Treating the sequelae of chronic childhood emotional abandonment

Chronic emotional abandonment is traumatic for children, and often leads them to identify with the aggressor (IWA)-in order to hold onto their needed attachment to their parents, they feel, think, and do what their parents require, blame themselves for being abused and for their family's unhappiness, and feel ashamed. IWA often persists as a general tendency. Treatment requires therapists' dependability, attunement, empathy, interest, humility, and perhaps playfulness. Patients' history of abandonment should be explored in detail, though patients may be protective of their parents. Therapists should explore their own behavior if necessary, and acknowledge lapses; normalize and explore patients' shame; and avoid trying to "rescue" patients. Patients must be helped to re-find authority and agency over their own lives, and mourn their early loss of feeling "the right to a life." The treatment of "Claire," a 40-something child of two depressed parents, illustrates some of these points.

The motivated appeal to hypocrisy: the relation of motivational threats to message rejection

Few studies have focused on the conditions in which individuals perceive hypocrisy in others. The current study introduces and tests the Motivated Appeal to Hypocrisy (MAtH) hypothesis. This hypothesis examines core social psychological motivational threats and asks (a) whether these are related to the accounts of individuals in charging others with hypocrisy, and (b) whether these perceptions of hypocrisy are associated with reductions in the persuasiveness of persons targeted as hypocrites. Study 1 (N = 201 ) was based on qualitative coding of stories and revealed, as expected, that violations of core social motives involving belongingness, understanding, control, self-enhancement, and trust are involved in participants' stories of hypocrisy. Study 2 (N = 237 ) used a multilevel correlational approach and demonstrated that violations of core social motives significantly predict perceptions of hypocrisy and the rejection of a person's message or advice. The relation between social motive violations and message rejection was mediated by perceptions of hypocrisy.

Understanding the Magnitude of Hypocrisy in Moral Contradictions: The Role of Surprise at Violating Strong Attitudes

Although two people could both enact similar forms of hypocrisy, one person might be judged as more hypocritical than the other. The present research advances a novel, theoretical explanation for a paradigmatic instance of this: the increased hypocrisy ascribed to contradicting a morally (vs. nonmorally) based attitude. In contrast to prior explanations, the present research shows that people infer targets holding morally (vs. nonmorally) based attitudes are more difficult to change. Consequently, when people are hypocritical on these stances, it elicits greater surprise, which amplifies the perceived hypocrisy. Through both statistical mediation and experimental moderation, we provide evidence for this process and show how our explanation generalizes to understanding heightened hypocrisy in other contexts, too (i.e., violating nonmoral attitudes held with certainty vs. uncertainty). Altogether, we provide an integrative, theoretical lens for predicting when moral and nonmoral acts of hypocrisy will be perceived as particularly hypocritical.

Being good to look good: Self-reported moral character predicts moral double standards among reputation-seeking individuals

Moral character is widely expected to lead to moral judgements and practices. However, such expectations are often breached, especially when moral character is measured by self-report. We propose that because self-reported moral character partly reflects a desire to appear good, people who self-report a strong moral character will show moral harshness towards others and downplay their own transgressions-that is, they will show greater moral hypocrisy. This self-other discrepancy in moral judgements should be pronounced among individuals who are particularly motivated by reputation. Employing diverse methods including large-scale multination panel data (N = 34,323), and vignette and behavioural experiments (N = 700), four studies supported our proposition, showing that various indicators of moral character (Benevolence and Universalism values, justice sensitivity, and moral identity) predicted harsher judgements of others' more than own transgressions. Moreover, these double standards emerged particularly among individuals possessing strong reputation management motives. The findings highlight how reputational concerns moderate the link between moral character and moral judgement.

Examining the Sexual Double Standards and Hypocrisy in Partner Suitability Appraisals Within a Norwegian Sample

Sexual double standards are social norms that impose greater social opprobrium on women versus men or that permit one sex greater sexual freedom than the other. This study examined sexual double standards when choosing a mate based on their sexual history. Using a novel approach, participants (N = 923, 64% women) were randomly assigned to make evaluations in long-term or short-term mating contexts and asked how a prospective partner's sexual history would influence their own likelihood of having sex (short-term) or entering a relationship (long-term) with them. They were then asked how the same factors would influence the appraisal they would make of male and female friends in a similar position. We found no evidence of traditional sexual double standards for promiscuous or sexually undesirable behavior. There was some evidence for small sexual double standard for self-stimulation, but this was in the opposite direction to that predicted. There was greater evidence for sexual hypocrisy as sexual history tended to have a greater negative impact on suitor assessments for the self rather than for same-sex friends. Sexual hypocrisy effects were more prominent in women, though the direction of the effects was the same for both sexes. Overall, men were more positive about women's self-stimulation than women wee, particularly in short-term contexts. Socially undesirable sexual behavior (unfaithfulness, mate poaching, and jealous/controlling) had a large negative impact on appraisals of a potential suitor across all contexts and for both sexes. Effects of religiosity, disgust, sociosexuality, and question order effects are considered.

"I agree with LGBT rights, but…": Authoritarianism and social dominance orientation underlying hypocritical attitudes of Taiwan society

In the modern public sphere, ordinary people may display hypocrisy in political participation, showing contradictory attitudes across different social issues. But there still exists another type of hypocritical attitude within one single issue, such as agreeing with LGBT rights but refusing to amend the current Civil Code simultaneously in the case of Taiwan. In the same-sex marriage legalizing process, the hypocritical attitude could be observed in Taiwan's conservative campus, together with the explicitly prejudiced attitude. In this article, we explored the existence of the hypocritical attitude on this issue and discovered its psychological foundations. We conducted an online questionnaire survey in 2018 (N = 544) to measure Taiwanese participants' attitudes toward same-sex marriage and their psychological dispositions of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Our results showed that while attitudes toward LGBT rights and special-law were negatively correlated, several participants showed the hypocrisy of positive attitudes toward the two sets of questions simultaneously. The hypocritical people shared similar psychological dispositions with the explicitly prejudiced people as high in RWA and SDO while differentiated from the LGBT-friendly people. Attitudinal hypocrisy and explicit prejudice constitute two sides of the conservative camp in Taiwan, which is based on the Confucianism cultural value of interpersonal harmony. The cultural and societal implications were discussed.

Feeling One Thing and Doing Another: How Expressions of Guilt and Shame Influence Hypocrisy Judgment

The present study investigated how people, as uninvolved social observers (i.e., those not affected by the emotion expresser's behavior), judge hypocrisy in a target who publicly expresses their self-conscious emotions (i.e., shame and guilt) after making an immoral decision, then repeats the same immoral behavior again. Results across the two studies conducted showed that participants viewed the target as more hypocritical when the target expressed guilt (vs. shame) for their past misdeed and then committed the same act again. The present study suggests that social perceivers tend to infer expressions of guilt (and of shame to a lesser degree) as signaling future changes, which is reflected in judgments of hypocrisy. The study further discusses implications for the social functions of emotional expression and communication.

On the Characteristics of the Cognitive Dissonance State: Exploration Within the Pleasure Arousal Dominance Model

Little is actually known about the nature and characteristics of the cognitive dissonance state. In this paper, we review the actual knowledge and the main limitations of past studies. Then, we present two studies that investigate the characteristics of the cognitive dissonance state from the perspective the Pleasure Arousal Dominance model of emotion. Study 1 (N = 102) used the hypocrisy paradigm and Study 2 (N = 130) used a counterattitudinal essay. In Study 1, participants in the Dissonance condition reported less Pleasure with each inconsistent behaviour remembered. In Study 2, participants in the Dissonance condition reported less Pleasure than participants in the Control Condition. In both studies, no significant difference was found on the Arousal and Dominance indexes. These results are among the first to link cognitive dissonance to a general model of emotions, an approach that should be pursued further.

Hypocrisy and Corruption: How Disparities in Power Shape the Evolution of Social Control

Altruism presents an evolutionary paradox, as altruistic individuals are good for the group yet vulnerable to exploitation by selfish individuals. One mechanism that can effectively curtail selfishness within groups is punishment. Here, we show in an evolutionary game-theoretical model that punishment can effectively evolve and maintain high levels of altruism in the population, yet not all punishment strategies were equally virtuous. Unlike typical models of social evolution, we explicitly altered the extent to which individuals vary in their power over others, such that powerful individuals can more readily punish and escape the punishment of others. Two primary findings emerged. Under large power asymmetries, a powerful selfish minority maintained altruism of the masses. In contrast, increased symmetry of power among individuals produced a more egalitarian society held together by altruism and punishment carried out by the collective. These extremes are consistent with the coercive nature of the powerful elites in social insects and egalitarian mechanisms of punishment in humans such as coalitional enforcement and gossip. Our overall findings provide insights into the importance of oversight, the consequences to changes in the power structure of social systems, and the roots of hypocrisy and corruption in human and nonhuman animal societies.

The epistemic costs of compromise in bioethics

Bioethicists sometimes defend compromise positions, particularly when they enter debates on applied topics that have traditionally been highly polarised, such as those regarding abortion, euthanasia and embryonic stem cell research. However, defending compromise positions is often regarded with a degree of disdain. Many are intuitively attracted to the view that it is almost always problematic to defend compromise positions, in the sense that we have a significant moral reason not to do so. In this paper, we consider whether this common sense view can be given a principled basis. We first show how existing explanations for the problematic nature of compromise fall short of vindicating the common sense view, before offering our own explanation, which, we claim, comes closer to vindicating that view. We argue that defending a compromise will typically have two epistemic costs: it will corrupt attempts to use the claims of ethicists as testimonial evidence, and it will undermine standards that are important to making epistemic progress in ethics. We end by suggesting that the epistemic costs of compromise could be reduced by introducing a stronger separation between ethical debate aimed at fulfilling the epistemic role of ethics, and ethical debate that aims to directly produce good policy or practice.

FERENCZI'S EVOLVING CONCEPTION OF NARCISSISIC PATHOLOGY AND ITS BASIS IN TRAUMA

Ferenczi's landmark contributions to understanding and treating psychological trauma are inseparable from his evolving conception of narcissism, though he grasped their interrelationship only gradually. Ultimately, he saw narcissistic disorders as the result of how children cope with abuse or neglect, and their aftermath-they identify and comply with the needs of the aggressor, and later of people more generally, and dissociate their own needs, feelings, and perceptions; and they compensate for their submission and sacrifice of self by regressing to soothing omnipotent fantasies-which, ironically, may facilitate continued submission. Ferenczi's experiments in technique were designed to help patients overcome their defensive retreat to omnipotent fantasies and regain their lost selves. His earliest experiment, active technique, in which he frustrated patients, was a direct attack on their clinging to omnipotent fantasy. But as he came to see such narcissistic personality distortions as a way of coping with the residue of early trauma, his focus shifted to the underlying trauma. His loving and indulgent relaxation technique was intended as an antidote to early emotional neglect. His final experiment, mutual analysis, characterized by the analyst's openness and honesty in examining his own inevitable insincerities, was an attempt to heal the damage from parents' hypocrisy about their mistreatment, which Ferenczi came to see as most destructive to the child.

The difference between ice cream and Nazis: Moral externalization and the evolution of human cooperation

A range of empirical findings is first used to more precisely characterize our distinctive tendency to objectify or externalize moral demands and obligations, and it is then argued that this salient feature of our moral cognition represents a profound puzzle for evolutionary approaches to human moral psychology that existing proposals do not help resolve. It is then proposed that such externalization facilitated a broader shift to a vastly more cooperative form of social life by establishing and maintaining a connection between the extent to which an agent is herself motivated by a given moral norm and the extent to which she uses conformity to that same norm as a criterion in evaluating candidate partners in social interaction generally. This connection ensures the correlated interaction necessary to protect those prepared to adopt increasingly cooperative, altruistic, and other prosocial norms of interaction from exploitation, especially as such norms were applied in novel ways and/or to novel circumstances and as the rapid establishment of new norms allowed us to reap still greater rewards from hypercooperation. A wide range of empirical findings is then used to support this hypothesis, showing why the status we ascribe to moral demands and considerations exhibits the otherwise puzzling combination of objective and subjective elements that it does, as well as showing how the need to effectively advertise our externalization of particular moral commitments generates features of our social interaction so familiar that they rarely strike us as standing in need of any explanation in the first place.

The ethics of diplomatic criticism: The Responsibility to Protect, Just War Theory and Presumptive Last Resort

This article presents the ethical case for diplomatic criticism as a response to mass atrocities and serious external aggression. It argues, in short, that states have a moral duty to criticise the offending parties. More specifically, it argues that diplomatic criticism is often a plausible and preferable alternative to other means of addressing serious external aggression and mass atrocities (such as war, economic sanctions and other diplomatic measures). It also argues that diplomatic criticism is often preferable to doing nothing, and that even if other means are undertaken, states should engage in diplomatic criticism as well. There are two subsidiary aims of the article. The first is to reject some of the worries surrounding international hypocrisy - I aim to show that even hypocritical diplomatic criticism may be obligatory. The second is to highlight the impact on Just War Theory of considering in more detail the ethical issues raised by the alternatives to war, such as diplomatic criticism, and, more specifically, to present a new account of the last resort principle, which I call 'Presumptive Last Resort'.