1
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Kuo YP, Carja O. Evolutionary graph theory beyond single mutation dynamics: on how network-structured populations cross fitness landscapes. Genetics 2024; 227:iyae055. [PMID: 38639307 PMCID: PMC11151934 DOI: 10.1093/genetics/iyae055] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/07/2024] [Revised: 03/28/2024] [Accepted: 04/01/2024] [Indexed: 04/20/2024] Open
Abstract
Spatially resolved datasets are revolutionizing knowledge in molecular biology, yet are under-utilized for questions in evolutionary biology. To gain insight from these large-scale datasets of spatial organization, we need mathematical representations and modeling techniques that can both capture their complexity, but also allow for mathematical tractability. Evolutionary graph theory utilizes the mathematical representation of networks as a proxy for heterogeneous population structure and has started to reshape our understanding of how spatial structure can direct evolutionary dynamics. However, previous results are derived for the case of a single new mutation appearing in the population and the role of network structure in shaping fitness landscape crossing is still poorly understood. Here we study how network-structured populations cross fitness landscapes and show that even a simple extension to a two-mutational landscape can exhibit complex evolutionary dynamics that cannot be predicted using previous single-mutation results. We show how our results can be intuitively understood through the lens of how the two main evolutionary properties of a network, the amplification and acceleration factors, change the expected fate of the intermediate mutant in the population and further discuss how to link these models to spatially resolved datasets of cellular organization.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yang Ping Kuo
- Computational Biology Department, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15232, USA
| | - Oana Carja
- Computational Biology Department, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15232, USA
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2
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Kuo YP, Nombela-Arrieta C, Carja O. A theory of evolutionary dynamics on any complex population structure reveals stem cell niche architecture as a spatial suppressor of selection. Nat Commun 2024; 15:4666. [PMID: 38821923 PMCID: PMC11143212 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-024-48617-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/18/2023] [Accepted: 05/02/2024] [Indexed: 06/02/2024] Open
Abstract
How the spatial arrangement of a population shapes its evolutionary dynamics has been of long-standing interest in population genetics. Most previous studies assume a small number of demes or symmetrical structures that, most often, act as well-mixed populations. Other studies use network theory to study more heterogeneous spatial structures, however they usually assume small, regular networks, or strong constraints on the strength of selection considered. Here we build network generation algorithms, conduct evolutionary simulations and derive general analytic approximations for probabilities of fixation in populations with complex spatial structure. We build a unifying evolutionary theory across network families and derive the relevant selective parameter, which is a combination of network statistics, predictive of evolutionary dynamics. We also illustrate how to link this theory with novel datasets of spatial organization and use recent imaging data to build the cellular spatial networks of the stem cell niches of the bone marrow. Across a wide variety of parameters, we find these networks to be strong suppressors of selection, delaying mutation accumulation in this tissue. We also find that decreases in stem cell population size also decrease the suppression strength of the tissue spatial structure.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yang Ping Kuo
- Computational Biology Department, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
- Joint Carnegie Mellon University-University of Pittsburgh Ph.D. Program in Computational Biology, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
| | - César Nombela-Arrieta
- Department of Medical Oncology and Hematology, University and University Hospital Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
| | - Oana Carja
- Computational Biology Department, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.
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3
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Wang X, Zhou L, McAvoy A, Li A. Imitation dynamics on networks with incomplete information. Nat Commun 2023; 14:7453. [PMID: 37978181 PMCID: PMC10656501 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-023-43048-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/13/2023] [Accepted: 10/30/2023] [Indexed: 11/19/2023] Open
Abstract
Imitation is an important learning heuristic in animal and human societies. Previous explorations report that the fate of individuals with cooperative strategies is sensitive to the protocol of imitation, leading to a conundrum about how different styles of imitation quantitatively impact the evolution of cooperation. Here, we take a different perspective on the personal and external social information required by imitation. We develop a general model of imitation dynamics with incomplete information in networked systems, which unifies classical update rules including the death-birth and pairwise-comparison rule on complex networks. Under pairwise interactions, we find that collective cooperation is most promoted if individuals neglect personal information. If personal information is considered, cooperators evolve more readily with more external information. Intriguingly, when interactions take place in groups on networks with low degrees of clustering, using more personal and less external information better facilitates cooperation. Our unifying perspective uncovers intuition by examining the rate and range of competition induced by different information situations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xiaochen Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, 100871, China
| | - Lei Zhou
- School of Automation, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, 100081, China
| | - Alex McAvoy
- School of Data Science and Society, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599, USA
| | - Aming Li
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, 100871, China.
- Center for Multi-Agent Research, Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Peking University, Beijing, 100871, China.
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4
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Tkadlec J, Kaveh K, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. Evolutionary dynamics of mutants that modify population structure. J R Soc Interface 2023; 20:20230355. [PMID: 38016637 PMCID: PMC10684346 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2023.0355] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/23/2023] [Accepted: 11/01/2023] [Indexed: 11/30/2023] Open
Abstract
Natural selection is usually studied between mutants that differ in reproductive rate, but are subject to the same population structure. Here we explore how natural selection acts on mutants that have the same reproductive rate, but different population structures. In our framework, population structure is given by a graph that specifies where offspring can disperse. The invading mutant disperses offspring on a different graph than the resident wild-type. We find that more densely connected dispersal graphs tend to increase the invader's fixation probability, but the exact relationship between structure and fixation probability is subtle. We present three main results. First, we prove that if both invader and resident are on complete dispersal graphs, then removing a single edge in the invader's dispersal graph reduces its fixation probability. Second, we show that for certain island models higher invader's connectivity increases its fixation probability, but the magnitude of the effect depends on the exact layout of the connections. Third, we show that for lattices the effect of different connectivity is comparable to that of different fitness: for large population size, the invader's fixation probability is either constant or exponentially small, depending on whether it is more or less connected than the resident.
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Affiliation(s)
- Josef Tkadlec
- Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Computer Science Institute, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic
| | - Kamran Kaveh
- Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA
| | - Krishnendu Chatterjee
- Institute of Science and Technology Austria, Am Campus 1, 3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria
| | - Martin A. Nowak
- Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
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5
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Inaba M, Akiyama E. Evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks through asymmetry between interaction and replacement. Sci Rep 2023; 13:9814. [PMID: 37330611 PMCID: PMC10276876 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-37074-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/29/2023] [Accepted: 06/15/2023] [Indexed: 06/19/2023] Open
Abstract
Cooperation is the foundation of society and has been the subject of numerous studies over the past three decades. However, the mechanisms underlying the spread of cooperation within a group are not yet fully comprehended. We analyze cooperation in multiplex networks, a model that has recently gained attention for successfully capturing certain aspects of human social connections. Previous studies on the evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks have shown that cooperative behavior is promoted when the two key processes in evolution, interaction and strategy replacement, are performed with the same partner as much as possible, that is, symmetrically, in a variety of network structures. We focus on a particular type of symmetry, namely, symmetry in the scope of communication, to investigate whether cooperation is promoted or hindered when interactions and strategy replacements have different scopes. Through multiagent simulations, we found some cases where asymmetry can promote cooperation, contrasting with previous studies. These results hint toward the potential effectiveness of not only symmetrical but also asymmetrical approaches in fostering cooperation within particular groups under certain social conditions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Masaaki Inaba
- Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Japan.
| | - Eizo Akiyama
- Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Japan
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6
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Richter H. Spectral dynamics of guided edge removals and identifying transient amplifiers for death-Birth updating. J Math Biol 2023; 87:3. [PMID: 37284903 DOI: 10.1007/s00285-023-01937-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/05/2022] [Revised: 01/03/2023] [Accepted: 05/19/2023] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
Abstract
The paper deals with two interrelated topics: (1) identifying transient amplifiers in an iterative process, and (2) analyzing the process by its spectral dynamics, which is the change in the graph spectra by edge manipulation. Transient amplifiers are networks representing population structures which shift the balance between natural selection and random drift. Thus, amplifiers are highly relevant for understanding the relationships between spatial structures and evolutionary dynamics. We study an iterative procedure to identify transient amplifiers for death-Birth updating. The algorithm starts with a regular input graph and iteratively removes edges until desired structures are achieved. Thus, a sequence of candidate graphs is obtained. The edge removals are guided by quantities derived from the sequence of candidate graphs. Moreover, we are interested in the Laplacian spectra of the candidate graphs and analyze the iterative process by its spectral dynamics. The results show that although transient amplifiers for death-Birth updating are generally rare, a substantial number of them can be obtained by the proposed procedure. The graphs identified share structural properties and have some similarity to dumbbell and barbell graphs. We analyze amplification properties of these graphs and also two more families of bell-like graphs and show that further transient amplifiers for death-Birth updating can be found. Finally, it is demonstrated that the spectral dynamics possesses characteristic features useful for deducing links between structural and spectral properties. These feature can also be taken for distinguishing transient amplifiers among evolutionary graphs in general.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hendrik Richter
- Faculty of Engineering, HTWK Leipzig University of Applied Sciences, Leipzig, Germany.
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7
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Abstract
In order to accommodate the empirical fact that population structures are rarely simple, modern studies of evolutionary dynamics allow for complicated and highly heterogeneous spatial structures. As a result, one of the most difficult obstacles lies in making analytical deductions, either qualitative or quantitative, about the long-term outcomes of evolution. The "structure-coefficient" theorem is a well-known approach to this problem for mutation-selection processes under weak selection, but a general method of evaluating the terms it comprises is lacking. Here, we provide such a method for populations of fixed (but arbitrary) size and structure, using easily interpretable demographic measures. This method encompasses a large family of evolutionary update mechanisms and extends the theorem to allow for asymmetric contests to provide a better understanding of the mutation-selection balance under more realistic circumstances. We apply the method to study social goods produced and distributed among individuals in spatially heterogeneous populations, where asymmetric interactions emerge naturally and the outcome of selection varies dramatically, depending on the nature of the social good, the spatial topology, and the frequency with which mutations arise.
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8
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Li Q, Zhao G, Feng M. Prisoner's Dilemma Game with Cooperation-Defection Dominance Strategies on Correlational Multilayer Networks. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2022; 24:822. [PMID: 35741542 PMCID: PMC9222612 DOI: 10.3390/e24060822] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/11/2022] [Revised: 06/03/2022] [Accepted: 06/11/2022] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
As multilayer networks are widely applied in modern society, numerous studies have shown the impact of a multilayer network structure and the network nature on the proportion of cooperators in the network. In this paper, we use Barabási-Albert scale-free networks (BA) and Watts and Strogatz networks (WS) to build a multilayer network structure, and we propose a new strategy-updating rule called "cooperation-defection dominance", which can be likened to dominant and recessive traits in biogenetics. With the newly constructed multilayer network structure and the strategy-updating rules, based on the simulation results, we find that in the BA-BA network, the cooperation dominance strategy can make the networks with different rs show a cooperative trend, while the defection dominance strategy only has an obvious effect on the network cooperation with a larger r. When the BA network is connected to the WS network, we find that the effect of strategy on the proportion of cooperators in the network decreases, and the main influencing factor is the structure of the network. In the three-layer network, the cooperation dominance strategy has a greater impact on the BA network, and the proportion of the cooperators is enhanced more than under the natural evolution strategy, but the promotion effect is still smaller than that of the two-layer BA network because of the WS network. Under the defection dominance strategy, the WS layer appears different from the first two strategies, and we conclude through simulation that when the payoff parameter is at the middle level, its cooperator proportion will be suppressed, and we deduce that the proportion of cooperators and defectors, as well as the payoff, play an important role.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qin Li
- School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;
| | - Guopeng Zhao
- College of Artificial Intelligence, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China;
| | - Minyu Feng
- College of Artificial Intelligence, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China;
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9
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Su Q, McAvoy A, Plotkin JB. Evolution of cooperation with contextualized behavior. SCIENCE ADVANCES 2022; 8:eabm6066. [PMID: 35138905 PMCID: PMC10921959 DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.abm6066] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/28/2021] [Accepted: 12/16/2021] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
How do networks of social interaction govern the emergence and stability of prosocial behavior? Theoretical studies of this question typically assume unconditional behavior, meaning that an individual either cooperates with all opponents or defects against all opponents-an assumption that produces a pessimistic outlook for the evolution of cooperation, especially in highly connected populations. Although these models may be appropriate for simple organisms, humans have sophisticated cognitive abilities that allow them to distinguish between opponents and social contexts, so they can condition their behavior on the identity of opponents. Here, we study the evolution of cooperation when behavior is conditioned by social context, but behaviors can spill over between contexts. Our mathematical analysis shows that contextualized behavior rescues cooperation across a broad range of population structures, even when the number of social contexts is small. Increasing the number of social contexts further promotes cooperation by orders of magnitude.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qi Su
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
| | - Alex McAvoy
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
| | - Joshua B. Plotkin
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
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10
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Takács K, Gross J, Testori M, Letina S, Kenny AR, Power EA, Wittek RPM. Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200297. [PMID: 34601917 PMCID: PMC8487750 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0297] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Reputation has been shown to provide an informal solution to the problem of cooperation in human societies. After reviewing models that connect reputations and cooperation, we address how reputation results from information exchange embedded in a social network that changes endogenously itself. Theoretical studies highlight that network topologies have different effects on the extent of cooperation, since they can foster or hinder the flow of reputational information. Subsequently, we review models and empirical studies that intend to grasp the coevolution of reputations, cooperation and social networks. We identify open questions in the literature concerning how networks affect the accuracy of reputations, the honesty of shared information and the spread of reputational information. Certain network topologies may facilitate biased beliefs and intergroup competition or in-group identity formation that could lead to high cooperation within but conflicts between different subgroups of a network. Our review covers theoretical, experimental and field studies across various disciplines that target these questions and could explain how the dynamics of interactions and reputations help or prevent the establishment and sustainability of cooperation in small- and large-scale societies. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.
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Affiliation(s)
- Károly Takács
- The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, 601 74 Norrköping, Sweden.,Computational Social Science-Research Center for Educational and Network Studies (CSS-RECENS), Centre for Social Sciences, Tóth Kálmán u. 4., 1097 Budapest, Hungary
| | - Jörg Gross
- Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK, Leiden, The Netherlands
| | - Martina Testori
- Organization Sciences, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Srebrenka Letina
- The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, 601 74 Norrköping, Sweden.,Institute of Health and Wellbeing, MRC/CSO Social and Public Health Sciences Unit, University of Glasgow, Berkeley Square, 99 Berkeley Street, Glasgow G3 7HR, UK
| | - Adam R Kenny
- Institute of Cognitive and Evolutionary Anthropology, University of Oxford, 64 Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 6PN, UK.,Calleva Research Centre for Evolution and Human Sciences, Magdalen College, High Street, Oxford OX1 4AU, UK
| | - Eleanor A Power
- Department of Methodology, The London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
| | - Rafael P M Wittek
- Department of Sociology, University of Groningen, Grote Rozenstraat 31, 9712 TG Groningen, The Netherlands
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11
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McAvoy A, Rao A, Hauert C. Intriguing effects of selection intensity on the evolution of prosocial behaviors. PLoS Comput Biol 2021; 17:e1009611. [PMID: 34780464 PMCID: PMC8629389 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009611] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/04/2021] [Revised: 11/29/2021] [Accepted: 11/03/2021] [Indexed: 12/05/2022] Open
Abstract
In many models of evolving populations, genetic drift has an outsized role relative to natural selection, or vice versa. While there are many scenarios in which one of these two assumptions is reasonable, intermediate balances between these forces are also biologically relevant. In this study, we consider some natural axioms for modeling intermediate selection intensities, and we explore how to quantify the long-term evolutionary dynamics of such a process. To illustrate the sensitivity of evolutionary dynamics to drift and selection, we show that there can be a “sweet spot” for the balance of these two forces, with sufficient noise for rare mutants to become established and sufficient selection to spread. This balance allows prosocial traits to evolve in evolutionary models that were previously thought to be unconducive to the emergence and spread of altruistic behaviors. Furthermore, the effects of selection intensity on long-run evolutionary outcomes in these settings, such as when there is global competition for reproduction, can be highly non-monotonic. Although intermediate selection intensities (neither weak nor strong) are notoriously difficult to study analytically, they are often biologically relevant; and the results we report suggest that they can elicit novel and rich dynamics in the evolution of prosocial behaviors. Theoretical models of populations have been useful for assessing when and how traits spread, in large part because they are simple. Rather than being used to reproduce empirical data, these idealized models involve relatively few parameters and are utilized to gain a qualitative understanding of what promotes or suppresses a trait. For prosocial traits, which entail a cost to self to help another, one thing that mathematical models often suggest is that competition to reproduce must be localized, meaning an individual must be fitter than just a small subset of the population in order to produce an offspring. We show here that this finding is not robust. Such traits can indeed proliferate when there is global competition for reproduction, which we demonstrate by increasing the degree to which payoffs from games affect birth rates. Since this kind of “stronger selection” has also been observed empirically, we discuss how it is incorporated into theoretical models more broadly.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alex McAvoy
- Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America
- * E-mail:
| | - Andrew Rao
- Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - Christoph Hauert
- Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
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12
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He P, Montiglio PO, Somveille M, Cantor M, Farine DR. The role of habitat configuration in shaping animal population processes: a framework to generate quantitative predictions. Oecologia 2021; 196:649-665. [PMID: 34159423 PMCID: PMC8292241 DOI: 10.1007/s00442-021-04967-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/04/2020] [Accepted: 06/10/2021] [Indexed: 12/20/2022]
Abstract
By shaping where individuals move, habitat configuration can fundamentally structure animal populations. Yet, we currently lack a framework for generating quantitative predictions about the role of habitat configuration in modulating population outcomes. To address this gap, we propose a modelling framework inspired by studies using networks to characterize habitat connectivity. We first define animal habitat networks, explain how they can integrate information about the different configurational features of animal habitats, and highlight the need for a bottom–up generative model that can depict realistic variations in habitat potential connectivity. Second, we describe a model for simulating animal habitat networks (available in the R package AnimalHabitatNetwork), and demonstrate its ability to generate alternative habitat configurations based on empirical data, which forms the basis for exploring the consequences of alternative habitat structures. Finally, we lay out three key research questions and demonstrate how our framework can address them. By simulating the spread of a pathogen within a population, we show how transmission properties can be impacted by both local potential connectivity and landscape-level characteristics of habitats. Our study highlights the importance of considering the underlying habitat configuration in studies linking social structure with population-level outcomes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Peng He
- Department of Collective Behavior, Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior, Konstanz, Germany. .,Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany. .,Department of Biology, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany. .,Department of Evolutionary Biology and Environmental Science, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.
| | | | - Marius Somveille
- Birdlife International, The David Attenborough Building, Cambridge, UK.,Department of Biology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, 80523, USA
| | - Mauricio Cantor
- Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany.,Department of Evolutionary Biology and Environmental Science, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.,Department for the Ecology of Animal Societies, Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior, Konstanz, Germany.,Departamento de Ecologia e Zoologia, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, Brazil
| | - Damien R Farine
- Department of Collective Behavior, Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior, Konstanz, Germany.,Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany.,Department of Evolutionary Biology and Environmental Science, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
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13
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Richter H. Spectral analysis of transient amplifiers for death-birth updating constructed from regular graphs. J Math Biol 2021; 82:61. [PMID: 33993365 PMCID: PMC8126557 DOI: 10.1007/s00285-021-01609-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/18/2021] [Revised: 03/31/2021] [Accepted: 04/19/2021] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
A central question of evolutionary dynamics on graphs is whether or not a mutation introduced in a population of residents survives and eventually even spreads to the whole population, or becomes extinct. The outcome naturally depends on the fitness of the mutant and the rules by which mutants and residents may propagate on the network, but arguably the most determining factor is the network structure. Some structured networks are transient amplifiers. They increase for a certain fitness range the fixation probability of beneficial mutations as compared to a well-mixed population. We study a perturbation method for identifying transient amplifiers for death–birth updating. The method involves calculating the coalescence times of random walks on graphs and finding the vertex with the largest remeeting time. If the graph is perturbed by removing an edge from this vertex, there is a certain likelihood that the resulting perturbed graph is a transient amplifier. We test all pairwise nonisomorphic regular graphs up to a certain order and thus cover the whole structural range expressible by these graphs. For cubic and quartic regular graphs we find a sufficiently large number of transient amplifiers. For these networks we carry out a spectral analysis and show that the graphs from which transient amplifiers can be constructed share certain structural properties. Identifying spectral and structural properties may promote finding and designing such networks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hendrik Richter
- HTWK Leipzig University of Applied Sciences, Leipzig, Germany.
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14
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Okada I, Yamamoto H, Akiyama E, Toriumi F. Cooperation in spatial public good games depends on the locality effects of game, adaptation, and punishment. Sci Rep 2021; 11:7642. [PMID: 33828116 PMCID: PMC8026997 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-86668-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/23/2021] [Accepted: 03/18/2021] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Despite intensive studies on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games, there have been few investigations into locality effects in interaction games, adaptation, and punishment. Here we analyze locality effects using an agent-based model of a regular graph. Our simulation shows that a situation containing a local game, local punishment, and global adaptation leads to the most robustly cooperative regime. Further, we show an interesting feature in local punishment. Previous studies showed that a local game and global adaptation are likely to generate cooperation. However, they did not consider punishment. We show that if local punishment is introduced in spatial public goods games, a situation satisfying either local game or local adaptation is likely to generate cooperation. We thus propose two principles. One is if interactions in games can be restricted locally, it is likely to generate cooperation independent of the interaction situations on punishment and adaptation. The other is if the games must be played globally, a cooperative regime requires both local punishment and local adaptation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Isamu Okada
- Faculty of Business Administration, Soka University, Hachioji, 192-8577, Japan. .,Department of Information Systems and Operations, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, 1020, Austria.
| | - Hitoshi Yamamoto
- Faculty of Business Administration, Rissho University, Tokyo, 141-8602, Japan
| | - Eizo Akiyama
- Faculty of Engineering, Information and Systems, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, 305-8573, Japan
| | - Fujio Toriumi
- Graduate School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan
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15
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Zhang H. A game-theoretical dynamic imitation model on networks. J Math Biol 2021; 82:30. [PMID: 33683438 DOI: 10.1007/s00285-021-01573-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/13/2020] [Revised: 01/09/2021] [Accepted: 02/08/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
A game-theoretical model is constructed to capture the effect of imitation on the evolution of cooperation. This imitation describes the case where successful individuals are more likely to be imitated by newcomers who will employ their strategies and social networks. Two classical repeated strategies 'always defect (ALLD)' and 'tit-for-tat (TFT)' are adopted. Mathematical analyses are mainly conducted by the method of coalescence theory. Under the assumption of a large population size and weak selection, the results show that the evolution of cooperation is promoted in this dynamic network. As we observed that the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is smaller compared to that in well-mixed populations. The critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches a specific value which depends on three parameters, the repeated rounds of the game, the effective strategy mutation rate, and the effective link mutation rate. Specifically, for a very high value of the effective link mutation rate, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches 1. Remarkably, for a low value of the effective link mutation rate, by letting the effective strategy mutation is nearly equal to zero, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches [Formula: see text] for the resulting highly connected networks, which allows TFT to be evolutionary stable. It illustrates that dominance of TFTs is associated with more connected networks. This research can enrich the theory of the coevolution of game strategy and network structure with dynamic imitation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hui Zhang
- School of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, 710072, Shaanxi, China.
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16
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Lee JH, Yamaguchi R, Yokomizo H, Nakamaru M. Preservation of the value of rice paddy fields: Investigating how to prevent farmers from abandoning the fields by means of evolutionary game theory. J Theor Biol 2020; 495:110247. [PMID: 32184076 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110247] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/26/2019] [Revised: 01/30/2020] [Accepted: 03/13/2020] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
The evolution of group cooperation is still an evolutionary puzzle and has been studied from the perspective of not only evolutionary ecology but also social sciences. Some socio-ecological problems are caused by collapse of group cooperation. By applying theoretical studies about the evolution of cooperation, we can elucidate what causes the problems and find solutions. One of the appropriate examples is maintaining rice paddy field landscapes, which are a grand spectacle in Asia, and some are UNESCO world heritage sites. These magnificent landscapes and the associated biodiversity are at risk of abandonment for social and financial reasons. Rice paddy fields can be preserved not only by regular cultivation, which requires farmers to invest effort in cultivation, but also by the maintenance of common facilities such as irrigation canals. To investigate how this landscape might be preserved, we developed an agent-based model in which each farmer makes two types of efforts: an effort for land cultivation and an effort for collective action such as common facility maintenance. Additionally, we consider the side effects of rice production such as field deterioration from abandonment and water use competition. These factors determine the utility of each player who imitates the level of efforts necessary to invest in land cultivation and common facility maintenance of one with higher utility. This decision-making of each player can be described by the evolutionary game theory. We find that maintenance effort promotes cultivation effort, but not vice versa, even though we usually consider that each farmer's cultivation effort makes rice field landscape sustainable. We also find that if players and their near neighbors are responsible for maintaining their common facilities together, they continue to maintain them and cultivate, but if all players are responsible for maintaining all facilities in the whole farmland, players are likely to quit facility maintenance and stop cultivation. Competition for water use among all players, however, promotes cultivation more than competition among neighbors only. Therefore, rice paddy field landscapes can be sustainable if neighbors, but not the whole players, are responsible for maintaining their common facilities and cooperate together, and if the water usage of all players, but not neighbors, influences the productivity of each rice field.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joung Hun Lee
- Department of Biology, Faculty of Science, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan; Institute of Decision Science for a Sustainable Society, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan.
| | - Ryo Yamaguchi
- Department of Biological Sciences, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Hachioji, Tokyo, Japan
| | - Hiroyuki Yokomizo
- Center for Health and Environmental Risk Research, National Institute for Environmental Studies, Tsukuba,Ibaraki, Japan
| | - Mayuko Nakamaru
- Department of Innovation Science, School of Environment and Society, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan.
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17
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Rong Z, Wu ZX, Li X, Holme P, Chen G. Heterogeneous cooperative leadership structure emerging from random regular graphs. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2019; 29:103103. [PMID: 31675848 DOI: 10.1063/1.5120349] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/17/2019] [Accepted: 09/10/2019] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
This paper investigates the evolution of cooperation and the emergence of hierarchical leadership structure in random regular graphs. It is found that there exist different learning patterns between cooperators and defectors, and cooperators are able to attract more followers and hence more likely to become leaders. Hence, the heterogeneous distributions of reputation and leadership can emerge from homogeneous random graphs. The important directed game-learning skeleton is then studied, revealing some important structural properties, such as the heavy-tailed degree distribution and the positive in-in degree correlation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zhihai Rong
- School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China
| | - Zhi-Xi Wu
- Institute of Computational Physics and Complex Systems, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000, China
| | - Xiang Li
- Adaptive Networks and Control Lab, Department of Electronic Engineering, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China
| | - Petter Holme
- Tokyo Tech World Research Hub Initiative (WRHI), Institute of Innovative Research, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Nagatsuta-cho 4259, Midori-ku, Yokohama, Kanagawa 226-8503, Japan
| | - Guanrong Chen
- Department of Electrical Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
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18
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Wang XJ, Gu CL, Quan J. Evolutionary game dynamics of the Wright-Fisher process with different selection intensities. J Theor Biol 2019; 465:17-26. [PMID: 30629962 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.01.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/22/2018] [Revised: 10/17/2018] [Accepted: 01/07/2019] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Abstract
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations can be described by a frequency-dependent, stochastic Wright-Fisher process. The fitness of individuals in a population is not only linked to environmental conditions but also tightly coupled to the types and frequencies of competitors, leading to different types of individuals with different selection intensities. We studied a 2 × 2 symmetric game in a finite population and established a dynamic model of the Wright-Fisher process by introducing different selection intensities for different strategies. Thus, we provided another effective way to study the evolutionary dynamics of a finite population and obtained the analytical expressions of fixation probabilities under weak selection. The fixation probability of a strategy is not only related to a game matrix but also to different selection intensities. The conditions required for natural selection to favor one strategy and for that strategy to be an evolutionary stable strategy (ESSN) are specified in our model. We compared our results with those of a Moran dynamic process with different selection intensities to explore these two processes better. In the two processes, the conditions conducive to the strategy's taking fixation are the same. By simulation analysis, the dynamic relationships between the fixation probabilities and selection intensities were intuitively observed in the prisoner's dilemma, coordination, and coexistence games. The fixation probability of the cooperative strategy in the prisoner's dilemma decreases with the increase of its own selection intensity. In the coexistence and coordination games, the fixation probability of the cooperative strategy increases with its own selection intensity. For the three types of games, the fixation probability of the cooperative strategy decreases with the increase of the selection intensity of the defection strategy.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xian-Jia Wang
- School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China; Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
| | - Cui-Ling Gu
- Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China.
| | - Ji Quan
- School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430072, China
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Kaveh K, McAvoy A, Nowak MA. Environmental fitness heterogeneity in the Moran process. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2019; 6:181661. [PMID: 30800394 PMCID: PMC6366185 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.181661] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/02/2018] [Accepted: 11/30/2018] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
Many mathematical models of evolution assume that all individuals experience the same environment. Here, we study the Moran process in heterogeneous environments. The population is of finite size with two competing types, which are exposed to a fixed number of environmental conditions. Reproductive rate is determined by both the type and the environment. We first calculate the condition for selection to favour the mutant relative to the resident wild-type. In large populations, the mutant is favoured if and only if the mutant's spatial average reproductive rate exceeds that of the resident. But environmental heterogeneity elucidates an interesting asymmetry between the mutant and the resident. Specifically, mutant heterogeneity suppresses its fixation probability; if this heterogeneity is strong enough, it can even completely offset the effects of selection (including in large populations). By contrast, resident heterogeneity has no effect on a mutant's fixation probability in large populations and can amplify it in small populations.
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20
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Yamauchi A, van Baalen M, Sabelis MW. Spatial patterns generated by simultaneous cooperation and exploitation favour the evolution of altruism. J Theor Biol 2018; 441:58-67. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.12.027] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/19/2017] [Revised: 12/22/2017] [Accepted: 12/27/2017] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
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21
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Krieger MS, McAvoy A, Nowak MA. Effects of motion in structured populations. J R Soc Interface 2017; 14:rsif.2017.0509. [PMID: 28978749 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2017.0509] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/14/2017] [Accepted: 09/05/2017] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
In evolutionary processes, population structure has a substantial effect on natural selection. Here, we analyse how motion of individuals affects constant selection in structured populations. Motion is relevant because it leads to changes in the distribution of types as mutations march towards fixation or extinction. We describe motion as the swapping of individuals on graphs, and more generally as the shuffling of individuals between reproductive updates. Beginning with a one-dimensional graph, the cycle, we prove that motion suppresses natural selection for death-birth (DB) updating or for any process that combines birth-death (BD) and DB updating. If the rule is purely BD updating, no change in fixation probability appears in the presence of motion. We further investigate how motion affects evolution on the square lattice and weighted graphs. In the case of weighted graphs, we find that motion can be either an amplifier or a suppressor of natural selection. In some cases, whether it is one or the other can be a function of the relative reproductive rate, indicating that motion is a subtle and complex attribute of evolving populations. As a first step towards understanding less restricted types of motion in evolutionary graph theory, we consider a similar rule on dynamic graphs induced by a spatial flow and find qualitatively similar results, indicating that continuous motion also suppresses natural selection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Madison S Krieger
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Suite 6, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | - Alex McAvoy
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Suite 6, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | - Martin A Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Suite 6, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
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22
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Richter H. Dynamic landscape models of coevolutionary games. Biosystems 2017; 153-154:26-44. [PMID: 28238940 DOI: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2017.02.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/06/2016] [Revised: 01/30/2017] [Accepted: 02/17/2017] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
Players of coevolutionary games may update not only their strategies but also their networks of interaction. Based on interpreting the payoff of players as fitness, dynamic landscape models are proposed. The modeling procedure is carried out for Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Snowdrift (SD) games that both use either birth-death (BD) or death-birth (DB) strategy updating. The main focus is on using dynamic fitness landscapes as a mathematical model of coevolutionary game dynamics. Hence, an alternative tool for analyzing coevolutionary games becomes available, and landscape measures such as modality, ruggedness and information content can be computed and analyzed. In addition, fixation properties of the games and quantifiers characterizing the interaction networks are calculated numerically. Relations are established between landscape properties expressed by landscape measures and quantifiers of coevolutionary game dynamics such as fixation probabilities, fixation times and network properties.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hendrik Richter
- HTWK Leipzig University of Applied Sciences, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, Postfach 301166, D-04251 Leipzig, Germany.
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23
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Verma P, Nandi AK, Sengupta S. Bribery games on inter-dependent regular networks. Sci Rep 2017; 7:42735. [PMID: 28205644 PMCID: PMC5311942 DOI: 10.1038/srep42735] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/19/2016] [Accepted: 01/12/2017] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
We examine a scenario of social conflict that is manifest during an interaction between government servants providing a service and citizens who are legally entitled to the service, using evolutionary game-theory in structured populations characterized by an inter-dependent network. Bribe-demands by government servants during such transactions, called harassment bribes, constitute a widespread form of corruption in many countries. We investigate the effect of varying bribe demand made by corrupt officials and the cost of complaining incurred by harassed citizens, on the proliferation of corrupt strategies in the population. We also examine how the connectivity of the various constituent networks affects the spread of corrupt officials in the population. We find that incidents of bribery can be considerably reduced in a network-structured populations compared to mixed populations. Interestingly, we also find that an optimal range for the connectivity of nodes in the citizen's network (signifying the degree of influence a citizen has in affecting the strategy of other citizens in the network) as well as the interaction network aids in the fixation of honest officers. Our results reveal the important role of network structure and connectivity in asymmetric games.
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Affiliation(s)
- Prateek Verma
- Department of Physical Sciences, Indian Institute of Science Education and Research Kolkata, Mohanpur, 741246, India
| | - Anjan K. Nandi
- Department of Physical Sciences, Indian Institute of Science Education and Research Kolkata, Mohanpur, 741246, India
| | - Supratim Sengupta
- Department of Physical Sciences, Indian Institute of Science Education and Research Kolkata, Mohanpur, 741246, India
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24
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Chen YT, McAvoy A, Nowak MA. Fixation Probabilities for Any Configuration of Two Strategies on Regular Graphs. Sci Rep 2016; 6:39181. [PMID: 28004806 PMCID: PMC5177945 DOI: 10.1038/srep39181] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/16/2016] [Accepted: 11/18/2016] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
Population structure and spatial heterogeneity are integral components of evolutionary dynamics, in general, and of evolution of cooperation, in particular. Structure can promote the emergence of cooperation in some populations and suppress it in others. Here, we provide results for weak selection to favor cooperation on regular graphs for any configuration, meaning any arrangement of cooperators and defectors. Our results extend previous work on fixation probabilities of rare mutants. We find that for any configuration cooperation is never favored for birth-death (BD) updating. In contrast, for death-birth (DB) updating, we derive a simple, computationally tractable formula for weak selection to favor cooperation when starting from any configuration containing any number of cooperators. This formula elucidates two important features: (i) the takeover of cooperation can be enhanced by the strategic placement of cooperators and (ii) adding more cooperators to a configuration can sometimes suppress the evolution of cooperation. These findings give a formal account for how selection acts on all transient states that appear in evolutionary trajectories. They also inform the strategic design of initial states in social networks to maximally promote cooperation. We also derive general results that characterize the interaction of any two strategies, not only cooperation and defection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yu-Ting Chen
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Center of Mathematical Sciences and Applications, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA
| | - Alex McAvoy
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, 1984 Mathematics Road, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2
| | - Martin A. Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
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25
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Stewart AJ, Parsons TL, Plotkin JB. Evolutionary consequences of behavioral diversity. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2016; 113:E7003-E7009. [PMID: 27791109 PMCID: PMC5111714 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1608990113] [Citation(s) in RCA: 34] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Iterated games provide a framework to describe social interactions among groups of individuals. This body of work has focused primarily on individuals who face a simple binary choice, such as "cooperate" or "defect." Real individuals, however, can exhibit behavioral diversity, varying their input to a social interaction both qualitatively and quantitatively. Here we explore how access to a greater diversity of behavioral choices impacts the evolution of social dynamics in populations. We show that, in public goods games, some simple strategies that choose between only two possible actions can resist invasion by all multichoice invaders, even while engaging in relatively little punishment. More generally, access to a larger repertoire of behavioral choices results in a more "rugged" fitness landscape, with populations able to stabilize cooperation at multiple levels of investment. As a result, increased behavioral choice facilitates cooperation when returns on investments are low, but it hinders cooperation when returns on investments are high. Finally, we analyze iterated rock-paper-scissors games, the nontransitive payoff structure of which means that unilateral control is difficult to achieve. Despite this, we find that a large proportion of multichoice strategies can invade and resist invasion by single-choice strategies-so that even well-mixed populations will tend to evolve and maintain behavioral diversity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alexander J Stewart
- Department of Genetics, Environment and Evolution, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom;
| | - Todd L Parsons
- Laboratoire de Probabilités et Modèles Aléatoires, CNRS UMR 7599, Université Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 75005, France
| | - Joshua B Plotkin
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104
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26
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27
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Evolutionary Games of Multiplayer Cooperation on Graphs. PLoS Comput Biol 2016; 12:e1005059. [PMID: 27513946 PMCID: PMC4981334 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005059] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/21/2016] [Accepted: 07/12/2016] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
There has been much interest in studying evolutionary games in structured populations, often modeled as graphs. However, most analytical results so far have only been obtained for two-player or linear games, while the study of more complex multiplayer games has been usually tackled by computer simulations. Here we investigate evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs updated with a Moran death-Birth process. For cycles, we obtain an exact analytical condition for cooperation to be favored by natural selection, given in terms of the payoffs of the game and a set of structure coefficients. For regular graphs of degree three and larger, we estimate this condition using a combination of pair approximation and diffusion approximation. For a large class of cooperation games, our approximations suggest that graph-structured populations are stronger promoters of cooperation than populations lacking spatial structure. Computer simulations validate our analytical approximations for random regular graphs and cycles, but show systematic differences for graphs with many loops such as lattices. In particular, our simulation results show that these kinds of graphs can even lead to more stringent conditions for the evolution of cooperation than well-mixed populations. Overall, we provide evidence suggesting that the complexity arising from many-player interactions and spatial structure can be captured by pair approximation in the case of random graphs, but that it need to be handled with care for graphs with high clustering. Cooperation can be defined as the act of providing fitness benefits to other individuals, often at a personal cost. When interactions occur mainly with neighbors, assortment of strategies can favor cooperation but local competition can undermine it. Previous research has shown that a single coefficient can capture this trade-off when cooperative interactions take place between two players. More complicated, but also more realistic, models of cooperative interactions involving multiple players instead require several such coefficients, making it difficult to assess the effects of population structure. Here, we obtain analytical approximations for the coefficients of multiplayer games in graph-structured populations. Computer simulations show that, for particular instances of multiplayer games, these approximate coefficients predict the condition for cooperation to be promoted in random graphs well, but fail to do so in graphs with more structure, such as lattices. Our work extends and generalizes established results on the evolution of cooperation on graphs, but also highlights the importance of explicitly taking into account higher-order statistical associations in order to assess the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in spatially structured populations.
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28
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Abstract
In evolutionary game theory, an important measure of a mutant trait (strategy) is its ability to invade and take over an otherwise-monomorphic population. Typically, one quantifies the success of a mutant strategy via the probability that a randomly occurring mutant will fixate in the population. However, in a structured population, this fixation probability may depend on where the mutant arises. Moreover, the fixation probability is just one quantity by which one can measure the success of a mutant; fixation time, for instance, is another. We define a notion of homogeneity for evolutionary games that captures what it means for two single-mutant states, i.e. two configurations of a single mutant in an otherwise-monomorphic population, to be 'evolutionarily equivalent' in the sense that all measures of evolutionary success are the same for both configurations. Using asymmetric games, we argue that the term 'homogeneous' should apply to the evolutionary process as a whole rather than to just the population structure. For evolutionary matrix games in graph-structured populations, we give precise conditions under which the resulting process is homogeneous. Finally, we show that asymmetric matrix games can be reduced to symmetric games if the population structure possesses a sufficient degree of symmetry.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alex McAvoy
- Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Z2
| | - Christoph Hauert
- Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Z2
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29
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Zhang Y, Su Q, Sun C. Intermediate-Range Migration Furnishes a Narrow Margin of Efficiency in the Two-Strategy Competition. PLoS One 2016; 11:e0155787. [PMID: 27219327 PMCID: PMC4878735 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0155787] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/18/2015] [Accepted: 05/04/2016] [Indexed: 11/28/2022] Open
Abstract
It is well-known that the effects of spatial selection on the two-strategy competition can be quantified by the structural coefficient σ under weak selection. We here calculate the accurate value of σ in group-structured populations of any finite size. In previous similar models, the large population size has been explicitly required for obtaining σ, and here we analyze quantitatively how large the population should be. Unlike previous models which have only involved the influences of the longest and the shortest migration rang on σ, we consider all migration ranges together. The new phenomena are that an intermediate range maximizes σ for medium migration probabilities which are of the tiny minority and the maximum value is slightly larger than those for other ranges. Furthermore, we find the ways that migration or mutation changes σ can vary significantly through determining analytically how the high-frequency steady states (distributions of either strategy over all groups) impact the expression of σ obtained before. Our findings can be directly used to resolve the dilemma of cooperation and provide a more intuitive understanding of spatial selection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yanling Zhang
- School of Automation and Electrical Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing, China
| | - Qi Su
- Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
| | - Changyin Sun
- School of Automation and Electrical Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing, China
- * E-mail:
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30
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Archetti M. Cooperation among cancer cells as public goods games on Voronoi networks. J Theor Biol 2016; 396:191-203. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.02.027] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/28/2015] [Revised: 01/13/2016] [Accepted: 02/19/2016] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
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31
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Computational complexity of ecological and evolutionary spatial dynamics. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2015; 112:15636-41. [PMID: 26644569 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1511366112] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
There are deep, yet largely unexplored, connections between computer science and biology. Both disciplines examine how information proliferates in time and space. Central results in computer science describe the complexity of algorithms that solve certain classes of problems. An algorithm is deemed efficient if it can solve a problem in polynomial time, which means the running time of the algorithm is a polynomial function of the length of the input. There are classes of harder problems for which the fastest possible algorithm requires exponential time. Another criterion is the space requirement of the algorithm. There is a crucial distinction between algorithms that can find a solution, verify a solution, or list several distinct solutions in given time and space. The complexity hierarchy that is generated in this way is the foundation of theoretical computer science. Precise complexity results can be notoriously difficult. The famous question whether polynomial time equals nondeterministic polynomial time (i.e., P = NP) is one of the hardest open problems in computer science and all of mathematics. Here, we consider simple processes of ecological and evolutionary spatial dynamics. The basic question is: What is the probability that a new invader (or a new mutant) will take over a resident population? We derive precise complexity results for a variety of scenarios. We therefore show that some fundamental questions in this area cannot be answered by simple equations (assuming that P is not equal to NP).
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32
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Cellular cooperation with shift updating and repulsion. Sci Rep 2015; 5:17147. [PMID: 26602306 PMCID: PMC4667539 DOI: 10.1038/srep17147] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/14/2015] [Accepted: 10/26/2015] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
Population structure can facilitate evolution of cooperation. In a structured population, cooperators can form clusters which resist exploitation by defectors. Recently, it was observed that a shift update rule is an extremely strong amplifier of cooperation in a one dimensional spatial model. For the shift update rule, an individual is chosen for reproduction proportional to fecundity; the offspring is placed next to the parent; a random individual dies. Subsequently, the population is rearranged (shifted) until all individual cells are again evenly spaced out. For large population size and a one dimensional population structure, the shift update rule favors cooperation for any benefit-to-cost ratio greater than one. But every attempt to generalize shift updating to higher dimensions while maintaining its strong effect has failed. The reason is that in two dimensions the clusters are fragmented by the movements caused by rearranging the cells. Here we introduce the natural phenomenon of a repulsive force between cells of different types. After a birth and death event, the cells are being rearranged minimizing the overall energy expenditure. If the repulsive force is sufficiently high, shift becomes a strong promoter of cooperation in two dimensions.
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33
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Abstract
When a new mutant arises in a population, there is a probability it outcompetes the residents and fixes. The structure of the population can affect this fixation probability. Suppressing population structures reduce the difference between two competing variants, while amplifying population structures enhance the difference. Suppressors are ubiquitous and easy to construct, but amplifiers for the large population limit are more elusive and only a few examples have been discovered. Whether or not a population structure is an amplifier of selection depends on the probability distribution for the placement of the invading mutant. First, we prove that there exist only bounded amplifiers for adversarial placement—that is, for arbitrary initial conditions. Next, we show that the Star population structure, which is known to amplify for mutants placed uniformly at random, does not amplify for mutants that arise through reproduction and are therefore placed proportional to the temperatures of the vertices. Finally, we construct population structures that amplify for all mutational events that arise through reproduction, uniformly at random, or through some combination of the two.
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Affiliation(s)
- B. Adlam
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | | | - M. A. Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
- Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
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Abstract
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, differing baseline characteristics, and other possible sources of heterogeneity. To model these phenomena, we introduce into evolutionary game theory two broad classes of asymmetric interactions: ecological and genotypic. Ecological asymmetry results from variation in the environments of the players, while genotypic asymmetry is a consequence of the players having differing baseline genotypes. We develop a theory of these forms of asymmetry for games in structured populations and use the classical social dilemmas, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game, for illustrations. Interestingly, asymmetric games reveal essential differences between models of genetic evolution based on reproduction and models of cultural evolution based on imitation that are not apparent in symmetric games. Biological interactions, even between members of the same species, are almost always asymmetric due to differences in size, access to resources, or past interactions. However, classical game-theoretical models of evolution fail to account for sources of asymmetry in a comprehensive manner. Here, we extend the theory of evolutionary games to two general classes of asymmetry arising from environmental variation and individual differences, covering much of the heterogeneity observed in nature. If selection is weak, evolutionary processes based on asymmetric interactions behave macroscopically like symmetric games with payoffs that may depend on the resource distribution in the population or its structure. Asymmetry uncovers differences between genetic and cultural evolution that are not apparent when interactions are symmetric.
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Wang X, Chen X, Wang L. Evolutionary dynamics of fairness on graphs with migration. J Theor Biol 2015; 380:103-14. [PMID: 26004749 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.05.020] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/01/2015] [Revised: 05/11/2015] [Accepted: 05/13/2015] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
Individual migration plays a crucial role in evolutionary dynamics of population on networks. In this paper, we generalize the networked ultimatum game by diluting population structures as well as endowing individuals with migration ability, and investigate evolutionary dynamics of fairness on graphs with migration in the ultimatum game. We first revisit the impact of node degree on the evolution of fairness. Interestingly, numerical simulations reveal that there exists an optimal value of node degree resulting in the maximal offer level of populations. Then we explore the effects of dilution and migration on the evolution of fairness, and find that both the dilution of population structures and the endowment of migration ability to individuals would lead to the drop of offer level, while the rise of acceptance level of populations. Notably, natural selection even favors the evolution of self-incompatible strategies, when either vacancy rate or migration rate exceeds a critical threshold. To confirm our simulation results, we also propose an analytical method to study the evolutionary dynamics of fairness on graphs with migration. This method can be applied to explore any games governed by pairwise interactions in finite populations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xiaofeng Wang
- Center for Complex Systems, Xidian University, Xi׳an 710071, China
| | - Xiaojie Chen
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China.
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36
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Aspiration dynamics in structured population acts as if in a well-mixed one. Sci Rep 2015; 5:8014. [PMID: 25619664 PMCID: PMC4306144 DOI: 10.1038/srep08014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 41] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/01/2014] [Accepted: 12/23/2014] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
Understanding the evolution of human interactive behaviors is important. Recent experimental results suggest that human cooperation in spatial structured population is not enhanced as predicted in previous works, when payoff-dependent imitation updating rules are used. This constraint opens up an avenue to shed light on how humans update their strategies in real life. Studies via simulations show that, instead of comparison rules, self-evaluation driven updating rules may explain why spatial structure does not alter the evolutionary outcome. Though inspiring, there is a lack of theoretical result to show the existence of such evolutionary updating rule. Here we study the aspiration dynamics, and show that it does not alter the evolutionary outcome in various population structures. Under weak selection, by analytical approximation, we find that the favored strategy in regular graphs is invariant. Further, we show that this is because the criterion under which a strategy is favored is the same as that of a well-mixed population. By simulation, we show that this holds for random networks. Although how humans update their strategies is an open question to be studied, our results provide a theoretical foundation of the updating rules that may capture the real human updating rules.
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37
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Zhang H, Gao M, Wang W, Liu Z. Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on graphs and social networks with external constraint. J Theor Biol 2014; 358:122-31. [PMID: 24909494 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.05.038] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/02/2013] [Revised: 05/23/2014] [Accepted: 05/27/2014] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
A game-theoretical model is constructed to capture the effect of external constraint on the evolution of cooperation. External constraint describes the case where individuals are forced to cooperate with a given probability in a society. Mathematical analyses are conducted via pair approximation and diffusion approximation methods. The results show that the condition for cooperation to be favored on graphs with constraint is b¯/c¯>k/A¯ (A¯=1+kp/(1-p)), where b¯ and c¯ represent the altruistic benefit and cost, respectively, k is the average degree of the graph and p is the probability of compulsory cooperation by external enforcement. Moreover, numerical simulations are also performed on a repeated game with three strategies, always defect (ALLD), tit-for-tat (TFT) and always cooperate (ALLC). These simulations demonstrate that a slight enforcement of ALLC can only promote cooperation when there is weak network reciprocity, while the catalyst effect of TFT on cooperation is verified. In addition, the interesting phenomenon of stable coexistence of the three strategies can be observed. Our model can represent evolutionary dynamics on a network structure which is disturbed by a specified external constraint.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hui Zhang
- Department of Applied Mathematics, School of Natural and Applied Sciences, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi׳an, Shaanxi 710027, China.
| | - Meng Gao
- Yantai Institute of Coastal Zone Research, CAS, Yantai 264003, China
| | - Wenting Wang
- School of Mathematics and Computer Science Institute, Northwest University for Nationalities, Lanzhou, Gansu 730000, China
| | - Zhiguang Liu
- School of Mathematics and Information Sciences, Henan University, Kaifeng, Henan 475001, China
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38
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Stable heterogeneity for the production of diffusible factors in cell populations. PLoS One 2014; 9:e108526. [PMID: 25268125 PMCID: PMC4182498 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0108526] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/18/2014] [Accepted: 08/28/2014] [Indexed: 12/04/2022] Open
Abstract
The production of diffusible molecules that promote survival and growth is common in bacterial and eukaryotic cell populations, and can be considered a form of cooperation between cells. While evolutionary game theory shows that producers and non-producers can coexist in well-mixed populations, there is no consensus on the possibility of a stable polymorphism in spatially structured populations where the effect of the diffusible molecule extends beyond one-step neighbours. I study the dynamics of biological public goods using an evolutionary game on a lattice, taking into account two assumptions that have not been considered simultaneously in existing models: that the benefit of the diffusible molecule is a non-linear function of its concentration, and that the molecule diffuses according to a decreasing gradient. Stable coexistence of producers and non-producers is observed when the benefit of the molecule is a sigmoid function of its concentration, while strictly diminishing returns lead to coexistence only for very specific parameters and linear benefits never lead to coexistence. The shape of the diffusion gradient is largely irrelevant and can be approximated by a step function. Since the effect of a biological molecule is generally a sigmoid function of its concentration (as described by the Hill equation), linear benefits or strictly diminishing returns are not an appropriate approximations for the study of biological public goods. A stable polymorphism of producers and non-producers is in line with the predictions of evolutionary game theory and likely to be common in cell populations.
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39
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Exact formulas for fixation probabilities on a complete oriented star. Inf Sci (N Y) 2014. [DOI: 10.1016/j.ins.2014.03.099] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
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40
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Diffusive public goods and coexistence of cooperators and cheaters on a 1D lattice. PLoS One 2014; 9:e100769. [PMID: 25025985 PMCID: PMC4098918 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0100769] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/16/2014] [Accepted: 05/28/2014] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Many populations of cells cooperate through the production of extracellular materials. These materials (enzymes, siderophores) spread by diffusion and can be applied by both the cooperator and cheater (non-producer) cells. In this paper the problem of coexistence of cooperator and cheater cells is studied on a 1D lattice where cooperator cells produce a diffusive material which is beneficial to the individuals according to the local concentration of this public good. The reproduction success of a cell increases linearly with the benefit in the first model version and increases non-linearly (saturates) in the second version. Two types of update rules are considered; either the cooperative cell stops producing material before death (death-production-birth, DpB) or it produces the common material before it is selected to die (production-death-birth, pDB). The empty space is occupied by its neighbors according to their replication rates. By using analytical and numerical methods I have shown that coexistence of the cooperator and cheater cells is possible although atypical in the linear version of this 1D model if either DpB or pDB update rule is assumed. While coexistence is impossible in the non-linear model with pDB update rule, it is one of the typical behaviors in case of the non-linear model with DpB update rule.
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41
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Olejarz JW, Nowak MA. Evolution of staying together in the context of diffusible public goods. J Theor Biol 2014; 360:1-12. [PMID: 24992231 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.06.023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/03/2013] [Revised: 04/29/2014] [Accepted: 06/20/2014] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
Abstract
We study the coevolution of staying together and cooperation. Staying together means that replicating units do not separate after reproduction, but remain in proximity. For example, following cell division the two daughter cells may not fully separate but stay attached to each other. Repeated cell division thereby can lead to a simple multi-cellular complex. We assume that cooperators generate a diffusible public good, which can be absorbed by any cell in the system. The production of the public good entails a cost, while the absorption leads to a benefit. Defectors produce no public good. Defectors have a selective advantage unless a mechanism for evolution of cooperation is at work. Here we explore the idea that the public good produced by a cooperating cell is absorbed by cells of the same complex with a probability that depends on the size of the complex. Larger complexes are better at absorbing the public goods produced by their own individuals. We derive analytical conditions for the evolution of staying together, thereby studying the coevolution of clustering and cooperation. If cooperators and defectors differ in their intrinsic efficiency to absorb the public good, then we find multiple stable equilibria and the possibility for coexistence between cooperators and defectors. Finally we study the implications of disadvantages that might arise if complexes become too large.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jason W Olejarz
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
| | - Martin A Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA; Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
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42
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Wang Z, Wang L, Perc M. Degree mixing in multilayer networks impedes the evolution of cooperation. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2014; 89:052813. [PMID: 25353850 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.89.052813] [Citation(s) in RCA: 37] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/11/2013] [Indexed: 05/05/2023]
Abstract
Traditionally, the evolution of cooperation has been studied on single, isolated networks. Yet a player, especially in human societies, will typically be a member of many different networks, and those networks will play different roles in the evolutionary process. Multilayer networks are therefore rapidly gaining on popularity as the more apt description of a networked society. With this motivation, we here consider two-layer scale-free networks with all possible combinations of degree mixing, wherein one network layer is used for the accumulation of payoffs and the other is used for strategy updating. We find that breaking the symmetry through assortative mixing in one layer and/or disassortative mixing in the other layer, as well as preserving the symmetry by means of assortative mixing in both layers, impedes the evolution of cooperation. We use degree-dependent distributions of strategies and cluster-size analysis to explain these results, which highlight the importance of hubs and the preservation of symmetry between multilayer networks for the successful resolution of social dilemmas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zhen Wang
- Department of Physics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong and Center for Nonlinear Studies and Beijing-Hong Kong-Singapore Joint Center for Nonlinear and Complex Systems, Institute of Computational and Theoretical Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
| | - Lin Wang
- Centre for Chaos and Complex Networks, Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
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43
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Kurvers RHJM, Krause J, Croft DP, Wilson ADM, Wolf M. The evolutionary and ecological consequences of animal social networks: emerging issues. Trends Ecol Evol 2014; 29:326-35. [PMID: 24792356 DOI: 10.1016/j.tree.2014.04.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 140] [Impact Index Per Article: 14.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/01/2013] [Revised: 03/16/2014] [Accepted: 04/04/2014] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
Abstract
The first generation of research on animal social networks was primarily aimed at introducing the concept of social networks to the fields of animal behaviour and behavioural ecology. More recently, a diverse body of evidence has shown that social fine structure matters on a broader scale than initially expected, affecting many key ecological and evolutionary processes. Here, we review this development. We discuss the effects of social network structure on evolutionary dynamics (genetic drift, fixation probabilities, and frequency-dependent selection) and social evolution (cooperation and between-individual behavioural differences). We discuss how social network structure can affect important coevolutionary processes (host-pathogen interactions and mutualisms) and population stability. We also discuss the potentially important, but poorly studied, role of social network structure on dispersal and invasion. Throughout, we highlight important areas for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ralf H J M Kurvers
- Department of Biology and Ecology of Fishes, Leibniz Institute of Freshwater Ecology and Inland Fisheries, Mueggelseedamm 310, 12587 Berlin, Germany.
| | - Jens Krause
- Department of Biology and Ecology of Fishes, Leibniz Institute of Freshwater Ecology and Inland Fisheries, Mueggelseedamm 310, 12587 Berlin, Germany; Humboldt University of Berlin, Faculty of Life Sciences, Invalidenstraße 42, 10115 Berlin, Germany
| | - Darren P Croft
- Centre for Research In Animal Behaviour, College of Life & Environmental Science, University of Exeter, Exeter, EX4 4QG, UK
| | - Alexander D M Wilson
- Department of Biology and Ecology of Fishes, Leibniz Institute of Freshwater Ecology and Inland Fisheries, Mueggelseedamm 310, 12587 Berlin, Germany
| | - Max Wolf
- Department of Biology and Ecology of Fishes, Leibniz Institute of Freshwater Ecology and Inland Fisheries, Mueggelseedamm 310, 12587 Berlin, Germany
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44
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Santos MD, Dorogovtsev SN, Mendes JFF. Biased imitation in coupled evolutionary games in interdependent networks. Sci Rep 2014; 4:4436. [PMID: 24658580 PMCID: PMC3963071 DOI: 10.1038/srep04436] [Citation(s) in RCA: 67] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/19/2014] [Accepted: 02/27/2014] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
We explore the evolutionary dynamics of two games—the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game—played within distinct networks (layers) of interdependent networks. In these networks imitation and interaction between individuals of opposite layers is established through interlinks. We explore an update rule in which revision of strategies is a biased imitation process: individuals imitate neighbors from the same layer with probability p, and neighbors from the second layer with complementary probability 1 − p. We demonstrate that a small decrease of p from p = 1 (which corresponds to forbidding strategy transfer between layers) is sufficient to promote cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma subpopulation. This, on the other hand, is detrimental for cooperation in the Snowdrift Game subpopulation. We provide results of extensive computer simulations for the case in which layers are modelled as regular random networks, and support this study with analytical results for coupled well-mixed populations.
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Affiliation(s)
- M D Santos
- Department of Physics & I3N, University of Aveiro, 3810-193 Aveiro, Portugal
| | - S N Dorogovtsev
- 1] Department of Physics & I3N, University of Aveiro, 3810-193 Aveiro, Portugal [2] A. F. Ioffe Physico-Technical Institute, 194021 St. Petersburg, Russia
| | - J F F Mendes
- Department of Physics & I3N, University of Aveiro, 3810-193 Aveiro, Portugal
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45
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Zhang J, Zhang C, Chu T, Weissing FJ. Cooperation in networks where the learning environment differs from the interaction environment. PLoS One 2014; 9:e90288. [PMID: 24632774 PMCID: PMC3954561 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0090288] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/28/2013] [Accepted: 02/01/2014] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in a structured population, combining insights from evolutionary game theory and the study of interaction networks. In earlier studies it has been shown that cooperation is difficult to achieve in homogeneous networks, but that cooperation can get established relatively easily when individuals differ largely concerning the number of their interaction partners, such as in scale-free networks. Most of these studies do, however, assume that individuals change their behaviour in response to information they receive on the payoffs of their interaction partners. In real-world situations, subjects do not only learn from their interaction partners, but also from other individuals (e.g. teachers, parents, or friends). Here we investigate the implications of such incongruences between the ‘interaction network’ and the ‘learning network’ for the evolution of cooperation in two paradigm examples, the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG) and the Snowdrift game (SDG). Individual-based simulations and an analysis based on pair approximation both reveal that cooperation will be severely inhibited if the learning network is very different from the interaction network. If the two networks overlap, however, cooperation can get established even in case of considerable incongruence between the networks. The simulations confirm that cooperation gets established much more easily if the interaction network is scale-free rather than random-regular. The structure of the learning network has a similar but much weaker effect. Overall we conclude that the distinction between interaction and learning networks deserves more attention since incongruences between these networks can strongly affect both the course and outcome of the evolution of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jianlei Zhang
- State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
- Network Analysis and Control Group, Institute for Industrial Engineering, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
- Theoretical Biology Group, Centre for Ecological and Evolutionary Studies, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
| | - Chunyan Zhang
- Network Analysis and Control Group, Institute for Industrial Engineering, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
- Theoretical Biology Group, Centre for Ecological and Evolutionary Studies, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
| | - Tianguang Chu
- State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
- * E-mail: (TC); (FJW)
| | - Franz J. Weissing
- Theoretical Biology Group, Centre for Ecological and Evolutionary Studies, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
- * E-mail: (TC); (FJW)
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46
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Maciejewski W. Reproductive value in graph-structured populations. J Theor Biol 2013; 340:285-93. [PMID: 24096097 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.09.032] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/13/2012] [Revised: 09/19/2013] [Accepted: 09/24/2013] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
Abstract
Evolutionary graph theory has grown to be an area of intense study. Despite the amount of interest in the field, it seems to have grown separate from other subfields of population genetics and evolution. In the current work I introduce the concept of Fisher's (1930) reproductive value into the study of evolution on graphs. Reproductive value is a measure of the expected genetic contribution of an individual to a distant future generation. In a heterogeneous graph-structured population, differences in the number of connections among individuals translate into differences in the expected number of offspring, even if all individuals have the same fecundity. These differences are accounted for by reproductive value. The introduction of reproductive value permits the calculation of the fixation probability of a mutant in a neutral evolutionary process in any graph-structured population for either the moran birth-death or death-birth process.
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Affiliation(s)
- Wes Maciejewski
- Department of Mathematics, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
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47
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Archetti M. Dynamics of growth factor production in monolayers of cancer cells and evolution of resistance to anticancer therapies. Evol Appl 2013; 6:1146-59. [PMID: 24478797 PMCID: PMC3901545 DOI: 10.1111/eva.12092] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/26/2013] [Accepted: 07/03/2013] [Indexed: 01/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Tumor heterogeneity is well documented for many characters, including the production of growth factors, which improve tumor proliferation and promote resistance against apoptosis and against immune reaction. What maintains heterogeneity remains an open question that has implications for diagnosis and treatment. While it has been suggested that therapies targeting growth factors are robust against evolved resistance, current therapies against growth factors, like antiangiogenic drugs, are not effective in the long term, as resistant mutants can evolve and lead to relapse. We use evolutionary game theory to study the dynamics of the production of growth factors by monolayers of cancer cells and to understand the effect of therapies that target growth factors. The dynamics depend on the production cost of the growth factor, on its diffusion range and on the type of benefit it confers to the cells. Stable heterogeneity is a typical outcome of the dynamics, while a pure equilibrium of nonproducer cells is possible under certain conditions. Such pure equilibrium can be the goal of new anticancer therapies. We show that current therapies, instead, can be effective only if growth factors are almost completely eliminated and if the reduction is almost immediate.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marco Archetti
- School of Biological Sciences, University of East Anglia Norwich, UK
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48
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Peña J, Rochat Y. Bipartite graphs as models of population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. PLoS One 2012; 7:e44514. [PMID: 22970237 PMCID: PMC3438187 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0044514] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/10/2012] [Accepted: 08/08/2012] [Indexed: 12/03/2022] Open
Abstract
By combining evolutionary game theory and graph theory, “games on graphs” study the evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent selection in population structures modeled as geographical or social networks. Networks are usually represented by means of unipartite graphs, and social interactions by two-person games such as the famous prisoner’s dilemma. Unipartite graphs have also been used for modeling interactions going beyond pairwise interactions. In this paper, we argue that bipartite graphs are a better alternative to unipartite graphs for describing population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. To illustrate this point, we make use of bipartite graphs to investigate, by means of computer simulations, the evolution of cooperation under the conventional and the distributed N-person prisoner’s dilemma. We show that several implicit assumptions arising from the standard approach based on unipartite graphs (such as the definition of replacement neighborhoods, the intertwining of individual and group diversity, and the large overlap of interaction neighborhoods) can have a large impact on the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Our work provides a clear example of the importance of construction procedures in games on graphs, of the suitability of bigraphs and hypergraphs for computational modeling, and of the importance of concepts from social network analysis such as centrality, centralization and bipartite clustering for the understanding of dynamical processes occurring on networked population structures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jorge Peña
- Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Institute of Applied Mathematics, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland.
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49
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Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. PLoS One 2012; 7:e30689. [PMID: 22363470 PMCID: PMC3281853 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0030689] [Citation(s) in RCA: 54] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/23/2011] [Accepted: 12/21/2011] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Holding on to one's strategy is natural and common if the later warrants success and satisfaction. This goes against widespread simulation practices of evolutionary games, where players frequently consider changing their strategy even though their payoffs may be marginally different than those of the other players. Inspired by this observation, we introduce an aspiration-based win-stay-lose-learn strategy updating rule into the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. The rule is simple and intuitive, foreseeing strategy changes only by dissatisfied players, who then attempt to adopt the strategy of one of their nearest neighbors, while the strategies of satisfied players are not subject to change. We find that the proposed win-stay-lose-learn rule promotes the evolution of cooperation, and it does so very robustly and independently of the initial conditions. In fact, we show that even a minute initial fraction of cooperators may be sufficient to eventually secure a highly cooperative final state. In addition to extensive simulation results that support our conclusions, we also present results obtained by means of the pair approximation of the studied game. Our findings continue the success story of related win-stay strategy updating rules, and by doing so reveal new ways of resolving the prisoner's dilemma.
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50
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Affiliation(s)
- Martin A Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
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