Variability in toddlers’ ability to verbally update their mental representations of absent objects

Conceptualizing avoidant/restrictive food intake disorder via an executive functioning lens

Avoidant/restrictive food intake disorder (ARFID) is a heterogeneous disorder wherein restrictive eating is primarily attributed to non-shape/weight-based reasons (e.g., sensory sensitivity) that empirical research continues to explore. Mounting evidence suggests that ARFID often presents alongside neurodevelopmental diagnoses (NDs) or divergent neurodevelopment broadly. Executive functioning (EF) differences often characterize divergent neurodevelopmental trajectories. Additionally, restrictive eating in anorexia nervosa has been conceptualized as related to EF factors (e.g., set shifting). Given the neurodevelopmental phenotype that may be associated with ARFID and the role of EF in anorexia nervosa, this paper proposes EF as a potentially important, yet understudied factor in ARFID pathology. We posit that various observed ARFID behavioral/cognitive tendencies can be conceptualized in relation to EF differences. We contextualize commonly observed ARFID presentations within "core" EF components (i.e., cognitive flexibility, working memory, inhibitory control), leading to hypotheses about EF in ARFID. Finally, we offer additional considerations/directions for future research on EF in ARFID. Increased research on EF in ARFID is needed to consider this potential common factor in the etiology and maintenance of this heterogeneous disorder. We aim to promote further consideration of EF in ARFID etiology, maintenance, and treatment-outcome research. PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE: This article proposes that aspects of executive functioning (EF) may play a role in the onset and maintenance of avoidant/restrictive food intake disorder (ARFID), although this notion is largely untested by existing research. Further research on the role of EF in ARFID may assist with refining models and treatments for this heterogeneous disorder.

Infants differentiate between successful and failed communication in a false-belief context

Communication is based on social interaction, that is, interlocutors sharing attention to the intentions that they communicate about. In this study, we asked whether infants are aware of the fact that for information to be transferred, both interlocutors need to be present and share attention. Using a violation-of-expectation paradigm created to test infants' understanding of others' false beliefs, we asked whether 18-month-olds (n = 84) understood that correcting an agent's false belief via communication requires that the agent discerns the verbal statement. Participants saw how an agent put a toy into a box and left. An assistant then moved the toy into a cup. The intervention phase varied between three conditions: The agent and the assistant communicated about the actual location of the toy (full-communication), the agent was absent during the assistant's statement (incomplete-communication) or no communication took place (no-communication). At test, the agent reached into either the box or the cup. When no communication took place, infants expected the agent to search the toy at the original location. Full communication resulted in infants' expectations that the recipient's actions were altered, that is, the infants expected her to search the toy at the actual location. In contrast, incomplete communication did not yield clear expectations. Eighteen-month-olds thus seem to understand that for information to be transferred, it is a precondition that the recipient of the communicative act must be present and share attention during the communicator's statement. Only then communication can change a recipient's mental state.

How children revise their beliefs in light of reasons

We investigate how the ability to respond appropriately to reasons provided in discourse develops in young children. In Study 1 (N = 58, Germany, 26 girls), 4- and 5-, but not 3-year-old children, differentiated good from bad reasons. In Study 2 (N = 131, Germany, 64 girls), 4- and 5-year-old children considered both the strength of evidence for their initial belief and the quality of socially provided reasons for an alternative view when deciding whether to change their minds. Study 3 (N = 80, the United States, 42 girls, preregistered) shows that 4- and 5-year-old children also consider meta-reasons (reasons about reasons) in their belief revision. These results suggest that by age 4, children possess key critical thinking capacities for participating in public discourse.

Can infants use video to update mental representations of absent objects?

Before their second birthday, infants can update their knowledge based on what someone tells them, but can they do so based on what a video shows them? The current study explored whether infants can update their representation of an absent object's properties after seeing a video of something happening to it, following seminal work showing that they can update their representation after being told about something happening to it (Ganea et al., 2007). It thus adapted an existing paradigm for testing infants' understanding of references to absent objects (using language) to investigate a different symbolic medium (video). Twenty-two-month-olds first played with a toy and later saw on video that the toy underwent a change in state while they were out of the room. Infants in the current study did not subsequently identify the toy based on this new information, whereas those in previous research did. Infants this age thus appear less likely to update their representation of an absent object's properties using video than using language. This result is consistent with the possibility that infants may understand the representational function of symbolic objects later in development than they understand the representational function of language. It also aligns with evidence of the video deficit in which infants learn less effectively from video than from firsthand experience.