1
|
Kawakatsu M, Kessinger TA, Plotkin JB. A mechanistic model of gossip, reputations, and cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2024; 121:e2400689121. [PMID: 38717858 PMCID: PMC11098103 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2400689121] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/12/2024] [Accepted: 04/12/2024] [Indexed: 05/18/2024] Open
Abstract
Social reputations facilitate cooperation: those who help others gain a good reputation, making them more likely to receive help themselves. But when people hold private views of one another, this cycle of indirect reciprocity breaks down, as disagreements lead to the perception of unjustified behavior that ultimately undermines cooperation. Theoretical studies often assume population-wide agreement about reputations, invoking rapid gossip as an endogenous mechanism for reaching consensus. However, the theory of indirect reciprocity lacks a mechanistic description of how gossip actually generates consensus. Here, we develop a mechanistic model of gossip-based indirect reciprocity that incorporates two alternative forms of gossip: exchanging information with randomly selected peers or consulting a single gossip source. We show that these two forms of gossip are mathematically equivalent under an appropriate transformation of parameters. We derive an analytical expression for the minimum amount of gossip required to reach sufficient consensus and stabilize cooperation. We analyze how the amount of gossip necessary for cooperation depends on the benefits and costs of cooperation, the assessment rule (social norm), and errors in reputation assessment, strategy execution, and gossip transmission. Finally, we show that biased gossip can either facilitate or hinder cooperation, depending on the direction and magnitude of the bias. Our results contribute to the growing literature on cooperation facilitated by communication, and they highlight the need to study strategic interactions coupled with the spread of social information.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Mari Kawakatsu
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19104
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19104
| | | | - Joshua B. Plotkin
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19104
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19104
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Morsky B, Plotkin JB, Akçay E. Indirect reciprocity with Bayesian reasoning and biases. PLoS Comput Biol 2024; 20:e1011979. [PMID: 38662682 PMCID: PMC11045068 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011979] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2023] [Accepted: 03/10/2024] [Indexed: 04/28/2024] Open
Abstract
Reputations can foster cooperation by indirect reciprocity: if I am good to you then others will be good to me. But this mechanism for cooperation in one-shot interactions only works when people agree on who is good and who is bad. Errors in actions or assessments can produce disagreements about reputations, which can unravel the positive feedback loop between social standing and pro-social behaviour. Cooperators can end up punished and defectors rewarded. Public reputation systems and empathy are two possible mechanisms to promote agreement about reputations. Here we suggest an alternative: Bayesian reasoning by observers. By taking into account the probabilities of errors in action and observation and their prior beliefs about the prevalence of good people in the population, observers can use Bayesian reasoning to determine whether or not someone is good. To study this scenario, we develop an evolutionary game theoretical model in which players use Bayesian reasoning to assess reputations, either publicly or privately. We explore this model analytically and numerically for five social norms (Scoring, Shunning, Simple Standing, Staying, and Stern Judging). We systematically compare results to the case when agents do not use reasoning in determining reputations. We find that Bayesian reasoning reduces cooperation relative to non-reasoning, except in the case of the Scoring norm. Under Scoring, Bayesian reasoning can promote coexistence of three strategic types. Additionally, we study the effects of optimistic or pessimistic biases in individual beliefs about the degree of cooperation in the population. We find that optimism generally undermines cooperation whereas pessimism can, in some cases, promote cooperation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Bryce Morsky
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America
- Department of Mathematics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, United States of America
| | - Joshua B. Plotkin
- Department of Mathematics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, United States of America
| | - Erol Akçay
- Department of Mathematics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, United States of America
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Pandula N, Akçay E, Morsky B. Indirect reciprocity with abductive reasoning. J Theor Biol 2024; 580:111715. [PMID: 38154522 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2023.111715] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/07/2023] [Revised: 12/12/2023] [Accepted: 12/15/2023] [Indexed: 12/30/2023]
Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is a reputational mechanism through which cooperative behavior can be promoted amongst a group of individuals. However, in order for this mechanism to effectively do so, cheating must be appropriately punished and cooperating appropriately rewarded. Errors in assessments and actions can hinder this process. In such a setting, individuals might try to reason about evidence to assign reputations given the possibility of errors. Here, we consider a well-established theory of reasoning used to combine evidence, abductive reasoning, as a possible means by which such errors can be circumvented. Specifically, we use Dempster-Shafer theory to model individuals who account for possible errors by combining information about their beliefs about the status of the population and the errors rates and then choose the simplest scenario that could explain their observations in the context of these beliefs. We investigate the effectiveness of abductive reasoning at promoting cooperation for five social norms: Scoring, Shunning, Simple Standing, Staying, and Stern Judging. We find that, generally, abductive reasoning can outperform non-reasoning models at ameliorating the effects of the aforementioned challenges and promote higher levels of cooperation under low-error conditions. However, for high-error conditions, we find that abductive reasoning can undermine cooperation. Furthermore, we also find that a degree of bias towards believing previously held reputations can help sustain cooperation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Neel Pandula
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
| | - Erol Akçay
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
| | - Bryce Morsky
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA; Department of Mathematics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA.
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Kawakatsu M, Michel-Mata S, Kessinger TA, Tarnita CE, Plotkin JB. When do stereotypes undermine indirect reciprocity? PLoS Comput Biol 2024; 20:e1011862. [PMID: 38427626 PMCID: PMC10906830 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011862] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/12/2023] [Accepted: 01/28/2024] [Indexed: 03/03/2024] Open
Abstract
Social reputations provide a powerful mechanism to stimulate human cooperation, but observing individual reputations can be cognitively costly. To ease this burden, people may rely on proxies such as stereotypes, or generalized reputations assigned to groups. Such stereotypes are less accurate than individual reputations, and so they could disrupt the positive feedback between altruistic behavior and social standing, undermining cooperation. How do stereotypes impact cooperation by indirect reciprocity? We develop a theoretical model of group-structured populations in which individuals are assigned either individual reputations based on their own actions or stereotyped reputations based on their groups' behavior. We find that using stereotypes can produce either more or less cooperation than using individual reputations, depending on how widely reputations are shared. Deleterious outcomes can arise when individuals adapt their propensity to stereotype. Stereotyping behavior can spread and can be difficult to displace, even when it compromises collective cooperation and even though it makes a population vulnerable to invasion by defectors. We discuss the implications of our results for the prevalence of stereotyping and for reputation-based cooperation in structured populations.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Mari Kawakatsu
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America
| | - Sebastián Michel-Mata
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
| | - Taylor A. Kessinger
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America
| | - Corina E. Tarnita
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
| | - Joshua B. Plotkin
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Murase Y, Hilbe C. Indirect reciprocity with stochastic and dual reputation updates. PLoS Comput Biol 2023; 19:e1011271. [PMID: 37471286 PMCID: PMC10359017 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011271] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/02/2023] [Accepted: 06/13/2023] [Indexed: 07/22/2023] Open
Abstract
Cooperation is a crucial aspect of social life, yet understanding the nature of cooperation and how it can be promoted is an ongoing challenge. One mechanism for cooperation is indirect reciprocity. According to this mechanism, individuals cooperate to maintain a good reputation. This idea is embodied in a set of social norms called the "leading eight". When all information is publicly available, these norms have two major properties. Populations that employ these norms are fully cooperative, and they are stable against invasion by alternative norms. In this paper, we extend the framework of the leading eight in two directions. First, we include norms with 'dual' reputation updates. These norms do not only assign new reputations to an acting donor; they also allow to update the reputation of the passive recipient. Second, we allow social norms to be stochastic. Such norms allow individuals to evaluate others with certain probabilities. Using this framework, we characterize all evolutionarily stable norms that lead to full cooperation in the public information regime. When only the donor's reputation is updated, and all updates are deterministic, we recover the conventional model. In that case, we find two classes of stable norms: the leading eight and the 'secondary sixteen'. Stochasticity can further help to stabilize cooperation when the benefit of cooperation is comparably small. Moreover, updating the recipients' reputations can help populations to recover more quickly from errors. Overall, our study highlights a remarkable trade-off between the evolutionary stability of a norm and its robustness with respect to errors. Norms that correct errors quickly require higher benefits of cooperation to be stable.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Yohsuke Murase
- RIKEN Center for Computational Science, Kobe, Japan
- Max Planck Research Group 'Dynamics of Social Behavior', Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
| | - Christian Hilbe
- Max Planck Research Group 'Dynamics of Social Behavior', Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Kessinger TA, Tarnita CE, Plotkin JB. Evolution of norms for judging social behavior. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2023; 120:e2219480120. [PMID: 37276388 PMCID: PMC10268218 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2219480120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2022] [Accepted: 05/03/2023] [Indexed: 06/07/2023] Open
Abstract
Reputations provide a powerful mechanism to sustain cooperation, as individuals cooperate with those of good social standing. But how should someone's reputation be updated as we observe their social behavior, and when will a population converge on a shared norm for judging behavior? Here, we develop a mathematical model of cooperation conditioned on reputations, for a population that is stratified into groups. Each group may subscribe to a different social norm for assessing reputations and so norms compete as individuals choose to move from one group to another. We show that a group initially comprising a minority of the population may nonetheless overtake the entire population-especially if it adopts the Stern Judging norm, which assigns a bad reputation to individuals who cooperate with those of bad standing. When individuals do not change group membership, stratifying reputation information into groups tends to destabilize cooperation, unless individuals are strongly insular and favor in-group social interactions. We discuss the implications of our results for the structure of information flow in a population and for the evolution of social norms of judgment.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Corina E. Tarnita
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ08544
| | - Joshua B. Plotkin
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19104
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19104
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Fujimoto Y, Ohtsuki H. Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2023; 120:e2300544120. [PMID: 37155910 PMCID: PMC10194006 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2300544120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/25/2023] [Accepted: 04/09/2023] [Indexed: 05/10/2023] Open
Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in humans. In indirect reciprocity, individuals use reputations to choose whether or not to cooperate with a partner and update others' reputations. A major question is how the rules to choose their actions and the rules to update reputations evolve. In the public reputation case where all individuals share the evaluation of others, social norms called Simple Standing (SS) and Stern Judging (SJ) have been known to maintain cooperation. However, in the case of private assessment where individuals independently evaluate others, the mechanism of maintenance of cooperation is still largely unknown. This study theoretically shows for the first time that cooperation by indirect reciprocity can be evolutionarily stable under private assessment. Specifically, we find that SS can be stable, but SJ can never be. This is intuitive because SS can correct interpersonal discrepancies in reputations through its simplicity. On the other hand, SJ is too complicated to avoid an accumulation of errors, which leads to the collapse of cooperation. We conclude that moderate simplicity is a key to stable cooperation under the private assessment. Our result provides a theoretical basis for the evolution of human cooperation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Yuma Fujimoto
- Research Center for Integrative Evolutionary Science, SOKENDAI (The Graduate University for Advanced Studies), Hayama240-0193, Japan
- Universal Biology Institute, The University of Tokyo, Bunkyo-ku113-0033, Japan
- CyberAgent, Inc., Shibuya-ku150-0042, Japan
| | - Hisashi Ohtsuki
- Research Center for Integrative Evolutionary Science, SOKENDAI (The Graduate University for Advanced Studies), Hayama240-0193, Japan
- Department of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, SOKENDAI, Hayama240-0193, Japan
| |
Collapse
|
8
|
Fujimoto Y, Ohtsuki H. Reputation structure in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment. Sci Rep 2022; 12:10500. [PMID: 35732644 PMCID: PMC9217807 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-14171-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2022] [Accepted: 06/02/2022] [Indexed: 12/04/2022] Open
Abstract
Evaluation relationships are pivotal for maintaining a cooperative society. A formation of the evaluation relationships has been discussed in terms of indirect reciprocity, by modeling dynamics of good or bad reputations among individuals. Recently, a situation that individuals independently evaluate others with errors (i.e., noisy and private reputation) is considered, where the reputation structure (from what proportion of individuals in the population each receives good reputations, defined as goodness here) becomes complex, and thus has been studied mainly with numerical simulations. The present study gives a theoretical analysis of such complex reputation structure. We formulate the time change of goodness of individuals caused by updates of reputations among individuals. By considering a large population, we derive dynamics of the frequency distribution of goodnesses. An equilibrium state of the dynamics is approximated by a summation of Gaussian functions. We demonstrate that the theoretical solution well fits the numerical calculation. From the theoretical solution, we obtain a new interpretation of the complex reputation structure. This study provides a novel mathematical basis for cutting-edge studies on indirect reciprocity.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Yuma Fujimoto
- Department of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, SOKENDAI, Shonan Village, Hayama, Kanagawa, 240-0193, Japan.
- Universal Biology Institute (UBI), The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Tokyo, Bunkyo-ku, 113-0033, Japan.
| | - Hisashi Ohtsuki
- Department of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, SOKENDAI, Shonan Village, Hayama, Kanagawa, 240-0193, Japan
| |
Collapse
|
9
|
Lee S, Murase Y, Baek SK. A second-order stability analysis for the continuous model of indirect reciprocity. J Theor Biol 2022; 548:111202. [PMID: 35752284 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2022.111202] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/08/2022] [Revised: 05/26/2022] [Accepted: 06/13/2022] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
Abstract
Reputation is one of key mechanisms to maintain human cooperation, but its analysis gets complicated if we consider the possibility that reputation does not reach consensus because of erroneous assessment. The difficulty is alleviated if we assume that reputation and cooperation do not take binary values but have continuous spectra so that disagreement over reputation can be analysed in a perturbative way. In this work, we carry out the analysis by expanding the dynamics of reputation to the second order of perturbation under the assumption that everyone initially cooperates with good reputation. The second-order theory clarifies the difference between Image Scoring and Simple Standing in that punishment for defection against a well-reputed player should be regarded as good for maintaining cooperation. Moreover, comparison among the leading eight shows that the stabilizing effect of justified punishment weakens if cooperation between two ill-reputed players is regarded as bad. Our analysis thus explains how Simple Standing achieves a high level of stability by permitting justified punishment and also by disregarding irrelevant information in assessing cooperation. This observation suggests which factors affect the stability of a social norm when reputation can be perturbed by noise.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Sanghun Lee
- Department of Physics, Pukyong National University, Busan 48513, Republic of Korea
| | - Yohsuke Murase
- RIKEN Center for Computational Science, Kobe, Hyogo 650-0047, Japan
| | - Seung Ki Baek
- Department of Scientific Computing, Pukyong National University, Busan 48513, Republic of Korea.
| |
Collapse
|
10
|
Murase Y, Kim M, Baek SK. Social norms in indirect reciprocity with ternary reputations. Sci Rep 2022; 12:455. [PMID: 35013393 PMCID: PMC8748885 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-04033-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/21/2021] [Accepted: 12/07/2021] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism that promotes cooperation in social dilemmas by means of reputation. Although it has been a common practice to represent reputations by binary values, either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, such a dichotomy is a crude approximation considering the complexity of reality. In this work, we studied norms with three different reputations, i.e., ‘good’, ‘neutral’, and ‘bad’. Through massive supercomputing for handling more than thirty billion possibilities, we fully identified which norms achieve cooperation and possess evolutionary stability against behavioural mutants. By systematically categorizing all these norms according to their behaviours, we found similarities and dissimilarities to their binary-reputation counterpart, the leading eight. We obtained four rules that should be satisfied by the successful norms, and the behaviour of the leading eight can be understood as a special case of these rules. A couple of norms that show counter-intuitive behaviours are also presented. We believe the findings are also useful for designing successful norms with more general reputation systems.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Yohsuke Murase
- RIKEN Center for Computational Science, Kobe, Hyogo, 650-0047, Japan
| | - Minjae Kim
- Department of Physics, Pukyong National University, Busan, 48513, Korea
| | - Seung Ki Baek
- Department of Physics, Pukyong National University, Busan, 48513, Korea.
| |
Collapse
|
11
|
Perret C, Krellner M, Han TA. The evolution of moral rules in a model of indirect reciprocity with private assessment. Sci Rep 2021; 11:23581. [PMID: 34880264 PMCID: PMC8654852 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-02677-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/29/2021] [Accepted: 11/11/2021] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
Moral rules allow humans to cooperate by indirect reciprocity. Yet, it is not clear which moral rules best implement indirect reciprocity and are favoured by natural selection. Previous studies either considered only public assessment, where individuals are deemed good or bad by all others, or compared a subset of possible strategies. Here we fill this gap by identifying which rules are evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) among all possible moral rules while considering private assessment. We develop an analytical model describing the frequency of long-term cooperation, determining when a strategy can be invaded by another. We show that there are numerous ESSs in absence of errors, which however cease to exist when errors are present. We identify the underlying properties of cooperative ESSs. Overall, this paper provides a first exhaustive evolutionary invasion analysis of moral rules considering private assessment. Moreover, this model is extendable to incorporate higher-order rules and other processes.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Cedric Perret
- Teesside University, Southfield Rd, Middlesbrough, TS1 3BX, UK.
| | - Marcus Krellner
- Teesside University, Southfield Rd, Middlesbrough, TS1 3BX, UK
| | - The Anh Han
- Teesside University, Southfield Rd, Middlesbrough, TS1 3BX, UK
| |
Collapse
|
12
|
Schmid L, Shati P, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity. Sci Rep 2021; 11:17443. [PMID: 34465830 PMCID: PMC8408181 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-96932-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/08/2021] [Accepted: 08/17/2021] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on social norms. This mechanism requires that individuals in a population observe and judge each other's behaviors. Individuals with a good reputation are more likely to receive help from others. Previous work suggests that indirect reciprocity is only effective when all relevant information is reliable and publicly available. Otherwise, individuals may disagree on how to assess others, even if they all apply the same social norm. Such disagreements can lead to a breakdown of cooperation. Here we explore whether the predominantly studied 'leading eight' social norms of indirect reciprocity can be made more robust by equipping them with an element of generosity. To this end, we distinguish between two kinds of generosity. According to assessment generosity, individuals occasionally assign a good reputation to group members who would usually be regarded as bad. According to action generosity, individuals occasionally cooperate with group members with whom they would usually defect. Using individual-based simulations, we show that the two kinds of generosity have a very different effect on the resulting reputation dynamics. Assessment generosity tends to add to the overall noise and allows defectors to invade. In contrast, a limited amount of action generosity can be beneficial in a few cases. However, even when action generosity is beneficial, the respective simulations do not result in full cooperation. Our results suggest that while generosity can favor cooperation when individuals use the most simple strategies of reciprocity, it is disadvantageous when individuals use more complex social norms.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Laura Schmid
- IST Austria, Am Campus 1, 3400, Klosterneuburg, Austria.
| | - Pouya Shati
- Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, M5S, Canada
| | - Christian Hilbe
- Max Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306, Ploen, Germany
| | | |
Collapse
|
13
|
Local reputation, local selection, and the leading eight norms. Sci Rep 2021; 11:16560. [PMID: 34400674 PMCID: PMC8368190 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-95130-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/20/2021] [Accepted: 06/14/2021] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans are capable of solving cooperation problems following social norms. Social norms dictate appropriate behaviour and judgement on others in response to their previous actions and reputation. Recently, the so-called leading eight norms have been identified from many potential social norms that can sustain cooperation through a reputation-based indirect reciprocity mechanism. Despite indirect reciprocity being claimed to extend direct reciprocity in larger populations where direct experiences cannot be accumulated, the success of social norms have been analysed in models with global information and evolution. This study is the first to analyse the leading eight norms with local information and evolution. We find that the leading eight are robust against selfish players within most scenarios and can maintain a high level of cooperation also with local information and evolution. In fact, local evolution sustains cooperation under a wider set of conditions than global evolution, while local reputation does not hinder cooperation compared to global reputation. Four of the leading eight norms that do not reward justified defection offer better chances for cooperation with quick evolution, reputation with noise, larger networks, and when unconditional defectors enter the population.
Collapse
|
14
|
Lee S, Murase Y, Baek SK. Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity. Sci Rep 2021; 11:14225. [PMID: 34244552 PMCID: PMC8270921 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-93598-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/09/2021] [Accepted: 06/28/2021] [Indexed: 02/06/2023] Open
Abstract
Reputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. In this work, we investigate stability of cooperation in the donation game by regarding each player's reputation and behaviour as continuous variables. Through perturbative calculation, we derive a condition that a social norm should satisfy to give penalties to its close variants, provided that everyone initially cooperates with a good reputation, and this result is supported by numerical simulation. A crucial factor of the condition is whether a well-reputed player's donation to an ill-reputed co-player is appreciated by other members of the society, and the condition can be reduced to a threshold for the benefit-cost ratio of cooperation which depends on the reputational sensitivity to a donor's behaviour as well as on the behavioural sensitivity to a recipient's reputation. Our continuum formulation suggests how indirect reciprocity can work beyond the dichotomy between good and bad even in the presence of inhomogeneity, noise, and incomplete information.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Sanghun Lee
- grid.412576.30000 0001 0719 8994Department of Physics, Pukyong National University, Busan, 48513 Korea
| | - Yohsuke Murase
- grid.474693.bRIKEN Center for Computational Science, Kobe, Hyogo 650-0047 Japan
| | - Seung Ki Baek
- grid.412576.30000 0001 0719 8994Department of Physics, Pukyong National University, Busan, 48513 Korea
| |
Collapse
|
15
|
Adherence to public institutions that foster cooperation. Nat Commun 2021; 12:3567. [PMID: 34117236 PMCID: PMC8196024 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-021-23783-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/13/2020] [Accepted: 05/10/2021] [Indexed: 01/30/2023] Open
Abstract
Humans typically consider altruism a moral good and condition their social behavior on the moral reputations of others. Indirect reciprocity explains how social norms and reputations support cooperation: individuals cooperate with others who are considered good. Indirect reciprocity works when an institution monitors and publicly broadcasts moral reputations. Here we develop a theory of adherence to public monitoring in societies where individuals are, at first, independently responsible for evaluating the reputations of their peers. Using a mathematical model, we show that adherence to an institution of moral assessment can evolve and promote cooperation under four different social norms, including norms that previous studies found to perform poorly. We determine how an institution's size and its degree of tolerance towards anti-social behavior affect the rate of cooperation. Public monitoring serves to eliminate disagreements about reputations, which increases cooperation and payoffs, so that adherence evolves by social contagion and remains robust against displacement.
Collapse
|
16
|
Two ways to overcome the three social dilemmas of indirect reciprocity. Sci Rep 2020; 10:16799. [PMID: 33033279 PMCID: PMC7546724 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-020-73564-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/29/2020] [Accepted: 09/17/2020] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is one of the main principles of evolving cooperation in a social dilemma situation. In reciprocity, a positive score is given to cooperative behaviour while a negative score is given to non-cooperative behaviour, and the dilemma is resolved by selectively cooperating only with those with positive scores. However, many studies have shown that non-cooperation with those who have not cooperated also downgrades one's reputation; they have called this situation the scoring dilemma. To address this dilemma, the notion of justified punishments has been considered. The notion of justified punishment allows good individuals who defect against bad co-players to keep their standing. Despite numerous studies on justified punishment, it is unknown whether this solution leads to a new type of dilemma because reputations may be downgraded when the intent of punishment is not correctly communicated. The dilemma of punishment has so far been rarely analysed, and thus, the complete solution of the mechanism for evolving cooperation using the principle of indirect reciprocity has not been found yet. Here, we identify sufficient conditions to overcome each of the three dilemmas including the dilemma of punishment to maintain stable cooperation by using the framework of evolutionary game theory. This condition includes the principle of detecting free riders, which resolves the social dilemma, the principle of justification, which resolves the scoring dilemma, and the principle of generosity, which resolves the dilemma of punishment. A norm that satisfies these principles can stably maintain social cooperation. Our insights may offer a general assessment principle that applies to a wide range of subjects, from individual actions to national decisions.
Collapse
|
17
|
Abstract
Despite the accumulation of research on indirect reciprocity over the past 30 years and the publication of over 100,000 related papers, there are still many issues to be addressed. Here, we look back on the research that has been done on indirect reciprocity and identify the issues that have been resolved and the ones that remain to be resolved. This manuscript introduces indirect reciprocity in the context of the evolution of cooperation, basic models of social dilemma situations, the path taken in the elaboration of mathematical analysis using evolutionary game theory, the discovery of image scoring norms, and the breakthroughs brought about by the analysis of the evolutionary instability of the norms. Moreover, it presents key results obtained by refining the assessment function, resolving the punishment dilemma, and presenting a complete solution to the social dilemma problem. Finally, it discusses the application of indirect reciprocity in various disciplines.
Collapse
|
18
|
Radzvilavicius AL, Stewart AJ, Plotkin JB. Evolution of empathetic moral evaluation. eLife 2019; 8:44269. [PMID: 30964002 PMCID: PMC6488294 DOI: 10.7554/elife.44269] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/10/2018] [Accepted: 03/19/2019] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Social norms can promote cooperation by assigning reputations to individuals based on their past actions. A good reputation indicates that an individual is likely to reciprocate. A large body of research has established norms of moral assessment that promote cooperation, assuming reputations are objective. But without a centralized institution to provide objective evaluation, opinions about an individual’s reputation may differ across a population. In this setting we study the role of empathy–the capacity to form moral evaluations from another person’s perspective. We show that empathy tends to foster cooperation by reducing the rate of unjustified defection. The norms of moral evaluation previously considered most socially beneficial depend on high levels of empathy, whereas different norms maximize social welfare in populations incapable of empathy. Finally, we show that empathy itself can evolve through social contagion. We conclude that a capacity for empathy is a key component for sustaining cooperation in societies. When meerkats have pups, they employ an individual to stand guard and warn the others of potential dangers and predators, putting their own life at risk. What seems like a selfless act is actually a common behavior found throughout the animal kingdom. But rather than acting out of concern for another ones wellbeing, it is considered to be an altruistic behavior towards kin, where an individual sacrifices its own reproductive success for the sake of the reproductive fitness of its entire clan. In human societies, however, people often act altruistically towards unrelated individuals and have developed sophisticated systems of moral evaluation to decide who is worthy of cooperation and likely to reciprocate a favor. In other words, individuals will only help those who have a good reputation for being altruistic themselves. However, for this system to work, reputations need to be public knowledge, and societies need to agree on everyones reputations. But what happens when opinions about an individual's reputation are private and vary across a population? Now, Radzvilavicius et al. wanted to find out whether altruism can emerge when people have different opinions about each others moral reputations. To do so, they used a so-called evolutionary game theory a mathematical description of how strategies change in a population over time. In their model, each individual could decide if they wanted to pay a personal cost to create a benefit for another individual. Each participant decided whether to act altruistically based on the reputation of the recipient; observers could update the individuals reputation based on their behavior. The mathematical model revealed that when people are more empathetic and able to put themselves in someone elses shoes, altruism tends to spread over time. When people take into account different opinions and form moral judgements from another person's perspective, the population can sustain a higher level of cooperation. Moreover, the capacity for taking another person's perspective can itself evolve and remain stable in a population meaning that those individuals who evaluate each other empathetically tend to do better, and empathy spreads through social influence. These findings can help us understand how empathy might have evolved in societies that value reputation as a means of reciprocity. A next step could be to test the theory developed by Radzvilavicius et al. in manipulative experiments, or to compare the theory to field data on reputations and behavior in online interactions.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Joshua B Plotkin
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, United States
| |
Collapse
|
19
|
Hilbe C, Schmid L, Tkadlec J, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2018; 115:12241-12246. [PMID: 30429320 PMCID: PMC6275544 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1810565115] [Citation(s) in RCA: 40] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation based on shared moral systems and individual reputations. It assumes that members of a community routinely observe and assess each other and that they use this information to decide who is good or bad, and who deserves cooperation. When information is transmitted publicly, such that all community members agree on each other's reputation, previous research has highlighted eight crucial moral systems. These "leading-eight" strategies can maintain cooperation and resist invasion by defectors. However, in real populations individuals often hold their own private views of others. Once two individuals disagree about their opinion of some third party, they may also see its subsequent actions in a different light. Their opinions may further diverge over time. Herein, we explore indirect reciprocity when information transmission is private and noisy. We find that in the presence of perception errors, most leading-eight strategies cease to be stable. Even if a leading-eight strategy evolves, cooperation rates may drop considerably when errors are common. Our research highlights the role of reliable information and synchronized reputations to maintain stable moral systems.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Christian Hilbe
- Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria;
| | - Laura Schmid
- Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria
| | - Josef Tkadlec
- Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria
| | | | - Martin A Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138
- Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138
- Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138
| |
Collapse
|
20
|
Okada I, Yamamoto H, Sato Y, Uchida S, Sasaki T. Experimental evidence of selective inattention in reputation-based cooperation. Sci Rep 2018; 8:14813. [PMID: 30287848 PMCID: PMC6172233 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-018-33147-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/18/2018] [Accepted: 09/18/2018] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
Reputation-based cooperation is often observed in modern society. People gain several types of information by assessing others. Among these, the most important information is the actions of people and those of their recipients. However, almost all studies assume that people consider all of the information they receive. This assumption is extreme, and people engaging in reputation-based cooperation may not pay attention to some information, i.e., they may display selective inattention. We demonstrate that subjects’ decision-making in relation to cooperative action depends on the content of the information they receive about their recipients. Our results show that subjects either consider or ignore information depending on the content of that information. When their recipients had cooperated previously, subjects cooperated without considering the information they received. When the recipients had played before with those who had bad reputations, subjects did not use that information, regardless of whether it was disclosed proactively. In other cases, subjects considered information on both the previous actions of recipients and those of the recipients’ own recipients. We found that subjects did not always use the information to make decisions, although they willingly received information about their recipients. This supports the proposition that selective inattention occurs in reputation-based cooperation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Isamu Okada
- Department of Business Administration, Soka University, Tangi 1-236, Hachioji, Tokyo, 192-8577, Japan.
| | - Hitoshi Yamamoto
- Department of Business Administration, Rissho University, Osaki 4-2-16, Shinagawa, Tokyo, 141-8602, Japan
| | - Yoshiki Sato
- The United Graduate School of Education, Tokyo Gakugei University, Nukuikita 4-1-1, Koganei, Tokyo, 184-8501, Japan.,Info Screw Inc., Sakaecho 13-6, Itabashi, Tokyo, 173-0015, Japan
| | - Satoshi Uchida
- Research Center for Ethi-Culture Studies, RINRI Institute, Kioicho 4-5, Chiyoda, Tokyo, 102-8561, Japan
| | - Tatsuya Sasaki
- Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, 1090, Vienna, Austria.,F-power Inc., Roppongi 1-8-7-2F, Minato, Tokyo, 106-0032, Japan
| |
Collapse
|