1
|
Fleeson W, Furr RM, Jayawickreme E, Luke D, Prentice M, Reynolds CJ, Parham AH. Consensus, controversy, and chaos in the attribution of characteristics to the morally exceptional. J Pers 2024; 92:715-734. [PMID: 37553769 DOI: 10.1111/jopy.12867] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/17/2022] [Revised: 07/04/2023] [Accepted: 07/10/2023] [Indexed: 08/10/2023]
Abstract
OBJECTIVE What do people see as distinguishing the morally exceptional from others? To handle the problem that people may disagree about who qualifies as morally exceptional, we asked subjects to select and rate their own examples of morally exceptional, morally average, and immoral people. METHOD Subjects rated each selected exemplar on several enablers of moral action and several directions of moral action. By applying the logic underlying stimulus sampling in experimental design, we evaluated perceivers' level of agreement about the characteristics of the morally exceptional, even though perceivers rated different targets. RESULTS Across three studies, there was strong subjective consensus on who is morally exceptional: those who are empathetic and prone to guilt, those who reflect on moral issues and identify with morality, those who have self-control and actually enact moral behaviors, and those who care about harm, compassion, fairness, and honesty. Deep controversies also existed about the moral directions pursued by those seen as morally exceptional: People evaluated those who pursued similar values and made similar decisions more favorably. CONCLUSION Strong consensus suggests characteristics that may push a person to go beyond normal expectations, that the study of moral exceptionality is not overly hindered by disagreement over who is morally exceptional, and that there is some common ground between disagreeing camps.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- William Fleeson
- Department of Psychology, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA
| | - R Michael Furr
- Department of Psychology, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA
| | | | - Dillon Luke
- Department of Psychology, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA
| | - Mike Prentice
- Department of Psychology, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA
| | - Caleb J Reynolds
- Department of Psychology, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA
| | | |
Collapse
|
2
|
Berry Z, Lucas BJ. How Much Is Enough? The Relationship Between Prosocial Effort and Moral Character Judgments. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2024; 50:659-678. [PMID: 36575959 DOI: 10.1177/01461672221135954] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/29/2022]
Abstract
The amount of effort required to bring about a prosocial outcome can vary from low-handing a stranger the wallet she just dropped-to high-spending days tracking down the owner of a lost wallet. The goal of the current research is to characterize the relationship between prosocial effort and moral character judgments. Does more prosocial effort always lead to rosier moral character judgments? Across four studies (N = 1,658), we find that moral character judgments increase with prosocial effort to a point and then plateau. We find evidence that this pattern is produced, in part, by descriptive and prescriptive norms: exceeding descriptive norms increases moral character judgments, but exceeding prescriptive norms has the opposite effect, which leads to a tapering off of moral character judgments at higher levels of effort.
Collapse
|
3
|
Rose H, Sanders CA, Willett C, King LA. Target Happiness Attenuates Perceivers' Moral Condemnation of Prejudiced People. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2024:1461672241240160. [PMID: 38661132 DOI: 10.1177/01461672241240160] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/26/2024]
Abstract
Five experiments (combined N = 4,915) tested the prediction that the moral boost of happiness would persist for social targets with moral failings. In Studies 1 and 2, White and Black participants, respectively, judged happy (versus unhappy) racist targets more morally good. In Study 3, happy (versus unhappy) racist targets were judged more morally good and less (more) likely to engage in racist (good) behavior. Behavioral expectations explained the link between happiness and moral evaluations. Study 4 replicated Studies 1 to 3 in the context of sexism. In Study 5, happy (versus unhappy) targets who engaged in racially biased behavior were evaluated as more morally good, and this effect was explained by behavioral forecasts. Happiness boosts attributions of moral goodness for prejudiced people and does so via expectations for future behavior. Future directions are discussed.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Hope Rose
- University of Missouri, Columbia, USA
| | | | | | | |
Collapse
|
4
|
Kosteletos G, Zioga I, Protopapadakis ED, Panayiotou AG, Kontoangelos K, Papageorgiou C. The Consequentialist Scale: Translation and empirical investigation in a Greek sample. Heliyon 2023; 9:e18386. [PMID: 37539210 PMCID: PMC10393767 DOI: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e18386] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/21/2022] [Revised: 06/27/2023] [Accepted: 07/17/2023] [Indexed: 08/05/2023] Open
Abstract
The Consequentialist Scale (Robinson, 2012) [89] assesses the endorsement of consequentialist and deontological moral beliefs. This study empirically investigated the application of the Greek translation of the Consequentialist Scale in a sample of native Greek speakers. Specifically, 415 native Greek speakers completed the questionnaire. To uncover the underlying structure of the 10 items in the Consequentialist Scale, an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted. The results revealed a three-factor solution, where the deontology factor exhibited the same structure as the original work by Robinson (2012) [89], while the original consequentialism factor split into two separate factors. Significant Pearson's r correlations were observed between age and responses to the Consequentialist Scale. Separate EFAs were conducted for two age groups based on a medial split: younger (36 years old or less) and older (more than 36 years old). Interestingly, the younger group exhibited a two-factor solution with the same structure as the original work, while the older group showed a three-factor solution. A hierarchical k-means cluster analysis revealed that the cluster of participants who scored higher in deontology compared to consequentialism primarily consisted of older participants, whereas the two other clusters comprised of younger participants exhibited the reverse pattern. Neither gender nor previous experience with philosophy significantly affected scores on the Consequentialist Scale. Overall, our study provides evidence that the Consequentialist Scale is suitable for use in the Greek population.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- George Kosteletos
- University Mental Health, Neurosciences and Precision Medicine Research Institute “COSTAS STEFANIS” (UMHRI), Athens, Greece
- Applied Philosophy Research Laboratory, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece
- Open University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus
| | - Ioanna Zioga
- University Mental Health, Neurosciences and Precision Medicine Research Institute “COSTAS STEFANIS” (UMHRI), Athens, Greece
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
| | - Evangelos D. Protopapadakis
- Applied Philosophy Research Laboratory, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece
- Open University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus
| | - Andrie G. Panayiotou
- Cyprus International Institute for Environmental and Public Health, School of Health Sciences, Cyprus University of Technology, Limassol, Cyprus
| | - Konstantinos Kontoangelos
- University Mental Health, Neurosciences and Precision Medicine Research Institute “COSTAS STEFANIS” (UMHRI), Athens, Greece
- First Department of Psychiatry, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Medical School, Eginition Hospital, Athens, Greece
| | - Charalabos Papageorgiou
- University Mental Health, Neurosciences and Precision Medicine Research Institute “COSTAS STEFANIS” (UMHRI), Athens, Greece
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Teeny JD, Lanzalotta JV, Petty RE. Understanding the Magnitude of Hypocrisy in Moral Contradictions: The Role of Surprise at Violating Strong Attitudes. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 2023:1461672231177773. [PMID: 37317889 DOI: 10.1177/01461672231177773] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/16/2023]
Abstract
Although two people could both enact similar forms of hypocrisy, one person might be judged as more hypocritical than the other. The present research advances a novel, theoretical explanation for a paradigmatic instance of this: the increased hypocrisy ascribed to contradicting a morally (vs. nonmorally) based attitude. In contrast to prior explanations, the present research shows that people infer targets holding morally (vs. nonmorally) based attitudes are more difficult to change. Consequently, when people are hypocritical on these stances, it elicits greater surprise, which amplifies the perceived hypocrisy. Through both statistical mediation and experimental moderation, we provide evidence for this process and show how our explanation generalizes to understanding heightened hypocrisy in other contexts, too (i.e., violating nonmoral attitudes held with certainty vs. uncertainty). Altogether, we provide an integrative, theoretical lens for predicting when moral and nonmoral acts of hypocrisy will be perceived as particularly hypocritical.
Collapse
|
6
|
Bostyn DH, Chandrashekar SP, Roets A. Deontologists are not always trusted over utilitarians: revisiting inferences of trustworthiness from moral judgments. Sci Rep 2023; 13:1665. [PMID: 36717679 PMCID: PMC9885386 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-27943-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/16/2022] [Accepted: 01/09/2023] [Indexed: 01/31/2023] Open
Abstract
Recent research has looked at how people infer the moral character of others based on how they resolve sacrificial moral dilemmas. Previous studies provide consistent evidence for the prediction that those who endorse outcome-maximizing, utilitarian judgments are disfavored in social dilemmas and are seen as less trustworthy in comparison to those who support harm-rejecting deontological judgments. However, research investigating this topic has studied a limited set of sacrificial dilemmas and did not test to what extent these effects might be moderated by specific features of the situation described in the sacrificial dilemma (for instance, whether the dilemma involves mortal or non-mortal harm). In the current manuscript, we assessed the robustness of previous findings by exploring how trust inference of utilitarian and deontological decision makers is moderated by five different contextual factors (such as whether the sacrificial harm is accomplished by an action or inaction), as well as by participants' own moral preferences. While we find some evidence that trust perceptions of others are moderated by dilemma features, we find a much stronger effect of participants' own moral preference: deontologists favored other deontologists and utilitarians favored utilitarians. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION: The stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 21 September 2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.21325953 .
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Dries H Bostyn
- Department of Developmental, Personality, and Social Psychology, Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000, Ghent, Belgium.
| | - Subramanya Prasad Chandrashekar
- Department of Psychology, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Edvard Bulls veg 1, 7049, Trondheim, Norway
| | - Arne Roets
- Department of Developmental, Personality, and Social Psychology, Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000, Ghent, Belgium
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Plaks JE, Bustos Rodriguez L, Ayad R. Identifying psychological features of robots that encourage and discourage trust. COMPUTERS IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.chb.2022.107301] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
|
8
|
Aberman Y, Plaks J. When Less is better: Messages that Present Dietary Carbon Emissions Data at the individual (vs. Aggregate) Level Increase Commitment to Sustainable Beef Consumption. Appetite 2022; 174:105980. [PMID: 35339621 DOI: 10.1016/j.appet.2022.105980] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/29/2020] [Revised: 10/11/2021] [Accepted: 02/25/2022] [Indexed: 11/02/2022]
Abstract
The environmental footprint embedded in the human diet is massive. To convey the enormity of the problem, persuasive environmental messages often report large-scale, aggregate data (such as the billions of tons of greenhouse gases released to the atmosphere annually by the beef industry.) Is this strategy effective? In five studies (total N = 1237), the environmental footprint of beef was presented to participants with either aggregate, nation-level numeric data, or with the same data scaled to the individual level. Across the studies, a clear pattern emerged: Participants who received aggregate-level (versus individual-level) data perceived less of a connection between their behavior and the environment and expressed less intention to curb their meat consumption. These data suggest that aggregate environmental figures, rather than raising urgency, may instead demotivate many message recipients.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Youval Aberman
- University of Toronto, 4003 Sidney Smith Hall, 100 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G3, Canada.
| | - Jason Plaks
- University of Toronto, 4003 Sidney Smith Hall, 100 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G3, Canada.
| |
Collapse
|
9
|
Robbins P, Alvear F, Litton P. Good deeds and hard knocks: The effect of past suffering on praise for moral behavior. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2021.104216] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
|
10
|
Plaks JE, Lv J, Zhao M, Staples W, Robinson JS. Using conflict negativity to index psychological tension between impartiality and status-upholding principles. Soc Neurosci 2021; 16:500-512. [PMID: 34229583 DOI: 10.1080/17470919.2021.1953133] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
People often endorse the moral principle that all human lives are equally valuable. At the same time, people often privilege high-status individuals over low-status individuals. These two inclinations come into conflict in a scenario involving the potential killing of a high-status person to save the lives of multiple low-status people. In the present study, participants viewed a series of sacrificial dilemmas in which the social status of the victims and beneficiaries was varied. We measured participants' choice (sacrifice vs. don't sacrifice), response time, and electroencephalographic activity, with an emphasis on conflict negativity (CN). Overall, we found no effects of victim/beneficiaries status on choice and response time. However, participants displayed a more pronounced CN effect when contemplating a high-status victim/low-status beneficiaries tradeoff than a low-status-victim/high-status beneficiaries tradeoff. Further analyses revealed that this effect was primarily driven by participants who endorsed deontological principles (e.g., "Some rules must never be broken, no matter the consequences"). In contrast, those who endorsed utilitarian principles displayed equivalent levels of conflict negativity, regardless of the social status of victims and beneficiaries. These findings shed light on the role of conflict in the phenomenology of moral decision making.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Jason E Plaks
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
| | - Jianing Lv
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
| | - Mingjun Zhao
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
| | - William Staples
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
| | | |
Collapse
|
11
|
Plaks JE, Robinson JS, Forbes R. Anger and Sadness as Moral Signals. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PERSONALITY SCIENCE 2021. [DOI: 10.1177/19485506211025909] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Three studies examined the relationship between emotions and moral judgment from an interpersonal perspective. In Studies 1 and 2, participants justified their decisions in sacrificial dilemmas to an imagined interlocutor. Linguistic analyses revealed that Don’t Sacrifice justifications contained more anger-related language than sadness-related language, whereas Sacrifice justifications contained roughly equal proportions of anger and sadness language. In Study 3, participants made character inferences about an actor who chose to/refused to sacrifice one person to save multiple people. We manipulated the actor’s ratio of anger to sadness. Participants rated the Don’t Sacrifice actor more negatively when they displayed high anger relative to sadness but rated the Sacrifice actor negatively whenever they exhibited high anger (independent of sadness). These data highlight novel ways in which actors and observers use emotions to complement the substance of a moral argument.
Collapse
|
12
|
Mancini F, Gangemi A. Deontological and Altruistic Guilt Feelings: A Dualistic Thesis. Front Psychol 2021; 12:651937. [PMID: 34239480 PMCID: PMC8258242 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.651937] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/12/2021] [Accepted: 05/10/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
In this paper we argue in favor of the existence of two different guilt feelings: altruistic guilt (AG) and deontological guilt (DG). AG arises from having harmed, through one's own action or omission, an innocent victim, while DG arises from the transgression of an internalized norm. In most daily experiences of guilt feelings both types are present, but we argue that they are not traceable to each other and that each can be present without the other. We show that the two guilt feelings can be distinguished with reference to behavioral, cognitive, and neurophysiological aspects. Moreover, we demonstrate that they are differently related to other processes and emotions. AG is connected with pain, empathy and ToM. DG is strongly related to disgust. We briefly illustrate some implications for moral psychology and clinical psychology.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Francesco Mancini
- Scuola di Specializzazione in Psicoterapia Cognitiva (SPC), Rome, Italy.,Department of Human Sciences, Guglielmo Marconi University, Rome, Italy
| | - Amelia Gangemi
- Department of Cognitive Science, University of Messina, Messina, Italy
| |
Collapse
|
13
|
Arnestad MN, Eriksen KW, Kvaløy O, Laurila B. Effort Provision in a Game of Luck. Front Psychol 2021; 12:637339. [PMID: 34093319 PMCID: PMC8174658 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.637339] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/03/2020] [Accepted: 04/13/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
In some jobs, the correlation between effort and output is almost zero. For instance, money managers are primarily paid for luck. Using a controlled lab experiment, we examined under which conditions workers are willing to put in effort even if the output (and thus their employer's earnings) is determined by pure luck. We varied whether the employer could observe the workers' effort, as well as whether the employer knows that earnings were determined by luck. We find that, workers believed that the employer will reward their effort even if their effort does not affect earnings. Consequently, workers work harder if the employer could observe their (unproductive) effort. Moreover, even when the employer only saw earnings and not effort, workers labored harder if the employer did not know that earnings were determined by luck.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Mads Nordmo Arnestad
- Department of Leadership and Organizational Behaviour, BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, Norway
| | - Kristoffer W Eriksen
- University of Stavanger Business School, University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway
| | - Ola Kvaløy
- University of Stavanger Business School, University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway
| | - Bjørnar Laurila
- University of Stavanger Business School, University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway
| |
Collapse
|
14
|
Dhaliwal NA, Patil I, Cushman F. Reputational and cooperative benefits of third-party compensation. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.01.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/04/2023]
|
15
|
Erlandsson A, Wingren M, Andersson PA. Type and amount of help as predictors for impression of helpers. PLoS One 2020; 15:e0243808. [PMID: 33306708 PMCID: PMC7732071 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0243808] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/26/2020] [Accepted: 11/26/2020] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Impression of helpers can vary as a function of the magnitude of helping (amount of help) and of situational and motivational aspects (type of help). Over three studies conducted in Sweden and the US, we manipulated both the amount and the type of help in ten diverse vignettes and measured participants' impressions of the described helpers. Impressions were almost unaffected when increasing the amount of help by 500%, but clearly affected by several type of help-manipulations. Particularly, helpers were less positively evaluated if they had mixed motives for helping, did not experience intense emotions or empathy, or if helping involved no personal sacrifice. In line with the person-centered theory of moral judgment, people seem to form impressions of helpers primarily based on the presumed underlying processes and motives of prosociality rather than its consequences.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Arvid Erlandsson
- Department of Behavioral Sciences and Learning, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden
| | - Mattias Wingren
- Department of Behavioral Sciences and Learning, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden
| | - Per A. Andersson
- Department of Behavioral Sciences and Learning, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden
| |
Collapse
|
16
|
Critcher CR, Helzer EG, Tannenbaum D. Moral character evaluation: Testing another's moral-cognitive machinery. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2020. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103906] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
|
17
|
Robinson JS, Xu X, Plaks JE. Disgust and Deontology: Trait Sensitivity to Contamination Promotes a Preference for Order, Hierarchy, and Rule-Based Moral Judgment. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PERSONALITY SCIENCE 2017. [DOI: 10.1177/1948550617732609] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
Models of moral judgment have linked generalized emotionality with deontological moral judgment. The evidence, however, is mixed. Other research has linked the specific emotion of disgust with generalized moral condemnation. Here too, the evidence is mixed. We suggest that a synthesis of these two literatures points to one specific emotion (disgust) that reliably predicts one specific type of moral judgment (deontological). In all three studies, we found that trait disgust sensitivity predicted more extreme deontological judgment. In Study 3, with deontological endorsement and consequentialist endorsement operationalized as independent constructs, we found that disgust was positively associated with deontological endorsement but was unrelated to consequentialist endorsement. Across studies, the disgust–deontology link was mediated by individual difference variables related to preference for order (right-wing authoritarianism and intolerance for ambiguity). These data suggest a more precise model of emotion and moral judgment that identifies specific emotions, specific types of moral judgment, and specific motivational pathways.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Xiaowen Xu
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
| | - Jason E. Plaks
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
| |
Collapse
|