The ecological dynamics of trumpet improvisation

The nature of music improvisation continues to provide an interesting showcase of the multifaceted and skilful ways we engage with and act within our environments. Improvising musicians are somehow able to generate musical material in real time that adaptively navigates musical situations. In this article I explore the broader aspects of improvised activity-such as our bodily interactions with the instrument and environment-as they relate to improvised music-making. I do so by drawing upon principles from the embodied cognitive sciences, namely ecological and dynamical systems approaches. Firstly, I introduce the concept of affordances to illustrate the bidirectional relationship between improvisor and environment. I then take a dynamical view, exploring the ways that a trumpet player coordinates their body with their instrument and engages with trumpet affordances in order to navigate musical situations. I continue this dynamical view, taking the improviser to be an adaptive system whose behaviours are self-organised responses to a set of constraints. To conclude, I situate my research within the wider 4E approach. I advocate that 'E' approaches, which take seriously the role of the body-instrument-environment relationship, provide an insightful perspective on the nature of improvisation.

A grand unified theory for the unification of physics, life, information and cognition (mind)

The modern scientific world view was built on the incommensurability between cognition (mind) and physics (matter) and later life and physics (the autonomy of biology). Fuelled by Boltzmann's view of the second law of thermodynamics as a 'law of disorder', the idea of 'two opposing rivers', the river of physics 'flowing down' to disorder and the river of life and mind 'flowing up' to higher states of order became a cornerstone of contemporary thinking. The deleterious result of this paradigmatic separation of physics, life and mind has been to considerably incapacitate each by bracketing many of the deepest problems of science, including the very nature of life itself and its cognitive capabilities, outside the theoretical reach of contemporary science. An expanded view of physics, notably the addition of the fourth law of thermodynamics (LMEP), or the law of maximum entropy production, coupled with first law time-translation symmetry, and the self-referencing circularity of the relational ontology of autocatakinetic systems, provides the basis for a grand unified theory unifying physics, life, information and cognition (mind). This dissolves the dysfunctional myth of the two rivers, and solves the previously insoluble problems at the foundations of modern science associated with it. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thermodynamics 2.0: Bridging the natural and social sciences (Part 1)'.

Embodied cognitive morphogenesis as a route to intelligent systems

The embryological view of development is that coordinated gene expression, cellular physics and migration provides the basis for phenotypic complexity. This stands in contrast with the prevailing view of embodied cognition, which claims that informational feedback between organisms and their environment is key to the emergence of intelligent behaviours. We aim to unite these two perspectives as embodied cognitive morphogenesis, in which morphogenetic symmetry breaking produces specialized organismal subsystems which serve as a substrate for the emergence of autonomous behaviours. As embodied cognitive morphogenesis produces fluctuating phenotypic asymmetry and the emergence of information processing subsystems, we observe three distinct properties: acquisition, generativity and transformation. Using a generic organismal agent, such properties are captured through models such as tensegrity networks, differentiation trees and embodied hypernetworks, providing a means to identify the context of various symmetry-breaking events in developmental time. Related concepts that help us define this phenotype further include concepts such as modularity, homeostasis and 4E (embodied, enactive, embedded and extended) cognition. We conclude by considering these autonomous developmental systems as a process called connectogenesis, connecting various parts of the emerged phenotype into an approach useful for the analysis of organisms and the design of bioinspired computational agents.

Understanding mixed and ambiguous emotions - integrating neurophenomenology and literary studies

This commentary makes three suggestions on Willems' neurocognitive model for understanding mixed and ambiguous emotions and morality. First, it proposes that his atheoretical approach risks unwittingly adopting theoretical and conceptual limitations implicit in reigning paradigms and overlooking the need for theoretical impetus and constraints in the development of valid constructs of targeted emotions. Second, it suggests that a dynamical systems approach to emotions provides a fruitful theory and neuro-phenomenology as a corresponding methodology. Lastly, it proposes that Willems' objective would benefit from a more systematic integration of insights from the humanities into the nature and nuances of literary (moral) emotions.

The 4E approach to the human microbiome: Nested interactions between the gut-brain/body system within natural and built environments

The complexity of the human mind and its interaction with the environment is one of the main epistemological debates throughout history. Recent ideas, framed as the 4E perspective to cognition, highlight that human experience depends causally on both cerebral and extracranial processes, but also is embedded in a particular sociomaterial context and is a product of historical accumulation of trajectory changes throughout life. Accordingly, the human microbiome is one of the most intriguing actors modulating brain function and physiology. Here, we present the 4E approach to the Human Microbiome for understanding mental processes from a broader perspective, encompassing one's body physiology and environment throughout their lifespan, interconnected by microbiome community structure and dynamics. We review evidence supporting the approach theoretically and motivates the study of the global set of microbial ecosystem networks encountered by a person across their lifetime (from skin to gut to natural and built environments). We furthermore trace future empirical implementation of the approach. We finally discuss novel research opportunities and clinical interventions aimed toward developing low-cost/high-benefit integrative and personalized bio-psycho-socio-environmental treatments for mental health and including the brain-gut-microbiome axis.

Enacting Media. An Embodied Account of Enculturation Between Neuromediality and New Cognitive Media Theory

This paper argues that the still-emerging paradigm of situated cognition requires a more systematic perspective on media to capture the enculturation of the human mind. By virtue of being media, cultural artifacts present central experiential models of the world for our embodied minds to latch onto. The paper identifies references to external media within embodied, extended, enactive, and predictive approaches to cognition, which remain underdeveloped in terms of the profound impact that media have on our mind. To grasp this impact, I propose an enactive account of media that is based on expansive habits as media-structured, embodied ways of bringing forth meaning and new domains of values. We apply such habits, for instance, when seeing a picture or perceiving a movie. They become established through a process of reciprocal adaptation between media artifacts and organisms and define the range of viable actions within such a media ecology. Within an artifactual habit, we then become attuned to a specific media work (e.g., a TV series, a picture, a text, or even a city) that engages us. Both the plurality of habits and the dynamical adjustments within a habit require a more flexible neural architecture than is addressed by classical cognitive neuroscience. To detail how neural and media processes interlock, I will introduce the concept of neuromediality and discuss radical predictive processing accounts that could contribute to the externalization of the mind by treating media themselves as generative models of the world. After a short primer on general media theory, I discuss media examples in three domains: pictures and moving images; digital media; architecture and the built environment. This discussion demonstrates the need for a new cognitive media theory based on enactive artifactual habits-one that will help us gain perspective on the continuous re-mediation of our mind.

Using mobile brain/body imaging to advance research in arts, health, and related therapeutics

The uses of mobile brain/body imaging (MoBI) are expanding and allow for more direct study of the neurophysiological signals associated with behavior in psychotherapeutic encounters. Neuroaesthetics is concerned with the cognitive and neural basis of art appreciation, and scientific correlations are being made in the field that might help to clarify theories claimed in the creative arts therapies. Yet, most neuroaesthetics studies are confined to the laboratory and do not propose a translation for research methods and clinical applications. The creative arts therapies have a long history of clinical success with various patient populations and will benefit from increased scientific explanation to support intervention strategies. Examining the brain dynamics and motor behaviors that are associated with the higher complex processes involved in artistic expression offers MoBI as a promising instrumentation to move forward in linking ideas from neuroaesthetics to the creative arts therapies. Tracking brain dynamics in association with behavioral change allows for more objective and quantitative physiological monitors to evaluate, and together with subjective patient reports provides insight into the psychological mechanisms of change in treatment. We outline a framework that shows how MoBI can be used to study the effectiveness of creative arts therapy interventions motivated by the 4E approach to cognition with a focus on visual art therapy. The article illuminates how a new partnership among the fields of art therapy, neuroscience, and neuroaesthetics might work together within the 4E/MoBI framework in efforts to advance transdisciplinary research for clinical health populations.

Creativity and Cognition in Extreme Environments: The Space Arts as a Case Study

Humans, like all organisms, have evolved to survive in specific environments, while some elect or are forced to live and work in extreme environments. Understanding cognition as it relates to environmental conditions, we use 4E cognition as a framework to explore creativity in extreme environments. Our paper examines space arts as a case study through the history, present practices, and future possible arts in the context of humans beyond the Kármán boundary of the Earth’s atmosphere. We develop a proposed taxonomy of space arts, based on prior taxonomies, and provide specific exemplars of space art developed by artists in space or for use by astronauts in space. Using examples of space art since the birth of the space age, we discuss (1) how human survival in extreme environments requires investment in the space arts, driven by consideration of various biopsychosocial factors and (2) how new scientific and engineering discoveries; such as the detection of air current patterns with paper airplanes in zero gravity, could be consequences or examples of creative thinking driven by artists in the various types of space art. We conclude by discussing possible benefits of space art, future research applications, and advocate that all space actors, government or private, involve artists in all projects beyond the Kármán Boundary of the Earth’s atmosphere.

Out of our heads: Addiction and psychiatric externalism

In addiction, apparently causally significant phenomena occur at a huge number of levels; addiction is affected by biomedical, neurological, pharmacological, clinical, social, and politico-legal factors, among many others. In such a complex, multifaceted field of inquiry, it seems very unlikely that all the many layers of explanation will prove amenable to any simple or straightforward, reductive analysis; if we are to unify the many different sciences of addiction while respecting their causal autonomy, then, what we are likely to need is an integrative framework. In this paper, we propose the theory of "Externalist" or "4E" - for extended, embodied, embedded, and enactive - cognition, which focuses on the empirical and conceptual centrality of the wider extra-neural environment to cognitive and mental processes, as a candidate for such a framework. We begin in Section 2 by outlining how such a perspective might apply to psychiatry more generally, before turning to some of the ways it can illuminate addiction in particular: Section 3 points to a way of dissolving the classic dichotomy between the "choice model" and "disease model" in the addiction literature; Section 4 shows how 4E concepts can clarify the interplay between the addict's brain and her environment; and Section 5 considers how these insights help to explain the success of some recovery strategies, and may help to inform the development of new ones.

The Enactive Approach to Habits: New Concepts for the Cognitive Science of Bad Habits and Addiction

Habits are the topic of a venerable history of research that extends back to antiquity, yet they were originally disregarded by the cognitive sciences. They started to become the focus of interdisciplinary research in the 1990s, but since then there has been a stalemate between those who approach habits as a kind of bodily automatism or as a kind of mindful action. This implicit mind-body dualism is ready to be overcome with the rise of interest in embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive (4E) cognition. We review the enactive approach and highlight how it moves beyond the traditional stalemate by integrating both autonomy and sense-making into its theory of agency. It defines a habit as an adaptive, precarious, and self-sustaining network of neural, bodily, and interactive processes that generate dynamical sensorimotor patterns. Habits constitute a central source of normativity for the agent. We identify a potential shortcoming of this enactive account with respect to bad habits, since self-maintenance of a habit would always be intrinsically good. Nevertheless, this is only a problem if, following the mainstream perspective on habits, we treat habits as isolated modules. The enactive approach replaces this atomism with a view of habits as constituting an interdependent whole on whose overall viability the individual habits depend. Accordingly, we propose to define a bad habit as one whose expression, while positive for itself, significantly impairs a person's well-being by overruling the expression of other situationally relevant habits. We conclude by considering implications of this concept of bad habit for psychological and psychiatric research, particularly with respect to addiction research.

4E Music Pedagogy and the Principles of Self-Organization

Recent approaches in the cognitive and psychological sciences conceive of mind as an Embodied, Embedded, Extended, and Enactive (or 4E) phenomenon. While this has stimulated important discussions and debates across a vast array of disciplines, its principles, applications, and explanatory power have not yet been properly addressed in the domain of musical development. Accordingly, it remains unclear how the cognitive processes involved in the acquisition of musical skills might be understood through the lenses of this approach, and what this might offer for practical areas like music education. To begin filling this gap, the present contribution aims to explore central aspects of music pedagogy through the lenses of 4E cognitive science. By discussing cross-disciplinary research in music, pedagogy, psychology, and philosophy of mind, we will provide novel insights that may help inspire a richer understanding of what musical learning entails. In doing so, we will develop conceptual bridges between the notion of ‘autopoiesis’ (the property of continuous self-regeneration that characterizes living systems) and the emergent dynamics contributing to the flourishing of one’s musical life. This will reveal important continuities between a number of new teaching approaches and principles of self-organization. In conclusion, we will briefly consider how these conceptual tools align with recent work in interactive cognition and collective music pedagogy, promoting the close collaboration of musicians, pedagogues, and cognitive scientists.

The Clinical Concept of Opioid Addiction Since 1877: Still Wanting After All These Years

In 1877, the psychiatrist Edward Levinstein authored the first monograph on opioid addiction. The prevalence of opioid addiction prior to his publication had risen in several countries including England, France and Germany. He was the first to call it an illness, but doubted that it was a mental illness because the impairment of volition appeared to be restricted to opioid use: it was not pervasive, since it did not extend to other aspects of the individuals' life. While there has been huge progress in understanding the underlying neurobiological mechanisms, there has been little progress in the clinical psychopathology of addiction and in understanding how it relates to these neurobiological mechanisms. A focus on cravings has limited the exploration of other important aspects such as anosognosia and addiction-related behaviors like smuggling opioids into treatment and supporting the continued provision of co-patients. These behaviors are usually considered secondary reactions, but in clinical practice they appear to be central to addiction, indicating that an improved understanding of the complexity of the disorder is needed. We propose to consider an approach that takes into account the embodied, situated, dynamic, and phenomenological aspects of mental processes. Addiction in this context can be conceptualized as a habit, understood as a distributed network of mental, behavioral, and social processes, which not only shapes the addict's perceptions and actions, but also has a tendency to self-maintain. Such an approach may help to develop and integrate psychopathological and neurobiological research and practice of addictions.

4E Cognition and Teleomusicality in Early Infancy

In this paper we explore early musical behaviors through the lenses of the recently emerged "4E" approach to mind, which sees cognitive processes as Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, and Extended. In doing so, we draw from a range of interdisciplinary research, engaging in critical and constructive discussions with both new findings and existing positions. In particular, we refer to observational research by French pedagogue and psychologist François Delalande, who examined infants' first "sound discoveries" and individuated three different musical "conducts" inspired by the "phases of the game" originally postulated by Piaget. Elaborating on such ideas we introduce the notion of "teleomusicality," which describes the goal-directed behaviors infants adopt to explore and play with sounds. This is distinguished from the developmentally earlier "protomusicality," which is based on music-like utterances, movements, and emotionally relevant interactions (e.g., with primary caregivers) that do not entail a primary focus on sound itself. The development from protomusicality to teleomusicality is discussed in terms of an "attentive shift" that occurs between 6 and 10 months of age. This forms the basis of a conceptual framework for early musical development that emphasizes the emergence of exploratory, goal-directed (i.e., sound-oriented), and self-organized musical actions in infancy. In line with this, we provide a preliminary taxonomy of teleomusical processes discussing "Original Teleomusical Acts" (OTAs) and "Constituted Teleomusical Acts" (CTAs). We argue that while OTAs can be easily witnessed in infants' exploratory behaviors, CTAs involve the mastery of more specific and complex goal-directed chains of actions central to musical activity.

Why Brains Are Not Computers, Why Behaviorism Is Not Satanism, and Why Dolphins Are Not Aquatic Apes

Modern psychology has, to all intents and purposes, become synonymous with cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on the idea that the brain is a form of computer, whose job is to take in sensory input, process information, and produce motor output. This places the brain at a remove from both the body and environment and denies the intimate connection that exists between them. As a result, a great injustice is done to both human and nonhuman animals: On the one hand, we fail to recognize the distinctive nature of nonhuman cognition, and on the other hand, we continue to promote a somewhat misleading view of human psychological capacities. Here, I suggest a more mutualistic, embodied, enactive view might allow us to ask more interesting questions about how animals of all kinds come to know their worlds, in ways that avoid the (inevitable) anthropocentric baggage of the cognitivist viewpoint.