Family doctor responses to changes in target stringency under financial incentives

A new look at physicians' responses to financial incentives: Quality of care, practice characteristics, and motivations

There is considerable controversy about what causes (in)effectiveness of physician performance pay in improving the quality of care. Using a behavioral experiment with German primary-care physicians, we study the incentive effect of performance pay on service provision and quality of care. To explore whether variations in quality are based on the incentive scheme and the interplay with physicians' real-world profit orientation and patient-regarding motivations, we link administrative data on practice characteristics and survey data on physicians' attitudes with experimental data. We find that, under performance pay, quality increases by about 7pp compared to baseline capitation. While the effect increases with the severity of illness, the bonus level does not significantly affect the quality of care. Data linkage indicates that primary-care physicians in high-profit practices provide a lower quality of care. Physicians' other-regarding motivations and attitudes are significant drivers of high treatment quality.

Going the extra mile? General practitioners' upcoding of fees for home visits

General practitioners' (GPs') income often relies on self-reported activities and performances. They can therefore 'game the system' to maximize their remuneration. We investigate whether Danish GPs game their travel fees for home visits. Combining administrative and geographical data, we measure the difference between GPs' traveled and billed distances. We exploit a rise in the fees for home visits. If there is a link between the rise in fees and upcoding, we interpret this finding as indicative of gaming behavior. We find that upcoding occurs slightly more often than downcoding (16% vs. 13% of visits) for visits that can be both upcoded and downcoded. Using linear probability models with GP fixed effects, we find that the fee rise is associated with a reduction in upcoding of 0.6% of home visits (2.8% for visits where upcoding is feasible) and no change in downcoding. Importantly, we find no statistically significant differences in the reduction in upcoding across distance bands despite large differences in their fee rises. We therefore conclude that there is no causal evidence of GPs gaming their fees.

Unintended consequences of the 18-week referral to treatment standard in NHS England: a threshold analysis

OBJECTIVE

In 2012, an '18-week referral to treatment standard' was introduced in England. Among people on the list of those waiting for hospital treatment at a point in time, the standard states that at least '92% of patients should have been waiting for less than 18 weeks'. Targets can have unintended consequences, where patients are prioritised based on the target rather than clinical need. Such an effect will be evident as a spike in the number of hospital trusts at the target threshold, referred to as a threshold effect. This study examines for threshold effects across all non-specialist acute NHS England hospital trusts by financial year.

METHODS

A retrospective observational study of publicly available data examined waiting times for patients on the waiting list. We examined trust performance against the 92% target by financial year, from 2015/16 to 2021/22, using Cattaneo et al's manipulation density test (test for discontinuity/spike in data around target threshold) for all patients and by type of treatment.

RESULTS

The proportion of NHS hospital trusts meeting the 92% target deteriorated over time. From 2015/16 to 2019/20, there was strong evidence of a threshold effect at the 92% target (p<0.001). There was no evidence of a threshold effect in 2020/21 (p=0.063) or 2021/22 (p=0.090). Threshold effects were present across most types of treatment in 2016/17 and fewer types from 2017/18 onwards.

CONCLUSION

We observed striking evidence of a threshold effect suggesting that while targets change behaviour, they do so in a selective way, focusing on the threshold rather than a pervasive improvement in practice. However, at the height of the pandemic, as almost no trusts could reach the target, the threshold effect disappeared.

The Cost of Uncontrolled Blood Pressure in Australian General Practice: A Modelling Study Using Electronic Health Records (MedicineInsight)

BACKGROUND

Hypertension is the most common condition seen in Australian general practice. Despite hypertension being amenable to lifestyle modifications and pharmacological treatment, only around half of these patients have controlled blood pressure levels (< 140/90 mmHg), placing them at an increased risk of cardiovascular disease.

OBJECTIVE

We aimed to estimate the health and acute hospitalisation costs of uncontrolled hypertension among patients attending general practice.

METHODS

We used population data and electronic health records from 634,000 patients aged 45-74 years who regularly attended an Australian general practice between 2016 and 2018 (MedicineInsight database). An existing worksheet-based costing model was adapted to calculate the potential cost savings for acute hospitalisation of primary cardiovascular disease events by reducing the risk of a cardiovascular event over the next 5 years through improved systolic blood pressure control. The model estimated the number of expected cardiovascular disease events and associated acute hospital costs under current levels of systolic blood pressure and compared this estimate with the expected number of cardiovascular disease events and costs under different levels of systolic blood pressure control.

RESULTS

The model estimated that across all Australians aged 45-74 years who visit their general practitioner (n = 8.67 million), 261,858 cardiovascular disease events can be expected over the next 5 years at current systolic blood pressure levels (mean 137.8 mmHg, standard deviation = 12.3 mmHg), with a cost of AUD$1813 million (in 2019-20). By reducing the systolic blood pressure of all patients with a systolic blood pressure greater than 139 mmHg to 139 mmHg, 25,845 cardiovascular disease events could be avoided with an associated reduction in acute hospital costs of AUD$179 million. If systolic blood pressure is lowered further to 129 mmHg for all those with systolic blood pressure greater than 129 mmHg, 56,169 cardiovascular disease events could be avoided with potential cost savings of AUD$389 million. Sensitivity analyses indicate that potential cost savings range from AUD$46 million to AUD$1406 million and AUD$117 million to AUD$2009 million for the two scenarios, respectively. Cost savings by practice range from AUD$16,479 for small practices to AUD$82,493 for large practices.

CONCLUSIONS

The aggregate cost effects of poor blood pressure control in primary care are high, but cost implications at the individual practice level are modest. The potential cost savings improve the potential to design cost-effective interventions, but such interventions may be best targeted at a population level rather than at individual practices.

Estimated impact from the withdrawal of primary care financial incentives on selected indicators of quality of care in Scotland: controlled interrupted time series analysis

OBJECTIVE

To determine whether the withdrawal of the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) scheme in primary care in Scotland in 2016 had an impact on selected recorded quality of care, compared with England where the scheme continued.

DESIGN

Controlled interrupted time series regression analysis.

SETTING

General practices in Scotland and England.

PARTICIPANTS

979 practices with 5 599 171 registered patients in Scotland, and 7921 practices with 56 270 628 registered patients in England in 2013-14, decreasing to 864 practices in Scotland and 6873 in England in 2018-19, mainly due to practice mergers.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES

Changes in quality of care at one year and three years after withdrawal of QOF financial incentives in Scotland at the end of the 2015-16 financial year for 16 indicators (two complex processes, nine intermediate outcomes, and five treatments) measured annually for financial years from 2013-14 to 2018-19.

RESULTS

A significant decrease in performance was observed for 12 of the 16 quality of care indicators in Scotland one year after QOF was abolished and for 10 of the 16 indicators three years after QOF was abolished, compared with England. At three years, the absolute percentage point difference between Scotland and England was largest for recording (by tick box) of mental health care planning (-40.2 percentage points, 95% confidence interval -45.5 to -35.0) and diabetic foot screening (-22.8, -33.9 to -11.7). Substantial reductions were, however, also observed for intermediate outcomes, including blood pressure control in patients with peripheral arterial disease (-18.5, -22.1 to -14.9), stroke or transient ischaemic attack (-16.6, -20.6 to -12.7), hypertension (-13.7, -19.4 to -7.9), diabetes (-12.7, -15.0 to -12.4), or coronary heart disease (-12.8, -14.9 to -10.8), and for glycated haemoglobin control in people with HbA_1c levels ≤75 mmol/mol (-5.0, -8.4 to -1.5). No significant differences were observed between Scotland and England for influenza immunisation and antiplatelet or anticoagulant treatment for coronary heart disease three years after withdrawal of incentives.

CONCLUSION

The abolition of financial incentives in Scotland was associated with reductions in recorded quality of care for most performance indicators. Changes to pay for performance should be carefully designed and implemented to monitor and respond to any reductions in care quality.