Discipline and desire: On the relative importance of willpower and purity in signaling virtue

Is Doing Good Good Enough? A Motivation, Action, Sacrifice, and Temptation (MAST) View of Moral Praiseworthiness

We present the Motivation, Action, Sacrifice, and Temptation (MAST) view of moral praiseworthiness and evaluate four components shaping judgments of an actor's morality: (a) How did the person act? (b) Why did the person act? (c) Did the person sacrifice something when acting? and (d) Was the person tempted to avoid the sacrifice? Across multiple moral domains, we evaluate moral impressions of hypothetical actors who acted ostensibly morally under different motivational, sacrificial, and temptational conditions. Across four studies (total N > 1,200) and 150 morally relevant scenarios, all components shaped moral impressions, with motivational purity having the strongest impact. Exploring motivation more deeply via Self-Determination Theory, we found effects of internalized (vs. externalized) motivations. Broadly speaking, judges prefer actors to act automatically and in an idealized manner rather than with deliberation and effort. This work address questions that have fascinated philosophers, psychologists, and laypeople, advancing understanding of moral impression formation.

Dynamics of self-control during choice and post-choice consumption quantity

Observed choices between options representing a relative vice and a relative virtue have commonly been used as a measure of eating self-control in the literature. However, even though self-control operations may manifest across the post-choice consumption stage, either similarly or in different ways from the choice stage, most prior research has ignored consumption quantity of the chosen option. While the behavior of choosing a virtue instead of a vice does manifest self-control, we examine how this plays out in post-choice consumption. Specifically, we find that when processing resources are limited, after having chosen a virtue food, unrestrained eaters ironically consumed greater quantities and therefore more calories than restrained eaters (Study 1). This reflects more persistent self-control in the post-choice consumption stage among restrained eaters than unrestrained eaters, and occurs because choosing a virtue lowers accessibility of the self-control goal among unrestrained eaters relative to restrained eaters (Study 2), thereby increasing intake of the virtuous food. In contrast, subsequent to having chosen a vice, unrestrained eaters and restrained eaters did not show any such difference in intake (Study 1) or goal accessibility (Study 2). Together, these results reveal that persistence of self-control in the post-choice consumption stage depends on individuals' dietary restraint and their initial exercise of self-control in the choice decision. The mere act of choosing a virtue satisfies unrestrained eaters' self-control goal and leads to increased food intake, whereas the same act keeps the same goal activated among restrained eaters who reduce intake of the chosen virtue. Put differently, persistent self-control across choice and quantity decisions is observed only when those with a dietary goal show successful self-control enactment in the choice stage. We therefore highlight that the operation of self-control can be dynamic within a consumption episode, and thus, choice and post-choice quantity are both informative of self-control.

Forming Evaluations of Moral Character: How Are Multiple Pieces of Information Prioritized and Integrated?

Evaluating other people's moral character is a crucial social cognitive task. However, the cognitive processes by which people seek out, prioritize, and integrate multiple pieces of character-relevant information have not been studied empirically. The first aim of this research was to examine which character traits are considered most important when forming an impression of a person's overall moral character. The second aim was to understand how differing levels of trait expression affect overall character judgments. Four preregistered studies and one supplemental study (total N = 720), using five different measures of importance and sampling undergraduates, online workers, and community members, found that our participants placed the most importance on the traits honest, helpful, compassionate, loyal, and responsible. Also, when integrating the information that they have learned, our participants seemed to engage in a simple averaging process in which all available, relevant information is combined in a linear fashion to form an overall evaluation of moral character. This research provides new insights into the cognitive processes by which evaluations of moral character are formed.

Alcohol and morality: one alcoholic drink is enough to make people declare to harm others and behave impurely

We aimed to understand if alcohol intoxication affects the willingness to violate moral foundations (care, fairness, authority, loyalty, and purity). We conducted a laboratory study (N = 387) with three randomized groups: alcohol intoxication, placebo, and control, measuring the sacralization of moral foundations via the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale. The study showed intoxicated participants sacralized moral foundations of care and purity more often than participants from control and placebo groups. It means participants declared more willing to physically harm other people and animals and behave impurely, e.g., doing deviant sexual behaviors or selling their souls. No differences related to fairness, authority, and loyalty were found. Our study helps to understand the decision processes underlying immoral behaviors, including crimes. We showed that even one drink makes people change their judgments about what is right and wrong (in the cases of harmful and impure behaviors), and because this kind of judgment precedes immoral behaviors, our results may help explain why some people under the influence of alcohol break the rules by doing things which they would never do when sober.

The Problem of Purity in Moral Psychology

Academic AbstractThe idea of "purity" transformed moral psychology. Here, we provide the first systematic review of this concept. Although often discussed as one construct, we reveal ~9 understandings of purity, ranging from respecting God to not eating gross things. This striking heterogeneity arises because purity-unlike other moral constructs-is not understood by what it is but what it isn't: obvious interpersonal harm. This poses many problems for moral psychology and explains why purity lacks convergent and divergent validity and why purity is confounded with politics, religion, weirdness, and perceived harm. Because purity is not a coherent construct, it cannot be a distinct basis of moral judgment or specially tied to disgust. Rather than a specific moral domain, purity is best understood as a loose set of themes in moral rhetoric. These themes are scaffolded on cultural understandings of harm-the broad, pluralistic harm outlined by the Theory of Dyadic Morality.

Is it good to feel bad about littering? Conflict between moral beliefs and behaviors for everyday transgressions

People sometimes do things that they think are morally wrong. We investigate how actors' perceptions of the morality of their own behaviors affects observer evaluations. In Study 1 (n = 302), we presented participants with six different descriptions of actors who routinely engaged in a morally questionable behavior and varied whether the actors thought the behavior was morally wrong. Actors who believed their behavior was wrong were seen as having better moral character, but their behavior was rated as more wrong. In Study 2 (n = 391) we investigated whether perceptions of actor metadesires were responsible for the effects of actor beliefs on character judgments. We used the same stimuli and measures as in Study 1 but added a measure of the actor's perceived desires to engage in the behaviors. As predicted, the effect of actors' moral beliefs on judgments of their moral character was mediated by perceived metadesires. In Study 3 (n = 1092) we replicated these findings in a between-participants design and further found that the effect of actor beliefs on act and character judgments was moderated by participant beliefs about the general acceptability of the behavior.

Being Watched by God Versus a Third Person: Which Agent Lowers the Perceived Likelihood of Immoral Behaviors?

With three experimental studies using data from young adults living in a highly religious context, namely Turkey (N = 483), the current research examines how being watched by a third person versus God affects the perceived likelihood ratings of harmful versus impure immoral behaviors. We hypothesized that respondents would expect others to more strongly refrain from acting immorally when they believed they were being watched by God compared to a third person, and that this effect would be more pronounced for impure compared to harmful moral transgressions. The God condition was perceived as more effective than the third-person surveillance condition when immoral behaviors were harmful. However, for severe impure transgressions, neither surveillance condition was perceived as effective. We discuss our findings in light of contemporary morality research, outline the role of possible cultural and individual-level boundary conditions, and highlight the scientific and practical contributions of our research to the field.