Spatial patterns generated by simultaneous cooperation and exploitation favour the evolution of altruism

Evolution of sensitivity to warning cues from kin in plants with a structured population

Plants exchange a variety of information intra- and interspecifically by using various mediating cues. For example, plant individuals that are injured by herbivores release volatile chemicals, which induce receiver plants to express anti-herbivore resistance. Remarkably, some plant species were known to represent kin specificity in the response, where cues from a damaged individual induce a higher level of resistance in a kin receiver than in a non-kin receiver. Such higher sensitivity to warning cues from kin could be advantageous via two mechanisms. If each herbivore tends to attack plants with a certain genotype, plants should be more sensitive to warning cues from kin that share genetic properties. In addition, if herbivores successively attack the neighboring plant with a high probability, and if related plants tend to grow in close proximity, plants may be more sensitive to warning cues from neighboring kin under the presence of a trade-off between sensitivity to kin and non-kin. In the present study, we constructed a mathematical model including those mechanisms to investigate the evolutionary process of the higher sensitivity to warning cues from kin than sensitivities to cues from non-kin. According to the analysis of evolutionary dynamics, we revealed that both mechanisms could contribute, although higher sensitivity to cues from kin is more likely to evolve when the spatial range of competition is greater than the range of effective alarm cues. This result highlights the importance of the competition regime in the evolution of signaling among kin.

Sharp thresholds limit the benefit of defector avoidance in cooperation on networks

Consider a cooperation game on a spatial network of habitat patches, where players can relocate between patches if they judge the local conditions to be unfavorable. In time, the relocation events may lead to a homogeneous state where all patches harbor the same relative densities of cooperators and defectors, or they may lead to self-organized patterns, where some patches become safe havens that maintain an elevated cooperator density. Here we analyze the transition between these states mathematically. We show that safe havens form once a certain threshold in connectivity is crossed. This threshold can be analytically linked to the structure of the patch network and specifically to certain network motifs. Surprisingly, a forgiving defector avoidance strategy may be most favorable for cooperators. Our results demonstrate that the analysis of cooperation games in ecological metacommunity models is mathematically tractable and has the potential to link topics such as macroecological patterns, behavioral evolution, and network topology.

The joint evolution of cooperation and competition

In nature, cooperation among individuals is often accompanied by competition among the same individuals for the cooperatively produced rewards. In such a situation, the evolution of cooperative and competitive investments influences each other, but previous theoretical studies mostly focused on either cooperation or competition. Here we consider a generic situation in which individuals cooperatively produce rewards according to the continuous snowdrift game, and then rewards are divided among cooperating individuals according to a generalized tug-of-war game. Using adaptive dynamics and numerical simulations, we investigated the joint evolution of two continuous traits, the investment in cooperation and in competition, respectively. We found that competition for the division of rewards promotes evolutionary branching, and hence polymorphism in both the cooperative and the competitive traits. In polymorphic populations, cooperation levels are positively correlated with competition levels among strains, so that cooperators tend to benefit disproportionately from the benefits produced. We also found that the mean cooperation level within the population is promoted by the competition. Our results show that coevolution of cooperation and competition has qualitatively different outcomes compared to the evolution of only cooperation or only competition, and suggest that it is important to simultaneously consider multiple aspects of social interactions.