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Glynatsi NE, McAvoy A, Hilbe C. Evolution of reciprocity with limited payoff memory. Proc Biol Sci 2024; 291:20232493. [PMID: 38889792 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2023.2493] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/06/2023] [Accepted: 05/08/2024] [Indexed: 06/20/2024] Open
Abstract
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in repeated social interactions. According to the literature, individuals naturally learn to adopt conditionally cooperative strategies if they have multiple encounters with their partner. Corresponding models have greatly facilitated our understanding of cooperation, yet they often make strong assumptions on how individuals remember and process payoff information. For example, when strategies are updated through social learning, it is commonly assumed that individuals compare their average payoffs. This would require them to compute (or remember) their payoffs against everyone else in the population. To understand how more realistic constraints influence direct reciprocity, we consider the evolution of conditional behaviours when individuals learn based on more recent experiences. Even in the most extreme case that they only take into account their very last interaction, we find that cooperation can still evolve. However, such individuals adopt less generous strategies, and they cooperate less often than in the classical setup with average payoffs. Interestingly, once individuals remember the payoffs of two or three recent interactions, cooperation rates quickly approach the classical limit. These findings contribute to a literature that explores which kind of cognitive capabilities are required for reciprocal cooperation. While our results suggest that some rudimentary form of payoff memory is necessary, it suffices to remember a few interactions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nikoleta E Glynatsi
- Max Planck Research Group on the Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany
| | - Alex McAvoy
- School of Data Science and Society, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA
- Department of Mathematics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA
| | - Christian Hilbe
- Max Planck Research Group on the Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany
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2
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Murase Y, Baek SK. Grouping promotes both partnership and rivalry with long memory in direct reciprocity. PLoS Comput Biol 2023; 19:e1011228. [PMID: 37339134 PMCID: PMC10313083 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011228] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/11/2023] [Revised: 06/30/2023] [Accepted: 05/30/2023] [Indexed: 06/22/2023] Open
Abstract
Biological and social scientists have long been interested in understanding how to reconcile individual and collective interests in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Many effective strategies have been proposed, and they are often categorized into one of two classes, 'partners' and 'rivals.' More recently, another class, 'friendly rivals,' has been identified in longer-memory strategy spaces. Friendly rivals qualify as both partners and rivals: They fully cooperate with themselves, like partners, but never allow their co-players to earn higher payoffs, like rivals. Although they have appealing theoretical properties, it is unclear whether they would emerge in an evolving population because most previous works focus on the memory-one strategy space, where no friendly rival strategy exists. To investigate this issue, we have conducted evolutionary simulations in well-mixed and group-structured populations and compared the evolutionary dynamics between memory-one and longer-memory strategy spaces. In a well-mixed population, the memory length does not make a major difference, and the key factors are the population size and the benefit of cooperation. Friendly rivals play a minor role because being a partner or a rival is often good enough in a given environment. It is in a group-structured population that memory length makes a stark difference: When longer-memory strategies are available, friendly rivals become dominant, and the cooperation level nearly reaches a maximum, even when the benefit of cooperation is so low that cooperation would not be achieved in a well-mixed population. This result highlights the important interaction between group structure and memory lengths that drive the evolution of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yohsuke Murase
- RIKEN Center for Computational Science, Kobe, Japan
- Max Planck Research Group ‘Dynamics of Social Behavior,’ Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
| | - Seung Ki Baek
- Department of Scientific Computing, Pukyong National University, Busan, Korea
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3
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Schmid L, Shati P, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity. Sci Rep 2021; 11:17443. [PMID: 34465830 PMCID: PMC8408181 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-96932-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/08/2021] [Accepted: 08/17/2021] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on social norms. This mechanism requires that individuals in a population observe and judge each other's behaviors. Individuals with a good reputation are more likely to receive help from others. Previous work suggests that indirect reciprocity is only effective when all relevant information is reliable and publicly available. Otherwise, individuals may disagree on how to assess others, even if they all apply the same social norm. Such disagreements can lead to a breakdown of cooperation. Here we explore whether the predominantly studied 'leading eight' social norms of indirect reciprocity can be made more robust by equipping them with an element of generosity. To this end, we distinguish between two kinds of generosity. According to assessment generosity, individuals occasionally assign a good reputation to group members who would usually be regarded as bad. According to action generosity, individuals occasionally cooperate with group members with whom they would usually defect. Using individual-based simulations, we show that the two kinds of generosity have a very different effect on the resulting reputation dynamics. Assessment generosity tends to add to the overall noise and allows defectors to invade. In contrast, a limited amount of action generosity can be beneficial in a few cases. However, even when action generosity is beneficial, the respective simulations do not result in full cooperation. Our results suggest that while generosity can favor cooperation when individuals use the most simple strategies of reciprocity, it is disadvantageous when individuals use more complex social norms.
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Affiliation(s)
- Laura Schmid
- IST Austria, Am Campus 1, 3400, Klosterneuburg, Austria.
| | - Pouya Shati
- Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, M5S, Canada
| | - Christian Hilbe
- Max Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306, Ploen, Germany
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4
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Zhang H. A game-theoretical dynamic imitation model on networks. J Math Biol 2021; 82:30. [PMID: 33683438 DOI: 10.1007/s00285-021-01573-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/13/2020] [Revised: 01/09/2021] [Accepted: 02/08/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
A game-theoretical model is constructed to capture the effect of imitation on the evolution of cooperation. This imitation describes the case where successful individuals are more likely to be imitated by newcomers who will employ their strategies and social networks. Two classical repeated strategies 'always defect (ALLD)' and 'tit-for-tat (TFT)' are adopted. Mathematical analyses are mainly conducted by the method of coalescence theory. Under the assumption of a large population size and weak selection, the results show that the evolution of cooperation is promoted in this dynamic network. As we observed that the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is smaller compared to that in well-mixed populations. The critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches a specific value which depends on three parameters, the repeated rounds of the game, the effective strategy mutation rate, and the effective link mutation rate. Specifically, for a very high value of the effective link mutation rate, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches 1. Remarkably, for a low value of the effective link mutation rate, by letting the effective strategy mutation is nearly equal to zero, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches [Formula: see text] for the resulting highly connected networks, which allows TFT to be evolutionary stable. It illustrates that dominance of TFTs is associated with more connected networks. This research can enrich the theory of the coevolution of game strategy and network structure with dynamic imitation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hui Zhang
- School of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, 710072, Shaanxi, China.
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5
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A multi-armed bandit algorithm speeds up the evolution of cooperation. Ecol Modell 2021. [DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2020.109348] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
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6
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Darden SK, James R, Cave JM, Brask JB, Croft DP. Trinidadian guppies use a social heuristic that can support cooperation among non-kin. Proc Biol Sci 2020; 287:20200487. [PMID: 32900316 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2020.0487] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/02/2023] Open
Abstract
Cooperation among non-kin is well documented in humans and widespread in non-human animals, but explaining the occurrence of cooperation in the absence of inclusive fitness benefits has proven a significant challenge. Current theoretical explanations converge on a single point: cooperators can prevail when they cluster in social space. However, we know very little about the real-world mechanisms that drive such clustering, particularly in systems where cognitive limitations make it unlikely that mechanisms such as score keeping and reputation are at play. Here, we show that Trinidadian guppies (Poecilia reticulata) use a 'walk away' strategy, a simple social heuristic by which assortment by cooperativeness can come about among mobile agents. Guppies cooperate during predator inspection and we found that when experiencing defection in this context, individuals prefer to move to a new social environment, despite having no prior information about this new social group. Our results provide evidence in non-human animals that individuals use a simple social partner updating strategy in response to defection, supporting theoretical work applying heuristics to understanding the proximate mechanisms underpinning the evolution of cooperation among non-kin.
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Affiliation(s)
- Safi K Darden
- Centre for Research in Animal Behaviour, Department of Psychology, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, UK
| | - Richard James
- Department of Physics and Centre for Networks and Collective Behaviour, University of Bath, Bath, UK
| | - James M Cave
- Department of Physics and Centre for Networks and Collective Behaviour, University of Bath, Bath, UK
| | - Josefine Bohr Brask
- Centre for Research in Animal Behaviour, Department of Psychology, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, UK
| | - Darren P Croft
- Centre for Research in Animal Behaviour, Department of Psychology, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, UK
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7
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Abstract
Despite the accumulation of research on indirect reciprocity over the past 30 years and the publication of over 100,000 related papers, there are still many issues to be addressed. Here, we look back on the research that has been done on indirect reciprocity and identify the issues that have been resolved and the ones that remain to be resolved. This manuscript introduces indirect reciprocity in the context of the evolution of cooperation, basic models of social dilemma situations, the path taken in the elaboration of mathematical analysis using evolutionary game theory, the discovery of image scoring norms, and the breakthroughs brought about by the analysis of the evolutionary instability of the norms. Moreover, it presents key results obtained by refining the assessment function, resolving the punishment dilemma, and presenting a complete solution to the social dilemma problem. Finally, it discusses the application of indirect reciprocity in various disciplines.
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8
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Direct Reciprocity and Model-Predictive Strategy Update Explain the Network Reciprocity Observed in Socioeconomic Networks. GAMES 2020. [DOI: 10.3390/g11010016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Network reciprocity has been successfully put forward (since M. A. Nowak and R. May’s, 1992, influential paper) as the simplest mechanism—requiring no strategical complexity—supporting the evolution of cooperation in biological and socioeconomic systems. The mechanism is actually the network, which makes agents’ interactions localized, while network reciprocity is the property of the underlying evolutionary process to favor cooperation in sparse rather than dense networks. In theoretical models, the property holds under imitative evolutionary processes, whereas cooperation disappears in any network if imitation is replaced by the more rational best-response rule of strategy update. In social experiments, network reciprocity has been observed, although the imitative behavior did not emerge. What did emerge is a form of conditional cooperation based on direct reciprocity—the propensity to cooperate with neighbors who previously cooperated. To resolve this inconsistency, network reciprocity has been recently shown in a model that rationally confronts the two main behaviors emerging in experiments—reciprocal cooperation and unconditional defection—with rationality introduced by extending the best-response rule to a multi-step predictive horizon. However, direct reciprocity was implemented in a non-standard way, by allowing cooperative agents to temporarily cut the interaction with defecting neighbors. Here, we make this result robust to the way cooperators reciprocate, by implementing direct reciprocity with the standard tit-for-tat strategy and deriving similar results.
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9
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Marques ICP, Franco M. Cooperation networks in the area of health: systematic literature review. Scientometrics 2020. [DOI: 10.1007/s11192-019-03341-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
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10
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Direct reciprocity and model-predictive rationality explain network reciprocity over social ties. Sci Rep 2019; 9:5367. [PMID: 30931975 PMCID: PMC6443768 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-41547-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/21/2018] [Accepted: 02/28/2019] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Since M. A. Nowak & R. May’s (1992) influential paper, limiting each agent’s interactions to a few neighbors in a network of contacts has been proposed as the simplest mechanism to support the evolution of cooperation in biological and socio-economic systems. The network allows cooperative agents to self-assort into clusters, within which they reciprocate cooperation. This (induced) network reciprocity has been observed in several theoreticalmodels and shown to predict the fixation of cooperation under a simple rule: the benefit produced by an act of cooperation must outweigh the cost of cooperating with all neighbors. However, the experimental evidence among humans is controversial: though the rule seems to be confirmed, the underlying modeling assumptions are not. Specifically, models assume that agents update their strategies by imitating better performing neighbors, even though imitation lacks rationality when interactions are far from all-to-all. Indeed, imitation did not emerge in experiments. What did emerge is that humans are conditioned by their own mood and that, when in a cooperative mood, they reciprocate cooperation. To help resolve the controversy, we design a model in which we rationally confront the two main behaviors emerging from experiments—reciprocal cooperation and unconditional defection—in a networked prisoner’s dilemma. Rationality is introduced by means of a predictive rule for strategy update and is bounded by the assumed model society. We show that both reciprocity and a multi-step predictive horizon are necessary to stabilize cooperation, and sufficient for its fixation, provided the game benefit-to-cost ratio is larger than a measure of network connectivity. We hence rediscover the rule of network reciprocity, underpinned however by a different evolutionary mechanism.
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11
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Schimit PHT, Pattni K, Broom M. Dynamics of multiplayer games on complex networks using territorial interactions. Phys Rev E 2019; 99:032306. [PMID: 30999523 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.99.032306] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2018] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
The modeling of evolution in structured populations has been significantly advanced by evolutionary graph theory, which incorporates pairwise relationships between individuals on a network. More recently, a new framework has been developed to allow for multiplayer interactions of variable size in more flexible and potentially changing population structures. While the theory within this framework has been developed and simple structures considered, there has been no systematic consideration of a large range of different population structures, which is the subject of this paper. We consider a large range of underlying graphical structures for the territorial raider model, the most commonly used model in the new structure, and consider a variety of important properties of our structures with the aim of finding factors that determine the fixation probability of mutants. We find that the graphical temperature and the average group size, as previously defined, are strong predictors of fixation probability, while all other properties considered are poor predictors, although the clustering coefficient is a useful secondary predictor when combined with either temperature or group size. The relationship between temperature or average group size and fixation probability is sometimes, however, nonmonotonic, with a directional reverse occurring around the temperature associated with what we term "completely mixed" populations in the case of the hawk-dove game, but not the public goods game.
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Affiliation(s)
- Pedro H T Schimit
- Informatics and Knowledge Management Graduate Program, Universidade Nove de Julho, Rua Vergueiro, 235/249, CEP 01504-000, São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil
| | - Karan Pattni
- Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of Liverpool, Mathematical Sciences Building, Liverpool L69 7ZL, United Kingdom
| | - Mark Broom
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, United Kingdom
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Fotouhi B, Momeni N, Allen B, Nowak MA. Conjoining uncooperative societies facilitates evolution of cooperation. Nat Hum Behav 2018; 2:492-499. [DOI: 10.1038/s41562-018-0368-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 29] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/09/2017] [Accepted: 05/22/2018] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
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13
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Zhang Y, Su Q, Sun C. Intermediate-Range Migration Furnishes a Narrow Margin of Efficiency in the Two-Strategy Competition. PLoS One 2016; 11:e0155787. [PMID: 27219327 PMCID: PMC4878735 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0155787] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/18/2015] [Accepted: 05/04/2016] [Indexed: 11/28/2022] Open
Abstract
It is well-known that the effects of spatial selection on the two-strategy competition can be quantified by the structural coefficient σ under weak selection. We here calculate the accurate value of σ in group-structured populations of any finite size. In previous similar models, the large population size has been explicitly required for obtaining σ, and here we analyze quantitatively how large the population should be. Unlike previous models which have only involved the influences of the longest and the shortest migration rang on σ, we consider all migration ranges together. The new phenomena are that an intermediate range maximizes σ for medium migration probabilities which are of the tiny minority and the maximum value is slightly larger than those for other ranges. Furthermore, we find the ways that migration or mutation changes σ can vary significantly through determining analytically how the high-frequency steady states (distributions of either strategy over all groups) impact the expression of σ obtained before. Our findings can be directly used to resolve the dilemma of cooperation and provide a more intuitive understanding of spatial selection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yanling Zhang
- School of Automation and Electrical Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing, China
| | - Qi Su
- Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
| | - Changyin Sun
- School of Automation and Electrical Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing, China
- * E-mail:
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14
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Voelkl B. The evolution of generalized reciprocity in social interaction networks. Theor Popul Biol 2015; 104:17-25. [PMID: 26187659 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2015.06.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/11/2014] [Revised: 06/25/2015] [Accepted: 06/27/2015] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Generalized reciprocity has been proposed as a mechanism for enabling continued cooperation between unrelated individuals. It can be described by the simple rule "help somebody if you received help from someone", and as it does not require individual recognition, complex cognition or extended memory capacities, it has the potential to explain cooperation in a large number of organisms. In a panmictic population this mechanism is vulnerable to defection by individuals who readily accept help but do not help themselves. Here, I investigate to what extent the limitation of social interactions to a social neighborhood can lead to conditions that favor generalized reciprocity in the absence of population structuring. It can be shown that cooperation is likely to evolve if one assumes certain sparse interaction graphs, if strategies are discrete, and if spontaneous helping and reciprocating are independently inherited.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bernhard Voelkl
- Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road OX1 3PS, United Kingdom; Institute for Ecology and Evolution, Ethologische Station Hasli, Wohlenstrasse 50a, CH-3032 Hinterkappelen, United Kingdom.
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15
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Vukov J, Varga L, Allen B, Nowak MA, Szabó G. Payoff components and their effects in a spatial three-strategy evolutionary social dilemma. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2015; 92:012813. [PMID: 26274231 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.92.012813] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/03/2015] [Indexed: 06/04/2023]
Abstract
We study a three-strategy spatial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with imitation and logit update rules. Players can follow the always-cooperating, always-defecting or the win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) strategies and gain their payoff from games with their direct neighbors on a square lattice. The friendliness parameter of the WSLS strategy-characterizing its cooperation probability in the first round-tunes the cyclic component of the game determining whether the game can be characterized by a potential. We measured and calculated the phase diagrams of the system for a wide range of parameters. When the game is a potential game and the logit rule is applied, the theoretically predicted phase diagram agrees very well with the simulation results. Surprisingly, this phase diagram can be accurate even in the nonpotential case if there are only two surviving strategies in the stationary state; this result harmonizes with the fact that all 2×2 games are potential games. For the imitation dynamics, we found that the effects of spatiality combined with the presence of two cooperative strategies are so strong that they suppress even substantial changes in the payoff matrix, thus the phase diagrams are independent of the cyclic component's intensity. At the same time, this type of strategy update mechanism supports the formation of cooperative clusters that results in a cooperative society in a wider parameter range compared to the logit dynamics.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jeromos Vukov
- Research Center for Educational and Network Studies, Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P. O. Box 20, H-1250 Budapest, Hungary
| | - Levente Varga
- Babeş-Bolyai University, Faculty of Physics, RO-400084 Cluj-Napoca, Romania
| | - Benjamin Allen
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
| | - Martin A Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
- Department of Mathematics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
| | - György Szabó
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P. O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
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Roos P, Gelfand M, Nau D, Lun J. Societal threat and cultural variation in the strength of social norms: An evolutionary basis. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 2015. [DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.01.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 137] [Impact Index Per Article: 15.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
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17
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How insurance affects altruistic provision in threshold public goods games. Sci Rep 2015; 5:9098. [PMID: 25765206 PMCID: PMC4357994 DOI: 10.1038/srep09098] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/17/2014] [Accepted: 01/28/2015] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
The occurrence and maintenance of cooperative behaviors in public goods systems have attracted great research attention across multiple disciplines. A threshold public goods game requires a minimum amount of contributions to be collected from a group of individuals for provision to occur. Here we extend the common binary-strategy combination of cooperation and defection by adding a third strategy, called insured cooperation, which corresponds to buying an insurance covering the potential loss resulted from the unsuccessful public goods game. Particularly, only the contributing agents can opt to be insured, which is an effort decreasing the amount of the potential loss occurring. Theoretical computations suggest that when agents face the potential aggregate risk in threshold public goods games, more contributions occur with increasing compensation from insurance. Moreover, permitting the adoption of insurance significantly enhances individual contributions and facilitates provision, especially when the required threshold is high. This work also relates the strategy competition outcomes to different allocation rules once the resulted contributions exceed the threshold point in populations nested within a dilemma.
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18
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Zhang H, Gao M, Wang W, Liu Z. Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on graphs and social networks with external constraint. J Theor Biol 2014; 358:122-31. [PMID: 24909494 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.05.038] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/02/2013] [Revised: 05/23/2014] [Accepted: 05/27/2014] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
A game-theoretical model is constructed to capture the effect of external constraint on the evolution of cooperation. External constraint describes the case where individuals are forced to cooperate with a given probability in a society. Mathematical analyses are conducted via pair approximation and diffusion approximation methods. The results show that the condition for cooperation to be favored on graphs with constraint is b¯/c¯>k/A¯ (A¯=1+kp/(1-p)), where b¯ and c¯ represent the altruistic benefit and cost, respectively, k is the average degree of the graph and p is the probability of compulsory cooperation by external enforcement. Moreover, numerical simulations are also performed on a repeated game with three strategies, always defect (ALLD), tit-for-tat (TFT) and always cooperate (ALLC). These simulations demonstrate that a slight enforcement of ALLC can only promote cooperation when there is weak network reciprocity, while the catalyst effect of TFT on cooperation is verified. In addition, the interesting phenomenon of stable coexistence of the three strategies can be observed. Our model can represent evolutionary dynamics on a network structure which is disturbed by a specified external constraint.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hui Zhang
- Department of Applied Mathematics, School of Natural and Applied Sciences, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi׳an, Shaanxi 710027, China.
| | - Meng Gao
- Yantai Institute of Coastal Zone Research, CAS, Yantai 264003, China
| | - Wenting Wang
- School of Mathematics and Computer Science Institute, Northwest University for Nationalities, Lanzhou, Gansu 730000, China
| | - Zhiguang Liu
- School of Mathematics and Information Sciences, Henan University, Kaifeng, Henan 475001, China
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19
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van Veelen M, García J, Rand DG, Nowak MA. Direct reciprocity in structured populations. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2012; 109:9929-34. [PMID: 22665767 PMCID: PMC3382515 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1206694109] [Citation(s) in RCA: 110] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Reciprocity and repeated games have been at the center of attention when studying the evolution of human cooperation. Direct reciprocity is considered to be a powerful mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, and it is generally assumed that it can lead to high levels of cooperation. Here we explore an open-ended, infinite strategy space, where every strategy that can be encoded by a finite state automaton is a possible mutant. Surprisingly, we find that direct reciprocity alone does not lead to high levels of cooperation. Instead we observe perpetual oscillations between cooperation and defection, with defection being substantially more frequent than cooperation. The reason for this is that "indirect invasions" remove equilibrium strategies: every strategy has neutral mutants, which in turn can be invaded by other strategies. However, reciprocity is not the only way to promote cooperation. Another mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, which has received as much attention, is assortment because of population structure. Here we develop a theory that allows us to study the synergistic interaction between direct reciprocity and assortment. This framework is particularly well suited for understanding human interactions, which are typically repeated and occur in relatively fluid but not unstructured populations. We show that if repeated games are combined with only a small amount of assortment, then natural selection favors the behavior typically observed among humans: high levels of cooperation implemented using conditional strategies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthijs van Veelen
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
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20
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Horváth G, Kovářík J, Mengel F. Limited memory can be beneficial for the evolution of cooperation. J Theor Biol 2012; 300:193-205. [PMID: 22310069 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.01.034] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/07/2010] [Revised: 01/20/2012] [Accepted: 01/23/2012] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
In this study we analyze the effect of working memory capacity on the evolution of cooperation and show a case in which societies with strongly limited memory achieve higher levels of cooperation than societies with larger memory. Agents in our evolutionary model are arranged on a network and interact in a prisoner's dilemma with their neighbors. They learn from their own experience and that of their neighbors in the network about the past behavior of others and use this information when making their choices. Each agent can only process information from her last h interactions. We show that if memory (h) is too short, cooperation does not emerge in the long run. A slight increase of memory length to around 5-10 periods, though, can lead to largely cooperative societies. Longer memory, on the other hand, is detrimental to cooperation in our model.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gergely Horváth
- School of Public Administration, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, 610074 Chengdu, Sichuan, China.
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21
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Wang X, Han J, Han H. Special agents can promote cooperation in the population. PLoS One 2011; 6:e29182. [PMID: 22216202 PMCID: PMC3244459 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0029182] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/07/2011] [Accepted: 11/22/2011] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperation is ubiquitous in our real life but everyone would like to maximize her own profits. How does cooperation occur in the group of self-interested agents without centralized control? Furthermore, in a hostile scenario, for example, cooperation is unlikely to emerge. Is there any mechanism to promote cooperation if populations are given and play rules are not allowed to change? In this paper, numerical experiments show that complete population interaction is unfriendly to cooperation in the finite but end-unknown Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (RPD). Then a mechanism called soft control is proposed to promote cooperation. According to the basic idea of soft control, a number of special agents are introduced to intervene in the evolution of cooperation. They comply with play rules in the original group so that they are always treated as normal agents. For our purpose, these special agents have their own strategies and share knowledge. The capability of the mechanism is studied under different settings. We find that soft control can promote cooperation and is robust to noise. Meanwhile simulation results demonstrate the applicability of the mechanism in other scenarios. Besides, the analytical proof also illustrates the effectiveness of soft control and validates simulation results. As a way of intervention in collective behaviors, soft control provides a possible direction for the study of reciprocal behaviors.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xin Wang
- Key Laboratory of Systems and Control, Institute of Systems Science, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Jing Han
- Key Laboratory of Systems and Control, Institute of Systems Science, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Huawei Han
- Key Laboratory of Systems and Control, Institute of Systems Science, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
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22
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van Doorn GS, Taborsky M. THE EVOLUTION OF GENERALIZED RECIPROCITY ON SOCIAL INTERACTION NETWORKS. Evolution 2011; 66:651-664. [DOI: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01479.x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 62] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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23
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Shakarian P, Roos P, Johnson A. A review of evolutionary graph theory with applications to game theory. Biosystems 2011; 107:66-80. [PMID: 22020107 DOI: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2011.09.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 105] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/15/2011] [Accepted: 09/26/2011] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Evolutionary graph theory (EGT), studies the ability of a mutant gene to overtake a finite structured population. In this review, we describe the original framework for EGT and the major work that has followed it. This review looks at the calculation of the "fixation probability" - the probability of a mutant taking over a population and focuses on game-theoretic applications. We look at varying topics such as alternate evolutionary dynamics, time to fixation, special topological cases, and game theoretic results. Throughout the review, we examine several interesting open problems that warrant further research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Paulo Shakarian
- Network Science Center and Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY 10996, United States.
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24
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Abstract
Many specific models have been proposed to study evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations, but most analytical results so far describe the competition of only two strategies. Here we derive a general result that holds for any number of strategies, for a large class of population structures under weak selection. We show that for the purpose of strategy selection any evolutionary process can be characterized by two key parameters that are coefficients in a linear inequality containing the payoff values. These structural coefficients, σ(1) and σ(2), depend on the particular process that is being studied, but not on the number of strategies, n, or the payoff matrix. For calculating these structural coefficients one has to investigate games with three strategies, but more are not needed. Therefore, n = 3 is the general case. Our main result has a geometric interpretation: Strategy selection is determined by the sum of two terms, the first one describing competition on the edges of the simplex and the second one in the center. Our formula includes all known weak selection criteria of evolutionary games as special cases. As a specific example we calculate games on sets and explore the synergistic interaction between direct reciprocity and spatial selection. We show that for certain parameter values both repetition and space are needed to promote evolution of cooperation.
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Wu B, Zhou D, Fu F, Luo Q, Wang L, Traulsen A. Evolution of cooperation on stochastic dynamical networks. PLoS One 2010; 5:e11187. [PMID: 20614025 PMCID: PMC2894855 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0011187] [Citation(s) in RCA: 84] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/12/2010] [Accepted: 05/21/2010] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperative behavior that increases the fitness of others at a cost to oneself can be promoted by natural selection only in the presence of an additional mechanism. One such mechanism is based on population structure, which can lead to clustering of cooperating agents. Recently, the focus has turned to complex dynamical population structures such as social networks, where the nodes represent individuals and links represent social relationships. We investigate how the dynamics of a social network can change the level of cooperation in the network. Individuals either update their strategies by imitating their partners or adjust their social ties. For the dynamics of the network structure, a random link is selected and breaks with a probability determined by the adjacent individuals. Once it is broken, a new one is established. This linking dynamics can be conveniently characterized by a Markov chain in the configuration space of an ever-changing network of interacting agents. Our model can be analytically solved provided the dynamics of links proceeds much faster than the dynamics of strategies. This leads to a simple rule for the evolution of cooperation: The more fragile links between cooperating players and non-cooperating players are (or the more robust links between cooperators are), the more likely cooperation prevails. Our approach may pave the way for analytically investigating coevolution of strategy and structure.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bin Wu
- Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China.
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26
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The ‘Hawk-Dove’ Game and the Speed of the Evolutionary Process in Small Heterogeneous Populations. GAMES 2010. [DOI: 10.3390/g1020103] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
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27
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Mogielski K, Płatkowski T. A mechanism of dynamical interactions for two-person social dilemmas. J Theor Biol 2009; 260:145-50. [PMID: 19523961 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.06.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2009] [Revised: 05/31/2009] [Accepted: 06/01/2009] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
We propose a new mechanism of interactions between game-theoretical agents in which the weights of the connections between interacting individuals are dynamical, payoff-dependent variables. Their evolution depends on the difference between the payoff of the agents from a given type of encounter and their average payoff. The mechanism is studied in the frame of two models: agents distributed on a random graph, and a mean field model. Symmetric and asymmetric connections between the agents are introduced. Long time behavior of both systems is discussed for the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snow Drift games.
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Affiliation(s)
- Krzysztof Mogielski
- Department of Mathematics, Informatics and Mechanics, University of Warsaw, Banacha, Poland
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28
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Tarnita CE, Ohtsuki H, Antal T, Fu F, Nowak MA. Strategy selection in structured populations. J Theor Biol 2009; 259:570-81. [PMID: 19358858 PMCID: PMC2710410 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.03.035] [Citation(s) in RCA: 153] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/18/2008] [Revised: 03/18/2009] [Accepted: 03/23/2009] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory studies frequency dependent selection. The fitness of a strategy is not constant, but depends on the relative frequencies of strategies in the population. This type of evolutionary dynamics occurs in many settings of ecology, infectious disease dynamics, animal behavior and social interactions of humans. Traditionally evolutionary game dynamics are studied in well-mixed populations, where the interaction between any two individuals is equally likely. There have also been several approaches to study evolutionary games in structured populations. In this paper we present a simple result that holds for a large variety of population structures. We consider the game between two strategies, A and B, described by the payoff matrix(abcd). We study a mutation and selection process. For weak selection strategy A is favored over B if and only if sigma a+b>c+sigma d. This means the effect of population structure on strategy selection can be described by a single parameter, sigma. We present the values of sigma for various examples including the well-mixed population, games on graphs, games in phenotype space and games on sets. We give a proof for the existence of such a sigma, which holds for all population structures and update rules that have certain (natural) properties. We assume weak selection, but allow any mutation rate. We discuss the relationship between sigma and the critical benefit to cost ratio for the evolution of cooperation. The single parameter, sigma, allows us to quantify the ability of a population structure to promote the evolution of cooperation or to choose efficient equilibria in coordination games.
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Affiliation(s)
- Corina E Tarnita
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
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29
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Sekiguchi T, Nakamaru M. Effect of the presence of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation by costly punishment in spatial games. J Theor Biol 2008; 256:297-304. [PMID: 18952110 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.025] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/12/2008] [Revised: 09/24/2008] [Accepted: 09/25/2008] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
Cooperation and spiteful behavior are still evolutionary puzzles. Costly punishment, for which the game payoff is the same as that of spiteful behavior, is one mechanism for promoting the evolution of cooperation. A spatially structured population facilitates the evolution of either cooperation or spite/punishment if cooperation is linked explicitly or implicitly with spite/punishment; a cooperator cooperates with another cooperator and punishes/spites the other type of player. Different updating rules in the evolutionary game produce different evolutionary outcomes: with one updating rule-the score-dependent viability model, in which a player dies with a probability inversely proportional to the game score and the resulting unoccupied site is colonized by one player chosen randomly-the evolution of spite/punishment is promoted more than with the other updating rule-the score-dependent fertility model, in which, after a player dies randomly, the site is colonized by a player with a higher game score. If the population has empty sites, spiteful players or punishers should have less chance to interact with others and then spite/punish others. Thus the presence of empty sites would affect the evolutionary dynamics of spite/punishment. Here, we investigated whether the presence of empty sites discourages the evolution of spite/punishment in both a lattice-structured population and a completely mixing population where players interact with others randomly, especially when the score-dependent viability model is adopted. In the lattice-structured population adopting this viability model, the presence of empty sites promoted the evolution of cooperation and did not reduce the effect of spite/punishment. In the completely mixing population, the presence of empty sites did not promote evolution of cooperation by punishment. The evolutionary dynamics of the score-dependent viability model with empty sites were close to those of the score-dependent fertility model.
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Affiliation(s)
- Takuya Sekiguchi
- Department of Value and Decision Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan.
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Traulsen A, Shoresh N, Nowak MA. Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity. Bull Math Biol 2008; 70:1410-24. [PMID: 18386099 PMCID: PMC2574888 DOI: 10.1007/s11538-008-9305-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 93] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/29/2007] [Accepted: 01/25/2008] [Indexed: 12/01/2022]
Abstract
The idea of evolutionary game theory is to relate the payoff of a game to reproductive success (= fitness). An underlying assumption in most models is that fitness is a linear function of the payoff. For stochastic evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, this leads to analytical results in the limit of weak selection, where the game has a small effect on overall fitness. But this linear function makes the analysis of strong selection difficult. Here, we show that analytical results can be obtained for any intensity of selection, if fitness is defined as an exponential function of payoff. This approach also works for group selection (= multi-level selection). We discuss the difference between our approach and that of inclusive fitness theory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Arne Traulsen
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA.
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31
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Pacheco JM, Traulsen A, Ohtsuki H, Nowak MA. Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking. J Theor Biol 2007; 250:723-31. [PMID: 18076911 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.10.040] [Citation(s) in RCA: 47] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/17/2007] [Revised: 10/31/2007] [Accepted: 10/31/2007] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
Abstract
Direct reciprocity relies on repeated encounters between the same two individuals. Here we examine the evolution of cooperation under direct reciprocity in dynamically structured populations. Individuals occupy the vertices of a graph, undergoing repeated interactions with their partners via the edges of the graph. Unlike the traditional approach to evolutionary game theory, where individuals meet at random and have no control over the frequency or duration of interactions, we consider a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions. Moreover, once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. Whenever the active dynamics of links is sufficiently fast, population structure leads to a simple transformation of the payoff matrix, effectively changing the game under consideration, and hence paving the way for reciprocators to dominate defectors. We derive analytical conditions for evolutionary stability.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jorge M Pacheco
- ATP-Group and CFTC, Departamento de Física da Faculdade de Ciências, P-1649-003 Lisboa Codex, Portugal.
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