Recentering neuroscience on behavior: The interface between brain and environment is a privileged level of control of neural activity

Measuring episodic memory and mental time travel: crossing the species gap

Mental time travel is the projection of the mind into the past or future, and relates to experiential aspects of episodic memory, and episodic future thinking. Framing episodic memory and future thinking in this way causes a challenge when studying memory in animals, where demonstration of this mental projection is prevented by the absence of language. However, there is good evidence that non-human animals pass tests of episodic memory that are based on behavioural criteria, meaning a better understanding needs to be had of the relationship between episodic memory and mental time travel. We argue that mental time travel and episodic memory are not synonymous, and that mental time travel is neither a requirement of, nor an irrelevance to, episodic memory. Mental time travel can allow improved behavioural choices based on episodic memory, and work in all species (including humans) should include careful consideration of the behavioural outputs being measured. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Uncovering the determinants of brain functioning, behavior and their interplay in the light of context

Notwithstanding the huge progress in molecular and cellular neuroscience, our ability to understand the brain and develop effective treatments promoting mental health is still limited. This can be partially ascribed to the reductionist, deterministic and mechanistic approaches in neuroscience that struggle with the complexity of the central nervous system. Here, I introduce the Context theory of constrained systems proposing a novel role of contextual factors and genetic, molecular and neural substrates in determining brain functioning and behavior. This theory entails key conceptual implications. First, context is the main driver of behavior and mental states. Second, substrates, from genes to brain areas, have no direct causal link to complex behavioral responses as they can be combined in multiple ways to produce the same response and different responses can impinge on the same substrates. Third, context and biological substrates play distinct roles in determining behavior: context drives behavior, substrates constrain the behavioral repertoire that can be implemented. Fourth, since behavior is the interface between the central nervous system and the environment, it is a privileged level of control and orchestration of brain functioning. Such implications are illustrated through the Kitchen metaphor of the brain. This theoretical framework calls for the revision of key concepts in neuroscience and psychiatry, including causality, specificity and individuality. Moreover, at the clinical level, it proposes treatments inducing behavioral changes through contextual interventions as having the highest impact to reorganize the complexity of the human mind and to achieve a long-lasting improvement in mental health.

Formalising the role of behaviour in neuroscience

We develop a mathematical approach to formally proving that certain neural computations and representations exist based on patterns observed in an organism's behaviour. To illustrate, we provide a simple set of conditions under which an ant's ability to determine how far it is from its nest would logically imply neural structures isomorphic to the natural numbers ℕ . We generalise these results to arbitrary behaviours and representations and show what mathematical characterisation of neural computation and representation is simplest while being maximally predictive of behaviour. We develop this framework in detail using a path integration example, where an organism's ability to search for its nest in the correct location implies representational structures isomorphic to two-dimensional coordinates under addition. We also study a system for processinga n b n strings common in comparative work. Our approach provides an objective way to determine what theory of a physical system is best, addressing a fundamental challenge in neuroscientific inference. These results motivate considering which neurobiological structures have the requisite formal structure and are otherwise physically plausible given relevant physical considerations such as generalisability, information density, thermodynamic stability and energetic cost.

Measuring the replicability of our own research

In the study of transgenic mouse models of neurodevelopmental and neurodegenerative disorders, we use batteries of tests to measure deficits in behaviour and from the results of these tests, we make inferences about the mental states of the mice that we interpret as deficits in "learning", "memory", "anxiety", "depression", etc. This paper discusses the problems of determining whether a particular transgenic mouse is a valid mouse model of disease X, the problem of background strains, and the question of whether our behavioural tests are measuring what we say they are. The problem of the reliability of results is then discussed: are they replicable between labs and can we replicate our results in our own lab? This involves the study of intra- and inter- experimenter reliability. The variables that influence replicability and the importance of conducting a complete behavioural phenotype: sensory, motor, cognitive and social emotional behaviour are discussed. Then the thorny question of failure to replicate is examined: Is it a curse or a blessing? Finally, the role of failure in research and what it tells us about our research paradigms is examined.

A mathematical formula of plasticity: Measuring susceptibility to change in mental health and data science

Plasticity is increasingly recognized as a critical concept in psychiatry and mental health because it allows the reorganization of neural circuits and behavior during the transition from psychopathology to wellbeing. Differences in individual plasticity may explain why therapies, such as psychotherapeutic and environmental interventions, are highly effective in some but not in all patients. Here I propose a mathematical formula to assess plasticity - i.e., the susceptibility to change - to identify, at baseline, which individuals or populations are more likely to modify their behavioral outcome according to therapies or contextual factors. The formula is grounded in the network theory of plasticity so that, when representing a system (e.g., a patient's psychopathology) as a weighed network where the nodes are the system features (e.g., symptoms) and the edges are the connections (i.e., correlations) among them, the network connectivity strength is an inverse measure of the plasticity of the system: the weaker the connectivity, the higher the plasticity and the greater the susceptibility to change. The formula is predicted to be generalizable, measuring plasticity at multiple scales, from the single cell to the whole brain, and can be applied to a wide range of research fields, including neuroscience, psychiatry, ecology, sociology, physics, market and finance.

The brain is not mental! coupling neuronal and immune cellular processing in human organisms

Significant efforts have been made in the past decades to understand how mental and cognitive processes are underpinned by neural mechanisms in the brain. This paper argues that a promising way forward in understanding the nature of human cognition is to zoom out from the prevailing picture focusing on its neural basis. It considers instead how neurons work in tandem with other type of cells (e.g., immune) to subserve biological self-organization and adaptive behavior of the human organism as a whole. We focus specifically on the immune cellular processing as key actor in complementing neuronal processing in achieving successful self-organization and adaptation of the human body in an ever-changing environment. We overview theoretical work and empirical evidence on "basal cognition" challenging the idea that only the neuronal cells in the brain have the exclusive ability to "learn" or "cognize." The focus on cellular rather than neural, brain processing underscores the idea that flexible responses to fluctuations in the environment require a carefully crafted orchestration of multiple cellular and bodily systems at multiple organizational levels of the biological organism. Hence cognition can be seen as a multiscale web of dynamic information processing distributed across a vast array of complex cellular (e.g., neuronal, immune, and others) and network systems, operating across the entire body, and not just in the brain. Ultimately, this paper builds up toward the radical claim that cognition should not be confined to one system alone, namely, the neural system in the brain, no matter how sophisticated the latter notoriously is.

Is information the other face of causation in biological systems?

Is information the other face of causation? This issue cannot be clarified without discussing how these both are related to physical laws, logic, computation, networks, bio-signaling, and the mind-body problem. The relation between information and causation is also intrinsically linked to many other concepts in complex systems theory such as emergence, self-organization, synergy, criticality, and hierarchy, which in turn involve various notions such as observer-dependence, dimensionality reduction, and especially downward causation. A canonical example proposed for downward causation is the collective behavior of the whole system at a macroscale that may affect the behavior of each its member at a microscale. In neuroscience, downward causation is suggested as a strong candidate to account for mental causation (free will). However, this would be possible only on the condition that information might have causal power. After introducing the Causal Equivalence Principle expanding the relativity principle for coarse-grained and fine-grained linear causal chains, and a set-theoretical definition of multiscale nested hierarchy composed of modular ⊂-chains, it is shown that downward causation can be spurious. It emerges only in the eyes of an observer, though, due to information that could not be obtained by "looking" exclusively at the behavior of a system at a microscale. On the other hand, since biological systems are hierarchically organized, this information gain is indicative of how information can be a function of scale in these systems and a prerequisite for scale-dependent emergence of cognition and consciousness in neural networks.

A cultural-ecosocial systems view for psychiatry

While contemporary psychiatry seeks the mechanisms of mental disorders in neurobiology, mental health problems clearly depend on developmental processes of learning and adaptation through ongoing interactions with the social environment. Symptoms or disorders emerge in specific social contexts and involve predicaments that cannot be fully characterized in terms of brain function but require a larger social-ecological view. Causal processes that result in mental health problems can begin anywhere within the extended system of body-person-environment. In particular, individuals' narrative self-construal, culturally mediated interpretations of symptoms and coping strategies as well as the responses of others in the social world contribute to the mechanisms of mental disorders, illness experience, and recovery. In this paper, we outline the conceptual basis and practical implications of a hierarchical ecosocial systems view for an integrative approach to psychiatric theory and practice. The cultural-ecosocial systems view we propose understands mind, brain and person as situated in the social world and as constituted by cultural and self-reflexive processes. This view can be incorporated into a pragmatic approach to clinical assessment and case formulation that characterizes mechanisms of pathology and identifies targets for intervention.

Time moderates the interplay between 5-HTTLPR and stress on depression risk: gene x environment interaction as a dynamic process

The serotonin-transporter-linked promoter region (5-HTTLPR) has been widely investigated as contributing to depression vulnerability. Nevertheless, empirical research provides wide contrasting findings regarding its involvement in the etiopathogenesis of the disorder. Our hypothesis was that such discrepancy can be explained considering time as moderating factor. We explored this hypothesis, exploiting a meta analytic approach. We searched PubMed, PsychoINFO, Scopus and EMBASE databases and 1096 studies were identified and screened, resulting in 22 studies to be included in the meta-analyses. The effect of the 5-HTTLPR x stress interaction on depression risk was found to be moderated by the following temporal factors: the duration of stress (i.e. chronic vs. acute) and the time interval between end of stress and assessment of depression (i.e. within 1 year vs. more than 1 year). When stratifying for the duration of stress, the effect of the 5-HTTLPR x stress interaction emerged only in the case of chronic stress, with a significant subgroup difference (p = 0.004). The stratification according to time interval revealed a significant interaction only for intervals within 1 year, though no difference between subgroups was found. The critical role of time interval clearly emerged when considering only chronic stress: a significant effect of the 5-HTTLPR and stress interaction was confirmed exclusively within 1 year and a significant subgroup difference was found (p = 0.01). These results show that the 5-HTTLPR x stress interaction is a dynamic process, producing different effects at different time points, and indirectly confirm that s-allele carriers are both at higher risk and more capable to recover from depression. Overall, these findings expand the current view of the interplay between 5-HTTLPR and stress adding the temporal dimension, that results in a three-way interaction: gene x environment x time.

Plasticity in mental health: A network theory

Plasticity is the ability to modify brain and behavior, ultimately promoting an amplification of the impact of the context on the individual's mental health. Thus, plasticity is not beneficial per se but its value depends on contextual factors, such as the quality of the living environment. High plasticity is beneficial in a favorable environment, but can be detrimental in adverse conditions, while the opposite applies to low plasticity. Resilience and vulnerability are not univocally associated to high or low plasticity. Consequently, individuals should undergo different preventive and therapeutic strategies according to their plasticity levels and living conditions. Here, an operationalization of plasticity relying on network theory is proposed: the strength of the connection among the network elements defining the individual, such as its symptoms, is a measure of plasticity. This theoretical framework represents a promising tool to investigate research questions related to changes in neural structure and activity and in behavior, and to improve therapeutic strategies for psychiatric disorders, such as major depression.