9 years, n = 241, of diverse race and ethnicity) prefer the conjectures, even when the conjectures are preceded by uncertainty markers or explicitly violate prior expectations.

Learning From "Thinkers": Parent Epistemological Understanding Predicts Individual Differences in Children's Judgments About Reasoners

Four-, 5-, and 6-year olds (N = 102) observed agents perform a reasoning task that required gathering hidden evidence. An agent who made sound inferences was contrasted with an agent who made either unsound inferences (UI; failed to base conclusion on gathered evidence) or guesses (failed to gather evidence). Four-year olds attributed knowledge to all agents and endorsed their conclusions widely. However, 5- and 6-year olds' knowledge attributions were mitigated by UI, and 6-year olds neither attributed knowledge to a guesser nor endorsed his conclusions. Notably, parents' tendency to make evaluativist epistemological judgments-which place value in evidence as a basis for belief-predicted children's reluctance to learn from and credit knowledge to poor reasoners. Parents' evaluativist judgments also predicted children's selective learning about object functions.

Investigating Science Together: Inquiry-Based Training Promotes Scientific Conversations in Parent-Child Interactions

This study examined the effects of two pedagogical training approaches on parent-child dyads’ discussion of scientific content in an informal museum setting. Forty-seven children (mean age = 5.43) and their parents were randomly assigned to training conditions where an experimenter modeled one of two different pedagogical approaches when interacting with the child and a science-based activity: (1) a scientific inquiry-based process or (2) a scientific statement-sharing method. Both approaches provided the same information about scientific mechanisms but differed in the process through which that content was delivered. Immediately following the training, parents were invited to model the same approach with their child with a novel science-based activity. Results indicated significant differences in the process through which parents prompted discussion of the targeted information content: when talking about causal scientific concepts, parents in the scientific inquiry condition were significantly more likely to pose questions to their child than parents in the scientific statements condition. Moreover, children in the scientific inquiry condition were marginally more responsive to parental causal talk and provided significantly more scientific content in response. These findings provide initial evidence that training parents to guide their children using scientific inquiry-based approaches in informal learning settings can encourage children to participate in more joint scientific conversations.

Developmental differences in preschoolers' definition assessment and production

Children are able to assess the quality of information presented to them, most notably in the domains of causal explanations and arguments. However, children are also presented with another form of verbal information-definitions. Very little empirical work has investigated how children assess and produce definitions. Two experiments explored preschoolers' comprehension and production of definitions. In Experiment 1, a selective trust paradigm was used to assess 3-year-olds' (n = 28) and 5-year-olds' (n = 28) endorsements of informative and uninformative definitions. Participants were provided with two informants: one who always provided a circular definition (e.g., "Silly means when you are silly") and one who always provided a noncircular definition (e.g., "Silly means when you are goofy"). The 5-year-olds endorsed noncircular definitions over circular definitions for both frequent and infrequent words, but they chose to learn only from informants who provided information about infrequent words. The 3-year-olds, on the other hand, did not systematically endorse either definition type. In Experiment 2, new groups of 3-year-olds (n = 25) and 5-year-olds (n = 24) were asked to provide definitions, and their responses were coded for correctness and circularity. Results demonstrated that 5-year-olds provided more definitions than 3-year-olds. In addition, 5-year-olds provided more noncircular definitions than 3-year-olds for infrequent words but not for frequent words. Together, the results from Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that children's understanding of definitions emerges during the preschool period. This work presents an important first step in addressing an understudied facet of lexical development.

Embedding Scientific Explanations Into Storybooks Impacts Children's Scientific Discourse and Learning

Children’s understanding of unobservable scientific entities largely depends on testimony from others, especially through parental explanations that highlight the mechanism underlying a scientific entity. Mechanistic explanations are particularly helpful in promoting children’s conceptual understanding, yet they are relatively rare in parent–child conversations. The current study aimed to increase parent–child use of mechanistic conversation by modeling this language in a storybook about the mechanism of electrical circuits. We also examined whether an increase in mechanistic conversation was associated with science learning outcomes, measured at both the dyadic- and child-level. In the current study, parents and their 4- to 5-year-old children (N = 60) were randomly assigned to read a book containing mechanistic explanations (n = 32) or one containing non-mechanistic explanations (n = 28). After reading the book together, parent–child joint understanding of electricity’s mechanism was tested by asking the dyad to assemble electrical components of a circuit toy so that a light would turn on. Finally, child science learning outcomes were examined by asking children to assemble a novel circuit toy and answer comprehension questions to gauge their understanding of electricity’s mechanism. Results indicate that dyads who read storybooks containing mechanistic explanations were (1) more successful at completing the circuit (putting the pieces together to make the light turn on) and (2) used more mechanistic language than dyads assigned to the non-mechanistic condition. Children in the mechanistic condition also had better learning outcomes, but only if they engaged in more mechanistic discourse with their parent. We discuss these results using a social interactionist framework to highlight the role of input and interaction for learning. We also highlight how these results implicate everyday routines such as book reading in supporting children’s scientific discourse and understanding.

Seeing thought: a cultural cognitive tool

The present paper, which is the first of two twin opinion papers, offers a theoretical approach of literacy and critical literacy in relation to language, thought, and reasoning. Literacy acquisition and practice proceed through two stages, which partially overlap in terms of processing abilities: the first is achieved when the learner becomes a skilled reader and writer, characterized by automatic word processing; the second, when reading comprehension and written production become expert instruments in the communication of progressively more abstract and sophisticated, but always linguistically-mediated, knowledge and ideas. The destiny of literacy, depending on educational and social factors, is thus to be to fused with language, thought and reasoning. Oral language becomes literate language; and our cognitive activity becomes—as indicated in the title—“seeing thought”, which paves the way, we will argue, for reasoning skills. Making of literacy an epistemic and social tool of our own collective history requires a critical stance that raises itself and ourselves to a stage called critical literacy. In this paper we focus on some of the favorable and unfavorable factors influencing this achievement. The main challenge is to bring literate cognition up to the capacity of choosing between accept and verify, between belief and disbelief, by weighting evidence and reasoning, by arguing and debunking errors and falsities. Accordingly, our objective is essentially to narrate how literacy gives birth to critical literacy and explain why, at the end of this process, critical literacy becomes hard to distinguish from thinking and reasoning.

Argument Quality in Real World Argumentation

The idea of resolving dispute through the exchange of arguments and reasons has been central to society for millennia. We exchange arguments as a way of getting at the truth in contexts as diverse as science, the court room, and our everyday lives. In democracies, political decisions should be negotiated through argument, not deception, or even worse, brute force. If argument is to lead to the truth or to good decisions, then some arguments must be better than others and 'argument strength' must have some meaningful connection with truth. Can argument strength be measured in a way that tracks an objective relationship with truth and not just mere persuasiveness? This article describes recent developments in providing such measures.

Preschoolers refer to direct and indirect evidence in their collaborative reasoning

Collaborative reasoning requires partners to evaluate options and the evidence for or against each option. We investigated whether preschoolers can explain why one option is best (direct reasons) and why the other option is not (indirect reasons), looking at both problems that have a correct answer and those that require choosing the better option. In Study 1, both age groups produced direct reasons equally frequently in both problems. However, 5-year-olds produced indirect reasons more often than 3-year-olds, especially when there was a correct answer. In Study 2 with a nonverbal task with a correct answer, 3-year-olds produced indirect reasons more often than in Study 1, although 5-year-olds' indirect reasons were more efficiently stated. These results demonstrate that even 3-year-olds, and even nonverbally, can point out to a partner a fact that constitutes a reason for them to arrive at a correct joint decision.

Trust me, I'm a competent expert: Developmental differences in children's use of an expert's explanation quality to infer trustworthiness

In this study, we examined how 3-, 4-, 5-, and 7-year-old children respond when informants who are labeled as experts fail to provide high-quality explanations about phenomena within their realm of expertise. We found that 4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds discounted their initial trust in an expert who provided low-quality explanations in a task related to the expert's area of expertise. The 5-year-olds' distrust of the expert who provided low-quality explanations also generalized to additional learning tasks. When an expert provided explanations consistent with the expert's labeled expertise, 5-year-olds maintained a similar level of trust in the expert, but 7-year-olds displayed an increased level of trust in the expert within the expert's area of expertise. We did not find consistent preferences in 3-year-olds' judgments. We discuss the implications of these findings for age-based differences in children's relative weighting of trait-based versus real-time epistemic cues when evaluating informant reliability.

The role of epistemic and social characteristics in children's selective trust: Three meta-analyses

Over the last 15 years, researchers have been increasingly interested in understanding the nature and development of children's selective trust. Three meta-analyses were conducted on a total of 51 unique studies (88 experiments) to provide a quantitative overview of 3- to 6-year-old children's selective trust in an informant based on the informant's epistemic or social characteristics, and to examine the relation between age and children's selective trust decisions. The first and second meta-analyses found that children displayed medium-to-large pooled effects in favor of trusting the informant who was knowledgeable or the informant with positive social characteristics. Moderator analyses revealed that 4-year-olds were more likely to endorse knowledgeable informants than 3-year-olds. The third meta-analysis examined cases where two informants simultaneously differed in their epistemic and social characteristics. The results revealed that 3-year-old children did not selectively endorse informants who were more knowledgeable but had negative social characteristics over informants who were less knowledgeable but had positive social characteristics. However, 4- to 6-year-olds consistently prioritized epistemic cues over social characteristics when deciding who to trust. Together, these meta-analyses suggest that epistemic and social characteristics are both valuable to children when they evaluate the reliability of informants. Moreover, with age, children place greater value on epistemic characteristics when deciding whether to endorse an informant's testimony. Implications for the development of epistemic trust and the design of studies of children's selective trust are discussed.

How children use accuracy information to infer informant intentions and to make reward decisions

The ability to assess the value of the information one receives and the intentions of the source of that information can be used to establish cooperative relationships and to identify cooperative partners. Across two experiments, 4- to 8-year-old children (N = 204) received a note with correct, incorrect, or no information that affected their efforts on a search task. Children were told that all informants had played the game before and knew the location of the hidden reward. In the no information condition, children were told that the informant needed to leave before finishing the note and, thus, was not intentionally uninformative. Children rated the note with correct information as more helpful than the note with no information; incorrect information was rated least helpful. When asked about the informant's intentions, children attributed positive intentions when the information was correct and when they received unhelpful information but knew the informant was not intentionally uninformative. Children attributed less positive intentions to the informant when they received incorrect information. When given the chance to reward the informant, children rewarded the informant who provided correct information and no information equally; the informant who provided incorrect information received fewer rewards. Combined, these results suggest that young children assume that informants have positive intentions even when they provide no useful information. However, when the information provided is clearly inaccurate, children infer more negative intentions and reward those informants at lower rates. These results suggest that children tend to reward informants more based on their presumed intentions, placing less weight on the value of the information they provide.

Children's success at detecting circular explanations and their interest in future learning

These studies explore elementary-school-aged children's ability to evaluate circular explanations and whether they respond to receiving weak explanations by expressing interest in additional learning. In the first study, 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds (n = 53) heard why questions about unfamiliar animals. For each question, they rated the quality of single explanations and later selected the best explanation between pairs of circular and noncircular explanations. When judging single explanations, 8- and 10-year-olds, and to some extent 6-year-olds, provided higher ratings for noncircular explanations compared to circular ones. When selecting between pairs of explanations, all age groups preferred noncircular explanations to circular ones, but older children did so more consistently than 6-year-olds. Children who recognized the weakness of the single circular explanations were more interested in receiving additional information about the question topics. In Study 2, all three age groups (n = 87) provided higher ratings for noncircular explanations compared to circular ones when listening to responses to how questions, but older children showed a greater distinction in their ratings than 6-year-olds. Moreover, the link between recognizing circular explanations as weak and interest in future learning could not be accounted for solely by individual differences in verbal intelligence. These findings illustrate the developmental trajectory of explanation evaluation and support that recognition of weak explanations is linked to interest in future learning across the elementary years. Implications for education are discussed.

Children's meta-talk in their collaborative decision making with peers

In collaborative decision making, children must evaluate the evidence behind their respective claims and the rationality of their respective proposals with their partners. In the main study, 5- and 7-year-old peer dyads (N = 196) were presented with a novel animal. In the key condition, children in a dyad individually received conflicting information about what the animal needs (e.g., rocks vs. sand for food) from sources that differ in reliability (with first-hand vs. indirect evidence). Dyads in both age groups were able to reliably settle on the option with the best supporting evidence. Moreover, in making their decision, children, especially 7-year-olds, engaged in various kinds of meta-talk about the evidence and its validity. In a modified version of the key condition in Study 2, 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 120) interacted with a puppet who tried to convince children to change their minds by producing meta-talk. When the puppet insisted and produced meta-talk, 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, were more likely to change their minds if their information was unreliable. These results suggest that even preschoolers can engage in collaborative reasoning successfully, but the ability to reflect on the process by stepping back to jointly examine the evidence emerges only during the early school years.

Children's reasoning with peers in cooperative and competitive contexts

We report two studies that demonstrate how five- and seven-year-olds adapt their production of arguments to either a cooperative or a competitive context. Two games elicited agreements from peer dyads about placing animals on either of two halves of a playing field owned by either child. Children had to produce arguments to justify these decisions. Played in a competitive context that encouraged placing animals on one's own half, children's arguments showed a bias that was the result of withholding known arguments. In a cooperative context, children produced not only more arguments, but also more 'two-sided' arguments. Also, seven-year-olds demonstrated a more frequent and strategic use of arguments that specifically refuted decisions that would favour their peers. The results suggest that cooperative contexts provide a more motivating context for children to produce arguments. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? Reasoning is a social skill that allows people to reach joint decisions. Preschoolers give reasons for their proposals in their peer conversations. By adolescence, children use sophisticated arguments (e.g., refutations and rebuttals). What the present study adds? Cooperation offers a more motivating context for children's argument production. Seven-year-olds are more strategic than five-year-olds in their reasoning with peers. Children's reasoning with others becomes more sophisticated after preschool years.

Children's developing metaethical judgments

Human adults incline toward moral objectivism but may approach things more relativistically if different cultures are involved. In this study, 4-, 6-, and 9-year-old children (N=136) witnessed two parties who disagreed about moral matters: a normative judge (e.g., judging that it is wrong to do X) and an antinormative judge (e.g., judging that it is okay to do X). We assessed children's metaethical judgment, that is, whether they judged that only one party (objectivism) or both parties (relativism) could be right. We found that 9-year-olds, but not younger children, were more likely to judge that both parties could be right when a normative ingroup judge disagreed with an antinormative extraterrestrial judge (with different preferences and background) than when the antinormative judge was another ingroup individual. This effect was not found in a comparison case where parties disagreed about the possibility of different physical laws. These findings suggest that although young children often exhibit moral objectivism, by early school age they begin to temper their objectivism with culturally relative metaethical judgments.

How Gullible are We? A Review of the Evidence from Psychology and Social Science

A long tradition of scholarship, from ancient Greece to Marxism or some contemporary social psychology, portrays humans as strongly gullible—wont to accept harmful messages by being unduly deferent. However, if humans are reasonably well adapted, they should not be strongly gullible: they should be vigilant toward communicated information. Evidence from experimental psychology reveals that humans are equipped with well-functioning mechanisms of epistemic vigilance. They check the plausibility of messages against their background beliefs, calibrate their trust as a function of the source's competence and benevolence, and critically evaluate arguments offered to them. Even if humans are equipped with well-functioning mechanisms of epistemic vigilance, an adaptive lag might render them gullible in the face of new challenges, from clever marketing to omnipresent propaganda. I review evidence from different cultural domains often taken as proof of strong gullibility: religion, demagoguery, propaganda, political campaigns, advertising, erroneous medical beliefs, and rumors. Converging evidence reveals that communication is much less influential than often believed—that religious proselytizing, propaganda, advertising, and so forth are generally not very effective at changing people's minds. Beliefs that lead to costly behavior are even less likely to be accepted. Finally, it is also argued that most cases of acceptance of misguided communicated information do not stem from undue deference, but from a fit between the communicated information and the audience's preexisting beliefs.

Preschoolers' Preference for Syntactic Complexity Varies by Socioeconomic Status

Two experiments investigated whether 4- and 5-year-old children choose to learn from informants who use more complex syntax (passive voice) over informants using more simple syntax (active voice). In Experiment 1 (N = 30), children viewed one informant who consistently used the passive voice and another who used active voice. When learning novel words from the two informants, children were more likely to endorse information from the passive informant. Experiment 2 (N = 32) explored whether preference for the passive informant varied by socioeconomic status (SES; eligibility for free/reduced lunch). Although higher SES children selectively preferred the passive informant, lower SES children preferred the active informant. Explanations are discussed for why SES might moderate children's sensitivity to syntactic complexity when choosing from whom to learn.

The Argumentative Theory: Predictions and Empirical Evidence

The argumentative theory of reasoning suggests that the main function of reasoning is to exchange arguments with others. This theory explains key properties of reasoning. When reasoners produce arguments, they are biased and lazy, as can be expected if reasoning is a mechanism that aims at convincing others in interactive contexts. By contrast, reasoners are more objective and demanding when they evaluate arguments provided by others. This fundamental asymmetry between production and evaluation explains the effects of reasoning in different contexts: the more debate and conflict between opinions there is, the more argument evaluation prevails over argument production, resulting in better outcomes. Here I review how the argumentative theory of reasoning helps integrate a wide range of empirical findings in reasoning research.

Young Children Detect and Avoid Logically Inconsistent Sources: The Importance of Communicative Context and Executive Function

The reported research tested the hypothesis that young children detect logical inconsistency in communicative contexts that support the evaluation of speakers' epistemic reliability. In two experiments (N = 194), 3- to 5-year-olds were presented with two speakers who expressed logically consistent or inconsistent claims. Three-year-olds failed to detect inconsistencies (Experiment 1), 4-year-olds detected inconsistencies when expressed by human speakers but not when read from books, and 5-year-olds detected inconsistencies in both contexts (Experiment 2). In both experiments, children demonstrated skepticism toward testimony from previously inconsistent sources. Executive function and working memory each predicted inconsistency detection. These findings indicate logical inconsistency understanding emerges in early childhood, is supported by social and domain general cognitive skills, and plays a role in adaptive learning from testimony.

The influence of power and reason on young Maya children's endorsement of testimony

Two important parenting strategies are to impose one's power and to use reasoning. The effect of these strategies on children's evaluation of testimony has received very little attention. Using the epistemic vigilance framework, we predict that when the reasoning cue is strong enough it should overcome the power cue. We test this prediction in a population for which anthropological data suggest that power is the prominent strategy while reasoning is rarely relied on in the interactions with children. In Experiment 1, 4- to 6-year-old children from a traditional Maya population are shown to endorse the testimony supported by a strong argument over that supported by a weak argument. In Experiment 2, the same participants are shown to follow the testimony of a dominant over that of a subordinate. The participants are then shown to endorse the testimony of a subordinate who provides a strong argument over that of a dominant who provides either a weak argument (Experiment 3) or no argument (Experiment 4). Thus, when the power and reasoning cues conflict, reasoning completely trumps power.

The medium helps the message: Early sensitivity to auditory fluency in children's endorsement of statements

Recently, a growing number of studies have investigated the cues used by children to selectively accept testimony. In parallel, several studies with adults have shown that the fluency with which information is provided influences message evaluation: adults evaluate fluent information as more credible than dysfluent information. It is therefore plausible that the fluency of a message could also influence children's endorsement of statements. Three experiments were designed to test this hypothesis with 3- to 5-year-olds where the auditory fluency of a message was manipulated by adding different levels of noise to recorded statements. The results show that 4 and 5-year-old children, but not 3-year-olds, are more likely to endorse a fluent statement than a dysfluent one. The present study constitutes a first attempt to show that fluency, i.e., ease of processing, is recruited as a cue to guide epistemic decision in children. An interpretation of the age difference based on the way cues are processed by younger children is suggested.