1
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Nirjhor MSA, Nakamaru M. The evolution of cooperation in the unidirectional division of labour on a tree network. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2023; 10:230830. [PMID: 38026038 PMCID: PMC10663798 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.230830] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/15/2023] [Accepted: 10/31/2023] [Indexed: 12/01/2023]
Abstract
Division of labour on complex networks is rarely investigated using evolutionary game theory. We investigate a division of labour where divided roles are assigned to groups on the nodes of a general unidirectional finite tree graph network. From the network's original node, a task flows and is divided along the branches. A player is randomly selected in each group of cooperators and defectors, who receives a benefit from a cooperator in the upstream group and a part of the task. A cooperator completes their part by paying a cost and then passing it downstream until the entire task is completed. Defectors do not do anything and the division of labour stops, causing all groups to suffer losses due to the incomplete task. We develop a novel method to analyse the local stability in this general tree. We discover that not the benefits but the costs of the cooperation influence the evolution of cooperation, and defections in groups that are directly related to that group's task cause damage to players in that group. We introduce two sanction systems, one of which induces the evolution of cooperation more than the system without sanctions, and promote the coexistence of cooperator and defector groups.
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Affiliation(s)
- Md Sams Afif Nirjhor
- School of Environment and Society, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 3-3-6, Shibaura, Minato, Tokyo 108-0023, Japan
| | - Mayuko Nakamaru
- School of Environment and Society, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 3-3-6, Shibaura, Minato, Tokyo 108-0023, Japan
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2
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Yuan Y, Wang J, Wang Z, Yang H, Xu T, Huang H. Aspiration-driven co-evolution of cooperation with individual behavioral diversity. PLoS One 2023; 18:e0291134. [PMID: 37713378 PMCID: PMC10503719 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0291134] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/23/2023] [Accepted: 08/22/2023] [Indexed: 09/17/2023] Open
Abstract
In evolutionary game, aspiration-driven updates and imitation updates are the two dominant game models, and individual behavior patterns are mainly categorized into two types: node player and link player. In more recent studies, the mixture strategy of different types of players has been proven to improve cooperation substantially. Motivated by such a co-evolution mechanism, we combine aspiration dynamics with individual behavioral diversity, where self-assessed aspirations are used to update imitation strategies. In this study, the node players and the link players are capable to transform into each other autonomously, which introduces new features to cooperation in a diverse population as well. In addition, by driving all the players to form specific behavior patterns, the proposed mechanism achieves a survival environment optimization of the cooperators. As expected, the interaction between node players and link players allows the cooperator to avoid the invasion of the defector. Based on the experimental evaluation, the proposed work has demonstrated that the co-evolution mechanism has facilitated the emergence of cooperation by featuring mutual transformation between different players. We hope to inspire a new way of thinking for a promising solution to social dilemmas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yongqiong Yuan
- Key Laboratory of Data Link, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, Xi’an, China
| | - Jian Wang
- AVIC Chengdu Aircraft Design & Research Institute, Chengdu, China
| | - Zhigang Wang
- Key Laboratory of Data Link, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, Xi’an, China
| | - Haochun Yang
- School of Computer Science and Engineering, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, Shaanxi, China
| | - Tao Xu
- School of Computer Science and Engineering, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, Shaanxi, China
| | - Huang Huang
- School of Computer Science and Engineering, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, Shaanxi, China
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3
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Su Q, McAvoy A, Plotkin JB. Strategy evolution on dynamic networks. NATURE COMPUTATIONAL SCIENCE 2023; 3:763-776. [PMID: 38177777 DOI: 10.1038/s43588-023-00509-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/19/2023] [Accepted: 08/08/2023] [Indexed: 01/06/2024]
Abstract
Models of strategy evolution on static networks help us understand how population structure can promote the spread of traits like cooperation. One key mechanism is the formation of altruistic spatial clusters, where neighbors of a cooperative individual are likely to reciprocate, which protects prosocial traits from exploitation. However, most real-world interactions are ephemeral and subject to exogenous restructuring, so that social networks change over time. Strategic behavior on dynamic networks is difficult to study, and much less is known about the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Here we provide an analytical treatment of cooperation on dynamic networks, allowing for arbitrary spatial and temporal heterogeneity. We show that transitions among a large class of network structures can favor the spread of cooperation, even if each individual social network would inhibit cooperation when static. Furthermore, we show that spatial heterogeneity tends to inhibit cooperation, whereas temporal heterogeneity tends to promote it. Dynamic networks can have profound effects on the evolution of prosocial traits, even when individuals have no agency over network structures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qi Su
- Department of Automation, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China.
- Key Laboratory of System Control and Information Processing, Ministry of Education of China, Shanghai, China.
- Shanghai Engineering Research Center of Intelligent Control and Management, Shanghai, China.
| | - Alex McAvoy
- School of Data Science and Society, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA.
- Department of Mathematics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA.
| | - Joshua B Plotkin
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
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4
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Murase Y, Baek SK. Grouping promotes both partnership and rivalry with long memory in direct reciprocity. PLoS Comput Biol 2023; 19:e1011228. [PMID: 37339134 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011228] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/11/2023] [Accepted: 05/30/2023] [Indexed: 06/22/2023] Open
Abstract
Biological and social scientists have long been interested in understanding how to reconcile individual and collective interests in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Many effective strategies have been proposed, and they are often categorized into one of two classes, 'partners' and 'rivals.' More recently, another class, 'friendly rivals,' has been identified in longer-memory strategy spaces. Friendly rivals qualify as both partners and rivals: They fully cooperate with themselves, like partners, but never allow their co-players to earn higher payoffs, like rivals. Although they have appealing theoretical properties, it is unclear whether they would emerge in an evolving population because most previous works focus on the memory-one strategy space, where no friendly rival strategy exists. To investigate this issue, we have conducted evolutionary simulations in well-mixed and group-structured populations and compared the evolutionary dynamics between memory-one and longer-memory strategy spaces. In a well-mixed population, the memory length does not make a major difference, and the key factors are the population size and the benefit of cooperation. Friendly rivals play a minor role because being a partner or a rival is often good enough in a given environment. It is in a group-structured population that memory length makes a stark difference: When longer-memory strategies are available, friendly rivals become dominant, and the cooperation level nearly reaches a maximum, even when the benefit of cooperation is so low that cooperation would not be achieved in a well-mixed population. This result highlights the important interaction between group structure and memory lengths that drive the evolution of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yohsuke Murase
- RIKEN Center for Computational Science, Kobe, Japan
- Max Planck Research Group 'Dynamics of Social Behavior,' Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
| | - Seung Ki Baek
- Department of Scientific Computing, Pukyong National University, Busan, Korea
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5
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Nirjhor MSA, Nakamaru M. The evolution of cooperation in the unidirectional linear division of labour of finite roles. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2023; 10:220856. [PMID: 36908993 PMCID: PMC9993041 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.220856] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/07/2022] [Accepted: 02/14/2023] [Indexed: 06/18/2023]
Abstract
Evolution of cooperation is a puzzle in evolutionary biology and social sciences. Previous studies assumed that players are equal and have symmetric relationships. In our society, players are in different roles, have an asymmetric relationship and cooperate together. We focused on the linear division of labour in a unidirectional chain that has finite roles, each of which is assigned to one group with cooperators and defectors. A cooperator in an upstream group produces and modifies a product, paying a cost of cooperation, and hands it to a player in a downstream group who obtains the benefit from the product. If players in all roles cooperate, a final product can be completed. However, if a player in a group chooses defection, the division of labour stops, the final product cannot be completed and all players in all roles suffer damage. By using the replicator equations of the asymmetric game, we investigate which sanction system promotes the evolution of cooperation in the division of labour. We find that not the benefit of the product but the cost of cooperation matters to the evolutionary dynamics and that the probability of finding a defector determines which sanction system promotes the evolution of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Md Sams Afif Nirjhor
- School of Environment and Society, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 3-3-6, Shibaura, Minato, Tokyo 108-0023, Japan
| | - Mayuko Nakamaru
- School of Environment and Society, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 3-3-6, Shibaura, Minato, Tokyo 108-0023, Japan
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6
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Afsahi A. The Role of Self-Interest in Deliberation: A Theory of Deliberative Capital. POLITICAL STUDIES 2022; 70:701-718. [PMID: 35941966 PMCID: PMC9353969 DOI: 10.1177/0032321720981491] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 11/26/2020] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
How do successful deliberations unfold? What happens when they unravel? In this article, I propose that we think of the dynamics of participant engagement within deliberation as series of self-interested and reciprocal investments in and divestments from deliberative capital. This article has three parts. First, I draw on the literatures on deliberative democracy and social capital to outline a theory of deliberative capital. I highlight the important role self-interest plays in the process of those initial investments - instances of engagement in positive deliberative behaviours. Second, drawing from my experience as a facilitator, I give an account of the particular indicators of investments and divestments that we might expect to see in a given deliberative engagement. Third, I briefly outline two innovative facilitation techniques that can be utilized at the beginning or during a deliberative process that trigger self-interest, which incentivizes investments and discourages divestments.
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Affiliation(s)
- Afsoun Afsahi
- Afsoun Afsahi, Department of
Political Science, University of Amsterdam, Roeterseiland Campus, Room
B10.00, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, 1018WV Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
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7
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Zhang H. A game-theoretical dynamic imitation model on networks. J Math Biol 2021; 82:30. [PMID: 33683438 DOI: 10.1007/s00285-021-01573-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/13/2020] [Revised: 01/09/2021] [Accepted: 02/08/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
A game-theoretical model is constructed to capture the effect of imitation on the evolution of cooperation. This imitation describes the case where successful individuals are more likely to be imitated by newcomers who will employ their strategies and social networks. Two classical repeated strategies 'always defect (ALLD)' and 'tit-for-tat (TFT)' are adopted. Mathematical analyses are mainly conducted by the method of coalescence theory. Under the assumption of a large population size and weak selection, the results show that the evolution of cooperation is promoted in this dynamic network. As we observed that the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is smaller compared to that in well-mixed populations. The critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches a specific value which depends on three parameters, the repeated rounds of the game, the effective strategy mutation rate, and the effective link mutation rate. Specifically, for a very high value of the effective link mutation rate, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches 1. Remarkably, for a low value of the effective link mutation rate, by letting the effective strategy mutation is nearly equal to zero, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches [Formula: see text] for the resulting highly connected networks, which allows TFT to be evolutionary stable. It illustrates that dominance of TFTs is associated with more connected networks. This research can enrich the theory of the coevolution of game strategy and network structure with dynamic imitation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hui Zhang
- School of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, 710072, Shaanxi, China.
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8
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Yamamoto H, Okada I, Taguchi T, Muto M. Effect of voluntary participation on an alternating and a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma. Phys Rev E 2019; 100:032304. [PMID: 31639975 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.100.032304] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/02/2019] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
We studied the evolution of cooperation in the framework of evolutionary game theory, implementing voluntary participation in the prisoner's dilemma. Although previous studies have tried to overcome the dilemma by introducing voluntary participation called a "loner," the question of which strategies among various strategies including voluntary participation are adaptive under competitive circumstances is still an unsolved puzzle. Here we have developed a model that consists of all possible strategies using a one-period memory of past actions. This model enables us to analyze a "melting pot" of strategies, wherein several strategies interact and compete with each other. Our results revealed that one strategy, in which one escapes if a partner defects or cooperates if a partner becomes a loner, dominates and maintains cooperation in an alternating prisoner's dilemma game. However, the so-called "win-stay, lose-shift" strategy dominates in a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma game. Our simulations clearly show that voluntary participation in the prisoner's dilemma game works in the alternating situation rather than the simultaneous one.
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Affiliation(s)
- H Yamamoto
- Faculty of Business Administration, Rissho University, Osaki 4-2-16, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo 141-8602, Japan
| | - I Okada
- Faculty of Business Administration, Soka University, Tangi 1-236, Hachioji City, Tokyo 192-8577, Japan
| | - T Taguchi
- College of Systems Engineering and Science, Shibaura Institute of Technology, Fukasaku 307, Minuma-ku, Saitama City, Saitama, 337-8570, Japan
| | - M Muto
- College of Systems Engineering and Science, Shibaura Institute of Technology, Fukasaku 307, Minuma-ku, Saitama City, Saitama, 337-8570, Japan
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9
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Coevolution of Environmental Perception and Cooperative Behavior in Evacuation Crowd. Sci Rep 2018; 8:16311. [PMID: 30397252 PMCID: PMC6218506 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-018-33798-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/07/2018] [Accepted: 09/28/2018] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
For the evacuation crowd of social agents, environment plays a big effect on the behavior and decision of the agents. When facing the uncertain environment, the behavior and decision of agents depend heavily on the perception of environment. Therefore, the cooperation between agents and their perception of environment may coexist during evacuation. Here we establish a mechanism to analyze the coevolution between the cooperation of agents and the perception of environment. In detail, we use a regular square lattice with periodic boundaries, where two payoff matrices are used to describe two kinds of games between neighbors in the safe and dangerous environments. For individual agent, its perception can be adjusted by interacting with neighboring agents. When the environment is generally considered dangerous, the fraction of cooperative agents keeps at a high level, even if the value of b is very large. When all the agents think that the environment is safe, the fraction of cooperation will decrease as the value of b increases.
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10
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Herrerías-Azcué F, Pérez-Muñuzuri V, Galla T. Stirring does not make populations well mixed. Sci Rep 2018; 8:4068. [PMID: 29511246 PMCID: PMC5840425 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-018-22062-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/17/2017] [Accepted: 02/09/2018] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
In evolutionary dynamics, the notion of a ‘well-mixed’ population is usually associated with all-to-all interactions at all times. This assumption simplifies the mathematics of evolutionary processes, and makes analytical solutions possible. At the same time the term ‘well-mixed’ suggests that this situation can be achieved by physically stirring the population. Using simulations of populations in chaotic flows, we show that in most cases this is not true: conventional well-mixed theories do not predict fixation probabilities correctly, regardless of how fast or thorough the stirring is. We propose a new analytical description in the fast-flow limit. This approach is valid for processes with global and local selection, and accurately predicts the suppression of selection as competition becomes more local. It provides a modelling tool for biological or social systems with individuals in motion.
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Affiliation(s)
- Francisco Herrerías-Azcué
- Theoretical Physics, School of Physics and Astronomy, The University of Manchester, M13 9PL, Manchester, United Kingdom.
| | - Vicente Pérez-Muñuzuri
- Group of Nonlinear Physics, Faculty of Physics, University of Santiago de Compostela, E-15782, Santiago de Compostela, Spain.
| | - Tobias Galla
- Theoretical Physics, School of Physics and Astronomy, The University of Manchester, M13 9PL, Manchester, United Kingdom.
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11
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Lee HW, Malik N, Mucha PJ. Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games coevolving on adaptive networks. JOURNAL OF COMPLEX NETWORKS 2018; 6:1-23. [PMID: 29732158 PMCID: PMC5931405 DOI: 10.1093/comnet/cnx018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
Abstract
We study a model for switching strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on adaptive networks of player pairings that coevolve as players attempt to maximize their return. We use a node-based strategy model wherein each player follows one strategy at a time (cooperate or defect) across all of its neighbors, changing that strategy and possibly changing partners in response to local changes in the network of player pairing and in the strategies used by connected partners. We compare and contrast numerical simulations with existing pair approximation differential equations for describing this system, as well as more accurate equations developed here using the framework of approximate master equations. We explore the parameter space of the model, demonstrating the relatively high accuracy of the approximate master equations for describing the system observations made from simulations. We study two variations of this partner-switching model to investigate the system evolution, predict stationary states, and compare the total utilities and other qualitative differences between these two model variants.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hsuan-Wei Lee
- Department of Sociology, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
| | | | - Peter J Mucha
- Department of Mathematics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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12
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Krieger MS, McAvoy A, Nowak MA. Effects of motion in structured populations. J R Soc Interface 2017; 14:rsif.2017.0509. [PMID: 28978749 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2017.0509] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/14/2017] [Accepted: 09/05/2017] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
In evolutionary processes, population structure has a substantial effect on natural selection. Here, we analyse how motion of individuals affects constant selection in structured populations. Motion is relevant because it leads to changes in the distribution of types as mutations march towards fixation or extinction. We describe motion as the swapping of individuals on graphs, and more generally as the shuffling of individuals between reproductive updates. Beginning with a one-dimensional graph, the cycle, we prove that motion suppresses natural selection for death-birth (DB) updating or for any process that combines birth-death (BD) and DB updating. If the rule is purely BD updating, no change in fixation probability appears in the presence of motion. We further investigate how motion affects evolution on the square lattice and weighted graphs. In the case of weighted graphs, we find that motion can be either an amplifier or a suppressor of natural selection. In some cases, whether it is one or the other can be a function of the relative reproductive rate, indicating that motion is a subtle and complex attribute of evolving populations. As a first step towards understanding less restricted types of motion in evolutionary graph theory, we consider a similar rule on dynamic graphs induced by a spatial flow and find qualitatively similar results, indicating that continuous motion also suppresses natural selection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Madison S Krieger
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Suite 6, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | - Alex McAvoy
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Suite 6, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | - Martin A Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Suite 6, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
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13
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Zheng XD, Li C, Yu JR, Wang SC, Fan SJ, Zhang BY, Tao Y. A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. J Theor Biol 2017; 420:12-17. [PMID: 28259660 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.02.036] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/11/2016] [Revised: 02/23/2017] [Accepted: 02/27/2017] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
The long-term coexistence of cooperation and defection is a common phenomenon in nature and human society. However, none of the theoretical models based on the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game can provide a concise theoretical model to explain what leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the long-term even though some rules for promoting cooperation have been summarized (Nowak, 2006, Science 314, 1560-1563). Here, based on the concept of direct reciprocity, we develop an elementary model to show why stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the PD game is possible. The basic idea behind our theoretical model is that all players in a PD game prefer a cooperator as an opponent, and our results show that considering strategies allowing opting out against defection provide a general and concise way of understanding the fundamental importance of direct reciprocity in driving the evolution of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xiu-Deng Zheng
- Key Laboratory of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Centre for Computational and Evolutionary Biology, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, PR China
| | - Cong Li
- Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada
| | - Jie-Ru Yu
- College of Resources and Environmental Sciences, Gansu Agricultural University, Lanzhou, PR China
| | - Shi-Chang Wang
- Key Laboratory of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Centre for Computational and Evolutionary Biology, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, PR China
| | - Song-Jia Fan
- Key Laboratory of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Centre for Computational and Evolutionary Biology, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, PR China
| | - Bo-Yu Zhang
- School of Mathematical Science, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, PR China.
| | - Yi Tao
- Key Laboratory of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Centre for Computational and Evolutionary Biology, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, PR China.
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14
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15
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Pacheco JM, Van Segbroeck S, Santos FC. Disease Spreading in Time-Evolving Networked Communities. TEMPORAL NETWORK EPIDEMIOLOGY 2017. [PMCID: PMC7124106 DOI: 10.1007/978-981-10-5287-3_13] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
Human communities are organized in complex webs of contacts that may be represented by a graph or network. In this graph, vertices identify individuals and edges establish the existence of some type of relations between them. In real communities, the possible edges may be active or not for variable periods of time. These so-called temporal networks typically result from an endogenous social dynamics, usually coupled to the process under study taking place in the community. For instance, disease spreading may be affected by local information that makes individuals aware of the health status of their social contacts, allowing them to reconsider maintaining or not their social contacts. Here we investigate the impact of such a dynamical network structure on disease dynamics, where infection occurs along the edges of the network. To this end, we define an endogenous network dynamics coupled with disease spreading. We show that the effective infectiousness of a disease taking place along the edges of this temporal network depends on the population size, the number of infected individuals in the population and the capacity of healthy individuals to sever contacts with the infected, ultimately dictated by availability of information regarding each individual’s health status. Importantly, we also show how dynamical networks strongly decrease the average time required to eradicate a disease.
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16
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Zhang BY, Fan SJ, Li C, Zheng XD, Bao JZ, Cressman R, Tao Y. Opting out against defection leads to stable coexistence with cooperation. Sci Rep 2016; 6:35902. [PMID: 27775099 PMCID: PMC5075917 DOI: 10.1038/srep35902] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/04/2016] [Accepted: 10/05/2016] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperation coexisting with defection is a common phenomenon in nature and human society. Previous studies for promoting cooperation based on kin selection, direct and indirect reciprocity, graph selection and group selection have provided conditions that cooperators outcompete defectors. However, a simple mechanism of the long-term stable coexistence of cooperation and defection is still lacking. To reveal the effect of direct reciprocity on the coexistence of cooperation and defection, we conducted a simple experiment based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, where the basic idea behind our experiment is that all players in a PD game should prefer a cooperator as an opponent. Our experimental and theoretical results show clearly that the strategies allowing opting out against defection are able to maintain this stable coexistence.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bo-Yu Zhang
- Key Lab of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Chinese Academy of Science, Beijing, China.,Laboratory of Mathematics and Complex Systems, Ministry of Education, School of Mathematical Sciences, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China
| | - Song-Jia Fan
- Key Lab of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Chinese Academy of Science, Beijing, China
| | - Cong Li
- Key Lab of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Chinese Academy of Science, Beijing, China.,Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada
| | - Xiu-Deng Zheng
- Key Lab of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Chinese Academy of Science, Beijing, China
| | - Jian-Zhang Bao
- School of Complex Systems, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China
| | - Ross Cressman
- Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada
| | - Yi Tao
- Key Lab of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Chinese Academy of Science, Beijing, China
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17
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Baek SK, Jeong HC, Hilbe C, Nowak MA. Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity. Sci Rep 2016; 6:25676. [PMID: 27161141 PMCID: PMC4861973 DOI: 10.1038/srep25676] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/04/2016] [Accepted: 04/19/2016] [Indexed: 12/01/2022] Open
Abstract
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions. When individuals meet repeatedly, they can use conditional strategies to enforce cooperative outcomes that would not be feasible in one-shot social dilemmas. Direct reciprocity requires that individuals keep track of their past interactions and find the right response. However, there are natural bounds on strategic complexity: Humans find it difficult to remember past interactions accurately, especially over long timespans. Given these limitations, it is natural to ask how complex strategies need to be for cooperation to evolve. Here, we study stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations to systematically compare the evolutionary performance of reactive strategies, which only respond to the co-player's previous move, and memory-one strategies, which take into account the own and the co-player's previous move. In both cases, we compare deterministic strategy and stochastic strategy spaces. For reactive strategies and small costs, we find that stochasticity benefits cooperation, because it allows for generous-tit-for-tat. For memory one strategies and small costs, we find that stochasticity does not increase the propensity for cooperation, because the deterministic rule of win-stay, lose-shift works best. For memory one strategies and large costs, however, stochasticity can augment cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Seung Ki Baek
- Department of Physics, Pukyong National University, Busan 48513, Korea
| | - Hyeong-Chai Jeong
- Department of Physics and Astronomy, Sejong University, Seoul 05006, Korea
| | - Christian Hilbe
- IST Austria, Am Campus 1, 3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Mathematics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States of America
| | - Martin A. Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Mathematics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States of America
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18
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Pinheiro FL, Santos FC, Pacheco JM. Linking Individual and Collective Behavior in Adaptive Social Networks. PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS 2016; 116:128702. [PMID: 27058108 DOI: 10.1103/physrevlett.116.128702] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/11/2015] [Indexed: 06/05/2023]
Abstract
Adaptive social structures are known to promote the evolution of cooperation. However, up to now the characterization of the collective, population-wide dynamics resulting from the self-organization of individual strategies on a coevolving, adaptive network has remained unfeasible. Here we establish a (reversible) link between individual (micro)behavior and collective (macro)behavior for coevolutionary processes. We demonstrate that an adaptive network transforms a two-person social dilemma locally faced by individuals into a collective dynamics that resembles that associated with an N-person coordination game, whose characterization depends sensitively on the relative time scales between the entangled behavioral and network evolutions. In particular, we show that the faster the relative rate of adaptation of the network, the smaller the critical fraction of cooperators required for cooperation to prevail, thus establishing a direct link between network adaptation and the evolution of cooperation. The framework developed here is general and may be readily applied to other dynamical processes occurring on adaptive networks, notably, the spreading of contagious diseases or the diffusion of innovations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Flávio L Pinheiro
- INESC-ID and Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, 2744-016 Porto Salvo, Portugal
- Centro de Biologia Molecular e Ambiental da Universidade do Minho, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal
- ATP-group, P-2744-016 Porto Salvo, Portugal
| | - Francisco C Santos
- INESC-ID and Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, 2744-016 Porto Salvo, Portugal
- ATP-group, P-2744-016 Porto Salvo, Portugal
| | - Jorge M Pacheco
- Centro de Biologia Molecular e Ambiental da Universidade do Minho, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal
- ATP-group, P-2744-016 Porto Salvo, Portugal
- Departamento de Matemática e Aplicações da Universidade do Minho, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal
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19
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Bednarik P, Fehl K, Semmann D. Costs for switching partners reduce network dynamics but not cooperative behaviour. Proc Biol Sci 2015; 281:rspb.2014.1661. [PMID: 25122233 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2014.1661] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Social networks represent the structuring of interactions between group members. Above all, many interactions are profoundly cooperative in humans and other animals. In accordance with this natural observation, theoretical work demonstrates that certain network structures favour the evolution of cooperation. Yet, recent experimental evidence suggests that static networks do not enhance cooperative behaviour in humans. By contrast, dynamic networks do foster cooperation. However, costs associated with dynamism such as time or resource investments in finding and establishing new partnerships have been neglected so far. Here, we show that human participants are much less likely to break links when costs arise for building new links. Especially, when costs were high, the network was nearly static. Surprisingly, cooperation levels in Prisoner's Dilemma games were not affected by reduced dynamism in social networks. We conclude that the mere potential to quit collaborations is sufficient in humans to reach high levels of cooperative behaviour. Effects of self-structuring processes or assortment on the network played a minor role: participants simply adjusted their cooperative behaviour in response to the threats of losing a partner or of being expelled.
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Affiliation(s)
- Peter Bednarik
- Research Group Evolution of Cooperation and Prosocial Behaviour, Courant Research Centre Evolution of Social Behaviour, University of Göttingen, Kellnerweg 6, 37077 Göttingen, Germany
| | - Katrin Fehl
- Research Group Evolution of Cooperation and Prosocial Behaviour, Courant Research Centre Evolution of Social Behaviour, University of Göttingen, Kellnerweg 6, 37077 Göttingen, Germany
| | - Dirk Semmann
- Research Group Evolution of Cooperation and Prosocial Behaviour, Courant Research Centre Evolution of Social Behaviour, University of Göttingen, Kellnerweg 6, 37077 Göttingen, Germany
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20
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How insurance affects altruistic provision in threshold public goods games. Sci Rep 2015; 5:9098. [PMID: 25765206 PMCID: PMC4357994 DOI: 10.1038/srep09098] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/17/2014] [Accepted: 01/28/2015] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
The occurrence and maintenance of cooperative behaviors in public goods systems have attracted great research attention across multiple disciplines. A threshold public goods game requires a minimum amount of contributions to be collected from a group of individuals for provision to occur. Here we extend the common binary-strategy combination of cooperation and defection by adding a third strategy, called insured cooperation, which corresponds to buying an insurance covering the potential loss resulted from the unsuccessful public goods game. Particularly, only the contributing agents can opt to be insured, which is an effort decreasing the amount of the potential loss occurring. Theoretical computations suggest that when agents face the potential aggregate risk in threshold public goods games, more contributions occur with increasing compensation from insurance. Moreover, permitting the adoption of insurance significantly enhances individual contributions and facilitates provision, especially when the required threshold is high. This work also relates the strategy competition outcomes to different allocation rules once the resulted contributions exceed the threshold point in populations nested within a dilemma.
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21
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What is a group? Conceptual clarity can help integrate evolutionary and social scientific research on cooperation. Behav Brain Sci 2014; 37:260-1. [PMID: 24970406 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x13002872] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
Smaldino argues that evolutionary theories of social behavior do not adequately explain the emergence of group-level traits, including differentiation of roles and organized interactions among individuals. We find Smaldino's account to be commendable but incomplete. Our commentary focuses on a simple question that has not been adequately addressed: What is a group?
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22
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Miyaji K, Tanimoto J, Hagishima A, Ikegaya N. Influence of stochastic perturbation of both action updating and strategy updating in mixed-strategy 2×2 games on evolution of cooperation. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2013; 88:062149. [PMID: 24483427 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.88.062149] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/28/2013] [Indexed: 06/03/2023]
Abstract
In a mixed-strategy game framework, each agent's strategy is defined by a real number; on the other hand, in a discrete strategy game framework, only binary strategies, either cooperation or defection, are allowed. In a spatial mixed-strategy game, with respect to the process for updating action (offer), either a synchronous or an asynchronous strategy update should be presumed. This study elucidates how stochastic perturbation that results from a synchronous or an asynchronous process for updating action significantly affects the enhancement of cooperation in an evolutionary process. Especially, when a synchronous process for updating action is assumed, the extent of cooperation increases with an increase in degree.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kohei Miyaji
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
| | - Aya Hagishima
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
| | - Naoki Ikegaya
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
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23
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Song Z, Feldman MW. The coevolution of long-term pair bonds and cooperation. J Evol Biol 2013; 26:963-70. [DOI: 10.1111/jeb.12111] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/24/2012] [Accepted: 12/11/2012] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Z. Song
- Department of Biology; Stanford University; Stanford CA USA
| | - M. W. Feldman
- Department of Biology; Stanford University; Stanford CA USA
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24
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Does insurance against punishment undermine cooperation in the evolution of public goods games? J Theor Biol 2013; 321:78-82. [PMID: 23291010 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.12.019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/27/2012] [Revised: 12/08/2012] [Accepted: 12/21/2012] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
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25
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Payne JL, Giacobini M, Moore JH. Complex and dynamic population structures: synthesis, open questions, and future directions. Soft comput 2013. [DOI: 10.1007/s00500-013-0994-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
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26
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Szabó G, Szolnoki A, Czakó L. Coexistence of fraternity and egoism for spatial social dilemmas. J Theor Biol 2013; 317:126-32. [PMID: 23079284 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.10.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/17/2012] [Revised: 10/06/2012] [Accepted: 10/08/2012] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
We have studied an evolutionary game with spatially arranged players who can choose one of the two strategies (named cooperation and defection for social dilemmas) when playing with their neighbors. In addition to the application of the usual strategies in the present model the players are also characterized by one of the two extreme personal features representing the egoist or fraternal behavior. During the evolution each player can modify both her own strategy and/or personal feature via a myopic update process in order to improve her utility. The results of numerical simulations and stability analysis are summarized in phase diagrams representing a wide scale of spatially ordered distribution of strategies and personal features when varying the payoff parameters. In most of the cases only two of the four possible options prevail and may form sublattice ordered spatial structure. The evolutionary advantage of the fraternal attitude is demonstrated within a large range of payoff parameters including the region of prisoner's dilemma where egoist defectors and fraternal cooperators form a role-separating chessboard like pattern.
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Affiliation(s)
- György Szabó
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Research Centre for Natural Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary.
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27
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Reward from punishment does not emerge at all costs. PLoS Comput Biol 2013; 9:e1002868. [PMID: 23341764 PMCID: PMC3547799 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002868] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/02/2012] [Accepted: 11/14/2012] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
The conundrum of cooperation has received increasing attention during the last decade. In this quest, the role of altruistic punishment has been identified as a mechanism promoting cooperation. Here we investigate the role of altruistic punishment on the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in structured populations exhibiting connectivity patterns recently identified as key elements of social networks. We do so in the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory, employing the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag-Hunt metaphors to model the conflict between individual and collective interests regarding cooperation. We find that the impact of altruistic punishment strongly depends on the ratio q/p between the cost of punishing a defecting partner (q) and the actual punishment incurred by the partner (p). We show that whenever q/p<1, altruistic punishment turns out to be detrimental for cooperation for a wide range of payoff parameters, when compared to the scenario without punishment. The results imply that while locally, the introduction of peer punishment may seem to reduce the chances of free-riding, realistic population structure may drive the population towards the opposite scenario. Hence, structured populations effectively reduce the expected beneficial contribution of punishment to the emergence of cooperation which, if not carefully dosed, may in fact hinder the chances of widespread cooperation. Altruistic punishment — when a cooperative individual pays a cost to punish her defective partner — has been described as one of the mechanisms that help to explain cooperation's ubiquity in nature. Here, we investigate a model population where individuals interact with each other along the links of a network. The network is built so that it contains the relevant features of real social and biological interaction webs. Individuals engage in cooperation dilemmas with each other and have the possibility to punish defective partners in order to enforce higher cooperation levels. However, it turns out that the introduction of altruistic punishment not always promotes cooperation – in fact, it can actually hinder the spread of cooperation in a variety of cases that we are able to characterize. Effects acting at “micro”, individual level, such as softening the dilemma and reducing the pressure originating from the fear from being cheated and/or the temptation to cheat, can result in lower overall cooperation at a “macro”, population-wide level, due to the complex interference of the social dilemma and the heterogeneous interaction network.
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28
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Gomez Portillo I. Building cooperative networks. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2012; 86:051108. [PMID: 23214739 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.86.051108] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/11/2012] [Indexed: 06/01/2023]
Abstract
We study the cooperation problem in the framework of evolutionary game theory by using the prisoner's dilemma as a metaphor of the problem. By considering the growing process of the system and individuals with imitation capacity, we show conditions that allow the formation of highly cooperative networks of any size and topology. By introducing general considerations of real systems, we reduce the required conditions for cooperation to evolve, which approaches the benefit-cost ratio r for the theoretical minimum r=1 when the mean connectivity of the individuals is increased. Throughout the paper, we distinguish different mechanisms that allow the system to maintain high levels of cooperation when the system grows by incorporation of defectors. These mechanisms require heterogeneity among individuals for cooperation to evolve. However, the required benefit-cost ratio and heterogeneities are drastically reduced as compared to those required for static networks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ignacio Gomez Portillo
- Departament de Física, Grup de Física Estadística, Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona, Barcelona 08193, Spain.
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29
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Mobilia M. Stochastic dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma with cooperation facilitators. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2012; 86:011134. [PMID: 23005395 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.86.011134] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/26/2012] [Indexed: 06/01/2023]
Abstract
In the framework of the paradigmatic prisoner's dilemma game, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in the presence of "cooperation facilitators." In our model, cooperators and defectors interact as in the classical prisoner's dilemma, where selection favors defection. However, here the presence of a small number of cooperation facilitators enhances the fitness (reproductive potential) of cooperators, while it does not alter that of defectors. In a finite population of size N, the dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma with facilitators is characterized by the probability that cooperation takes over (fixation probability) by the mean times to reach the absorbing states. These quantities are computed exactly using Fokker-Planck equations. Our findings, corroborated by stochastic simulations, demonstrate that the influence of facilitators crucially depends on the difference between their density z and the game's cost-to-benefit ratio r. When z > r, the fixation of cooperators is likely in a large population and, under weak selection pressure, invasion and replacement of defection by cooperation is favored by selection if b(z - r)(1 - z) > N(-1), where 0<b ≤ 1 is the cooperation payoff benefit. When z < r, the fixation probability of cooperators is exponentially enhanced by the presence of facilitators but defection is the dominating strategy.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mauro Mobilia
- Department of Applied Mathematics, School of Mathematics, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, United Kingdom.
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30
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Zhang C, Zhang J, Weissing FJ, Perc M, Xie G, Wang L. Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation. PLoS One 2012; 7:e35183. [PMID: 22539958 PMCID: PMC3335150 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0035183] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/15/2011] [Accepted: 03/09/2012] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own. While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chunyan Zhang
- State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
- Theoretical Biology Group, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
| | - Jianlei Zhang
- State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
- Theoretical Biology Group, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
| | - Franz J. Weissing
- Theoretical Biology Group, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
- * E-mail: (GX); (MP); (FJW)
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Department of Physics, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Maribor, Slovenia
- * E-mail: (GX); (MP); (FJW)
| | - Guangming Xie
- State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
- * E-mail: (GX); (MP); (FJW)
| | - Long Wang
- State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
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31
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Santos FC, Pinheiro FL, Lenaerts T, Pacheco JM. The role of diversity in the evolution of cooperation. J Theor Biol 2012; 299:88-96. [PMID: 21930134 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.09.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 139] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/27/2011] [Revised: 06/21/2011] [Accepted: 09/02/2011] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
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32
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Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2011; 108:19193-8. [PMID: 22084103 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1108243108] [Citation(s) in RCA: 269] [Impact Index Per Article: 20.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Human populations are both highly cooperative and highly organized. Human interactions are not random but rather are structured in social networks. Importantly, ties in these networks often are dynamic, changing in response to the behavior of one's social partners. This dynamic structure permits an important form of conditional action that has been explored theoretically but has received little empirical attention: People can respond to the cooperation and defection of those around them by making or breaking network links. Here, we present experimental evidence of the power of using strategic link formation and dissolution, and the network modification it entails, to stabilize cooperation in sizable groups. Our experiments explore large-scale cooperation, where subjects' cooperative actions are equally beneficial to all those with whom they interact. Consistent with previous research, we find that cooperation decays over time when social networks are shuffled randomly every round or are fixed across all rounds. We also find that, when networks are dynamic but are updated only infrequently, cooperation again fails. However, when subjects can update their network connections frequently, we see a qualitatively different outcome: Cooperation is maintained at a high level through network rewiring. Subjects preferentially break links with defectors and form new links with cooperators, creating an incentive to cooperate and leading to substantial changes in network structure. Our experiments confirm the predictions of a set of evolutionary game theoretic models and demonstrate the important role that dynamic social networks can play in supporting large-scale human cooperation.
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33
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Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. PLoS One 2011; 6:e26724. [PMID: 22066006 PMCID: PMC3204981 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0026724] [Citation(s) in RCA: 32] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/21/2011] [Accepted: 10/02/2011] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that different selection criteria for the new interaction partners as well as their number vitally affect the outcome of the game. The resolution of the social dilemma is most probable if the selection favors more successful players and if their maximally attainable number is restricted. While the preferential selection of the best players promotes cooperation irrespective of game parametrization, the optimal number of new interactions depends somewhat on the temptation to defect. Our findings reveal that the "making of new friends" may be an important activity for the successful evolution of cooperation, but also that partners must be selected carefully and their number limited.
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34
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Wu B, Zhou D, Wang L. Evolutionary dynamics on stochastic evolving networks for multiple-strategy games. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2011; 84:046111. [PMID: 22181231 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.84.046111] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/28/2011] [Revised: 08/19/2011] [Indexed: 05/31/2023]
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory on dynamical networks has received much attention. Most of the work has been focused on 2×2 games such as prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift, with general n×n games seldom addressed. In particular, analytical methods are still lacking. Here we generalize the stochastic linking dynamics proposed by Wu, Zhou, Fu, Luo, Wang, and Traulsen [PLoS ONE 5, e11187 (2010)] to n×n games. We analytically obtain that the fast linking dynamics results in the replicator dynamics with a rescaled payoff matrix. In the rescaled matrix, intuitively, each entry is the product of the original entry and the average duration time of the corresponding link. This result is shown to be robust to a wide class of imitation processes. As applications, we show both analytically and numerically that the biodiversity, modeled as the stability of a zero-sum rock-paper-scissors game, cannot be altered by the fast linking dynamics. In addition, we show that the fast linking dynamics can stabilize tit-for-tat as an evolutionary stable strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game provided the interaction between the identical strategies happens sufficiently often. Our method paves the way for an analytical study of the multiple-strategy coevolutionary dynamics.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bin Wu
- Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China.
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35
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Zhang C, Zhang J, Xie G, Wang L. Effects of encounter in a population of spatial prisoner's dilemma players. Theor Popul Biol 2011; 80:226-31. [PMID: 21763708 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2011.06.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/10/2011] [Revised: 06/24/2011] [Accepted: 06/29/2011] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games, whereby each player extends its interaction scope by trying to interact with a certain number of encounters randomly chosen from its non-neighbors, in addition to its permanently linked nearest neighbors. Furthermore, the non-neighbors treat the initiative interactions in two scenarios: definitely accepting that from the cooperators, whereas guardedly interacting with defectors with an acceptance probability which may take arbitrary value in [0,1]. Importantly, our results reveal that the proposed encounter mechanism is a potent extrinsic factor that is able to boost cooperation when appropriately adjusting the values of the encounter number and acceptance probability, though rational players would always defect in one-shot encounters, regardless of the action from the counterparts. We hope our studies may help understand that the proposed encounter mechanism is also an important ingredient of a flourishing cooperative society.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chunyan Zhang
- State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China.
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36
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Fehl K, van der Post DJ, Semmann D. Co-evolution of behaviour and social network structure promotes human cooperation. Ecol Lett 2011; 14:546-51. [PMID: 21463459 DOI: 10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01615.x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 97] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
The ubiquity of cooperation in nature is puzzling because cooperators can be exploited by defectors. Recent theoretical work shows that if dynamic networks define interactions between individuals, cooperation is favoured by natural selection. To address this, we compare cooperative behaviour in multiple but independent repeated games between participants in static and dynamic networks. In the latter, participants could break their links after each social interaction. As predicted, we find higher levels of cooperation in dynamic networks. Through biased link breaking (i.e. to defectors) participants affected their social environment. We show that this link-breaking behaviour leads to substantial network clustering and we find primarily cooperators within these clusters. This assortment is remarkable because it occurred on top of behavioural assortment through direct reciprocity and beyond the perception of participants, and represents a self-organized pattern. Our results highlight the importance of the interaction between ecological context and selective pressures on cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Katrin Fehl
- Junior Research Group Evolution of Cooperation and Prosocial Behaviour, Courant Research Centre Evolution of Social Behaviour, University of Göttingen, Kellnerweg 6, 37077 Göttingen, Germany
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37
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Cao L, Ohtsuki H, Wang B, Aihara K. Evolution of cooperation on adaptively weighted networks. J Theor Biol 2011; 272:8-15. [PMID: 21163270 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.12.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/28/2010] [Revised: 12/07/2010] [Accepted: 12/07/2010] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Lang Cao
- Department of Mathematical Engineering and Information Physics, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan.
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38
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Iñiguez G, Kertész J, Kaski KK, Barrio RA. Phase change in an opinion-dynamics model with separation of time scales. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2011; 83:016111. [PMID: 21405748 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.83.016111] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/16/2010] [Revised: 11/26/2010] [Indexed: 05/30/2023]
Abstract
We define an opinion formation model of agents in a one-dimensional ring, where the opinion of an agent evolves due to its interactions with close neighbors and due to its either positive or negative attitude toward the overall mood of all the other agents. While the dynamics of the agent's opinion is described with an appropriate differential equation, from time to time pairs of agents are allowed to change their locations to improve the homogeneity of opinion (or comfort feeling) with respect to their short-range environment. In this way the timescale of transaction dynamics and that of environment update are well separated and controlled by a single parameter. By varying this parameter we discovered a phase change in the number of undecided individuals. This phenomenon arises from the fact that too frequent location exchanges among agents result in frustration in their opinion formation. Our mean field analysis supports this picture.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gerardo Iñiguez
- BECS, School of Science and Technology, Aalto University, P.O. Box 12200, FI-00076, Espoo, Finland
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39
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Models of coalition or alliance formation. J Theor Biol 2010; 274:187-204. [PMID: 21195717 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.12.031] [Citation(s) in RCA: 48] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/27/2010] [Revised: 12/08/2010] [Accepted: 12/21/2010] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
More than half a century has now elapsed since coalition or alliance formation theory (CAFT) was first developed. During that time, researchers have amassed a vast amount of detailed and high-quality data on coalitions or alliances among primates and other animals. But models have not kept pace, and more relevant theory is needed. In particular, even though CAFT is primarily an exercise in polyadic game theory, game theorists have devoted relatively little attention to questions that motivate field research, and much remains largely unexplored. The state of the art is both a challenge and an opportunity. In this review we describe a variety of game-theoretic and related modelling approaches that have much untapped potential to address the questions that field biologists ask.
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Grilo C, Correia L. Effects of asynchronism on evolutionary games. J Theor Biol 2010; 269:109-22. [PMID: 20971122 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.10.022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/31/2009] [Revised: 09/28/2010] [Accepted: 10/16/2010] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
We analyze the influence of the update dynamics on symmetric 2-player evolutionary games, which are among the most used tools to study the emergence of cooperation in populations of interacting agents. A synchronous dynamics means that, at each time step, all the agents of the population update their strategies simultaneously. An extreme case of asynchronism is sequential dynamics, in which only one agent is updated each time. We first show that these two opposite update dynamics can lead to very different outcomes and that sequential dynamics is detrimental to the emergence of cooperation only when the probability of imitating the most successful neighbors is high. In this sense, we can say that, when the update dynamics has some influence, in general asynchronism is beneficial to the emergence of cooperation. We then explore the consequences of using intermediate levels of asynchronism, where only a fraction of the agents update their behavior each time. In general, the level of cooperation changes smoothly and monotonically as we gradually go from synchronous to sequential dynamics. However, there are some exceptions that should be taken into account. In addition, the results show that the possibility of agents taking irrational decisions has a key role in the sensitivity of these models to changes in the update dynamics. Explanations for the observed behaviors are advanced.
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Affiliation(s)
- Carlos Grilo
- Departamento de Engenharia Informática, Escola Superior de Tecnologia e Gestão, Instituto Politécnico de Leiria, Morro do Lena, 2411-901 Leiria, Portugal.
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41
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Coevolution of Cooperation, Response to Adverse Social Ties and Network Structure. GAMES 2010. [DOI: 10.3390/g1030317] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
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Wu B, Zhou D, Fu F, Luo Q, Wang L, Traulsen A. Evolution of cooperation on stochastic dynamical networks. PLoS One 2010; 5:e11187. [PMID: 20614025 PMCID: PMC2894855 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0011187] [Citation(s) in RCA: 84] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/12/2010] [Accepted: 05/21/2010] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperative behavior that increases the fitness of others at a cost to oneself can be promoted by natural selection only in the presence of an additional mechanism. One such mechanism is based on population structure, which can lead to clustering of cooperating agents. Recently, the focus has turned to complex dynamical population structures such as social networks, where the nodes represent individuals and links represent social relationships. We investigate how the dynamics of a social network can change the level of cooperation in the network. Individuals either update their strategies by imitating their partners or adjust their social ties. For the dynamics of the network structure, a random link is selected and breaks with a probability determined by the adjacent individuals. Once it is broken, a new one is established. This linking dynamics can be conveniently characterized by a Markov chain in the configuration space of an ever-changing network of interacting agents. Our model can be analytically solved provided the dynamics of links proceeds much faster than the dynamics of strategies. This leads to a simple rule for the evolution of cooperation: The more fragile links between cooperating players and non-cooperating players are (or the more robust links between cooperators are), the more likely cooperation prevails. Our approach may pave the way for analytically investigating coevolution of strategy and structure.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bin Wu
- Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China.
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Population structure induces a symmetry breaking favoring the emergence of cooperation. PLoS Comput Biol 2009; 5:e1000596. [PMID: 20011116 PMCID: PMC2782104 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000596] [Citation(s) in RCA: 48] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2009] [Accepted: 11/03/2009] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
The evolution of cooperation described in terms of simple two-person interactions has received considerable attention in recent years, where several key results were obtained. Among those, it is now well established that the web of social interaction networks promotes the emergence of cooperation when modeled in terms of symmetric two-person games. Up until now, however, the impacts of the heterogeneity of social interactions into the emergence of cooperation have not been fully explored, as other aspects remain to be investigated. Here we carry out a study employing the simplest example of a prisoner's dilemma game in which the benefits collected by the participants may be proportional to the costs expended. We show that the heterogeneous nature of the social network naturally induces a symmetry breaking of the game, as contributions made by cooperators may become contingent on the social context in which the individual is embedded. A new, numerical, mean-field analysis reveals that prisoner's dilemmas on networks no longer constitute a defector dominance dilemma—instead, individuals engage effectively in a general coordination game. We find that the symmetry breaking induced by population structure profoundly affects the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation, dramatically enhancing the feasibility of cooperators: cooperation blooms when each cooperator contributes the same cost, equally shared among the plethora of games in which she participates. This work provides clear evidence that, while individual rational reasoning may hinder cooperative actions, the intricate nature of social interactions may effectively transform a local dilemma of cooperation into a global coordination problem. Humans contribute to a broad range of cooperative endeavors. In many of them, the amount or effort contributed often depends on the social context of each individual. Recent evidence has shown how modern societies are grounded in complex and heterogeneous networks of exchange and cooperation, in which some individuals play radically different roles and/or interact more than others. We show that such social heterogeneity drastically affects the behavioral dynamics and promotes cooperative behavior, whenever the social dilemma perceived by each individual is contingent on her/his social context. The multiplicity of roles and contributions induced by realistic population structures is shown to transform an initial defection dominance dilemma into a coordination challenge or even a cooperator dominance game. While locally defection may seem inescapable, globally there is an emergent new dilemma in which cooperation often prevails, illustrating how collective cooperative action may emerge from myopic individual selfishness.
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Coevolutionary games--a mini review. Biosystems 2009; 99:109-25. [PMID: 19837129 DOI: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2009.10.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 583] [Impact Index Per Article: 38.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/04/2009] [Revised: 10/02/2009] [Accepted: 10/05/2009] [Indexed: 01/10/2023]
Abstract
Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges faced by cooperators when competing with defectors. Evolutionary game theory provides a competent theoretical framework for addressing the subtleties of cooperation in such situations, which are known as social dilemmas. Recent advances point towards the fact that the evolution of strategies alone may be insufficient to fully exploit the benefits offered by cooperative behavior. Indeed, while spatial structure and heterogeneity, for example, have been recognized as potent promoters of cooperation, coevolutionary rules can extend the potentials of such entities further, and even more importantly, lead to the understanding of their emergence. The introduction of coevolutionary rules to evolutionary games implies, that besides the evolution of strategies, another property may simultaneously be subject to evolution as well. Coevolutionary rules may affect the interaction network, the reproduction capability of players, their reputation, mobility or age. Here we review recent works on evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as give a didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with the subject. In addition, we briefly outline directions for future research that we feel are promising, thereby particularly focusing on dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules on the evolution of cooperation, which are still widely open to research and thus hold promise of exciting new discoveries.
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Mogielski K, Płatkowski T. A mechanism of dynamical interactions for two-person social dilemmas. J Theor Biol 2009; 260:145-50. [PMID: 19523961 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.06.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2009] [Revised: 05/31/2009] [Accepted: 06/01/2009] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
We propose a new mechanism of interactions between game-theoretical agents in which the weights of the connections between interacting individuals are dynamical, payoff-dependent variables. Their evolution depends on the difference between the payoff of the agents from a given type of encounter and their average payoff. The mechanism is studied in the frame of two models: agents distributed on a random graph, and a mean field model. Symmetric and asymmetric connections between the agents are introduced. Long time behavior of both systems is discussed for the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snow Drift games.
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Affiliation(s)
- Krzysztof Mogielski
- Department of Mathematics, Informatics and Mechanics, University of Warsaw, Banacha, Poland
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Szabó G, Szolnoki A. Cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma with two types of players for increasing number of neighbors. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2009; 79:016106. [PMID: 19257106 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.79.016106] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/17/2008] [Indexed: 05/27/2023]
Abstract
We study a spatial two-strategy (cooperation and defection) prisoner's dilemma game with two types ( A and B ) of players located on the sites of a square lattice. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by iterated strategy adoption from a randomly selected neighbor with a probability depending on the payoff difference and also on the type of the neighbor. The strategy adoption probability is reduced by a prefactor (w<1) from the players of type B . We consider the competition between two opposite effects when increasing the number of neighbors ( k=4 , 8, and 24). Within a range of the portion of influential players (type A ) the inhomogeneous activity in strategy transfer yields a relevant increase (dependent on w ) in the density of cooperators. The noise dependence of this phenomenon is also discussed by evaluating phase diagrams.
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Affiliation(s)
- György Szabó
- Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
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